More on the Meaning of Life

George Fisher

What do We Mean By “The Meaning of Life”?

My last submission to the Forum, “The Meaning of Life” generated a number of comments. That was what I was hoping for. For this essay, I will get a little deeper into the question.

A popular description of the meaning of life is shown by the movie by Monty Python. It is one of my favorite movies. Maybe we should just leave it with Monty Python and go on about our lives, but you know how people are.

The meaning of life can be looked at from several different levels. On the one end there is the selfish view of how it is useful to us. Am I happy, am I successful, do I have a lot of friends, etc.? On the other end it is tied with purpose and causality. Not just my life but what about life in general or human life. Is there a reason why I am, or anyone is.

We pretty soon get into the oldest conundrum in philosophy that the universe exists. There is no reason for existence. In part this is why man has come up with the need for a God. God is the reason I exist. Who knows. Maybe that is correct and all there is. We can just relax and do what God wants us to do. The only problem here is that it is not entirely clear what God wants. Each of the religions on the earth have a slightly different perspective on what God wants. Another problem is that man is a reasoning animal, and this simple belief does not allow for our reasoning.

So, we are back to square one. I guess we just have to accept that existence is. As Descartes said, “I think therefore I am”. As I mentioned before, my background is in mathematics. In mathematics we come up with a set of axioms, that is, statements that are self-evident and cannot be proven. Most people’s experience with this is studying geometry and learning the axioms that Euclid came up with. With numerical questions there are things like Peano’s(1) axioms(2) . Nearly all of mathematics can be derived from his axioms. It would be nice if in philosophy we had a set of axioms, but I am afraid there is not general agreement on this.

Let’s see if we can come up with some general statements that most people would agree to.
1. The universe et.al exists.
2. Life is part of that universe.
3. Man is part of that universe.
4. Man is a sentient life form.
5. As other forms of life, man has certain characteristics.
6. One of man’s characteristics is that he is a reasoning life form.
7. Another of man’s characteristics is that he is a social animal and interacting with other people is a necessary part of his existence.
8.
Can we get anything out of these statements? A necessary part of a fundamental set of statements is that they are complete and consistent. That is, can we generate all that we want from them and are none of them contradictory. These are probably not but let’s work with them for a while.

So now back to our discussion of the higher meaning of life. Is there some reason for the existence of mankind? Is there a reason for my existence?

On the first question I don’t think we can do much better than Aristotle’s statement of God being the first cause. Mankind exists and he is the result of evolution over millions of years in the kingdom of life. As to the second question, I think you were created because of all mankind. You are the result of the process of life. If a frog could think it would propose that the meaning of its existence was propagation of the species. Maybe individual humans are there only to ensure the propagation of the species homo sapiens. If we are just a part of the evolutionary milieu then that is all there is.

That is a dismal thought. Aren’t we more special than that? Looking at the statements above, is number 4, Man is a sentient life form, sufficient to make man special. If it does then that suggest there is more to us. Why would evolution produce a thinking being if there was no purpose in it other than continuation of the species? Could we not have been as successful in the world as a very clever ape? Does our ability to reason contribute to our ability to adapt and thrive on the world in a critical way? That is an open question that I don’t think has been answered yet.

If we are an exception to the evolutionary path of life, why should we be? It does suggest that there is a higher purpose to our existence, but what could it be. It does suggest that there is some force in the universe that is, in very subtle ways, directing the evolution of life. I don’t want to call it intelligent design as that leads to all sorts of other philosophic problems, but what is happening here.

Maybe this is just hubris on our part. Maybe we are just a spec in the evolutionary process of the universe, but a lot of brilliant people have thought about this for the last few thousand years and have not come up with a better theory than some higher being creating all this. This higher force does not have to be a God. It could be some yet undiscovered physical effect that permeates the entire universe.

Maybe it is not obvious but there is another problem here, is the universe infinite in size and time. I have spent some time thinking about infinity and after reading John D. Barrow’s book, The Infinite Book(3) , I can see there are a number of new problems that come up. One can’t be flippant about saying the universe is infinite. If the universe is infinite, then probably the universe is God.

We are getting ourselves all bogged down here. There are too many big questions that we cannot answer. Maybe it is, as several people have suggested, nothing that we can answer so just accept it and go about your life.

On the personal side of the meaning of life, I suspect these questions are a matter for psychologists to talk about. These are matters that you feel about and help you live your very human life. They are not existential questions to be discussed in philosophy.

I know I have not finished talking about all the questions involved but I will offer this bit of thought on the questions. I would welcome all of your ideas. Maybe the one person with the answer is out there. We will see.
-----
(1) Giuseppe Peano 27 August 1858 – 20 April 1932) an Italian mathematician

(2)1. 0 is a natural number.
2. For every natural number x, x = x. That is, equality is reflexive.
3. For all natural numbers x and y, if x = y, then y = x. That is, equality is symmetric.
4. For all natural numbers x, y and z, if x = y and y = z, then x = z. That is, equality is transitive.
5. For all a and b, if b is a natural number and a = b, then a is also a natural number. That is, the natural numbers are closed under equality.
6. For every natural number n, S(n) is a natural number. That is, the natural numbers are closed under S.
7. For all natural numbers m and n, if S(m) = S(n), then m = n. That is, S is an injection.
8. For every natural number n, S(n) = 0 is false. That is, there is no natural number whose successor is 0.

(3) John D. Barrow, The Infinite Book, Pantheon Books, New York, 2005

mentos987

A lot of questions asked and assumptions made here. Is "What do We Mean By “The Meaning of Life”?" what you want us to focus on or was that just a preface?

Outlander

Let’s see if we can come up with some general statements that most people would agree to.
1. The universe et.al exists.
2. Life is part of that universe.
3. Man is part of that universe.
4. Man is a sentient life form.
5. As other forms of life, man has certain characteristics.
6. One of man’s characteristics is that he is a reasoning life form.
7. Another of man’s characteristics is that he is a social animal and interacting with other people is a necessary part of his existence.
8.
Can we get anything out of these statements? A necessary part of a fundamental set of statements is that they are complete and consistent. That is, can we generate all that we want from them and are none of them contradictory. These are probably not but let’s work with them for a while. — George Fisher

I for one love a set of well-defined and descriptive criterion one can agree or unpack numerically!

1.) What is the universe? The thing we see when we go outside at night and look up, invoking the vastness of the stars and other planetary heavenly bodies, or that which is inside ourselves that lets us acknowledge the former?

2.) What is life? Being able to breath, and have said breaths and various Co2/oxygen levels recorded by scientific instrument?

3.) What is man? Why is a monkey not the true man, perhaps we performed some sort of sorcery on the original human and turned him into monkey while doing the same to change our own appearance?

Furthermore, if "that universe" is simply that which is all encompassing by the senses it quickly loses it's literal physical definition and becomes all that simply is or can ever be, here or not..

4.) Assuming you and I, and those traditionally regarded as human are "man", sentient of what? Perhaps we are sentient to that which really matters not and other beings, that we call ghosts are the true sentient beings, only visiting us ever so seldom and by accident.

5.) If you are a man who posted this particular stipulation, redundancy and purposelessness is in fact one of your certain characteristics. Though that only would apply to you.

6.) Reasonability is subjective. It is reasonable for a drunk mentally ill homeless man to jump in front of a train, or attempt to connect a banana to a wall socket. Perhaps you mean, relatively, long term provable, productive reasoning that creates efficiency in what is required? Required by whom?

7.) I've left my baby alone for a few minutes without it randomly bursting into flames so no, social interaction is not "Required" for existence.

8.) You can squeeze blood out of a penny, apparently. Though I haven't had any luck.

--

Ooh, what a delightful thread! Do continue, OP. :yum:

Wayfarer

↪George Fisher

Greetings and thanks for the thoughtful post. Obviously it could be answered in any number of ways, but here I'll just respond with reference to what I consider unique about our historical situation.

I think these kinds of questions have really only been meaningful since maybe the mid-19th century. It would not have occured to anyone, or hardly anyone, that this was a question before that time. Subjects understood themselves in a social role, demarcated by their social class and their religion. Those background factors were assumed by everyone to be true - not only in the Christian West, but in other cultures also. The meaning of life was understood in those terms, and it was simply given, there was hardly the conceptual space to contemplate it. Of course, that may not be true of some exceptional individuals - Giordano Bruno comes to mind, but then his questioning of the accepted 'meta-narrative' so upset the establishment that he was burned at the stake. But to nearly anyone, if you were to ask them 'what is the meaning of life?', I think they would find it very hard to understand and respond, as their meaning was simply a given. They would not know what you were on about.

I think that with the dissolution of the geocentric cosmology and the advent of the scientific revolution there was a corresponding epochal shift in consciousness. The idea that human life might be the consequence of causes that could be understood through science was shockingly novel. As also was the discovery of the real vastness of the Universe and the age of the Earth. It thrust human culture into a completely different context - cf Pascal's 'the appalling vastness of space'. The idea that life could have arisen by chance alone, that there was no afterlife or any inherent reason for existence - these realisations were shattering. That is what gave rise to a great deal of art, literature and philosophy in the 20th Century - importantly, existentialism, from which the sense of 'existential crisis' arose.

I mention this to provide what I consider important historical context. Of course there is plenty more to say, but I'm sure there will be plenty of others to say it. :wink:

Agree-to-Disagree

But to nearly anyone, if you were to ask them 'what is the meaning of life?', I think they would find it very hard to understand and respond, as their meaning was simply a given. — Wayfarer

It is not necessary to know the meaning of life. Because our knowledge is finite it may not even be possible to know the "ultimate" meaning of life. There may not even be an "ultimate" meaning of life.

There may also be many different meanings of life. The answer to the question is subjective and different people may each have an answer which is different.

Wayfarer

↪Agree-to-Disagree

But you might agree that there are more and less meaningful ways to live. And that for many, the lack or loss of meaning is a genuine source of grief.

Count Timothy von Icarus

↪Wayfarer

I think these kinds of questions have really only been meaningful since maybe the mid-19th century. It would not have occured to anyone, or hardly anyone, that this was a question before that time. Subjects understood themselves in a social role, demarcated by their social class and their religion. Those background factors were assumed by everyone to be true - not only in the Christian West, but in other cultures also. The meaning of life was understood in those terms, and it was simply given, there was hardly the conceptual space to contemplate it. Of course, that may not be true of some exceptional individuals - Giordano Bruno comes to mind, but then his questioning of the accepted 'meta-narrative' so upset the establishment that he was burned at the stake. But to nearly anyone, if you were to ask them 'what is the meaning of life?', I think they would find it very hard to understand and respond, as their meaning was simply a given. They would not know what you were on about.

This reminds me of MacIntyre's premise in "After Virtue." He makes a parallel to the sci-fi novel "A Canticle for Leibowitz," where, after the apocalypse, mankind has recovered the language of science, but not the content. Students learn the periodic table, but have no real conception of atomic theory. People make appeals to neutrinos, but have only the faintest ideas about how they fit into a larger theory of physics, and absolutely no idea how the idea was originally empirically grounded.

MacIntyre's point is that this is essentially how we use moral language today. Moral language was developed in a framework where it was essentially universally agreed that man had a purpose: the cultivation of virtue, the contemplation of the Good (God), both fulfilled in the concepts of theosis/diefication.

The old Greek proverb: "count no man happy until he has died," is incoherent in the modern context. Happiness and the good life are disconnected from the original idea of "the Good Life." That is, the term "Good Life," as employed by Saint Augustine wasn't about "being happy and finding meaning," but rather about living the (morally) good life. Meaning and purpose are assumed in "the Good." I mean, it's even hard to make the distinction with our current lexicon.

I don't know if MacIntyre's thesis holds up all the way, because I haven't finished the book, but it seems highly plausible in at least some respects (namely the thesis that emotivism/relativism only make sense in our historical context and aren't universal). I don't think Augustine or Aristotle would understand emotivism. "Well of course people disagree about what is good, that's a direct consequence of their lacking virtue," I would imagine would be the response.

And overall, I think the ancients and medievals had decent reasons for thinking that cultivating virtue and conquering vice went along with meaning, in part because being free to do what ones thinks is truly good seems to be a prerequisite for a meaningful life, even if it can't define it by itself.

180 Proof

Is there some reason for the existence of mankind? — George Fisher

It's soundly reasonable to conclude that there is no "reason for the existence of mankind" but mankind's reasons.

Is there a reason for my existence?

Likewise, it's also soundly reasonable to conclude that there is no reason for "your existence" but your reasons.

Aren’t we more special than that?

All of the extant evidence, contrary to the anxieties of our fragile self-esteem, strongly suggests we are merely different from other natural beings, not "more special" than any them.

Why would evolution produce a thinking being if there was no purpose in it other than continuation of the species?

Your question is premised on an pathetic fallacy, George. "Evolution" is a blind process biologically perpetuated by the "continuation of the species".

Could we not have been as successful in the world as a very clever ape?

H. sapiens were merely that for about 1.8 million years and they're still apes, just a bit more clever for the last two hundred millenia.

Does our ability to reason contribute to our ability to adapt and thrive on the world in a critical way?

If the "ability to reason" were indispensible to the "ability to adapt and thrive", then living things could not have ever evolved. We – our species – would not exist. I assume by "in a critical way" you are referring to culture: no doubt cultural developments – human competence at reasoning – are accumulated artifacts of (varied degrees of) human aptitude for reasoning, which emerged only very recently in human evolution, and possibly as a mere exaptation or spandrel.

If we are an exception to the evolutionary path of life, why should we be?

I'd really appreciate some compelling evidence supporting the proposition that h. sapiens are an "exception" or any more improbable on "the evolutionary path of life" than any other multicellular species. We're not, and that's a brute fact.

addendum to ...
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/861707

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/864393

Count Timothy von Icarus

↪180 Proof

I'd really appreciate some compelling evidence supporting the proposition that h. sapiens are an "exception" or any more improbable on "the evolutionary path of life" than any other multicellular species. We're not, and that's a brute fact.

Caleb Scharf writes a lot of information theoretic interpretations of evolution (and just about everything else really.) One neat idea he has is that of "core algorithms," or "corgs," which he likens to chords in music in that you can make the same chords many different ways. "Heavier than air flight," would be an example. The idea is that there are certain features that can evolve that are very handy, features like flippers, wings, sight, echolocation, etc.

This is a framework for understanding convergent evolution. You can think of evolution as a terraced deep scan of a shifting solution space, and there are peaks around these corgs such that it becomes likely that they will be actualized by some species over enough iterations.

You see many corgs being realized through extremely diverse lineages. Different types of flight get reproduced in different lineages, e.g. the humming bird, unlike other aves, has mastered insects' ability to fly without traveling forwards. Human beings have hit on heavier than air flight with both fixed and rotary wing aircraft, echolocation, sonar, etc., all in a short time. That alone in unique.

Obviously, being vastly more intelligent than other animals has (at least temporarily) been a tremendous reproductive advantage. Humans are clearly special in the sense that culture and technology have allowed us to plow through corgs at a very fast rate. Language, while not totally sui generis, is also fairly unique and enabled this.

And I think it does bring up some decent questions. First, why wasn't this solution hit on earlier? It is very effective.

Second, it doesn't seem completely improbable that man, or some sort of self-modified post-human or synthetic lifeform born of man might make it off this rock. But if that's possible, someone else should have done it first, so where are the ETs? Surely someone else can at least figure out how to use radio broadcasting. That is, the Fermi Paradox would suggest we are sort of special.

We

180 Proof

↪Count Timothy von Icarus

:sweat: Nice try, Count, but not compelling evidence of anything.

Wayfarer

The old Greek proverb: "count no man happy until he has died," is incoherent in the modern context. Happiness and the good life are disconnected from the original idea of "the Good Life." That is, the term "Good Life," as employed by Saint Augustine wasn't about "being happy and finding meaning," but rather about living the (morally) good life. Meaning and purpose are assumed in "the Good." I mean, it's even hard to make the distinction with our current lexicon. — Count Timothy von Icarus

My Indian Philosophy lecturer, Arvind Sharma, noted that when people die in the West, they say he's given up the ghost, while in India, they say he's given up the body.

Agree with your reading of McIntyre, although must confess After Virtue is on my 'must get around to finishing this' list. Interesting that he converted to Catholicism from having been a convinced Marxist. He believes A-T (Aristotelian Thomism) is the only coherent philosophical system in Western culture. I can see why he says that. The point about pre-modern philosophy and religion generally is that it is set against the background of belief in life eternal (or release from Saṃsāra), compared to which the joys and tribulations of worldly life are fleeting and transient. Naturalism is, of course, inimical to such concerns. According to it, we're simply another species (in fact for some on the extreme end of the green left, we ourselves are merely a pestilence.)

Wayfarer

↪George Fisher

I feel compelled to mention the name of John Vervaeke, author of a series of 51 recorded lectures called Awakening from the Meaning Crisis. Vervaeke is a Professor at University of Toronto the departments of psychology, cognitive science, and Buddhist psychology. Those lectures were given over the course of a year and cover a lot of material. More about Vervaeke here and transcriptions and other materials here.

wonderer1

And I think it does bring up some decent questions. First, why wasn't this solution hit on earlier? It is very effective. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'd think a lot of the right factors had to come together. Off the top of my head:

1. Warm blooded for faster and more stable brain performance.
2. A highly social species that could greatly capitalize on language and culture.
3. Bipedal locomotion that freed up forelimbs for carrying things.
4. Hands suitable for tool use.

Those four factors alone would weed out a large majority of all animal species that have ever lived on Earth.

Agree-to-Disagree

But you might agree that there are more and less meaningful ways to live. And that for many, the lack or loss of meaning is a genuine source of grief. — Wayfarer

:up: :100:

180 Proof

↪Wayfarer

If you haven't read him yet, you might find interesting the writings of the naturalist philosopher of mind Owen Flanagan who has studied and appreciates Buddhist meditative practices. I've also previously recommended to you the works of naturalist neurophilosopher (and former Buddhist) Thomas Metzinger but you've never given any indication whether or not you've read him. Btw, Flanagan's writings are much less technical than Metzinger's and more explicitly concerned with ethics. These are two thinkers out of many others who do not find "naturalism inimical" to (philosophical) Buddhism and its "concerns" as you do, Wayf. The naturalistic conjecture of 'user-illusion' (i.e. phenomenal self model or Hume's bundle theory) is quite consistent with the doctrine of anatta (anatman), no? :chin:

Wayfarer

These are two thinkers out of many others who do not find "naturalism inimical" to (philosophical) Buddhism and its "concerns" as you do — 180 Proof

That’s because they’re generally in line with the ‘naturalized epistemology’ attitude. Fine as far as it goes but the Buddha is designated ‘lokuttara’ meaning ‘world-transcending’ which I don’t think can be limited to that framework. But then Metzinger, Stephen Bachelor et al perform a valuable service presenting Buddhist principles to the secular audience. All as part of a bigger picture.

{See https://inquiringmind.com/article/3102_20_bodhi-facing-the-great-divide/ for a ‘modern traditionalist analysis)

180 Proof

↪Wayfarer

:up:

wonderer1

If you haven't read him yet, you might find interesting the writings of the naturalist philosopher of mind Owen Flanagan who has studied and appreciates Buddhist meditative practices. — 180 Proof

Yes, The Problem of the Soul is good.

{See https://inquiringmind.com/article/3102_20_bodhi-facing-the-great-divide/ for a ‘modern traditionalist analysis) — Wayfarer

It looks to me like the article got the following part right:

The weaknesses of Classical Buddhism are typical of other forms of traditional religion. These include a tendency toward complacency, a suspicion of modernity, the identification of cultural forms with essence, and a disposition to doctrinal rigidity. At the popular level, Classical Buddhism often shelves the attitude of critical inquiry that the Buddha himself encouraged in favor of devotional fervor and unquestioning adherence to hallowed doctrinal formulas.

Wayfarer

↪wonderer1

Hey nice cherry pick :up:

wonderer1

Hey nice cherry pick :up: — Wayfarer

Picked especially for you. :grin:

mentos987

↪Vaskane

And here I thought you where trying to be nice :rofl:

Metaphysician Undercover

It's soundly reasonable to conclude that there is no "reason for the existence of mankind" but mankind's reasons.

Is there a reason for my existence?
Likewise, it's also soundly reasonable to conclude that there is no reason for "your existence" but your reasons. — 180 Proof

How could it be "soundly reasonable" that the reason for your existence is your reasons? The intent for a thing is prior in time to the existence of the thing, and in general the cause of a thing is prior in time to the existence of that thing. Therefore the reason for the existence of a thing, as the cause of existence of the thing, is prior in time to the existence of the thing. One's own reasons are an attribute of the individual, therefore dependent on the individual and not prior in time to the individual. It is impossible that your reasons are the reasons for your existence.

Now the supposedly "soundly reasonable" proposition is even more soundly refuted. And the preceding proposition which is also supposedly "soundly reasonable" suffers the same problem.

mentos987

How could it be "soundly reasonable" that the reason for your existence is your reasons? — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't know about "soundly" but, if we have an external "reason" then it may have been "programed" into us and take the form of our own "reasons".

Metaphysician Undercover

I don't know about "soundly" but, if we have an external "reason" then it may have been "programed" into us and take the form of our own "reasons". — mentos987

That's a good point, but you need to be careful with semantics. If the reasons are external, and preprogrammed, it would be incorrect to call them "one's own" reasons. I think that the "reasons" in the form in which they are attributed to the individual, would be distinctly different from the "reasons" which were prior to the individual, so we could not say that these are "the same reasons" in a different form. They would be distinctly different reasons. And if they are by any means "the same reasons", then we cannot attribute them to the individual.

180 Proof

↪Metaphysician Undercover

I actually wrote "soundly reasonable to conclude" referring to us here and now which is a posteriori. Misquoting – partially quoting – only gets you strawmen with which to shadowbox.

mentos987

↪Metaphysician Undercover

Subjectively they would be your own. From the viewpoint of fellow humans, they would be your own.

Metaphysician Undercover

↪180 Proof

Nice try, — 180 Proof

Metaphysician Undercover

Subjectively they would be your own. From the viewpoint of fellow humans, they would be your own. — mentos987

I don't see that. Can you explain?

mentos987

↪Metaphysician Undercover

We could all be puppets playing out a role given to us. But while we live in a world of puppets, we all remain real to each other, and so do our motivations, our "reason".

Not sure it that is less confusing, or more.

Count Timothy von Icarus

↪Metaphysician Undercover

If the reasons are external, and preprogrammed, it would be incorrect to call them "one's own" reasons. I think that the "reasons" in the form in which they are attributed to the individual, would be distinctly different from the "reasons" which were prior to the individual, so we could not say that these are "the same reasons" in a different form. They would be distinctly different reasons. And if they are by any means "the same reasons", then we cannot attribute them to the individual.

It seems to me that in many ancient and medieval ethical systems it would be both. There is on the one hand man's telos, which is internal to man (plural), but determined prior to any individual man. On the other hand, there is free man's own reasons for doing what he does, being who he is etc. The whole reason ethics is difficult is that these two can vary from one another in practice. Man can fail to fulfill his telos and fail to flourish, through his own choices.

The ideal situation is where man's free choice synchs up to mankind's telos. But there is a wrinkle here in that these thinkers were generally not free will libertarians. However, neither were they modern fatalists. Rather, they embrace a certain sort of "classical fatalism." "Character is destiny," Heraclitus says. They embrace the concepts of "fate" and "divine providence," and elucidate the ways in which man is a slave to circumstance, desire, and instinct, and yet allow that man, both individually and as a society, can manage to become more or less free / self-determining. Part of fulfilling man's telos is precisely becoming more self-determining and more "one's self," rather than being a mere effect of external causes. (Modern existentialism recapitulates part of this, while missing crucial elements)

This is why an overflowing love is important in Plato and the Patristics. To hate something to be controlled by it. To be indifferent to something is still to be defined by what one is not. Only love, the identification of the self in the other, allows one to avoid being determined by what is external to personal identity. This translates into a "love of fate," that must accompany the entity that will not be mere effect.

Plato's early-mid works are instructive here. The Phaedo and Republic goes into how man becomes more self-determining by overcoming desire, instinct, and circumstance, a view we also see particularly well elucidated by Saint Paul in Romans 7. For both Paul and Plato, Logos plays an essential role in the resurrection of the "slave to sin," to true personhood. However, in Plato there is also more of a recognition of the ways in which we enable each other's freedom, and in how society can enhance or fail to enhance to fulfillment of man's telos (the Apology and Crito get at this social dimension).

I think the social view moves towards a climax in Eusebius, who has a proto-Hegelian view of how history can act as an engine spurring man on towards the greater fulfillment of human purpose at the world-historical scale. With the medievals, you also start to see the acknowledgement that, while human telos has certain unchanging elements, it is also shaped by the social-historical conditions man finds himself in.

So individual man's reasons are not identical with the the global telos of man. This is precisely because man is not free, and being enslaved to desire, ignorance, and circumstance , man lacks the knowledge and means of fulfilling his purpose. Even modern existentialists seem to recognize the need for some level of self-determination to make life meaningful, although they deny the global telos.

The shift to emotivism is important here. For the existenialist, moral freedom can't be the crowing achievement of man because moral freedom is simply reducible to desire. Due to their focus on the individual, they often lack the same focus on social freedom as well, but not always. Without these, the idea of a telos for mankind does indeed become incoherent and reduce to a single "internal" purpose defined only by the the individual.

↪Wayfarer

Interesting that he converted to Catholicism from having been a convinced Marxist.

Interesting, but not totally surprising. There is this whole huge area of Catholic philosophy that sits sort of free floating from the rest of academic philosophy. It tends to be far more focused on ancient/ medieval philosophy, but unlike secular academic philosophy re ancient/medieval philosophy, it is also intent on updating these for modern times.

This camp does produce a lot of good philosophy. E.g., Nathan Lyons "Signs in the Dust," is the best theory of pansemiosis I've found, and is far more grounded in the natural sciences and much less "heavily continental," than anything else I've seen attempt this sort of thing. Sokolowski's "Phenomenology of the Human Person," a blend of Aristotle and Husserl, that also takes the natural sciences and modern linguistics seriously is another example. It's one of the better articulations of a "(more) direct realism."

Unfortunately, the conversation between these camps seems to mostly go one way ("After Virtue" being an exception), without much back and forth.

Corvus

The meaning of life can be looked at from several different levels. On the one end there is the selfish view of how it is useful to us. Am I happy, am I successful, do I have a lot of friends, etc.? On the other end it is tied with purpose and causality. Not just my life but what about life in general or human life. Is there a reason why I am, or anyone is. — George Fisher

People have different ideas on what life is, and how they want to live their life. But then, there are parts of life which all humans share.

They get born with no choice of their own. They live, and get old. Some die young, and some die old, but eventually and ultimately they all die. This is the common form of life all humans share.

Can life be reflected without reflecting death? Unlikely.

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