If that were the case, mathematics would be impossible. — Mww

This sounds like you are misunderstanding Mathematics with some empirical or religious subjects. :chin: :roll:
Mathematics and Geometry are A priori subjects, which work in the minds anyway. Kant demonstrated how these subjects work in CPR, but he wasn't deeply concerned with them at all. What Kant was deeply concerned was perception of the transcendental objects, and possibility of the knowledge and experience.

We don’t care as much for that to which pure reason deals, but moreso the mechanisms by which it functions, re: the construction of principles a priori. — Mww

Again, this is a minor point, which no one really cares. The main point is the details in my previous post.

“… Pure reason, then, never applies directly to experience, or to any sensuous object; its object is, on the contrary, the understanding, to the manifold cognition of which it gives a unity à priori by means of conceptions—a unity which may be called rational unity, and which is of a nature very different from that of the unity produced by the understanding….”

(Sigh) — Mww

Again still seems to be missing the point. The really relevant quotes are CPR A758 759 760 / B786 787 788.

Read on.
—————

This is a minor point, which no one really cares. — Corvus

Hence, skepticism and dogmatism in those who don’t.

Crap. Another duplicate post. How does that keep happening?????

This is a minor point, which no one really cares.
— Corvus

Hence, skepticism and dogmatism in those who don’t. — Mww

Dogmatism (of the rationalists = Spinoza, Wolf, Mendelssohn) was what Kant tried to fix.
You were incorrect in telling that Kant was trying to fix Hume's philosophy.

Mitigated academic scepticism is a natural human instinct and good for understanding the world better.

Dogmatism (of the rationalists = Spinoza, Wolf, Mendelssohn) was what Kant tried to fix. — Corvus

And yet, the question was…what caused Kant’s awakening from his dogmatic slumbers, which he allotted to Hume specifically.

Now you wish Kant to be fixing the dogmatism of the rationalists, but the entire reason d’etre of the Critique is aimed at the empiricists in general and Hume in particular, regarding the lack of critical examination of the capabilities and employment of pure reason herself.

Why not say Kant was just as dogmatic as Hume, up until he stopped to think about how that brand of philosophy wasn’t as fulfilling as it should be. So he woke up, from being a dogmatic thinker himself, something similar to the possibility I mentioned four days ago, around the top of pg 13.

So now it’s a matter of figuring out just what dogmatic thinking entails, and from there, why it’s unfulfilling, and lastly, the method by which it could be fixed.

Mitigated academic scepticism is a natural human instinct and good for understanding the world better. — Corvus

No it isn’t. It is forced upon us, by the criticism of pure reason, for without it we are apt to credit the world for that which does not belong naturally to it, can never be found naturally in it, therefore has no business being included in our empirical understanding.

And yet, the question was…what caused Kant’s awakening from his dogmatic slumbers, which he allotted to Hume specifically. — Mww

It has been clearly pointed out in this post.

Now you wish Kant to be fixing the dogmatism of the rationalists, — Mww

That is not my wish, but the officially accepted facts by the most contemporary academics, which turned out to be the same perspective of mine, so I accepted it.

but the entire reason d’etre of the Critique is aimed at the empiricists in general and Hume in particular, regarding the lack of critical examination of the capabilities and employment of pure reason herself. — Mww

I am not sure if this is true. It sounds unfamiliar, diffuse and groundless.

Why not say Kant was just as dogmatic as Hume, up until he stopped to think about how that brand of philosophy wasn’t as fulfilling as it should be. So he woke up, from being a dogmatic thinker himself, something similar to the possibility I mentioned four days ago, around the top of pg 13. — Mww

Why would anyone want to say that? I don't see a point, because it was not the case, and is irrelevant.

So now it’s a matter of figuring out just what dogmatic thinking entails, and from there, why it’s unfulfilling, and lastly, the method by which it could be fixed. — Mww

Dogmatic thinking is also the stubborn minds which refuse to change even after the clear conclusions demonstrated with all the facts, evidences and reasonable arguments.

Mitigated academic scepticism is a natural human instinct and good for understanding the world better.
— Corvus

No it isn’t. It is forced upon us, by the criticism of pure reason, for without it we are apt to credit the world for that which does not belong naturally to it, can never be found naturally in it, therefore has no business being included in our empirical understanding. — Mww

We still will keep on wondering and doubting on the world. It you understand CPR, then of course, you are likely to have the mitigated one. If not, you might have an extreme one.

but the entire reason d’etre of the Critique is aimed at the empiricists in general and Hume in particular particular, regarding the lack of critical examination of the capabilities and employment of pure reason herself.
— Mww
I am not sure if this is true. It sounds unfamiliar, diffuse and groundless. — Corvus

There’s a whole section on it.

“…. To avow an ability to solve all problems and to answer all questions would be a profession certain to convict any philosopher of extravagant boasting and self-conceit, and at once to destroy the confidence that might otherwise have been reposed in him. There are, however, sciences so constituted that every question arising within their sphere must necessarily be capable of receiving an answer from the knowledge already possessed, for the answer must be received from the same sources whence the question arose. In such sciences it is not allowable to excuse ourselves on the plea of necessary and unavoidable ignorance; a solution is absolutely requisite. The rule of right and wrong must help us to the knowledge of what is right or wrong in all possible cases; otherwise, the idea of obligation or duty would be utterly null, for we cannot have any obligation to that which we cannot know. On the other hand, in our investigations of the phenomena of nature, much must remain uncertain, and many questions continue insoluble; because what we know of nature is far from being sufficient to explain all the phenomena that are presented to our observation.

Now the question is: Whether there is in transcendental philosophy any question, relating to an object presented to pure reason, which is unanswerable by this reason; and whether we must regard the subject of the question as quite uncertain, so far as our knowledge extends, and must give it a place among those subjects, of which we have just so much conception as is sufficient to enable us to raise a question—faculty or materials failing us, however, when we attempt an answer.

Now I maintain that, among all speculative cognition, the peculiarity of transcendental philosophy is that there is no question, relating to an object presented to pure reason, which is insoluble by this reason; and that the profession of unavoidable ignorance—the problem being alleged to be beyond the reach of our faculties—cannot free us from the obligation to present a complete and satisfactory answer. For the very conception which enables us to raise the question must give us the power of answering it; inasmuch as the object, as in the case of right and wrong, is not to be discovered out of the conception...”

There’s a whole section on it. — Mww

Could you please add pages or the section numbers (if NKS CPR), and the titles in your quotes? When the quotes are just pasted with the quotation marks only without any information where they came from, it is not clear where you got the quotes from, and many times it is unclear whether if you are just quoting, or saying things from your own mind or whether if you are mixing them up.

“…. To avow an ability to solve all problems and to answer all questions would be a profession certain to convict any philosopher of extravagant boasting and self-conceit, and at once to destroy the confidence that might otherwise have been reposed in him. — Mww

Now the question is: Whether there is in transcendental philosophy any question, relating to an object presented to pure reason, which is unanswerable by this reason; — Mww

Now I maintain that, among all speculative cognition, the peculiarity of transcendental philosophy is that there is no question, — Mww

Could you please select 2 - 3 sentences from your quotes and repost them, which are your main points? There seem to be a number of paragraphs with many unclear sentences in the quotes, which make difficult to clarify in what they are actually trying to say in respect with our discussion.

Kant holds that such representations or ideas cannot be abstracted from experience; they must be the product of careful reflection on the nature of experience.
And what would provide the basis for such ‘careful reflection’ in the absence of an innate grasp of the issue at hand? — Wayfarer

It seems to be no mystery to me. We experience ourselves as causal agents and as being acted upon bodily. We can manipulate things, bend things, break things, variously crush them, smash them, cut them up, etc., etc. We also experience ourselves as acted upon; we can feel the heat of the sun, the wetness and temperature of the rain and the force of the wind on our bodies. We also feel the weighing of gravity, the impact of falls, and the caresses or blows of various objects, including animals and other people.

So, Hume was correct that we don't see the actual operations of causation, we don't see the forces at work, but when our bodies are involved, we can certainly feel them, I don't know if that was the point Kant was making in the quoted passage of course, but all it does take is reflection upon our felt experience to naturally form a notion of causation. I have no doubt animals also have an implicit sense of causation, but it seems most likely that language would be needed to formulate that sense.

What….use my reason to answer your reason’s questions, asked of itself?

Nahhh….I ain’t gonna do that. You’re smart enough, you got the books, use your own reason.

It shouldn’t matter that I don’t detail where the quotes come from, it being tacitly understood, from the thread title, they’re always from CPR. If a greater context, or specific pagination, is desired for a quote, do a search.

All quotes I post are in response to something you’ve said that Kant agrees with or not, as I understand both of you. If I misjudged, it’s on you to inform me as to my mistake.

It seems to be no mystery to me...........Hume was correct that we don't see the actual operations of causation, we don't see the forces at work, but when our bodies are involved, we can certainly feel them........................but all it does take is reflection upon our felt experience to naturally form a notion of causation. — Janus

The mystery is with Kant not Hume

There is no mystery to me with Hume's inductive approach to making sense of experiences, inferring from several particular instances a generalized conclusion. For example, in that if for one hundred consecutive days the sun rose in the east, one can comfortably infer that "the sun rises in the east".

As the IEP article on David Hume: Causation wrote:

Hume shows that experience does not tell us much. Of two events, A and B, we say that A causes B when the two always occur together, that is, are constantly conjoined. Whenever we find A, we also find B, and we have a certainty that this conjunction will continue to happen. Once we realize that “A must bring about B” is tantamount merely to “Due to their constant conjunction, we are psychologically certain that B will follow A”, then we are left with a very weak notion of necessity.

I am sure that even animals have an inductive sense of causation.

Hume is not the problem. Kant is the problem.

@Mww is correct in saying "Now you wish Kant to be fixing the dogmatism of the rationalists, but the entire reason d’etre of the Critique is aimed at the empiricists in general and Hume in particular, regarding the lack of critical examination of the capabilities and employment of pure reason herself."

Within the Critique of Pure Reason, the concept of the synthetic a priori is central.

Intro to CPR, page 6 - He entitles the question of how synthetic a priori judgments are possible the "general problem of pure reason" (B 1 9), and proposes an entirely new science in order to answer it (A IO-16/B 24-30).

How does Kant explain the origin of the a priori? How does Kant explain the origin of the Categories, the pure concepts of the understanding?

I can understand them as being innate within the human as a consequence of life's 3.5 billion years of evolving in synergy with the world. However, this is definitely not Kant's position.

For Kant, we have no innate knowledge:

Intro to CPR - page 6 - Kant agrees with Locke that we have no innate knowledge, that is, no knowledge of any particular propositions implanted in us by God or nature prior to the commencement of our individual experience.

One empirical possibility is we discoverer the Categories from our experiences of the world. Another rational possibility is that we invented the Categories from pure thought independent of any particular experiences of the world. But, Kant categorically denies that they are innate, as if they were implanted in us prior to birth by a Creator.

CPR 168 - If someone still wanted to propose a middle way between the only two, already named ways, namely, that the categories were neither self-thought a priori first principles of our cognition nor drawn from experience, but were rather subjective predispositions for thinking, implanted in us along with our existence by our author in such a way that their use would agree exactly with the laws of nature along which experience runs (a kind of prefonnation-system of pure reason), then (besides the fact that on such a hypothesis no end can be seen to how far one might drive the presupposition of predetermined predispositions for future judgments) this would be decisive against the supposed middle way: that in such a case the categories would lack the necessity that is essential to their concept.

A priori knowledge is knowledge before experience, but this does not entail innate knowledge. All innate knowledge is a priori, but not all a priori knowledge is innate. For example, all knowledge of mathematical propositions is a priori, yet this knowledge is not innate. Kant also did not equate a priori knowledge with innate knowledge.

Whereas Hume's notion of knowledge by induction gives a very weak notion of necessity, Kant's aim in the CPR was to argue for the possibility of a type of knowledge that was both universal and necessary, what Kant called a priori knowledge.

Intro to CPR - page 2 - Yet while he attempted to criticize and limit the scope of traditional metaphysics, Kant also sought to defend against empiricists its underlying claim of the possibility of universal and necessary knowledge - what Kant called a priori knowledge, knowledge originating independently of experience, because no knowledge derived from any particular experience, or a posteriori knowledge, could justify a claim to universal and necessary validity.

Where for Kant is the origin of the a priori

Kant does not believe there are any innate principles or ideas to be found in us, but come from a careful reflection on the nature of our experiences.

From the SEP article on The Historical Controversies Surrounding Innateness

In this respect Kant agrees with Locke that there are no innate principles or ideas to be ‘found’ in us. Both hold that all our ideas have their origin in experience. But Locke thinks that we build these ideas by abstracting from experience and recombining abstracted elements. Kant holds that such representations or ideas cannot be abstracted from experience; they must be the product of careful reflection on the nature of experience.

In understanding how Kant treats knowledge as a priori but not innate, a section from the SEP article of A Priorism in Moral Epistemology may be useful, in that, for Kant, a priori knowledge can be discovered as a result of careful reasoning, both transcendental and deductive.

Kant viewed moral knowledge as fundamentally a priori in the sense that moral knowledge must be the result of careful reasoning (first transcendental, then deductive); one could discover through reason the fundamental moral principle, and then deduce from that principle more specific moral duties. Moore, on the other hand, explicitly rules out reasoning to fundamental moral principles; since these principles are self-evident, Moore denies that there are, properly speaking, any reasons for them. Thus, we find in Moore a distinctively intuitionist account of a priori knowledge, as opposed to Kant’s rationalist account. Moore’s account is intuitionistic because the reason why we believe, and ought to believe, fundamental moral principles is that they are self-evident propositions that appear true to us.

The problem with causation

Any explanation of the origin of necessary and universal a priori knowledge about a world the other side of appearances as phenomena will hit the massive obstacle as pointed out by Aenesidemus. According to Kant, the Categories, including the Category of Causality, only applies to objects of experience, not Things in Themselves as the cause of such appearances. A seemingly unsurmountable problem, reinforced by Schopenhauer, who, although agreeing with Kant that behind every phenomenon is a being-in-itself, said that Kant made the mistake of trying to derive the Thing in Itself from a given representation by laws known a priori, but because a priori cannot lead to anything independent of the phenomena or representation.

Prolegomena 32 - And we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere appearances, confess thereby that they are based upon a thing in itself, though we know not this thing as it is in itself, but only know its appearances, viz., the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something.

How does Kant justify the possibility of the a priori

The SEP article wrote:

Kant holds that such representations or ideas cannot be abstracted from experience; they must be the product of careful reflection on the nature of experience.

How does Kant justify the possibility of an a priori knowledge that is both universal and necessary, if:
i) it is not innate, as if implanted in us prior to birth by our Creator
ii) it has come from a careful reflection on the nature of experience
iii) yet does not suffer from the very weak notion of necessity and universality given by Hume's inductive inferences about the world?
iv) and the Categories, including the Category of Causation, only apply to objects of experience

What….use my reason to answer your reason’s questions, asked of itself?

Nahhh….I ain’t gonna do that. You’re smart enough, you got the books, use your own reason. — Mww

You seem to be missing the point. It is not a matter of intelligence, but matter of a courtesy to add the source information of your quotes. It wouldn't be just you and me using the forum, and reading your posts. There would be many others from all over the world reading your posts. Some would be the students and beginners of Philosophy who would appreciate the added information of the source from the original works of Philosophy for the quotes for their studies and readings.

I am sure also the moderators and members of this forum would like any posters to add the source information of their quotes in their quotes from all published works, be it the originals, commentaries or articles as one of their forum operating policies.

It would be also a courtesy for the late Immanuel Kant, the author of CPR to be acknowledged on the source of his writings whenever you quote them.

It is not a matter of intelligence…. — Corvus

Of course it is:

“….our criticism is the necessary preparation for a thoroughly scientific system of metaphysics which must perform its task entirely à priori, to the complete satisfaction of speculative reason, and must, therefore, be treated, not popularly, but scholastically….”

And my limit on courtesy is nothing more than respect for one and his opinions.

I’ve already respected your intelligence, by surmising you have the capacity to research what you don’t know, or do know but find disagreeable. And if we stick with Kantian metaphysics in its practical sense, me doing your work for you….or any of the members of the audience, however scant their number….is disrespecting myself.
————

….use your own reason.
— Mww
You seem to be missing the point. — Corvus

I’m the one that missed the point? Really?

Using one’s own reason is what everyone has no choice but to do, all else being given.

by surmising you have the capacity to research what you don’t know, or do know but find disagreeable. And if we stick with Kantian metaphysics in its practical sense, me doing your work for you….or any of the members of the audience, however scant their number….is disrespecting myself. — Mww

It is not for me or for my understanding. I did read your posts, and also have referred to various academic publications on the topic, and already have accepted their point of view on the topic.

It was about the other people who might be reading your posts. There were a few times when I was not sure where the quotes were from, or whether you were saying something about some other things or whether you were mixing the quotes with your own writings.

I am now used to it, but the other readers might be unsure on what you are quoting and writing about with no indication where the quotes came from, and what they are about. It was just a suggestion. :)

How does Kant justify the possibility of an a priori knowledge — RussellA

By presupposing it given some general observations, then constructing a theory that supports the presuppositions without contradicting the observations.

“….. it is quite possible (the presupposition) that our empirical knowledge is a compound of that which we receive through impressions (the observation), and that which the faculty of cognition supplies from itself (the theory), an addition which we cannot distinguish from the original element given by sense, till long practice has made us attentive to, and skilful in separating it (the LNC).

Still, regarding long practice and attentive skill….

“…. when we get beyond the bounds of experience, we are of course safe from opposition in that quarter; and the charm of widening the range of our knowledge is so great that, unless we are brought to a standstill by some evident contradiction, we hurry on undoubtingly in our course. This, however, may be avoided, if we are sufficiently cautious in the construction of our fictions, which are not the less fictions on that account….”

….leaves metaphysics a nonetheless purely speculative theory. Even if all the predicates of transcendental philosophy are internally consistent with each other, and coherent as a whole in itself, there is nothing given from it that makes those predicates actually the case, at the expense of other relevant philosophies.

I agree with you in that the way I interpret Kant the a priori is both dependent on and independent of experience. As you say it initially comes, not sui generis, but from a careful reflection on the nature of experience (and of course also becomes culturally established), so in that sense it is dependent on experience. It is independent of experience in that once established it is clear that all possible experience must conform to the a priori categories. So, I'm with you in thinking that the a priori is evolutionarily established.

All well and good; just don’t confuse the nature of experience, with the experience itself.

I agree; the content of experience is endlessly variable, so it is the general character or forms that experience in general takes which is at issue.

As you say it initially comes, not sui generis, but from a careful reflection on the nature of experience (and of course also becomes culturally established), so in that sense it is dependent on experience. It is independent of experience in that once established it is clear that all possible experience must conform to the a priori categories — Janus

This sounds like Hume's position, in that we look at the world, see a particular sunrise on 100 consecutive days and theorise that in general the sun rises in the east. This then becomes an axiom (a statement or proposition which is regarded as being established, accepted, or self-evidently true) that we henceforth live by. It may be that one day the sun doesn't rise in the east, in which case we come up with a different theory and a new axiom. An approach that is only loosely necessary and universal, but in practice, works.

Though it seems to me that Kant is saying something different to Hume, in that we can know certain axioms existent in the world of necessity and universally. The question is, how exactly?

By presupposing it given some general observations, then constructing a theory that supports the presuppositions without contradicting the observations....................Even if all the predicates of transcendental philosophy are internally consistent with each other, and coherent as a whole in itself, there is nothing given from it that makes those predicates actually the case, at the expense of other relevant philosophies. — Mww

Kant and Hume

You are saying that we come up with a theory that we use as long as it corresponds with our experiences and is coherent with the other theories we have.

But this sounds more like Hume than Kant. For Hume, we look at the world, see a particular sunrise on 100 consecutive days and theorise that in general the sun rises in the east. This then becomes an axiom (a statement or proposition which is regarded as being established, accepted, or self-evidently true) that we henceforth live by. It may be that one day the sun doesn't rise in the east, in which case we come up with a different theory and a new axiom. An approach that is only loosely necessary and universal, but in practice, works.

Kant is saying something different to Hume, in that we can know certain axioms existent in the world of necessity and universally. The question is, how exactly?

Quotations

I agree with @Corvus that you should be giving attaching paragraph numbers to your quotes. As I am using a different translation to yours, sometimes it can take me 15 minutes to find the source of your quote.

I am using the Cambridge Edition translated and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W Wood.

I know that the elite heads of universities are allowed to plagiarise, but I don't think us common people are given the same leeway.

the a priori is evolutionarily established. — Janus

So Darwin explains Kant?

So Darwin explains Kant? — Wayfarer

Darwin explains the a priori, not Kant.

In the service of survival though, right?

I agree with Corvus that you should be giving attaching paragraph numbers to your quotes. As I am using a different translation to yours, sometimes it can take me 15 minutes to find the source of your quote. — RussellA

:fire: :100: :up:

I know that the elite heads of universities are allowed to plagiarise, but I don't think us common people are given the same leeway. — RussellA

Regardless whoever they are, quoting the published original works, books, commentaries or articles, without clearly marking or adding the information of the source could be regarded as an act of plagiarism.

In the service of survival though, right? — Wayfarer

Yes. If animals were born with minds empty of any built-in mental content, and had to learn the private subjective feeling of pain from their subsequent experiences, by the time they had learnt to avoid anything painful that threatened their survival, they would already have died out.

From the Wikipedia article on Tabula rasa
Tabula rasa is the idea of individuals being born empty of any built-in mental content, so that all knowledge comes from later perceptions or sensory experiences. This idea is the central view posited in the theory of knowledge known as empiricism. Empiricists disagree with the doctrines of innatism or rationalism, which hold that the mind is born already in possession of certain knowledge or rational capacity.

IE, if an animal species were Empiricists, they would quickly die out.

sometimes it can take me 15 minutes to find the source of your quote. — RussellA

Ooooo….15 whole minutes!!! Time well spent, then, huh?

….plagiarize.…. — RussellA

Hard to call passages bracketed by quotation marks as plagiarized, innit? I think that’s why they’re called “quotation marks”.

Hard to call passages bracketed by quotation marks as plagiarized, innit? — Mww

As the topic is front page news at the moment, it may be worth a post or two.

True, the passage is in quotation marks and we know it is somewhere within an 800 page book, but to locate it requires quite a lot of reading.

From the little I know, it is a complex and subtle subject, complicated by the fact that there is weak plagiarism and strong plagiarism, although both are officially plagiarism

I am sure that I am often guilty of breaking the letter of the law, although try not the break the spirit of the law, in that I have not made it clear which translation of the CPR I am using.

The topic is also complicated by the fact that ten different sources end up giving ten different viewpoints.

However, the site Good academic practice and avoiding plagiarism advises to give the page number of the original, and gives the example:
"Never use the passive, when you can use the active." (Orwell, 1946, p.169)

True, the passage is in quotation marks and we know it is somewhere within an 800 page book….. — RussellA

I shall consider myself vindicated.

….but to locate it requires quite a lot of reading. — RussellA

So on the one hand you’re offput cuz you gotta do some reading, and on the other you’re missing the point that the quote is usually meant to indicate a relation to only that to which it is a response. You don’t need to look it up, if it is understood to be either a correction to or an elaboration on that to which it relates in the discourse.

In the case where a quote is an initial submission for discourse, as opposed to a response in a continuing discourse, there’s no need to look it up at all. Work with what’s given, simple as that, and the burden is on the initiator to append the submission as the discourse requires.

Dunno about yours, but my online Guyer/Wood is not searchable. If yours isn’t either, I’d seriously recommend obtaining a translation that is. And if you already have one…..wtf is the problem???

All that being said, I’m not changing half a century’s worth of writing habits because it’s thought I’m not doing it right. Deal with it or ignore me; I don’t care which.

Though it seems to me that Kant is saying something different to Hume, in that we can know certain axioms existent in the world of necessity and universally. The question is, how exactly? — RussellA

I think we can only know what experience, and reflection on the nature of experience tells us. We can also elaborate and extrapolate from formal rule-based systems like logic, mathematics, chess, Go etc.