Presentism works for relativity as I understand it.
What am I denying?

The only thing I can think of is different rates of time passage measured by two clocks. It's still a physical present anywhere.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/presentism/#RelaPhys

Counterargument is bold in the extreme. It seems to require that we simply overturn the best physics on the basis of metaphysical arguments. Perhaps we could take this line (but it seems a very challenging route. The arguments for presentism (those stated in §2, for instance) look somewhat underpowered when it comes to delivering that result. The way in which counterarguers have typically tried to proceed, then, is by giving independent motivations for rejecting the special theory of relativity (both Crisp 2008 and Monton 2006 may be read as doing this). An interesting way to pursue this project is to argue that STR is to be rejected on scientific grounds, rather than for some purely philosophical reason, suggesting that another scientific theory (Quantum Mechanics, perhaps) requires absolute simultaneity. This is the approach taken by Tooley (1997: 335–71), though in defence of the growing block theory rather than presentism. Nonetheless, the orthodoxy remains strongly opposed to this kind of approach.

Are you saying STR and growing block theory are compatible? No they are not. Whoever was arguing that was wrong. Seems like you left out a lot of context just to give a quote.

The only claim I am making is that presentism isn't compatible with STR. Yes, there is a lot of context to consider.

Okay I did a little deeper look into what you are saying. A Google search says STR and presentism are incompatible. So you have company.

What I'm seeing is a complete ignorance of the past and future existing as physically present brain state. They just haven't developed their philosophy enough. Past and future existing as brain state in the physical present is compatible with presentism. So I'm sticking with what I wrote earlier.

There is a lot to this....

In the physical world we should use presentism

The physical world is the basis for our mental worlds.

In our mental worlds we should use eternalism. (Or growing block if needed).

Philosophy isn't always clear or you have to look closely to see what applies and context.

There is a lot to this....

In the physical world we should use presentism

The physical world is the basis for our mental worlds.

In our mental worlds we should use eternalism.

Philosophy isn't always clear or you have to look closely to see what applies and context. — Mark Nyquist

Being a physicalist monist, the idea of a mental world independent of the physical world doesn't resonate for me.

I recognize that we are apt to have deeply engrained presentist intuitions, and for practical purposes we more often than not make use of a presentist perspective. However there are practical cases where the STR needs to be taken into account, such as GPS technology.

I guess I don't know how to make sense of your statement here.

When two clocks tick at different rates due to STR it doesn't mean the accumulating difference is moving one or the other outside the physical present. From their relative positions they always are in the present. How is presentism lost in any way? Are you mistaking STR with time travel?

They are in a 'present' related to their reference frame, but that is a subjective notion of "present" that breaks down when trying to understand the bigger picture.

And no, I haven't been considering time travel, other than the time travel we are all doing continuously, as far as I can tell.

:D

Was I physical yesterday?

I'm not a committed physicalist, though it's in the territory of my thinking, but I believe if I am physical today then I was physical yesterday. In terms of physicalism, at least, this is a problem for presentism: how or why does physicality not apply to the computer I was typing on yesterday?

Yeah, I would say*, you and the computer you were typing on yesterday have extension along the temporal dimension of spacetime.

* Well, in a philosophy conversation anyway. :wink:

Emergence is a continuous process that appears to be sudden only because the mind reaches a tipping-point of understanding between an old meaning and a new meaning, — Gnomon
As if all emergence results from a tipping point between an old meaning and a new one. — creativesoul

Not necessarily "all" transformations. The quoted phrase was not referring to the physical Emergence, but to how it appears to the observer. The "tipping-point" trope is about an epistemological event in the mind, not a physical occurrence in the world. I assume that most physical emergences (e.g. phase changes) occur unobserved, unremarked, and unrecorded, hence unsurprising. :smile:

Emergence is what's going on when such knowledge is being formed. — creativesoul

Yes, the awareness of physical emergence usually comes as a surprise, due to its suddenness and unexpectedness. The intermediate steps between before & after states of phase change may be masked by "Noise" (chaotic information), giving the appearance of a causal gap. To some observers it may seem to be magical ("presto!"). For example, exponential Cosmic Inflation in 10−33 seconds from nothing to something could be described as a surprising "Phase Transition", or as a "Miracle". :gasp:

Tipping Point in Physics :
In discussions of global change, the term tipping point has been used to describe a variety of phenomena, including the appearance of a positive feedback, reversible phase transitions, phase transitions with hysteresis effects, and bifurcations where the transition is smooth but the future path of the system depends on the noise at a critical point.
https://www.pnas.org/doi/full/10.1073/pnas.0705414105

We're working from very different linguistic frameworks. For one, you're drawing a distinction between minds and the world in such a way that minds are not in the world. On my view, there is no emergence without some physical elemental constituent(s).

We're working from very different linguistic frameworks. For one, you're drawing a distinction between minds and the world in such a way that minds are not in the world. On my view, there is no emergence without some physical elemental constituent(s). — creativesoul

Yes, but an emergent immaterial function (Mind) from a mundane material substrate --- after 10B years of lifelessness & 13B years of mindlessness --- is a novel & unique phenomenon in the evolution of the near-infinite cosmos ; hence worthy of philosophical & linguistic distinction. If the phenomenon of Mind was not in & of this mundane world, I would not be here to talk about it. So, the metaphorical "distinction" is between the clay and the sculpture ; not between this world and one of many alternative universes.

Moreover, it's the job of philosophers to study the software, not the hardware or wet-ware ; the cathedral, not the stones or the scaffolding. Hence, my use of language appropriate for a philosophical forum. I'm sure you can find neurology forums that will use the linguistic framework you prefer. :wink:


Understanding complexity in the human brain
The human mind is a complex phenomenon built on the physical scaffolding of the brain
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3170818/

On my view, there are no purely immaterial things(although I may be able to be pursuaded to see things otherwise). On your view there is. It's a matter of methodological approach. The differences between our two views are so stark that we may not even be talking about the same things despite using the same words.

For example...

When you use the term "mind", what are you referring to such that it does not consist - in part at least - of biological machinery?

The second is that not only do we live in a physical world but that physical explanations are to be preferred to any other sort of explanation — Banno

For my part it's not that a purely physical explanation ought be, or is, preferred, but rather that the explanation and the entities referred to within it ought be made amenable in terms of evolutionary progression to/from purely physical entities.

Assuming monism is true, evolution always happens, and methodological naturalism is the best approach...

...provide a single overall account of how the world works. — Banno

Again, for my part...

Consistency/coherence within and of one's own worldview requires the ability(explanatory power) to provide different but commensurable explanations/accounts regarding how different sorts of more than just physical entities/things emerge.

The problem is that "what constitutes emergence," is deeply tied to metaphysical considerations that lie upstream of the concept, and how dependence is framed. Emergence is an old concept, but it seems many classical formulations of it are dead in the water.

I understand why people think we need emergence. My intuition though, is that a lot of attempts to build a definition of emergence are being built on top of prior assumptions that simply preclude the possibility of such a thing. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Bolding mine

I agree with the overall sentiment of this post. If emergence is a naturally occurring process, then it all boils down to the elemental constituency and existential dependency of the candidate under consideration. We've briefly talked about that in my thread by the same name.

Could you elaborate on some of the prior assumption that preclude the possibility of emergent things/entities? I personally do not find that the notion of emergent property is capable of taking proper account of all emergent things/entities.

On my view, there are no purely immaterial things (although I may be able to be pursuaded to see things otherwise). On your view there is. It's a matter of methodological approach. The differences between our two views are so stark that we may not even be talking about the same things despite using the same words.
For example...
When you use the term "mind", what are you referring to such that it does not consist - in part at least - of biological machinery? — creativesoul

As you implied, we seem to have different vocabularies : e.g. materialistic Scientism & wisdom Philosophy. But, I haven't said anything about "purely immaterial things", yet you seem to interpret the word "Mind" as-if it refers to a Soul or Ghost*1. For the record, I have no experience of a Mind without a Body (ghost). Instead, I define the human Mind as the primary Function of the human Brain. Technically, a "function" is not a thing-in-itself, but a causal relationship between inputs & outputs, as in the information processing of a computer. The biological Brain is a machine, but the psychological Mind is a process, a function : the creation of Meaning.

You may also interpret my use of Aristotelian "metaphysics" in terms of Catholic "theology". Philosophically, the Brain is physical (objective quantifiable matter + energy), but the Mind is meta-physical (subjective qualitative matterless meaning). That's a philosophical distinction --- Quanta vs Qualia --- going back to Aristotle*1. But you may be influenced by the anti-philosophy notion that "Metaphysics" means "religious beliefs". For me, it merely means "non-physical" or "immaterial" (i.e. mental)*2. Can you see or touch an Idea or a Feeling? If not, that's because it's Meta-physical (read -- non-physical). Philosophers don't study material objects, but they do examine the immaterial functions of material brains.

You won't understand my philosophical language from a scientific perspective. But that doesn't mean it's anti-science. Instead, my thesis returns "Science" to the broader meaning of the ancient Greeks : both Physics and Metaphysics. Both Material and Mental. Both Objective Things and Subjective Ideas about Things. The common denominator is Generic Information. Not the empty meaningless 1s & 0s of Shannon's data-containers (registers), but the intellectual content of communication.

Metaphysical Ideas, feelings & beliefs are indeed immaterial, but they are not "pure", because they are inextricably linked to a material substrate. Just as information processing requires a biological or mechanical computer, meaning-making and self-knowing requires an information-processing organ. But Generic Information is both Biology & Life and Brain & Mind. That statement won't make sense without an understanding of General Metaphysics*4 and Generic Information*5.

For philosophical purposes, I do study Mind as a separate topic from Brain. But I've never seen a Ghost walking around without a Body, or a meaningful Mind functioning without a mechanical Brain. Could you be persuaded to view the Mind/Body problem from a Philosophical perspective? :nerd:


*1. Mind/Body Problem :
Philosophers and scientists have long debated the relationship between a physical body and its non-physical properties, such as Life & Mind. Cartesian Dualism resolved the problem temporarily by separating the religious implications of metaphysics (Soul) from the scientific study of physics (Body). But now scientists are beginning to study the mind with their precise instruments, and have found no line of demarcation. So, they see no need for the hypothesis of a spiritual Soul added to the body by God. However, Enformationism resolves the problem by a return to Monism, except that the fundamental substance is meta-physical Information instead of physical Matter.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind%E2%80%93body_problem
https://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page15.html

*2. Special Metaphysics :
The philosophical science of Metaphysics is essential to my worldview, because, unlike Physics, it allows us to study the immaterial aspects of our reality, such as Qualia (properties) and Ideas (meanings).
https://bothandblog2.enformationism.info/page74.html

*3. Physics & Metaphysics :
Two sides of the same coin we call Reality. When we look for matters of fact, we see physics. But when we search for meaning, we find meta-physics. A mental flip is required to view the other side. And imagination is necessary to see both at the same time.
https://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page14.html

*4. General Metaphysics :
“General metaphysics, also referred to as Ontology, is the study of being or existence and is in line with Aristotle’s conception of metaphysics. Special Metaphysics, on the other hand was divided into three disciplines; cosmology, rational psychology, and natural theology. While general metaphysics was concerned with being at a broad, fundamental level, special metaphysics addressed more specific questions concerning existence. Topics addressed within special metaphysics included such things as immortality, freedom of the will, and the mind body problem.”
https://academyofideas.com/2013/06/introduction-to-metaphysics/

*5. Generic Information :
Originally, the word “information” referred to the meaningful software contents of a mind, which were assumed to be only loosely shaped by the physical container : the hardware brain. . . . . So now, Deacon turns the spotlight on the message rather than the medium.
http://bothandblog4.enformationism.info/page26.html

Your number 5 reference (just above here) is interesting. Information, the word, seems to have morphed and diverged a huge amount since it's origin.

Common usage now seems to be an abstraction that has no physical basis so I think the original meaning is more true to physicalism. And the ancient philosophers wouldn't have had the word or the current ideas of what information is. I just think its current usages (the word information) conflict and cause confusion

Thanks for bringing that up. For me, it is relevant to physicalism.

Your number 5 reference (just above here) is interesting. Information, the word, seems to have morphed and diverged a huge amount since it's origin.

Common usage now seems to be an abstraction that has no physical basis so I think the original meaning is more true to physicalism. And the ancient philosophers wouldn't have had the word or the current ideas of what information is. I just think it's current usages (the word information) conflict and cause confusion — Mark Nyquist

Yes. That's why I have to provide my own non-dictionary definitions*1, whenever I mention my Information-centric thesis. After the early 20th century, two terms --- "Information: and "Computer" --- radically changed meanings. Before, both referred to flesh & blood humans*2. After, both terms now refer to abstract Data and bloodless Machines.

Terrence Deacon noted that Shannon chose the wrong word to describe the physical nature of his novel notion of Information*3. Unfortunately, the physical term "Entropy" (negation of energy) is misleading. And the more appropriate term "Negentropy" (negation of the negation of Energy) is still confusing. Yet, it relates mental Information with physical energy. And that is the basis of my Enformationism thesis.

However, as Deacon notes below : "information is neither matter nor energy" in a physical sense. Instead, it is an elemental pre-cursor of both, in the philosophical meaning of Creative & Causal Power (Potential ; power to transform Possible into Actual). In a practical evolutionary sense, Information (EnFormAction) is both causal physical Energy and the Matter formed from its creative power : (E=MC^2). But in an Ontological philosophical sense, Information is the meta-physical contents of a Mind. Those who limit Physics to fundamental Materialism cannot grasp the relation between abstract intangible causal potential and concrete tangible actual stuff. They tend to equate natural mental Metaphysics with supernatural spiritual Ghosts. :nerd:

Note --- Aristotle defined "Potential" as the ultimate source of Actual things. Similar to Plato's notion of Ideal "Form" as the source of all Real Things.

*1. Information :
Knowledge and the ability to know. Technically, it's the ratio of order to disorder, of positive to negative, of knowledge to ignorance. It's measured in degrees of uncertainty. Those ratios are also called "differences". So Gregory Bateson* defined Information as "the difference that makes a difference". The latter distinction refers to "value" or "meaning". Babbage called his prototype computer a "difference engine". Difference is the cause or agent of Change. In Physics it’s called "Thermodynamics" or "Energy". In Sociology it’s called "Conflict".
https://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page11.html

*2. What did it mean to be a human computer?
Before there were actual computers, they were people. At NASA, women had to do all the math and science calculations for aircraft and space missions. From 1935 to 1942 more women began to work at NACA because many men volunteered to be in the war. The women that worked for NASA were often called "Human Computers".
https://digitalcommons.macalester.edu › amst_humanc...

*3. Terrence Deacon on Information :
Deacon introduces a second triad he calls Shannon-Boltzmann-Darwin (Claude, Ludwig, and Charles). He describes it on his Web site www. teleodynamics.com . I would rearrange the first two stages to match his homeodynamic-morphodynamic-teleodynamic triad. This would put Boltzmann first (matter and energy in motion, but both conserved, merely transformed by morphodynamics). A second Shannon stage then adds information (Deacon sees clearly that information is neither matter nor energy); for example, knowledge in an organism's "mind" about the external constraints that its actions can influence. . . .
Confusingly, John von Neumann suggested that Shannon use the word entropy for his measure of information. Then Leon Brillouin coined the term negentropy to describe far-from-equilibrium conditions in the world epitomized by information.
https://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/scientists/deacon/

I always thought Shannon Information was a poor choice of a word. It's a technical specialty that's made a huge impact but isn't good science or philosophy just because of that.

I might sometimes look like I'm defending physicalism or be some how attached to it but I'm not. It just gets us to the point where we do what we do with our brains which really is the interesting part. And not just in philosophy.

Since our brains/minds seem to be capable of believing anything, true or false, having some grounding in the physical basis might keep us from getting off track.

FYI, there's a rather influential book that was published about 20 years ago, Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, Bennett and Hacker. Bennett is a neuroscientist, Hacker a philosophy professor and eminent interpreter of Wittgenstein. I'm never going to read the entire book, which is pretty specialised, but there's a detailed review here. I think their 'mereological fallacy' - the attribution of agency to parts instead of beings - is on the mark.

Since our brains/minds seem to be capable of believing anything, true or false, having some grounding in the physical basis might keep us from getting off track. — Mark Nyquist

I keep saying this, but the problem is that culturally, we've rejected or destroyed many frameworks for thinking about the issue other than the physical. Because metaphysics generally is associated with religion - we've already seen this association made numerous times in this thread - then you're left with only the physical as an explanatory framework.

I'm someone who avoids the word metaphysical.
Maybe I don't use it enough to be comfortable with it. It seems more of a word for academics and like you say might be a negative to some.

Also, I focus on just certain areas of philosophy and try to have a general background.

I'm someone who avoids the word metaphysical. — Mark Nyquist

You're far from alone in that.

Since our brains/minds seem to be capable of believing anything, true or false, having some grounding in the physical basis might keep us from getting off track. — Mark Nyquist

:up:

Here are some highlights on Wayfarer's book reference that I liked:

From Descartes...explanation at the neurophysiological level will be in terms of efficient causation.

Once the Cartesian paradigm took hold, it fell to neuroscientists to work out its implications at the experimental level.

The book is Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, Bennett, Hacker, 2003

The review looked good.

Glad you found it helpful. As said, haven't, and probably won't, read it all - massive book - but the reviews and excerpts I've encountered seem on the mark, and it has been quite an influential book, I believe.

For example:

Francis Crick is one neuroscientist who wants to reduce the mental to the physical. His “astonishing hypothesis” that we are “no more than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules” (Francis Crick, The Astonishing Hypothesis, p. 3 (1995)) is a good example of the sort of explanatory account of human action that Bennett and Hacker reject as metaphysical nonsense.

In the course of reducing the mental to the physical, the normative dimensions of social life are lost. Consider this example. Suppose I place my signature on a document. The act of affixing my signature is accompanied by neural firings in my brain. The neural firings do not “explain” what I have done. In signing my name, I might be signing a check, giving an autograph, witnessing a will or signing a death certificate. In each case the neural firing may well be the same. And yet, the meaning of what I have done in affixing my signature is completely different in each case. These differences are “circumstance dependent,” not merely the product of my neural firings. Neural firings accompany the act of signing but only the circumstances of my signing, including the intention to do so, are the significant factors in explaining what I have done.

This applies equally to a lot of what is written about the so-called 'neural correlates of consciousness'.

Descartes idea of efficient causation is worth taking a look at. Mental circumstance can be traced to brain state but any change in mental circumstance will change brain state. So mental circumstance is driving brain state. It's a difficult idea to explain. Anyone, please take a try at it if you can do better or explain if you think it's something else.

Another related issue is holding true or false ideas.
My view is that it's very possible to hold false ideas without it being the fault of brain biology.
Some could wrongly take the position that false ideas can be traced to failed brain biology.
In practice failing brain biology.and holding false ideas have very different characteristics.

I might be drifting away from physicalism but if you take physicalism as the basis for what exists then these side issues follow.

Deleted. How do I erase this?

I always thought Shannon Information was a poor choice of a word. It's a technical specialty that's made a huge impact but isn't good science or philosophy just because of that.

I might sometimes look like I'm defending physicalism or be some how attached to it but I'm not. It just gets us to the point where we do what we do with our brains which really is the interesting part. And not just in philosophy.

Since our brains/minds seem to be capable of believing anything, true or false, having some grounding in the physical basis might keep us from getting off track. — Mark Nyquist

Shannon was an engineer, not a philosopher. So, he was interested in getting measurable physical results (communication data throughput), not in exploring the metaphysical meaning of his term "Information". That's OK though, others have taken-up that task. My interest in Information was piqued by physicist John A. Wheeler's philosophical concept of "it from bit". Together, these two thinkers gave us new insight in the broader significance of mental ideas, by linking those incorporeal "bits" with real-world changes in material things (its). In other words, en-formation is causation. In my thesis, mental Information (useful knowledge) is merely one of many forms of General Causation, that I call EnFormAction.

If you were a working scientist, Physicalism --- nothing non-physical --- would be an appropriate belief system for your profession. But for philosophical thinkers, there is more to the world than just tangible things (materialism). Philosophy is concerned with non-things like Ideas & Opinions & Beliefs, that can't be dissected with a scalpel, and can't be reduced down to Atoms. Physicalism implies that there is only one way to exist : Reality. But, in his essay The Ligatures of Reason*1, discusses the Ideal existence of "universals", such as number, math & logic. Scientists study particular things, but Philosophers study general & holistic concepts. That approach is what came to be known as "Metaphysics". Literally, "in addition to physical Reality" (i.e. Ideality), not necessarily super-natural, or un-real. Unfortunately, Catholic theology tainted that aspect of Philosophy by association with dubious religious dogma.

So yes, as amateur philosophers, we should be held accountable for the "grounds" of our reasoning. But material Science is not the only valid foundation for philosophical interpretations & conclusions. For non-rational animals, the physical facts may be all they know. But, us rational humans share ideas & opinions that can't be accepted at face-value. Instead, philosophers have developed Logical rules and Rational methods for sifting the grain from the chaff. Whereas, Physics uses Reductive & Deductive means to determine reliable facts, Philosophy uses Holistic & Inductive reasoning to learn what is universally true. Unfortunately, some posters on this forum hold the materialistic worldview of Scientism, which dismisses Metaphysical reasoning as groundless. Instead, I have adopted a BothAnd policy of combining bare Facts with logical Reasons. :smile:


*1. The Ligatures of Reason : logical, not physical, connections
This insight lead me to ponder what it means to say that number and phenomenal objects exist
in different ways. Until this time, it had never occurred to me that there might be different ways of existing; I had thought that things either exist, or they don’t. . . .
But then, I wondered, in what domain or sense do numbers exist? ‘Where’ are numbers? How can they be real? Perhaps, came the thought, they exist in an intelligible domain, of which cognition is an irreducible part,and so, accessible only by reason.
https://medium.com/@jonathan.shearman/the-ligatures-of-reason-66b775d443d1