Counterargument is bold in the extreme. It seems to require that we simply overturn the best physics on the basis of metaphysical arguments. Perhaps we could take this line (but it seems a very challenging route. The arguments for presentism (those stated in §2, for instance) look somewhat underpowered when it comes to delivering that result. The way in which counterarguers have typically tried to proceed, then, is by giving independent motivations for rejecting the special theory of relativity (both Crisp 2008 and Monton 2006 may be read as doing this). An interesting way to pursue this project is to argue that STR is to be rejected on scientific grounds, rather than for some purely philosophical reason, suggesting that another scientific theory (Quantum Mechanics, perhaps) requires absolute simultaneity. This is the approach taken by Tooley (1997: 335–71), though in defence of the growing block theory rather than presentism. Nonetheless, the orthodoxy remains strongly opposed to this kind of approach.
There is a lot to this....
In the physical world we should use presentism
The physical world is the basis for our mental worlds.
In our mental worlds we should use eternalism.
Philosophy isn't always clear or you have to look closely to see what applies and context. — Mark Nyquist
Not necessarily "all" transformations. The quoted phrase was not referring to the physical Emergence, but to how it appears to the observer. The "tipping-point" trope is about an epistemological event in the mind, not a physical occurrence in the world. I assume that most physical emergences (e.g. phase changes) occur unobserved, unremarked, and unrecorded, hence unsurprising. :smile:Emergence is a continuous process that appears to be sudden only because the mind reaches a tipping-point of understanding between an old meaning and a new meaning, — Gnomon
As if all emergence results from a tipping point between an old meaning and a new one. — creativesoul
Yes, the awareness of physical emergence usually comes as a surprise, due to its suddenness and unexpectedness. The intermediate steps between before & after states of phase change may be masked by "Noise" (chaotic information), giving the appearance of a causal gap. To some observers it may seem to be magical ("presto!"). For example, exponential Cosmic Inflation in 10−33 seconds from nothing to something could be described as a surprising "Phase Transition", or as a "Miracle". :gasp:Emergence is what's going on when such knowledge is being formed. — creativesoul
Yes, but an emergent immaterial function (Mind) from a mundane material substrate --- after 10B years of lifelessness & 13B years of mindlessness --- is a novel & unique phenomenon in the evolution of the near-infinite cosmos ; hence worthy of philosophical & linguistic distinction. If the phenomenon of Mind was not in & of this mundane world, I would not be here to talk about it. So, the metaphorical "distinction" is between the clay and the sculpture ; not between this world and one of many alternative universes.We're working from very different linguistic frameworks. For one, you're drawing a distinction between minds and the world in such a way that minds are not in the world. On my view, there is no emergence without some physical elemental constituent(s). — creativesoul
The second is that not only do we live in a physical world but that physical explanations are to be preferred to any other sort of explanation — Banno
...provide a single overall account of how the world works. — Banno
The problem is that "what constitutes emergence," is deeply tied to metaphysical considerations that lie upstream of the concept, and how dependence is framed. Emergence is an old concept, but it seems many classical formulations of it are dead in the water.
I understand why people think we need emergence. My intuition though, is that a lot of attempts to build a definition of emergence are being built on top of prior assumptions that simply preclude the possibility of such a thing. — Count Timothy von Icarus
As you implied, we seem to have different vocabularies : e.g. materialistic Scientism & wisdom Philosophy. But, I haven't said anything about "purely immaterial things", yet you seem to interpret the word "Mind" as-if it refers to a Soul or Ghost*1. For the record, I have no experience of a Mind without a Body (ghost). Instead, I define the human Mind as the primary Function of the human Brain. Technically, a "function" is not a thing-in-itself, but a causal relationship between inputs & outputs, as in the information processing of a computer. The biological Brain is a machine, but the psychological Mind is a process, a function : the creation of Meaning.On my view, there are no purely immaterial things (although I may be able to be pursuaded to see things otherwise). On your view there is. It's a matter of methodological approach. The differences between our two views are so stark that we may not even be talking about the same things despite using the same words.
For example...
When you use the term "mind", what are you referring to such that it does not consist - in part at least - of biological machinery? — creativesoul
Yes. That's why I have to provide my own non-dictionary definitions*1, whenever I mention my Information-centric thesis. After the early 20th century, two terms --- "Information: and "Computer" --- radically changed meanings. Before, both referred to flesh & blood humans*2. After, both terms now refer to abstract Data and bloodless Machines.Your number 5 reference (just above here) is interesting. Information, the word, seems to have morphed and diverged a huge amount since it's origin.
Common usage now seems to be an abstraction that has no physical basis so I think the original meaning is more true to physicalism. And the ancient philosophers wouldn't have had the word or the current ideas of what information is. I just think it's current usages (the word information) conflict and cause confusion — Mark Nyquist
Since our brains/minds seem to be capable of believing anything, true or false, having some grounding in the physical basis might keep us from getting off track. — Mark Nyquist
I'm someone who avoids the word metaphysical. — Mark Nyquist
Since our brains/minds seem to be capable of believing anything, true or false, having some grounding in the physical basis might keep us from getting off track. — Mark Nyquist
Francis Crick is one neuroscientist who wants to reduce the mental to the physical. His “astonishing hypothesis” that we are “no more than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules” (Francis Crick, The Astonishing Hypothesis, p. 3 (1995)) is a good example of the sort of explanatory account of human action that Bennett and Hacker reject as metaphysical nonsense.
In the course of reducing the mental to the physical, the normative dimensions of social life are lost. Consider this example. Suppose I place my signature on a document. The act of affixing my signature is accompanied by neural firings in my brain. The neural firings do not “explain” what I have done. In signing my name, I might be signing a check, giving an autograph, witnessing a will or signing a death certificate. In each case the neural firing may well be the same. And yet, the meaning of what I have done in affixing my signature is completely different in each case. These differences are “circumstance dependent,” not merely the product of my neural firings. Neural firings accompany the act of signing but only the circumstances of my signing, including the intention to do so, are the significant factors in explaining what I have done.
Shannon was an engineer, not a philosopher. So, he was interested in getting measurable physical results (communication data throughput), not in exploring the metaphysical meaning of his term "Information". That's OK though, others have taken-up that task. My interest in Information was piqued by physicist John A. Wheeler's philosophical concept of "it from bit". Together, these two thinkers gave us new insight in the broader significance of mental ideas, by linking those incorporeal "bits" with real-world changes in material things (its). In other words, en-formation is causation. In my thesis, mental Information (useful knowledge) is merely one of many forms of General Causation, that I call EnFormAction.I always thought Shannon Information was a poor choice of a word. It's a technical specialty that's made a huge impact but isn't good science or philosophy just because of that.
I might sometimes look like I'm defending physicalism or be some how attached to it but I'm not. It just gets us to the point where we do what we do with our brains which really is the interesting part. And not just in philosophy.
Since our brains/minds seem to be capable of believing anything, true or false, having some grounding in the physical basis might keep us from getting off track. — Mark Nyquist
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