That's fair enough, though I do not see how to proceed. This now becomes speculative metaphysics which, to be sure, is fun, but more often than not doesn't lead anywhere.

But keeping something so broad so as to argue that a simple being acts any possible world is nebulous in the extreme.

For sake of a total baseless guess, perhaps it can be said that the simplest possible thing is the cause of everything in the universe, somewhat akin to the singularity in the big bang, but ever simpler.

So, this simple being would thus necessarily be responsible, in an extremely remote and far off manner, for everything that there is.

Aside from this, I can't invent anything else that is intelligible in the least.

I think sums it up rightly here. It just doesn't make sense to think of God as in any way contingent in Thomism, which the "possible worlds" style of analysis seems to do implicitly.

Arguably, there are problems with Thomistic metaphysics "higher up the chain" — problems with the very concept of divine simplicity itself. However, I think that, if we're accepting Thomistic divine simplicity as a given, then there isn't necessarily a problem here "downstream" of that assumption. God only actualizes what God in God's perfect divine freedom actually does actualize. God is above "normal" properties in some sense, in the way that the Plotinian "One" is above the forms of Nous, being a higher Hypostases and the ground of being. Possibilities, to the extent they exist, must exist within God's essence since they are a part of being in the Aristotlean framework being employed re potentiality.

Plantinga has an influential attack on divine simplicity summed up here that is relevant: https://iep.utm.edu/divine-simplicity/#:~:text=Divine%20simplicity%20is%20central%20to,necessary)%20accruing%20to%20his%20nature

But in part, this is resolved by modern Thomists who have embraced Husserl via Edith Stein, resulting in "Thomistic-Personalism." If personhood is ontologically primitive, and God is a person (or three), the attribute question seems less acute since persons can manifest attributes without being those attributes (since they are fundementally persons, not abstract objects). This also seems to help to quell a long term problem between the extremely abstract thinking of some Christians, e.g. Eriugena, Hegel, on the one hand, and the traditions deep focus on personal experience and the particular individual on the other.

Possible worlds are simply a way of saying if God what could be/have been the case.
According to most Christians, including Thomists, it could have been that God created a completely different world or even no world at all.
My question is if God's essence is his existence , how can He end up xiiling to create different things? — Walter

This does not produce the problem you mentioned. If God's intention is to create A, then A is created, and if God's intention is to create B, then B is created. If there was confliction between A and B then God would know this, and not will both. Nowhere is it implied that God would will conflicting things.

Well, I am not saying that God can will conficting things. But God's will to create A cannot be identical to God's will to create B, unless God is not simple or has no control over what He creates.
A Will, no matter what it exactly is, is intrinsic to a person.

@LuckyR

Speaking of human beings... you do understand that each individual human gets to describe their god any way they want to, right?

-@LuckyR

NO!

Well, I am not saying that God can will conficting things. But God's will to create A cannot be identical to God's will to create B, unless God is not simple or has no control over what He creates.
A Will, no matter what it exactly is, is intrinsic to a person. — Walter

I don't understand your point. Let's say that at t1 God wills to create A, and at t2 God wills to create B. We could say that A and B are each a part of God's bigger plan, but I don't think that expressing these as distinct parts denies God's simplicity. It's just a feature of how we describe the situation, as A being something distinct from B, when the truer description would show the whole. Then A being distinct from B is just an artificial separation created by human analysis.

Well, we are not talking about God creating A at t1 and B at t2, we are talking about God creating B instead of A, which, according to most Thomists, is prefectly possible.

Well, you're welcome (for enlightening you to that basic reality).

Well, we are not talking about God creating A at t1 and B at t2, we are talking about God creating B instead of A, which, according to most Thomists, is prefectly possible. — Walter

How is that a problem? God created (or actualized) B, and God did not create (or actualize A). Where's the problem?

Well, God can't actualize A instead of B AND actualize B but not A. Aquinas is clear that God cannot perform contradictions.

God's freedom is that God actualizes exactly what God wants to actualize and nothing else. This doesn't seem like a limit on divine freedom. In the same way that Plantinga shows that "God cannot create a rock God cannot lift," is equivalent to "God can lift all rocks," "God cannot actualize what God hasn't chosen to actualize," seems equivalent with "God only creates what God wants."

The question is: was it possible for God to create B instead of A? The Thomist's answer is yes.

Yes, but is what God's wants to actualize necessary or not? Could God have wanted to actualzie B instad of A?

The question is: was it possible for God to create B instead of A? The Thomist's answer is yes. — Walter

So, how do you perceive this to be a problem? If God had created B instead of A, then there would be B instead of A. How is that a problem for divine simplicity? The fact is that God created the one, and not the other, and if He had created the other, He would have created that one instead. It is never implied that God could actualize (or will) both.

The claim.is that God is identical to God's Will. But if God Wills A, then God is identical to His Will to create A, while if He Wills B, He is identical to His Will to create B.
That means there are two Gods

That means there are two Gods — Walter

As you said, God does not will both A and B, God wills one or the other. Therefore we cannot conclude that there is two Gods.

I would think it follows from this that God is His act to actualize A and hence, A is necessary. That would mean that God does everyting out of necessity. — Walter

But what did God actually do? Do you have any evidence that God had done something?

God is simple and immutable, but He can be red of blue?
The redness or blueness of God is a contingent property. But if God is necessary and simple He is identical to all His properties. But how can a necessary being be identical to a contingent property?

If God exists and He is the creator of this world, then He obviously did something, namely creating this world

If God exists and He is the creator of this world, then — Walter

If you could prove your premise "If~", then it would help clarifying your conclusion "then"~.
Does God exist? Is he the creator of the world? Please prove them.

I don't think God exists.

I don't think God exists. — Walter

I am agnostic, but interested in reading about either positive or negative arguments for the proof of existence.

I am agnostic, but interested in reading about either positive or negative arguments for the proof of existence. — Corvus

Are you confident that arguments can establish whether or not gods exist?

Are you confident that arguments can establish whether or not gods exist? — Tom Storm

They are totally separate matter. My confidence in anything doesn't have any relevance in the arguments.

Yes, they are a separate matter. It's a question I have.

Depending on the arguments, yes it could establish some conclusions on the topic, I would imagine.

God is simple and immutable, but He can be red of blue?
The redness or blueness of God is a contingent property. But if God is necessary and simple He is identical to all His properties. But how can a necessary being be identical to a contingent property? — Walter

You have not been saying that God is red or blue, you have been saying that God can choose to create A or B. The property we are talking about is a property of God, and this is God's will. We are not talking about a property of the thing which God creates, such as if the thing created is red or blue. So the example is not analogous.

It appears like you do not respect a separation between God and the thing which God creates, so that if God creates a thing describable as A, you want to say that A is a property of God. That would be a pantheist way of understanding God, and this is not Thomistic.

I have been talking about God's Will to create A and God's Will to create B.
Are they different or is God's Will to create A the same as God's Will to create B?

If they are different, then they are contingent properties. How can contingent properties be identical to a necessary being?

If they are the same, how can God have control over whether A of B will obtain,?

I have been talking about God's Will to create A and God's Will to create B.
Are they different or is God's Will to create A the same as God's Will to create B? — Walter

I think you are misunderstanding what is meant by "God's Will". The will is the source of action, as the cause. So there is only a will to create A (cause of A) if A is created, and a will to create B (cause of B) if B is created. If A and B are conflicting there cannot be the will to create both.

If they are different, then they are contingent properties. — Walter

They are not properties of God at all. As I said earlier, "God's Will" refers to the property, the Will of God is a property of God. "A", or "B", is what we use to describe what has been created by that will. Our description of what God has Willed is not a description of God's Will.

So. the Will of God is a property of God and this Will of God is the same, whether A of B is created?
And God's action to create A is the very same as God's action to create B?

How can God make sure A is created instead of B?

The doctrine of Divine simplicity, according to which God is absolutely simple, has been out of favour for a while now in both Christian theology and philosophy. It is accused of being inconsistent with the doctrine of the Incarnation (Hughes 1989: 253–64), with that of the Trinity (Moreland and Craig 2003: 586) and of being incoherent in its own right (Plantinga 1980: 46–61)." — Christopher Tomaszewski