Alvin Plantinga’s modal argument for maximal greatness and maximal excellence
  • Iwanttostopphilosophizingbutikant
    6
    Alvin Plantinga’s modal argument for maximal greatness and maximal excellence can be broken down as the following:
    There is a possible world in which maximal greatness is instantiated.
    If there is a possible world in which maximal greatness is instantiated, then a being is maximally great only if it has maximal excellence in every world.
    If a being is maximally great only if it has maximal excellence in every world, then a being has maximal excellence in every world only if it has omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection in every world
    Therefore, if a being has maximal excellence in every world only if it has omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection in every world, then there is an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect being in every world. (2, 3 HS)
    Plantinga’s only concern for his argument is that it can go either ways when it comes to a theist belief or an atheist belief; one could replace exists with not exists–if God exists in one world, he must exist in all worlds and vice versa.
    I disagree with the overall assumptions that God either must exist in all worlds or must not exist in all worlds in the absolute sense. So I object to premise two because of counterfactuals of creaturely freedoms. Counterfactuals of creaturely freedoms pose different scenarios then ascribe truth values to them. The two counterfactuals of creaturely freedoms present are exist (If God is maximally great, he exists in every world) and non-existence (If there is no maximally great being, then they do not exist in every world). Both can be hypothetically true give the circumstances that each possibility is placed within and compared side by side. So, there are worlds in which God exists and there are worlds in which he doesn’t–hypothetically speaking and contingent upon the circumstances of the “worlds” being hypothesized. The real question is what is the context (settings) of the world in which we live? This will help to determine the truth value of the counterfactuals of creaturely freedoms and thus give provide an answer that is not only hypothetically true, but also physically true.
    Iwanttostopphilosophizingbutikant Options
  • Relativist
    2.1k
    ↪Iwanttostopphilosophizingbutikant
    Is it really possible to instantiate "maximal greatness"? That is questionable, and so it is just as reasonable to reject it as it is to accept it.

    One might be tempted to assent to the first premise, because as far as we know, it does not seem impossible. However, this is epistemic possibility (which is subjective, depending on background beliefs) and is not the modlity that is needed - it needs to be metaphysically possible because that is the modality that would have to be associated with "excellence."
    Relativist Options
  • Terrapin Station
    13.8k
    There is a possible world in which maximal greatness is instantiated. — Iwanttostopphilosophizingbutikant

    I already have a couple problems there. First, I'd want to clarify just what he's claiming re possible worlds. If it's some Lewisian nonsense a la possible world realism, then I have a problem with that (obviously).

    Secondly, I have to pretend that "greatness" isn't subjective, with highly varied ideas about just what would constitute it.
    If there is a possible world in which maximal greatness is instantiated, then a being is maximally great only if it has maximal excellence in every world. — Iwanttostopphilosophizingbutikant

    And that just seems like a non-sequitur, with a possibly equivocated usage of "maximally." I'd need to clarify just what "maximally" is supposed to amount to.
    Terrapin Station Options
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