If by "thing" one means an idea in the mind... — RussellA

The Eiffel Tower is indeed an idea, which has been realized (made real) in iron. Without the idea, no such thing could have been wrought.



The resulting artefact is an ideal exemplar of the synthesis of matter and form.

The Eiffel Tower is indeed an idea, which has been realized (made real) in iron. Without the idea, no such thing could have been wrought. The resulting artefact is an ideal exemplar of the synthesis of matter and form. — Wayfarer

For Kant, we know the form of the Eiffel Tower from its appearance as phenomena. However, we cannot know the matter of the Eiffel Tower from Sensible Intuition, as it is noumena.

A249 - Appearances, to the extent that as objects they are thought in accordance with the unity of the categories, are called phaenomena. If, however, I suppose there to be things that are merely objects of the understanding and that, nevertheless, can be given to an intuition, although not to sensible intuition (as coram intuiti intellectuali),then such things would be called noumena (intelligibilia).

However, we cannot know the matter of the Eiffel Tower from Sensible Intuition, as it is noumena. — RussellA

So how were you able to talk about "the matter of the Eiffel Tower", if you couldn't know it? Is it possible to know what "the matter" means?

On the fallacious attribution of principles to the understanding, from a Kantian point of view:

“….All our knowledge begins with sense, proceeds thence to understanding, and ends with reason, beyond which nothing higher can be discovered in the human mind for elaborating the matter of intuition and subjecting it to the highest unity of thought. At this stage of our inquiry it is my duty to give an explanation of this, the highest faculty of cognition, and I confess I find myself here in some difficulty. Of reason…there is a merely formal, that is, logical use, in which it makes abstraction of all content of cognition; but there is also a real use, inasmuch as it contains in itself the source of certain conceptions and principles, which it does not borrow either from the senses or the understanding. The (real use) has been long defined by logicians as the faculty of mediate conclusion in contradistinction to immediate conclusions (consequentiae immediatae); but the nature of the (formal use), which itself generates conceptions, is not to be understood from this definition…..

….In the former part of our transcendental logic, we defined the understanding to be the faculty of rules; reason may be distinguished from understanding as the faculty of principles.

….The term principle is ambiguous, and commonly signifies merely a cognition that may be employed as a principle, although it is not in itself, and as regards its proper origin, entitled to the distinction. Every general proposition, even if derived from experience by the process of induction, may serve as the major in a syllogism; but it is not for that reason a principle. Mathematical axioms (for example, there can be only one straight line between two points) are general à priori cognitions, and are therefore rightly denominated principles, relatively to the cases which can be subsumed under them. But I cannot for this reason say that I cognize this property of a straight line from principles—I cognize it only in pure intuition.

…..Cognition from principles, then, is that cognition in which I cognize the particular in the general by means of conceptions. Thus every syllogism is a form of the deduction of a cognition from a principle. For the major always gives a conception, through which everything that is subsumed under the condition thereof is cognized according to a principle. Now as every general cognition may serve as the major in a syllogism, and the understanding presents us with such general à priori propositions, they may be termed principles, in respect of their possible use.

…..But if we consider these principles of the pure understanding in relation to their origin, we shall find them to be anything rather than cognitions from conceptions. For they would not even be possible à priori, if we could not rely on the assistance of pure intuition (in mathematics), or on that of the conditions of a possible experience. That everything that happens has a cause, cannot be concluded from the general conception of that which happens; on the contrary the principle of causality instructs us as to the mode of obtaining from that which happens a determinate empirical conception….

…..Synthetical cognitions from conceptions the understanding cannot supply, and they alone are entitled to be called principles..

….. The understanding may be a faculty for the production of unity of phenomena by virtue of rules; the reason is a faculty for the production of unity of rules (of the understanding) under principles. Reason, therefore, never applies directly to experience, or to any sensuous object; its object is, on the contrary, the understanding, to the manifold cognition of which it gives a unity à priori by means of conceptions—a unity which may be called rational unity, and which is of a nature very different from that of the unity produced by the understanding….”

There are no principles of the understanding as such, pure or otherwise; there are only those under which the function of understanding is legitimized, the origin of which is the project of pure reason, and that from its transcendental nature alone.

On the continued fallacious attribution to noumena, from a Kantian point of view:

“…. The critique of the pure understanding, accordingly, does not permit us to create for ourselves a new field of objects beyond those which are presented to us as phenomena, and to stray into intelligible worlds; nay, it does not even allow us to endeavour to form so much as a conception of them. The specious error which leads to this—and which is a perfectly excusable one—lies in the fact that the employment of the understanding, contrary to its proper purpose and destination, is made transcendental, and objects, that is, possible intuitions, are made to regulate themselves according to conceptions, instead of the conceptions arranging themselves according to the intuitions, on which alone their own objective validity rests.

…..Now the reason of this again is that apperception, and with it thought, antecedes all possible determinate arrangement of representations. Accordingly we think something in general and determine it on the one hand sensuously, but, on the other, distinguish the general and in abstracto represented object from this particular mode of intuiting it. In this case there remains a mode of determining the object by mere thought, which is really but a logical form without content, which, however, seems to us to be a mode of the existence of the object in itself (noumenon), without regard to intuition which is limited to our senses.

….Before ending this transcendental analytic, we must make an addition, which, although in itself of no particular importance, seems to be necessary to the completeness of the system. The highest conception, with which a transcendental philosophy commonly begins, is the division into possible and impossible. But as all division presupposes a divided conception, a still higher one must exist, and this is the conception of an object in general—problematically understood and without its being decided whether it is something or nothing. As the categories are the only conceptions which apply to objects in general, the distinguishing of an object, whether it is something or nothing, must proceed according to the order and direction of the categories.

….To the categories of quantity, that is, the conceptions of all, many, and one, the conception which annihilates all, that is, the conception of none, is opposed. And thus the object of a conception, to which no intuition can be found to correspond, is = nothing. That is, it is a conception without an object (ens rationis), like noumena, which cannot be considered possible in the sphere of reality, though they must not therefore be held to be impossible….”
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So it is that A249 is not to be considered as pertaining to existent objects. It is the error in transcendental illusory “appearance” that “I suppose there to be things that are merely objects of the understanding that, nevertheless, can be given to an intuition, although not to sensible intuition”, which presupposes the type of intuition not possessed by humans, from which follows there is nothing to which an object of mere thought to be given, insofar as human intuition is always and only sensible. There can be no appearance given to intuition from mere understanding, but from perception alone.

It follows that if the matter of objects were noumena, and noumena obtain their conceptual validity from mere understanding, and understanding gives to intuition its false “appearance”, then all matter of all objects are or can be already determinable by the understanding, which immediately eliminates intuition as the faculty of sensory representation, making experience itself impossible. From whence it is clear, that if the matter of the Eiffel Tower were noumena, there wouldn’t be a tower, a contradiction.

The secondary notion of illusory appearance, irrespective of the type of intuition humans possess, is justified long before the textual evidence of the proof of its occurrence, from the proposition “….understanding cannot intuit, and the sensuous faculty cannot think…” (hence these must work together while being distinct and separate faculties). If then, I suppose to give to even a sensible intuition a conception I merely think, the system is caused to work backwards, and from which no determinable warrant to expect a proper cognition is possible, which is to say, I will know nothing from this bass-acwards procedure, including the very possibility of having accomplished it.

Furthermore….as if the above wasn’t enough….herein the justification for two and only two types of systemic representation….
……one from intuition the object of which is phenomenal representation, the origin of which is the synthesis of matter a posteriori and form a priori.
……the other from understanding the object of which is conceptual representation, the origin of which is the spontaneity of pure thought.

Now it can be, that while faculties of intuition and understanding are distinct and separate, their objects must necessary conjoin to each other through a mediary faculty that is not either of them.

So how were you able to talk about "the matter of the Eiffel Tower", if you couldn't know it? Is it possible to know what "the matter" means? — Corvus

For Kant, matter existing in the world is noumena, and as noumena cannot be cognized, it cannot therefore be talked about

From the SEP article on Kant’s Critique of Metaphysics
Throughout the Analytic Kant elaborates on this general view, noting that the transcendental employment of the understanding, which aims towards knowledge of things independently of experience (and thus knowledge of “noumena”), is illicit (cf. A246/B303).

From the SEP article Kant’s Transcendental Idealism:
In the section “On the ground of the distinction of all objects into phenomena and noumena”, which he substantially revised for the B Edition, Kant reiterates his argument that we cannot cognize objects beyond the bounds of possible experience, and introduces a complex distinction between phenomena and noumena....................Clearly, we do not cognize any noumena, since to cognize an object for us requires intuition and our intuition is sensible, not intellectual.

As Kant wrote:
A249 - if, however, I suppose that there be things that are merely objects of the understanding and that, nevertheless, can be given to an intuition, although not to sensible intuition (as coram intuiti intellectuali), then such things would be called noumena (intelligibilia).

I can talk about "matter" as unknown causes are named after known appearances

I can talk about seeing a red postbox in the world, even though the colour red doesn't exist in the world, but only in the mind. The cause of an appearance is named after the appearance, in that if the appearance is red, the cause is named red.

As the SEP article on Kant’s Critique of Metaphysics writes:
Filling this out, Kant suggests that to take ourselves to have unmediated intellectual access to objects (to have “non-sensible” knowledge) correlates with the assumption that there are non-sensible objects that we can know. To assume this, however, is to conflate “phenomena” (or appearances) with “noumena” (or things in themselves). The failure to draw the distinction between appearances and things in themselves is the hallmark of all those pernicious systems of thought that stand under the title of “transcendental realism.”

In practice, unknown noumena are named after known phenomena. IE, if our perception is named red, the unknown cause of our perception is also named red. The word red then has two distinct meanings, first as the known perception in the mind and second as the unknown cause in the world. Problems arise when these two distinct meanings are conflated. IE, when I talk about seeing a red postbox in the world, what I am talking about is not an unknown something existing in the world but a known appearance existing in the mind.

For Kant, matter existing in the world is noumena, and as noumena cannot be cognized, it cannot therefore be talked about — RussellA

It sounds gross self-contradictory to say "matter existing in the world is noumena", and then keeps going on "noumena cannot be cognized, it cannot therefore be talked about". You cannot say X exists in the world, if you don't know what X is, can you?

I can talk about "matter" as unknown causes are named after known appearances — RussellA

How can "matter" be talked about as "unknown causes"? Do you mean they are the same? How so?

It sounds gross self-contradictory to say "matter existing in the world is noumena", and then keeps going on "noumena cannot be cognized, it cannot therefore be talked about"......................How can "matter" be talked about as "unknown causes"? Do you mean they are the same? How so? — Corvus

"Matter" and "red" are words in language and concepts in the mind. As I perceive a red postbox in the world, I can also perceive solid matter in the world.

I can talk about red postboxes in the world even though what is referred to as the colour red doesn't exist in the world. Similarly, I can talk about solid matter in the world even though what is referred to as matter doesn't exist in the world.

From an innate belief in the Law of Causation, the Principle of Sufficient Reason, an appearance has a prior cause. If a known appearance in the mind is named "red", the unknown cause in the world can be named "X". "X" does not refer to a known thing in the world but refers to an unknown prior cause of a known effect. This prior cause can have happened at any time and can have been of any kind. For convenience within language, "X" is re-named "red".

"Matter" and "red" are words in language and concepts in the mind. As I perceive a red postbox in the world, I can also perceive solid matter in the world. — RussellA

There seem to be some problems here.
1. You are talking about only the things in your mind. It will not give you any further knowledge on the external world itself. You say you are seeing the red postbox, but it is in your mind, and it doesn't exist in the world. So it is not an empirical knowledge, but it is your belief in your mind, which you admit that it doesn't exist in the world.

2. There is also high possibility of illusion and hallucination on the perception and also talking about, because you believe that they are not the reality in the empirical world, but they are caused by the reality of the empirical world. Is the reality always accurate? Are the causation always consistent and accurate without errors? Is the content of the perception accurate?

3. These are not what Kant thinks how perception works. He was seeking to establish a solid ground for infallible knowledge. He would be seriously worried to see someone looking at things not existing in the world, and keeps talking about them as if they do exist in the world, and at the same time saying they don't exist in the world.

1. You are talking about only the things in your mind. It will not give you any further knowledge on the external world itself. You say you are seeing the red postbox, but it is in your mind, and it doesn't exist in the world. So it is not an empirical knowledge, but it is your belief in your mind, which you admit that it doesn't exist in the world. — Corvus

As an Indirect Realist, from the Indirect part of Indirect Realism, the red postbox exists in my mind and not the world. From the Realism part of Indirect Realism, something exists in the world which may or may not be the same as what exists in my mind.
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2. There is also high possibility of illusion and hallucination on the perception and also talking about them, which are not the reality in the empirical world. — Corvus

Yes, The Argument from Illusion against Direct Realism

The Argument from Illusion, found in Berkeley, Hume, Russell, and Ayer, begins from the familiar fact that things sometimes look other than they are (perceptual relativity, illusions, hallucinations) and concludes that we only directly (or immediately) perceive our own ideas (or sense data).

(Lecture II The Argument from Illusion - Penelope Maddy)
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3. These are not what Kant thinks how perception works. He was seeking to establish a solid ground for infallible knowledge. He would be seriously worried to see someone looking at things not existing in the world, and keeps talking about them as if they do exist in the world, and at the same time saying they don't exist in the world — Corvus

Where does Kant get his solid ground for infallible knowledge of noumena?

On matter, from a Kantian point of view:

“… the real in space—that is, matter…..”

“…what we cognize in matter is nothing but relations…”

“….Matter is substantia phaenomenon. That in it which is internal I seek to discover in all parts of space which it occupies, and in all the functions and operations it performs, and which are indeed never anything but phenomena of the external sense. I cannot therefore find anything that is absolutely, but only what is comparatively internal, and which itself consists of external relations. The absolutely internal in matter, and as it should be according to the pure understanding, is a mere chimera, for matter is not an object for the pure understanding. But the transcendental object, which is the foundation of the phenomenon which we call matter, is a mere nescio quid (re: I know not what; fr: quelque chose je ne sais quoi), the nature of which we could not understand, even though someone were found able to tell us.

….For we can understand nothing that does not bring with it something in intuition corresponding to the expressions employed. If, by the complaint of being unable to perceive the internal nature of things, it is meant that we do not comprehend by the pure understanding what the things which appear to us may be in themselves, it is a silly and unreasonable complaint; for those who talk thus really desire that we should be able to cognize, consequently to intuite, things without senses, and therefore wish that we possessed a faculty of cognition perfectly different from the human faculty, not merely in degree, but even as regards intuition and the mode thereof, so that thus we should not be men, but belong to a class of beings, the possibility of whose existence, much less their nature and constitution, we have no means of cognizing.

….By observation and analysis of phenomena we penetrate into the interior of nature, and no one can say what progress this knowledge may make in time. But those transcendental questions which pass beyond the limits of nature, we could never answer, even although all nature were laid open to us, because we have not the power of observing our own mind with any other intuition than that of our internal sense. For herein lies the mystery of the origin and source of our faculty of sensibility. Its application to an object, and the transcendental ground of this unity of subjective and objective, lie too deeply concealed for us, who cognize ourselves only through the internal sense, consequently as phenomena, to be able to discover in our existence anything but phenomena, the non-sensuous cause of which we at the same time earnestly desire to penetrate to….”.
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That human empirical knowledge is derivable from representation only, does not mean matter is not real, which it must be in order for there to be a representation of it.

That all we cognize in matter is its relations, and by which we “penetrate into the interior of nature”, re: Nature herself, is simply due to the type of cognizing capacities, having nothing whatsoever to do with matter itself, and from which it does not follow that matter of real objects must therefore be noumenal.

And the “someone found able to tell us” (of what to us is the chimera of the internal nature of matter) would, supposedly, not be human. Which reduces to…..no one is to be found to explain to us the internal nature of matter itself.

Where does Kant get his solid ground for infallible knowledge of noumena? — RussellA

Solid ground for infallible knowledge is about the objects in the empirical world. Noumena is for the A priori perceptions which have no objects in the world of appearance. Noumena has nothing to do with the solid material existence in the empirical world.

I probably should have been more specific - in the sense of transcendental idealism, is it not the case that the unity of perceptions of a given object actually represent a 'whole' object rather than merely a set of properties...

E.g sure, the Eiffel tower consists of metals in various forms, probably some electrics and wooden aspects too. But it is the Eiffel tower - not a list of components. This is a bad example though, so turning to Wolfs 'Horse' example, the 'Horseness' doesn't consist in any properties of the horse, but the totality of those properties, under certain concepts. Take away the 'brownness' and it's still a horse. Take away 'horse-hairy-ness' and it's still a horse. Take away the mane, the hoofs etc.. In parts, and Horseness remains. it's only removing a critical mass of those properties that removes the horseness. I guess this is the ambiguity im attempting to explore. I have no answers.

Noumena has nothing to do with the solid material existence in the empirical world. — Corvus

It seemed fairly clear to me that Noumena is the placeholder for things in themselves, beyond sensible intuition - of whcih we can know nothing. Not that they aren't related... Just that we can't actually know anything of them. Or be certain they exist.. only infer. But as usual, im looking to be set straight, not offering an actual take.

It seemed fairly clear to me that Noumena is the placeholder for things in themselves, beyond sensible intuition - of whcih we can know nothing. Not that they aren't related... Just that we can't actually know anything of them. Or be certain they exist.. only infer. But as usual, im looking to be set straight, not offering an actual take. — AmadeusD

I understood Noumena is the placeholder for Thing-in-itslef, and Thing-in-itself is for the abstract existences which appear in our minds without the matching objects in the empirical world such as God, Souls, Freedom etc.

It gets all strange, if you place the ordinary objects like cups or trees into Noumena, and say they are Thing-in-itself, which are unknowable and cannot be talked about.

It gets all strange, if you place the ordinary objects like cups or trees into Noumena, and say they are Thing-in-itself, which are unknowable and cannot be talked about. — Corvus

Agreed. I do recall passages in which it's essentially said that by inference, we can't get away from accepting that there are things-in-themselves causing our impressions of them, but that our impressions are removed from the objects enough to make it impossible to access.

Agreed. I do recall passages in which it's essentially said that by inference, we can't get away from accepting that there are things-in-themselves causing our impressions of them, but that our impressions are removed from the objects enough to make it impossible to access. — AmadeusD

Yes, good point. :ok:

but that our impressions are removed from the objects enough to make it impossible to access. — AmadeusD

Looked at this point again, but cannot quite follow what it means. Could you please elaborate with the CPR passage (if possible)? Thanks.

Looked at this point again, but cannot quite follow what it means. Could you please elaborate with the CPR passage (if possible)? Thanks. — Corvus

My understanding of this point is that, while we must infer something "in-itself" causes our phenomenal impressions, which in turn create our perceptions, our perceptions are not those impressions and cannot, in any meaningful sense, access them or the object which causes them.

IN the preface to teh 2nd edition we get this :

"The estimate of our rational cognition à priori at which we arrive is that it has only to do with phenomena, and that things in themselves, while possessing a real existence, lie beyond its sphere. "

Among other passages, seems to indicate to me that Kant accepts that the thing-in-itself is necessary, but unknowable.

Solid ground for infallible knowledge is about the objects in the empirical world. Noumena is for the A priori perceptions which have no objects in the world of appearance. Noumena has nothing to do with the solid material existence in the empirical world. — Corvus

Then where does Kant get his solid ground for infallible knowledge of solid material existence in the empirical world?
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It gets all strange, if you place the ordinary objects like cups or trees into Noumena, and say they are Thing-in-itself, which are unknowable and cannot be talked about. — Corvus

For the Indirect Realist, the colour red exists in the mind but not the world, though there is something in the world that caused our perception of the colour red. When the Indirect Realist talks about the colour red, they are referring to two distinct things, the known colour red in the mind and the unknown something in the world that caused our perception of the colour red.

For the Direct Realist, the colour red exists both in the mind and the world, When the Direct Realist talks about the colour red, they are referring to one thing.

Do you believe that the colour red exists in the world?

in the sense of transcendental idealism, is it not the case that the unity of perceptions of a given object actually represent a 'whole' object rather than merely a set of properties — AmadeusD

In Transcendental Idealism there is a priori pure intuition of space and time and a priori pure concepts of the understanding, ie, the Categories

Therefore, Transcendental Idealism applies to appearance in the mind not objects in the world. ie Transcendental Idealism applies to phenomena not noumena (though whether the Category of cause can apply to noumena is debated).

Yes, as the unity of perception of a given object is about an object that appears in the mind not as it actually is in the world, Kant's unity of perception is about a whole rather than a disparate set of parts.
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'Horseness' doesn't consist in any properties of the horse, but the totality of those properties, under certain concepts. Take away the 'brownness' and it's still a horse. Take away 'horse-hairy-ness' and it's still a horse. Take away the mane, the hoofs etc.. In parts, and Horseness remains. — AmadeusD

If there is something in the world which doesn't have the properties of brownness, horse-hairy-ness, mane and hoofs, would anyone looking at this something think that it was actually a horse?

My understanding of this point is that, while we must infer something "in-itself" causes our phenomenal impressions, which in turn create our perceptions, our perceptions are not those impressions and cannot, in any meaningful sense, access them or the object which causes them. — AmadeusD

I would have thought when we infer things, it is the internal operation in the mind, which doesn't involve the external objects.  In that case, would it not just work of intuition itself involving the concepts? When you say phenomenal impressions, it reminds me of the Humean impression which is for the external sensical objects.  I am not sure if Kant uses the term sense impression for the external objects.  As far as I can recall, he doesn't use the Humean terms such as impressions and ideas.

Logically speaking if you are inferring something in your mind, you wouldn't need to think about the external object at all, because it would be with the contents in your mind and intuition works with them.  Or if you are seeing objects in the empirical world, and inferring something, then it wouldn't be about the object itself, but it would be something else relating what-if scenarios or changes of the situation etc. The point here is that inferring something doesn't need reliance with Thing-in-itself or noumena.

"The estimate of our rational cognition à priori at which we arrive is that it has only to do with phenomena, and that things in themselves, while possessing a real existence, lie beyond its sphere. " — AmadeusD

Could this be further explicated using real life examples of perception?

Then where does Kant get his solid ground for infallible knowledge of solid material existence in the empirical world? — RussellA

Kant just explains how our perception works with the existence in the empirical world. He is not concerned with them too much. It is our intuitions and concepts which interact immediately with the objects for producing experience - it sounds like he was a direct realist.

Nothing special in our perception of the empirical reality objects in the way that he doesn't try to make them sound as if they belong to in some mysterious unknown realm of psychic world, but he tries to identify A priori elements in perception i.e. the intuitions, concepts and principles which construct our experience. Furthermore, it is mathematics, geometry and synthetic a priori knowledge he was focusing on how they work.

What he is concerned is clarifying how metaphysical knowledge works and why it has solid ground as knowledge like Scientific knowledge. Metaphysics deals with God, Immortality, Souls and Freedom..etc. These are the real topics Kant was interested in demonstrating for their solid existence, not some cups, trees or postbox in the empirical world.

Reason can only deal with the objects appearing in our sensibility via experience, and that is the limit of pure reason. What is not appearing in our sensibility but can be thought of are in the world of noumena as thing-in-itself, and reason has no capability in dealing with them. They would be then, in the world of unknown, which need postulation of faith for access.

If Thing-in-itself exists in the empirical world, and thought to appear in phenomenon, then it would be contradiction. They must exist in the world of noumena, and you need faith or postulation to access them. This makes sense.

Do you believe that the colour red exists in the world? — RussellA

I feel that when you say a postbox with red roof exists, then both the postbox and red colour patch must be in one object. It doesn't make sense to me, when you say, the postbox exist in the empirical world, but the red patch exists in your mind. They must be one entity, not separate. The postbox with red roof exists in the reality as one object. What you have in your mind is an image of it.

we can't get away from accepting that there are things-in-themselves causing our impressions of them — AmadeusD

In Kant, this is wrong.

we can't get away from accepting that there are things-in-themselves causing our impressions — AmadeusD

This is correct. IFF one accepts that the thing that appears to our senses, is the thing of the thing-in-itself. It is the aim of the human intellectual system, that the thing-as-it-is-in-itself, and the thing-as-it-seems-to us, be as congruent as possible. That the properties assigned to the representation of the real thing of our knowledge, do not conflict with the relations observed with respect to the real thing of our perception.
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…we must infer something "in-itself"… — AmadeusD

The Principle of Complementarity, writ large. For that thing which appears to sensibility, there must be that same thing that does not appear, for otherwise, immediately upon being an effect on the senses, if the thing did not already exist in itself, our own perception is necessary objective causality for that thing. It follows that, tantamount to a contradiction bordering on absurdity, for every singe perception, for every effect of a thing on the senses, that thing was caused by the senses, or, which is the same thing, it would be damn near impossible to prove with apodeitic certainty, the senses are not causal.
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things in themselves, while possessing a real existence — AmadeusD

And yet, there remains some idiotic insistence that noumena and thing-in-themselves are the same thing. Or the same kind of thing. Or can be treated as being the same kind of thing.

may offer support here, but it should be kept in mind, that in Kant’s day, Greek logic was still the rule, and Aristotle used the concepts phenomena/noumena in his way, so Kant had to, if not so much abide by the antecedent meanings, at least had to account for them, or no peer would take his philosophy seriously, insofar as the fundamental predication determining transcendental metaphysics, is purely logical.

Problem was, in the brand new metaphysics, there was no room for Aristotle’s concepts as such, on the one hand, and the brand new speculative machinations of human cognition couldn’t accommodate them both on the other.

But he had no choice but to accommodate Aristotle, somehow. Know how he did it? Cool as hell, if you ask me. He said, “….I can think whatever I please, provided only that I do not contradict myself…”. Now it is not self-contradictory to think noumena, from which arises a valid conception just as Aristotle professed, but there remains the need to abolish them in order they not interfere with the rest of the brand new speculative metaphysics, which would be where the contradiction of myself occurs, re: judgements in which the conception is contained relative to those judgements in which conception “phenomena” is contained.

Every notice….with all the talk of noumena, there is no talk of a noumenal object? Not one. Everyone talks of noumena but nobody wonders that there are no noumenal objects. And we can say there are none, even if it is only because we wouldn’t know of it as one if it reached out an bitch-slapped us.

If things-in-themselves give us things, shouldn’t noumena give us noumenal objects? Same thing, my ass. No where near the same, and moronic to consider them so.
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It seemed fairly clear to me that Noumena is the placeholder for things in themselves — AmadeusD

They are not. There’s something amiss in your clarity, methinks.

Reason can only deal with the objects appearing in our sensibility via experience, and that is the limit of pure reason. — Corvus

This sounds like Berkeley's Subjective Idealism, which denies the existence of material substance in the world and contends that familiar objects like tables and chairs are no more than ideas perceived by the mind, and as a result cannot exist without being perceived. IE, reason is limited by what we are able to perceive. (Wikipedia - George Berkeley)

However, Kant differentiated himself from Berkeley in not denying the real existence of objects distinct from our representation of them. From the Introduction to the CPR:
Specifically, he differentiated his position from Berkeleian idealism by arguing that he denied the real existence of space and time and the spatiotemporal properties of objects, but not the real existence of objects themselves distinct from our representations, and for this reason he proposed renaming his transcendental idealism with the more informative name of "formal" or "critical idealism," making it clear that his idealism concerned the form but not the existence of external objects.

Within the Refutation of Idealism is the argument that pure reason is not limited by experiences within our sensibilities, and whereas Idealism assumes that our only immediate experiences are inner experiences Kant shows that we also have immediate access to outer experiences.
B277 - Idealism assumed that the only immediate experience is inner experience, and that from that outer things could only be inferred, but, as in any case in which one infers from given effects to determinate causes, only unreliably, since the cause of the representations that we perhaps falsely ascribe to outer things can also lie in us. Yet here it is proved that outer experience is really immediate, * that only by means of it is possible not, to be sure, the consciousness of our own existence, but its determination in time, i.e., inner experience

As the Wikipedia article on Critique of Pure Reason writes:
In order to answer criticisms of the Critique of Pure Reason that Transcendental Idealism denied the reality of external objects, Kant added a section to the second edition (1787) titled "The Refutation of Idealism" which turns the "game" of idealism against itself by arguing that self-consciousness presupposes external objects.

Kant uses the idea of time to prove that external objects may be perceived directly enabling pure reason to transcend experiences within our sensibilities.
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If Thing-in-itself exists in the empirical world, and thought to appear in phenomenon, then it would be contradiction. — Corvus

For the Direct Realist, the thing in itself in the world does appear in appearance as phenomena, ie, when we perceive the colour red there is a colour red existing in the world. This is why Kant is not a Direct Realist.
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It doesn't make sense to me, when you say, the postbox exist in the empirical world, but the red patch exists in your mind. — Corvus

Perhaps because that's not something I said. As an Indirect Realist, as the colour red exists in the mind and the not the world, the postbox also exists in the mind and not the world.

For the Direct Realist, as the colour red exists both in the mind and the world, the postbox also exists in both the mind and the world.

Reason can only deal with the objects appearing in our sensibility via experience, and that is the limit of pure reason.
— Corvus

This sounds like Berkeley's Subjective Idealism, which denies the existence of material substance in the world and contends that familiar objects like tables and chairs are no more than ideas perceived by the mind, and as a result cannot exist without being perceived. IE, reason is limited by what we are able to perceive. (Wikipedia - George Berkeley) — RussellA

That is nothing to do with Berkeley's idealism. Berkeley's idealism treats your perception identical to the existence. In Kant, you need the empirical object affecting your sensibility. He doesn't deny the existence of empirical reality. He says what appears in your sensibility can be dealt by reason, but what doesn't appear in your sensibility, but what you can think of, are Thing-in-itself.

For the Direct Realist, the thing in itself in the world does appear in appearance as phenomena, ie, when we perceive the colour red there is a colour red existing in the world. This is why Kant is not a Direct Realist. — RussellA

No, I change my mind. Kant can't be a direct realist. He really doesn't say much about what he is i.e. he doesn't care about isms. He just says there are objects in the world which appear in your sensibility, and the intuition and reason deal with them to produce judgements. That's all he says. If you really have to brand him what he was, he would more likely had been a transcendental realist.

Perhaps because that's not something I said. As an Indirect Realist, as the colour red exists in the mind and the not the world, the postbox also exists in the mind and not the world. — RussellA

Now that is Berkeley's immaterial idealism, because you deny the existence in the world, but think they all exist in your mind.

Reason can only deal with the objects appearing in our sensibility via experience, and that is the limit of pure reason. — Corvus

That’s the whole problem: pure reason has no limit. The sole raison d’etre for the Critique of it, is what can be done about that problem.

What we can think, relative to what we can know…..THAT must have a limit.

That’s the whole problem: pure reason has no limit. The sole raison d’etre for the Critique of it, is what can be done about that problem. — Mww

All reason is pure in the sense that it is not a product of experience. Reason judges and analyses the content of experience. Knowing and thinking are psychological activities. Reason is a priori property of the mind.

I’m ok with that. I don’t like the notion of psychological activities particularly, but modern times finds value therein, somehow.

Just remember…reason does not apply directly to experience, so that part of your comment that says reason only deals with objects, etc, etc,. Isn’t the whole story.

I’m ok with that. I don’t like the notion of psychological activities particularly, but modern times finds value therein, somehow. — Mww

Acts of knowing and thinking are topics of psychology. How and what can be known and thought, are the topics of Epistemology.

Just remember…reason does not apply directly to experience, so that part of your comment that says reason only deals with objects, etc, etc,. Isn’t the whole story. — Mww

When reason sees the intuitions with no objects, it will resort to either scepticism or conclude unknowability. If it keeps asserting the existence without the objects in empirical reality, it would be a dogmatism.