He says what appears in your sensibility can be dealt by reason, but what doesn't appear in your sensibility, but what you can think of, are Thing-in-itself. — Corvus

It seems to me that in the section on Refutation of Idealism, Kant does argue that we can use reason to transcend our sensibilities.

B275 - The proof that is demanded must therefore establish that we have experience and not merely imagination of outer things, which cannot be accomplished unless one can prove that even our inner experience, undoubted by Descartes, is possible only under the presupposition of outer experience.

B276 - Theorem - The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me.

B276 - Proof - I am conscious of my existence as determined in time. All time-determination presupposes something persistent in perception. This persistent thing, however, cannot be something in me, since my own existence in time can first be determined only through this persistent thing. Thus the perception of this persistent thing is possible only through a thing outside me and not through the mere representation of a thing outside me. Consequently, the determination of my existence in time is possible only by means of the existence of actual things that I perceive outside myself. Now consciousness in time is necessarily combined with the consciousness of the possibility of this time-determination: Therefore it is also necessarily combined with the existence of the things outside me, as the condition of time-determination; i.e., the consciousness of my own existence is at the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things outside me.

He argues that we can prove using reason the existence of objects in space outside our sensibilities.
===============================================================================

If you really have to brand him what he was, he would more likely had been a transcendental realist. — Corvus

Kant was not a Transcendental Realist. From the SEP article Kant’s Transcendental Idealism

One promising place to begin understanding transcendental idealism is to look at the other philosophical positions from which Kant distinguishes it. In the “Fourth Paralogism”, he distinguishes transcendental idealism from transcendental realism:

Transcendental realism, according to this passage, is the view that objects in space and time exist independently of our experience of them, while transcendental idealism denies this.

Transcendental realism is the common-sense pre-theoretic view that objects in space and time are “things in themselves”, which Kant, of course, denies.
===============================================================================

Now that is Berkeley's immaterial idealism, because you deny the existence in the world, but think they all exist in your mind. — Corvus

As an Indirect Realist, I believe that a mind-independent world exists, which is the Realism part of Indirect Realism.

If it keeps asserting the existence without the objects in empirical reality, it would be a dogmatism. — Corvus

Yeah….one of the things he says I either didn’t bother with, or couldn’t wrap my head around, dunno which….is that he frowns on dogmatism, but grants pure reason is always dogmatic.

Clue is in the definitions, I guess. One’s a method, the other’s a doctrine, maybe. Dunno.

It seems to me that in the section on Refutation of Idealism, Kant does argue that we can use reason to transcend our sensibilities.[/quote — RussellA

He argues that we can prove using reason the existence of objects in space outside our sensibilities. — RussellA

Reason's duty is to tell truth from falsity and warranting judgements. It doesn't get involved in trying to prove external objects as real existence. Our intuition and concepts perceive and know them in the sensibility with immediacy.

Kant was not a Transcendental Realist. From the SEP article Kant’s Transcendental Idealism — RussellA

Kant was a Transcendental Realist in a sense that he propounded that the transcendental objects such as God, Immortality, Soul, Freedom exist in Noumena. It has nothing to do with the physical objects in empirical reality, because they don't belong to Noumena.

As an Indirect Realist, I believe that a mind-independent world exists, which is the Realism part of Indirect Realism. — RussellA

You say the postoffice exists in your mind and also in the world, so you have 2x postoffice when you see 1x postoffice. Is this not a contradiction?

Yeah….one of the things he says I either didn’t bother with, or couldn’t wrap my head around, dunno which….is that he frowns on dogmatism, but grants pure reason is always dogmatic. — Mww

Pure reason knows dogmatism, and usually discerns the antinomies. However, psychology of thinking might go wrong, overriding pure reason. Reason is a slave of passion. Hume woke up Kant from his slumber - remember? :)

Yep, from his dogmatic slumbers. So it depends on what he means by dogmatic, to figure out just what Hume woke him from. Was he slumbering and proper dogmatic criticisms heretofore escaped him, or, was he slumbering in a dogmatic fashion from which Hume disturbed him.

I think one needs a rather extensive understanding of Kant’s knowledge of Hume’s philosophy, and moreso, how Kant tackled what he thought was the very problem Hume took for granted as not being one, re: reason was merely a slave to the passions, and if habit and common sense couldn’t fix it, then there isn’t a fix to be had. Kant understood the problem before his critical period, around 1750 or so, but didn’t proceed to solve it until the first edition of CPR thirty years on.

Therefore I advise you to read Hume while reading Kant.

Ehhhh….been there done that. Got the coke-bottle glasses.

Yep, from his dogmatic slumbers. So it depends on what he means by dogmatic, to figure out just what Hume woke him from. Was he slumbering and proper dogmatic criticisms heretofore escaped him, or, was he slumbering in a dogmatic fashion from which Hume disturbed him. — Mww

I think one needs a rather extensive understanding of Kant’s knowledge of Hume’s philosophy, and moreso, how Kant tackled what he thought was the very problem Hume took for granted as not being one, — Mww

What is your idea on this?

re: reason was merely a slave to the passions, and if habit and common sense couldn’t fix it, then there isn’t a fix to be had. Kant understood the problem before his critical period, around 1750 or so, but didn’t proceed to solve it until the first edition of CPR thirty years on. — Mww

Has Kant succeeded in what he intended to achieve?

What is your idea on this? — Corvus

Ask and ye shall receive, or, be careful what you wish for.

The problem:
“….as the world has never been, and, no doubt, never will be without a system of metaphysics of one kind or another, it is the highest and weightiest concern of philosophy to render it powerless for harm, by closing up the sources of error….”

The solution:
“…. the Critique of Pure Reason (…) will render an important service (…), by substituting the certainty of scientific method for that random groping after results without the guidance of principles, which has hitherto characterized the pursuit of metaphysical studies….”

On the certainty of scientific method:
“….. strict demonstration from sure principles a priori….”

On the groping after results:
“…..dogmatism, that is, the presumption that it is possible to make any progress with a pure cognition (…) according to the principles which reason has long been in the habit of employing without first inquiring in what way and by what right reason has come into the possession of these principles….”

“….This critical science is not opposed to the dogmatic procedure of reason in pure cognition; for pure cognition must always be dogmatic, that is, rest on sure principles a priori. (….) Dogmatism is thus the dogmatic procedure of pure reason without previous criticism of its own powers….”

So the slumber represents the status quo of dogmatism, in which for metaphysics the strict demonstration from sure principles was demonstrated, but the dogmatic slumber awakened from, indicates the absence in dogmatism of the criticism by which those principles used in philosophical procedures, obtain the authority for the demonstrations they perform. Or, which is the same thing, how it is that the demonstrations may or may not follow from the principles, depending on a critical assessment sufficient to justify their use.
—————

Has Kant succeeded in what he intended to achieve? — Corvus

He intended to write a theory of metaphysics complete and consistent in itself, and he certainly considered himself as having achieved that. I think the only relevant measure of success, would be his own.

Ask and ye shall receive, or, be careful what you wish for. — Mww

I was asking exclusively about the part Kant had admitted having been indebted to Hume's awakening his dogmatic slumbers from i.e. exactly what part of Hume's ideas awakened Kant from his dogmatic slumbers?

The problem:
“….as the world has never been, and, no doubt, never will be without a system of metaphysics of one kind or another, it is the highest and weightiest concern of philosophy to render it powerless for harm, by closing up the sources of error….” — Mww

They had Aristotle's Metaphysics for almost 2000 years. What were the problems or deficiencies of Aristotle's Metaphysics did Kant think need to be fixed? Or would it rather be the contemporary of Kant's Metaphysics polluted by Wolff, Leibniz and Spinoza crowds, which Kant wasn't happy with? What did Kant think of the problems of his previous or his contemporary metaphysics were?

On the groping after results:
“…..dogmatism, that is, the presumption that it is possible to make any progress with a pure cognition (…) according to the principles which reason has long been in the habit of employing without first inquiring in what way and by what right reason has come into the possession of these principles….”

“….This critical science is not opposed to the dogmatic procedure of reason in pure cognition; for pure cognition must always be dogmatic, that is, rest on sure principles a priori. (….) Dogmatism is thus the dogmatic procedure of pure reason without previous criticism of its own powers….” — Mww

What do you think "pure cognition" is in detail?

I was asking exclusively about (….) exactly what part of Hume's ideas awakened Kant — Corvus

Didn’t sound that way to me. You didn’t ask about any exact thing. Wouldn’t matter anyway; there wasn’t any one exact thing. I gave what I thought explained the awakening in its most general sense, that being, Hume’s proclivity for philosophical demonstrations without sufficient criticism of the principles used to justify them.

Having advised me to read Hume in conjunction with Kant, I might ask if you’ve done the same. If so, then perhaps, as did I, you might have discerned the important aspect missing from Hume’s philosophy that leaves it at dogmatism, according to Kant, as opposed to his own, which is dogmatic.

Didn’t sound that way to me. You didn’t ask about any exact thing. Wouldn’t matter anyway; there wasn’t any one exact thing. I gave what I thought explained the awakening in its most general sense, that being, Hume’s proclivity for philosophical demonstrations without sufficient criticism of the principles used to justify them. — Mww

My question was from your own points on Hume and Kant.
Recall this?

Yep, from his dogmatic slumbers. So it depends on what he means by dogmatic, to figure out just what Hume woke him from. Was he slumbering and proper dogmatic criticisms heretofore escaped him, or, was he slumbering in a dogmatic fashion from which Hume disturbed him.
— Mww
I think one needs a rather extensive understanding of Kant’s knowledge of Hume’s philosophy, and moreso, how Kant tackled what he thought was the very problem Hume took for granted as not being one,
— Mww
What is your idea on this? — Corvus

Remember this?

Having devised me to read Hume in conjunction with Kant, I might ask if you’ve done the same. If so, then perhaps, as did I, you might have discerned the important aspect missing from Hume’s philosophy that leaves it at dogmatism, according to Kant, as opposed to his own, which is dogmatic. — Mww

Yes, I am reading Hume too. Hume is one of my favourite philosophers. I like his arguments in Treatise.

Recall this?

…..how Kant tackled what he thought was the very problem Hume took for granted as not being one,
— Mww

What is your idea on this? — Corvus

I addressed what Kant thought was the very problem Hume took for granted as not being one, that the critical examination of reason regarding its own powers for the originating and employment of principles, is a necessary prerequisite for philosophical demonstrations. Such was my idea on “this”.

Why Hume didn’t do this, and the ramifications for not doing it, resides in various Kant texts, specifically in CPR, wherein in A you’re supposed to dig it out, but in B Hume is mentioned more often in direct relation to the text, so the distinctions in the two philosophies more readily apparent.

I addressed what Kant thought was the very problem Hume took for granted as not being one, that the critical examination of reason regarding its own powers for the originating and employment of principles, is a necessary prerequisite for philosophical demonstrations. Such was my idea on “this”. — Mww

Hume didn't take anything for granted. He had done his own critical examination regarding its own powers and its capacities and limits in Treatise 1.4.1. Of Scepticism Regard to Reason.

Why Hume didn’t do this, and the ramifications for not doing it, resides in various Kant texts, specifically in CPR, wherein in A you’re supposed to dig it out, but in B Hume is mentioned more often in direct relation to the text, so the distinctions in the two philosophies more readily apparent. — Mww

Hume had done it in his own way, and obviously Kant read it, and that was the part that he took from Hume to launch his own way to investigate and criticise on Pure reason, hence CPR. That is the part of Hume's idea which woke up Kant from his dogmatic slumbers which Kant himself admitted. This was my idea, and I was trying to confirm it was correct. But you seem to have different ideas saying Hume didn't do that, and Kant was trying to fix Hume's problems.

He had done his own critical examination regarding its own powers and its capacities and limits in Treatise 1.4.1. Of Scepticism Regard to Reason. — Corvus

From your reference….

“…. There is no Algebraist nor Mathematician so expert in his science, as to place entire confidence in any truth immediately upon his discovery of it, or regard it as any thing, but a mere probability….”

….we see the problem writ large. Math is that science by which reliability and certainty is given, and thereby should hardly be considered a mere probability. Hume didn’t grasp how it is that the human mind can originate necessary truths on its own accord, without be subsidized by experience. So if one wishes to say Hume had his own critical examinations, which he did, some additional explanation is necessary for why such examinations were not sufficient for mathematical certainty.

Hume took for granted pure reason could not provide the principles necessary to make math more than mere probability. If you prefer, we could just say Hume was skeptical reason could so provide, but if so, we must also admit he was skeptical to the point of denying the possibility, which just is to take it for granted it could not. And, of course, in the next section, he carried this skepticism over to the existence of the body, and the continued/distinct dichotomy of the operation of the senses regarding the existence of any object.

From your reference….

“…. There is no Algebraist nor Mathematician so expert in his science, as to place entire confidence in any truth immediately upon his discovery of it, or regard it as any thing, but a mere probability….” — Mww

Where is that quote from?

Hume took for granted pure reason could not provide the principles necessary to make math more than mere probability. If you prefer, we could just say Hume was skeptical reason could so provide, but if so, we must also admit he was skeptical to the point of denying the possibility, which just is to take it for granted they could not. — Mww

Hume divides Reason into two different types. One is for Relations of Ideas, and Matters of Fact.
The former deals with Geometry, Algebra, Arithmetic, and in short, every affirmation, which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain.

The 2nd type is Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not ascertained in the same manner; nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing.

"ALL the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, Relations of Ideas and Matters of Fact. Of the first kind are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic; and in short, every affirmation, which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain. That the square of the hypothenuse is equal to the square of the two sides, is a proposition, which expresses a relation between these figures. That three times five is equal to the half of thirty, expresses a relation between these numbers. Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere opera-tion of thought, without dependence on what is any where existent in the universe. Though there never were a circle or triangle in nature, the truths, demonstrated by EUCLID, would for ever retain their certainty and evidence.

Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not ascertained in the same manner; nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible;t because it can never imply a con-tradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and dis-tinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality. That the sun will not rise to-morrow is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more con-tradiction, than the affirmation, that it will rise. We should in vain, there-fore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood. Were it demonstratively false, it would imply a contradiction, and could never be distinctly conceived by the mind. " - Enquiries (4.1.20)

Where is that quote from? — Corvus

As I said….your reference: Treatise on Human Nature 1.4.1., Of Scepticism Regard to Reason, although it should read…scepticism with regard to reason.
————-

Now I see you’ve switched to E.C.H.U. And “demonstrably” certain is the very criteria of experience. So yes, Euclidean figures are demonstrably certain in their relations, but it does not follow from the demonstrations, that the relations themselves are given by them.

As I said….your reference: Treatise on Human Nature 1.4.1., Of Scepticism Regard to Reason, although it should read…scepticism with regard to reason. — Mww

OK, I see it. I would interpret the quote "

“…. There is no Algebraist nor Mathematician so expert in his science, as to place entire confidence in any truth immediately upon his discovery of it, or regard it as any thing, but a mere probability….” — Mww

in his science must be, the empirical science, not Mathematics or Geometry. He seems to be talking about the Mathematicians cannot have confidence in the empirical scientific observations and theories at first, but they feel what they discover are mere probability. It can't be Mathematics or Geometry knowledge Hume was talking about. Because Hume acknowledges Reasoning on Relations of Ideas are "which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain."

Now I see you’ve switched to E.C.H.U. And “demonstrably” certain is the very criteria of experience. So yes, Euclidean figures are demonstrably certain in their relations, but it does not follow from the demonstrations, that the relations themselves are given by them. — Mww

Yes, we must look at both Enquiries and Treatise at the same time when reading Hume.

Anyway, it shows you that Hume's reason is not just one sided all probability affairs. There wasn't anything that Kant could have fixed in CPR, was there?

It can't be Mathematics or Geometry knowledge Hume was talking about. — Corvus

“….Algebraist nor Mathematician so expert in his science…”

What science would a mathematician be an expert in, if not mathematical science?
————

There wasn't anything that Kant could have fixed in CPR, was there? — Corvus

Kant fixed….

Reasoning on Relations of Ideas are "which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain." — Corvus

…..Hume’s reasoning on relations of ideas as empirical, indicated by “intuitive or demonstrable”, which indicates phenomena, to transcendental, which is merely logical, insofar as the relations of ideas is not at all phenomenal.

There’s a section in CPR where the meaning of idea is returned to the ancients, Plato in particular. So I guess Kant fixed….or at least changed…. Hume’s meaning of idea in order to change the reasoning on their relations.

What science would a mathematician be an expert in, if not mathematical science? — Mww

Mathematics is its own subject. No one calls Mathematics Science. It would be like saying Poetry is Science. Science is for the natural science, which deals with the phenomenon and objects in the empirical world.

Kant fixed….or at least changed…. Hume’s meaning of idea in order to change the reasoning on their relations. — Mww

In that case, why would Kant had said that Hume woke him up from the dogmatic slumbers? Something doesn't sound quite right here.

why would Kant had said that Hume woke him from the dogmatic slumbers? Something doesn't sound quite right here. — Corvus

According to Kant, because Hume used the word ideas, as an example, without proper criticism of the principle by which the conception connects to his use of it. As the lesser of the two “perceptions of the mind”, in Hume ideas are thoughts, which are hardly a lesser, and aren’t even perceptions at all.

He could have said ideas are objects of the mind, but he couldn’t intermingle the object of empiricism with object of the intellect. Kant did just that, by putting the concept “idea” back where the Greeks had it, turning it into an object of reason, which makes its relations transcendental, and not intuitive or demonstrable.
————-

To call math a science just means math follows the strictest of procedures, always consistently repeatable, always with the same result for each of its operations, and never false if properly followed.

In that case, why would Kant had said that Hume woke him up from the dogmatic slumbers? — Corvus

My interpretation is because of the challenge Hume posed to the natural assumption that events are causally related. Hume cast doubt on that by saying that causal relationships are grounded in nothing more than repeated observations - that because we observe the relationship of A and B, we say that A causes B, when in reality we're simply observing a constant conjunction of occurences. We can't say we know that A causes B, because we can't actually observe the precise nature of such causation, and also because it's not an analytic relationship, that is to say that it is not true as a matter of logical necessity.

Kant's answer to Hume required rethinking the basis of human knowledge and understanding, which is the task of his critical philosophy. He argued that our minds play a fundamental role in shaping our experience of the world. According to Kant, certain concepts, like causation, are not derived from experience but are rather innate to the human mind (remember, Hume and the other empiricists denied innate capacities). These categories (adapted from Aristotle) provide the framework for the interpretation of experiences, making empirical knowledge and objective understanding possible.

In Kant's view, Hume was correct in asserting that knowledge of causation (and other concepts) cannot be derived from sensory experience alone. However, Kant argued that this kind of insight is instead a precondition of experience. For Kant, the mind actively organizes and synthesizes sensory data according to these categories, which include causality, time, and space. This synthesis allows us to perceive the world in a coherent, consistent manner. Kant thus showed that the empiricist idea of the mind as a 'blank slate' (tabula rasa) was self-contradictory - if it were truly thus, they would not be able to form coherent sentences! (That's me, not Kant :-) )

Thus, Kant's answer to Hume was to argue that while our knowledge is grounded against experience, the fundamental structure of knowledge relies on innate capacities of the mind.

According to Kant, certain concepts, like causation, are not derived from experience but are rather innate to the human mind (remember, Hume and the other empiricists denied innate capacities) — Wayfarer

This is debated. For example "Several scholars take Kant's statement at face value. They claim that Kant did not endorse concept innatism, that the categories are not innate concepts and that Kant's views on innateness are significantly different from Leibniz's."
(Alberto Vanzo - Leibniz on Innate Ideas and Kant on the Origin of the Categories)

From the SEP - The Historical Controversies Surrounding Innateness

But the Lockean Empiricist approach carried the day, and innateness was written off as a backward and discredited view. Nineteenth century Kantianism, although potentially friendlier to innateness, left it on the sidelines as philosophically irrelevant.

He is certainly not an Empiricist; he sees his philosophy as a response to the challenge of Humean Empiricism. Nevertheless, he is critical of Rationalist versions of the Innateness doctrine at every turn.

Kant’s main complaint against Rationalist Nativism was that it accepted that the innate had to correspond to an independent reality, but it could not explain how we could establish such a correspondence or use it to account for the full range of our knowledge. In this, it failed to meet Hume’s challenge. Kant finds the position guilty of a number of related fatal errors.

1) Warrant. How can we establish that innate principles are true of the world? In the Prolegomena he criticizes the Innateness doctrine of his contemporary Crusius because even if a benevolent non-deceiving God was the source of the innate principles, we have no way to reliably determine which candidate principles are innate and which may pass as such (for some).
2) Psychologism. At times Kant seems to suggest that the psychologism of Rationalist Nativism is itself a problem and makes it impossible to explain how we can get knowledge of objective necessary connections (as opposed to subjective necessities).
3) Modal concepts. Callanan 2013 reads Kant as offering a Hume-style argument that Rationalist Nativism cannot explain how we could come to have a concept of objective necessity, if all we had were innate psychological principles.

In this respect Kant agrees with Locke that there are no innate principles or ideas to be ‘found’ in us. Both hold that all our ideas have their origin in experience. But Locke thinks that we build these ideas by abstracting from experience and recombining abstracted elements. Kant holds that such representations or ideas cannot be abstracted from experience; they must be the product of careful reflection on the nature of experience.

I can understand the a priori as part of the innate structure of the brain, but I don't understand Kant's a priori as a product of careful reflection on the nature of experience.

Kant holds that such representations or ideas cannot be abstracted from experience; they must be the product of careful reflection on the nature of experience.

And what would provide the basis for such ‘careful reflection’ in the absence of an innate grasp of the issue at hand?

And what would provide the basis for such ‘careful reflection’ in the absence of an innate grasp of the issue at hand? — Wayfarer

It's a mystery to me, but that seems to be Kant's position.

It's a mystery to me — RussellA

That does not constitute an argument.

That does not constitute an argument. — Wayfarer

True. It's not intended to constitute an argument, more a statement of fact.

In the same way that your statement "Thus, Kant's answer to Hume was to argue that while our knowledge is grounded against experience, the fundamental structure of knowledge relies on innate capacities of the mind" does not constitute an argument, but is more a statement of fact.

Once the groundwork has been laid, then a discussion may begin.

My interpretation is because of the challenge Hume posed to the natural assumption that events are causally related. — Wayfarer

Thus, Kant's answer to Hume was to argue that while our knowledge is grounded against experience, the fundamental structure of knowledge relies on innate capacities of the mind. — Wayfarer

This is more like what the academic articles (e.g. Kant's debt to the British Empiricists, by Wayne Waxman 2010) saying on the issue (A Kant Dictionary by Howard Caygill 1994). Kant was not happy with the rationalist crowd such as Wolf Spinoza Mendelssohn who believed in the reason's power to perceive the existence of God, Freedom, Soul by deduction. To Kant, that was a dogmatism.

Kant read Hume, and realised that Hume's idea of reason was much narrower and limited version than the rationalists'. Kant got the idea to write CPR to criticise the power of reason, and also set the limit of the reason for its power to the degree only able to deal with what is perceived via sensibility in empirical world.

What is not visible in the sensibility, but can be thought of such as God, Immortality and Soul are in Noumena and they are object of faith and postulation of pure reason. For Kant, that was the waking up call by Hume to the dogmatic slumbers of the rationalists.

According to Kant, certain concepts, like causation, are not derived from experience but are rather innate to the human mind….. — Wayfarer

Everybody knows the famous one-liners….understanding cannot intuit, intuition cannot think; thoughts without intuition are empty, intuitions without concepts, blind.

The two faculties must work together or we don’t have knowledge….yaddayaddayadda…..how they work together is given by the transcendental deduction of the categories, which…

“….is an exposition of the pure conceptions of the understanding (and with them of all theoretical à priori cognition), as principles of the possibility of experience (….), as the form of the understanding in relation to time and space as original forms of sensibility….” (B169)

So we get from the individual parts, to the unity of their working together, but the question remains as to how to arrive at the one, an internal condition, when the other is given to us, as an external condition. That which is given to us needs no explanation….it’s here, deal with it. But the origins of that which is not given to us, but arises within us, is susceptible to the possibility of having no explanatory power insofar as whatever is claimed for it, can be negated with equal justice.

In general, or, without getting too particular about it, we have knowledge of things from the union of sense and category. Cool. But the human animal can think real objects without them being sensed, re: possible knowledge of possible things. Here’s where the real question comes in….even if no object is given to the senses, but we can think it, does that mean the categories are necessary for those possible objects as equally as for directly sensed objects? The question takes the form….

“…. Now there are only two ways in which a necessary harmony of experience with the conceptions of its objects can be cogitated. Either experience makes these conceptions possible, or the conceptions make experience possible…”

…..so it seems as though the latter must be the case, insofar as the thought of possible objects, which we have, is sufficient for the possible experience of them, which we don’t. If the categories, the pure conceptions, were not necessary for the mere thought of possible objects equally with the thought of real sensed objects, we wouldn’t think them (synthesis of conceptions and all that behind the scenes stuff) and the experience of them, possible or otherwise, would be irrelevant.

So there are conceptions we have, not dependent on experience, but used for both experience and possible experience….but what can be said about them? If they are in us, the where in us can be said to be understanding, the what can be said to be that which makes cognition of objects possible, but what remains is that which states the origin of them. They’re here, they do this and that, but where do they come from?
———-

Now the fun part, where reader is left to his own devices, depending on the text he’s referencing, either original (“selbstgedachte”) or “self-thought first principles a priori”. All that being said, what is categorically denied, in addition to the empirical origin of the categories, is the validity of “subjective aptitudes” for this purpose, those being.….

“…. implanted in us contemporaneously with our existence, which were so ordered and disposed by our Creator, that their exercise perfectly harmonizes with the laws of nature which regulate experience…”

…..and even though that sure sounds an awful lot like the innate which may or may not be drawn out of the original German word, depending on the translator’s justifications, the denial of it is pretty cut and dried:

“…. with such an hypothesis it is impossible to say at what point we must stop in the employment of predetermined aptitudes, the fact that the categories would in this case entirely lose that character of necessity which is essentially involved in the very conception of them, is a conclusive objection to it….”

So it is that Kant grants no authority with respect to the origin of the categories to “subjective attitudes” and if one wishes to associate the innate with such attitudes, he is granted no authority as well.

Apparently, Kant wants it understood that the origin of the categories are reducible only as far as self-thought first principles a priori, and if that wasn’t vague enough, now arises the question as to tabula rasa, which seems on the one hand ill-fated insofar as there are self-thought first principles a priori residing in us, re: the mind does not come blank, but on the other it is reasonable insofar as these are not merely part of our subjective aptitude, re: the mind does come blank.

Time. When does “self-thought” begin”. When do subjective aptitudes develop? If these are not explainable, or are variable, they are not relevant. All that’s needed, for the sake of the consistency of the theory, is the logical function of pure conception within the tenets of a speculative paradigm.

“Shut up and calculate!!” held to the metaphysical fire.

set the limit of the reason for its power only able to deal with what is perceived via sensibility in empirical world. — Corvus

If that were the case, mathematics would be impossible.

We don’t care as much for that to which pure reason deals, but moreso the mechanisms by which it functions, re: the construction of principles a priori.

Again…..

“… Pure reason, then, never applies directly to experience, or to any sensuous object; its object is, on the contrary, the understanding, to the manifold cognition of which it gives a unity à priori by means of conceptions—a unity which may be called rational unity, and which is of a nature very different from that of the unity produced by the understanding….”

(Sigh)