I am not sure what you're saying I dismissed

For example, if the sperm that "won the race" in your case had not made it, someone else, not you, would have existed in your place; — Janus

This is where the third person view helps. Since I wouldn't have existed, how would we know that the replacement wasn't you? Equally, then, how do we know that the proposed minor variation - even if it caused a massive difference - would have been at all different from me? It's based on the assumptions 1) that the DNA would have been different in some way that made a difference to the result and 2) that every difference is equally important.

Absolutely. But it's interesting, because it is very unlikely that one will again come across the exact same chess position, and be able to make a different choice in the exact same situation, and yet one learns how to look, and how to analyse other positions and make other choices better. So counterfactuals function as useful notions here. — unenlightened

All of that is true. But the important thing here is that although one may never encounter the exact some position again, the process of analysis can reveal similarities among those differences. Some of them will matter, and some will not. When one can do that, one can learn from past experience. But if every difference is equally important and equally makes a position different in the sense that past experience is irrelevant, then past experience can teach you nothing.

If I had been a soldier in Cromwell's army, then necessarily the right sperm and egg would have miraculously come together at the appropriate time to make that happen. — unenlightened

I like that answer. Very neat.

The genes obviously contribute but seems intuitive one might change genetic information or phenotypic traits of a person and retain the identity. — Apustimelogist

It is well established that the links between genes and specific characteristics are very complicated and often surprising.

"A large part of DNA (more than 98% for humans) is non-coding, meaning that these sections do not serve as patterns for protein sequences." From Wikipedia article - "DNA"
From this it follows that a random variation in one base of the molecule is unlikely to cause a variation in the phenotype.

Here are some more complications:-
"Many features of a phenotype result from more than one genetic modification. An organism's phenotype results from two basic factors: the expression of an organism's genetic code (its genotype) and the influence of environmental factors. Both factors may interact, further affecting the phenotype." from Wikipedia - "Phenotype"
"When two or more clearly different phenotypes exist in the same population of a species, the species is called polymorphic. A well-documented example of polymorphism is Labrador Retriever colouring; while the coat colour depends on many genes, it is clearly seen in the environment as yellow, black, and brown." Wikipedia - "Phenotype"
"A genetic disorder is a health problem caused by one or more abnormalities in the genome. It can be caused by a mutation in a single gene (monogenic) or multiple genes (polygenic) or by a chromosomal abnormality. Although polygenic disorders are the most common, the term is mostly used when discussing disorders with a single genetic cause, either in a gene or chromosome. The mutation responsible can occur spontaneously before embryonic development (a de novo mutation), or it can be inherited from two parents who are carriers of a faulty gene (autosomal recessive inheritance) or from a parent with the disorder (autosomal dominant inheritance). When the genetic disorder is inherited from one or both parents, it is also classified as a hereditary disease. Some disorders are caused by a mutation on the X chromosome and have X-linked inheritance. Very few disorders are inherited on the Y chromosome or mitochondrial DNA (due to their size)." Wikipedia article - "Genetic disorder"

I am not sure what you're saying I dismissed — Apustimelogist

The whole notion of identity and discerning it. I don't even have to look this up, and I would guess there would be hundreds or more papers written on things tangential to this regarding identity, essence, genes, and the like. It just seemed you were a bit too hastily dismissive of any sort of notion related to that. But we don't have to dwell on this odd dismissiveness and hostility to the concept.

It's also a function that you missed a broad portion of the debate on the thread here and then just came in with these ideas focusing mainly on the genetic component aspect of my argument, and not the idea that it is combined with the causal. There is a casual aspect that it encompasses these two things coming together at a place in time that is not repeatable because as I had mentioned earlier with twins and clones example, there is a spatial, causal, as well as genetic component to it. I also mentioned that the genetics aspect is not some blank slate. It does have uniqueness that contributes to various aspects of the self that would be different than if the gametes were another set. It isn't just "any set of gametes" that makes you, you. It has to be those gametes, along with the other factors I mentioned.

Also, the debate started out on what can be counterfactual and what cannot. I made the claim that before your birth, there could be no possibility that YOU could be anything else. There would not have been a you if anything had changed that prevented those set of gametes from combining, even if by a few seconds. If another set of gametes combined, THOSE gametes would NOT be you. And that is an indication that indeed, it is a necessity that the gametes be the ones that combined with causal factors.

But then, any circumstances after conception that affect the development of the DNA will also result in a different entity existing. Surely? The development from DNA to person is not a railway track, but a path through rough country - to an indeterminate destination.

The fact that, on this account, the DNA is a necessary condition, but not sufficient, allows for the possibility that there are other conditions that could have produced the same result. No? — Ludwig V

If the criteria for establishing identity are physical, that is unique patterns or configurations of physiognomy then DNA would just be the most precisely measurable pattern. Whether those DNA patterns can change, as physiognomy obviously does would not seem to matter.

Take for example, oak leaves: every leaf has the same basic form (as every human does), but no two leaves are identical in every part. Each individual leaf grows from a bud and eventually turns reddish brown and falls to the ground where it will disintegrate over time. That is the whole usual story (some leaves may be eaten instead) of each particular leaf, but the details will not be exactly the same in any two cases,

But What function does this counterfactual serve? — unenlightened

To establish the facts?

"If i had been a soldier in Cromwell's New Model Army, I would have been having difficulty with the harsh discipline." - because "wrong sperm and egg". — unenlightened

Nothing I've said rules out imagining fictional scenarios. But I took this thread to be a critical examination of what it might be most plausible to think establishes identity. If it is the body, the physicality, that establishes identity, then you could not have been a soldier in Cromwell's army, but as I said earlier, if it is an immortal soul that establishes identity as is imagined in, for example, Hindu teachings, then you could have been a soldier in Cromwell's army.

This whole thread is a case of overreach by the thought police. — unenlightened

A somewhat hysterical overreaction, don't you think?

This is where the third person view helps. Since I wouldn't have existed, how would we know that the replacement wasn't you? Equally, then, how do we know that the proposed minor variation - even if it caused a massive difference - would have been at all different from me? It's based on the assumptions 1) that the DNA would have been different in some way that made a difference to the result and 2) that every difference is equally important. — Ludwig V

Don't you mean "Since I wouldn't have existed, how would we know that the replacement wasn't me?"?

I think it is uncontroversial from a science perspective that each sperm would produce a different genotype and hence a different phenotype (body).

On the other hand, if we were to adopt the "soul waiting to be born" scenario, then you could have been the same entity in a different body, if a different sperm had reached the goal first.

If knowledge and memory is also embedded in this momentarily unfolding flux then is there a fact of the matter about being the same as I was 5 minutes ago? After all, to generate the right expressions of memory or knowledge only requires the right momentary states in terms of physical states of my neuronal membranes. Continuity is not necessary and it is questionable whether my brain is ever in the same two states even for similar experiences at different times. — Apustimelogist

Right. Perdurance seems to me a more realistic way of looking at identity.

If that is the case then to say anything stays the same is a fallacy and it would also make the term is/change identical.

Same effectively means similar enough to be called the same. It is not some absolute term.

I am sure philosophers have broad range of beliefs on the issue. I doubt I am the only person drawn toward that kind of view.

I am sure philosophers have broad range of beliefs on the issue. I doubt I am the only person drawn toward that kind of view. — Apustimelogist

Cool. What’s your view? Do you really understand mine?

It is well established that the links between genes and specific characteristics are very complicated and often surprising. — Ludwig V

I admit was thinking in a much more simplistically. These are some excellent points and the kind of complexities I find very interesting about biology! I will have to consider more subtleties like this into my view.



That definitely is an interesting way of looking at it, certainly worth thinking about. I think the stage view looks a bit more appealing to me. I guess it really depends what you want from a theory of identity.

I think it is uncontroversial from a science perspective that each sperm would produce a different genotype and hence a different phenotype (body). — Janus

Very much so, but I think there are still important questions about whether you would consider your phenotype the same as your identity. Realistically, yes I am sure every conception event leads to a different person who is very different from every other person. But then I think that our biology incidentally does this (as a matter of just how our biology seems to work), it doesn't let us probe exactly the limits on how we might perceive a change of DNA to affect identity like you would in an experiment. I think DNA can be a good way of identifying different individuals, but is that just incidental to the actual identity itself? Do all DNA changes, do all phenotype changes correspond to identity change? Is DNA essential to what characterizes my identity as a person (could something else perform a similar role)? All that is why I said in another post my intuition was that maybe the historical chain role in the gamete fusion scenario may be just as if not more important as the blueprint role. The blueprint role is in many ways limited if the actual phenotype that emerges depends hugely on the environment... in fact it must always depend on the envrionment. I imagine just in many cases, the environment is very well controlled (e.g. inside a womb), which in some ways is incidental. Someone could have genes which normally produce five digit hands but in the wrong prenatal environment, they only end up with 4. The role we attribute to genes normally is not inherent to the genes but, we can just assign that function because of how nature happens to be commonly.

The whole notion of identity and discerning it. I don't even have to look this up, and I would guess there would be hundreds or more papers written on things tangential to this regarding identity, essence, genes, and the like. It just seemed you were a bit too hastily dismissive of any sort of notion related to that. But we don't have to dwell on this odd dismissiveness and hostility to the concept — schopenhauer1

Well I haven't had a deep look at the topic so myabe, but this type of view is my general inclination, which I think I could argue as holding in this area too. I would gladly discuss opposing points though. But I did say I get the intuition of what you said; it makes sense to me from an intuitive standpoint that the different gamete would not be you. At the same time, it brings up the question of what that statement actually means - that the different gamete person would be you, or the same gamete person not being you - beyond just the labelling of something as "you". When I think more about it, I am inclined away from a kind of essentialistic view of the self or even criteria for identity (or even truth) counterfactually.

It's also a function that you missed a broad portion of the debate on the thread here and then just came in with these ideas focusing mainly on the genetic component aspect of my argument, and not the idea that it is combined with the causal. — schopenhauer1

I did read the thread or I wouldn't have acknowledged some people made some good points.

I was just clarifying my views on the genetics as I was preoccupied with that bit.

I also mentioned that the genetics aspect is not some blank slate. It does have uniqueness that contributes to various aspects of the self that would be different than if the gametes were another set. It isn't just "any set of gametes" that makes you, you. It has to be those gametes, along with the other factors I mentioned. — schopenhauer1

Yes, sure, I just think its interesting to think about whether the genetics are the most important bit or not. If you have different gametes that all are genetically different, its not exactly a good experiment for answering that question. So I was think about that beyond whether just being a different gamete would make you a different person counterfactually *to the question of the role of genes in general in identity... whether they are incidental or not to identity*.

Edit: Just clarifying * ... *

Very much so, but I think there are still important questions about whether you would consider your phenotype the same as your identity. — Apustimelogist

Do you mean in the sense that I might think of my identity as consisting in being a mother, a scientist, an artist, a policewoman or whatever? Some people believe in an immortal soul and would say it is that soul and not their body that constitutes their identity.

If we don't accept the idea of a soul, then what alternative do we have but to think of the body as the manifestation of identity in the broadest sense, beyond considerations of profession and so on?

If each body has a unique genotype and phenotype, then DNA would be the most accurate way to establish bodily uniqueness, since differences of form can sometimes be hard to discern as can be the case with identical twins.

Yes, I think I understand your view.. at least the notion that alternative gametes wouldn't be you.

I guess my view is just that there isn't an objective fact of the matter about identities or self.

They say DNA is the blueprint for a human being. Well let's look at this idea of "blueprints" and maybe we can exorcise some of these essentialist demons.

We plan to construct a building. We will name it the "Nakatomi Tower". Before we begin we draw our design plans of Nakatomi Tower. In the course of planning we develop three plans, Blueprint A, Blueprint B, and Blueprint C. Each design is slightly different, maybe more rooms, different plumbing, etc. One plan has an extra floor, and another has one floor less. All three Blueprints are for the building we plan to construct and name "Nakatomi Tower." The plan location will be at the corner of 5th and Main. At first we settle on Blueprint A and began construction. However, we began to run out of money quicker than we thought, so we have to take some elements from Blueprint B and C as well as eliminate some floors al together. Finally, after years of construction the building was finished. At the opening ceremony, the owner of the building announced the name of the building "Nakatomi Plaza." After many decade, many new additions to the building were added, modifications were performed, and eventually the building took on the name of just "The Plaza".

As Wittgenstein said in The Blue Book, "Philosophers very often talk about investigating, analyzing, the meaning of words. But let's not forget that a word hasn't got a meaning given to it, as it were, by a power independent of the word of us, so that there could be a kind of scientific investigation into what a word really means. A word has the meaning someone has given to it."

Do you mean in the sense that I might think of my identity as consisting in being a mother, a scientist, an artist, a policewoman or whatever? — Janus

Uhh maybe not necessarily against that way of looking at it but I was thinking more just about exactly what parts of your physicality you consider you, what bits are essential, what bits could be changed and you would intuitively still consider yourself yourself.

Some people believe in an immortal soul and would say it is that soul and not their body that constitutes their identity. — Janus

I wouldn't say soul but then again I do think what I am experiencing in an ongoing way is what I liken to the self strongly. I imagine its plausible that my brain being transported into a vat, my self could be maintained. Then again, I don't think I identify all parts of my experiences with myself even though they are going on in parts of my brain... which are part of me???

then what alternative do we have but to think of the body — Janus

Yes but clearly its not all essential and I think identifying myself just as a population of cells misses something in the same way that I don't think there is necessarily a single way of identifying or labelling or drawing boundaries within/around bodies or animals, other objects etc., even though doing so and thinking about it may have practical benefits or be interesting in some ways.

If each body has a unique genotype and phenotype, then DNA would be the most accurate way to establish bodily uniqueness, since differences of form can sometimes be hard to discern as can be the case with identical twins. — Janus

Yes true, DNA certainly makes it easy to discern or pick you out; but then again, my dead body will have my DNA. I think there is at least a debate to be had about whether my dead body is me. Since I wouldn't be alive anymore. Maybe you would say it is me.

Are you the same person (same identity) today, than "you" were yesterday (or 20 years ago)?

what bits could be changed and you would intuitively still consider yourself yourself. — Apustimelogist

I'd say that whatever changes don't kill you would not change your identity.

Then again, I don't think I identify all parts of my experiences with myself even though they are going on in parts of my brain... which are part of me??? — Apustimelogist

When we think of ourselves as experiencing something, don't we generally think that what we experience is other than ourselves?

Yes but clearly its not all essential and I think identifying myself just as a population of cells misses something in the same way that I don't think there is necessarily a single way of identifying or labelling or drawing boundaries within/around bodies or animals, other objects etc., even though doing so and thinking about it may have practical benefits or be interesting in some ways. — Apustimelogist

You can lose parts of your body that are not critical to your survival and still be a living, experiencing body. However, if you lose your eyes or lose your hearing you will not experience in those domains. A mere population of cells does not necessarily experience anything like you as an organism consisting of a self-regulating population of specialized cells does.

Roughly speaking the boundary of your being is your skin; it is natural enough to think of whatever is sensed within that boundary as part of oneself and whatever is sensed outside of that boundary as other.

I think there is at least a debate to be had about whether my dead body is me. Since I wouldn't be alive anymore. Maybe you would say it is me. — Apustimelogist

I would say your dead body is the dead you, which is very different than the living you, because it is no longer capable of internal self-regulation or of experiencing anything at all, either internal or external to it. It has become like any non-living object, but every particular non-living object is still thought to have a unique identity.

Are you the same person (same identity) today, than "you" were yesterday (or 20 years ago)? — Relativist

My answer to that would be yes, even though the body has changed, in fact changed all its cells a few times, those cells still have the same unique genotype, and the basic structure of the body is still usually recognizable all through its changes barring severe disfigurement.

What is it that undergoes the changes if not you? It's no different with each leaf that grows from a bud in more or less the same configurations as all the other leaves of the same type and then falls from the tree and withers away due to other organisms of decay.

According to Lloyd Gerson in Platonism and Naturalism, universals are the only means of preserving realistic identity, because they provide the means that something can remain the same whilst also changing (same in essence, different in specifics.) This discovery was a consequence of the long dialectic arising from the teachings of Parmenides (nothing real changes) and Heraclitus (nothing real stays the same.)

As to whether identity can be reduced to genetics, I think not. People can overcome their genetic predispositions, although of course they can also enact them. But they are not wholly determined by them.

I think my position can resolve a lot of these nuances if we just phrase it that the gametes components are necessary but not sufficient for identity. I think Janus point earlier is that there is clearly a boundary of organism with non-organism. There is clearly a unit of this person versus that person. Indeed a brain in a vat might complicate things , but the brain itself seems to be the “seat” of mental events, so in a sense there the brain in the vat is still necessary. It is almost trivially true that it is a specific set of gametes with boundaries in space that separate it out in some way that define a person as separate and unique from another.

I think Janus point earlier is that there is clearly a boundary of organism with non-organism. — schopenhauer1

Maybe because with the emergence of organisms, there is an exponential increase in possibilities. And that in order to exist as an organism, the very first thing that appears is the boundary between self-and-not-self. After all, death is merely dissolution, isn't it? That the elements comprising a specific individual organism dissolve back into the periodic table. It is the ability of organisms not to simply succumb to chemical entropy that is the hallmark of organic life, isn't it?

What Do Organisms Mean?, Steve Talbott.

Are you the same person (same identity) today, than "you" were yesterday (or 20 years ago)?
— Relativist

My answer to that would be yes, even though the body has changed, in fact changed all its cells a few times, those cells still have the same unique genotype, and the basic structure of the body is still usually recognizable all through its changes barring severe disfigurement.

. — Janus

I think you're saying that the particular sperm/ovum combination that produced you is essential to being you. That combination is your historical origin, but isn't your subsequent history also essential to being you? This history would distinguish you from your identical twin, if you had one.

Is all your history essential to being you? If not, then how do you non-arbitrarily draw the line?

Another fact to reflect on is that every being occurs as 'me' from their first person point of view. Every living being experiences themself as 'me' but it's not until the being becomes attached to a particular set of sensations and memories that it is differentiated as an individual self or soul by the thought 'this is me, I am this, this is mine'. Of course, from the p-o-v of a specific individual, every other being is 'not-me' (cf Kastrup's 'dissociated alters') as within their first-person perspective there is only one 'me', as due to their identification with ego. That's why it's said in the Upanisads that the awakened see themselves in every being and every being in themselves.

Maybe because with the emergence of organisms, there is an exponential increase in possibilities. And that in order to exist as an organism, the very first thing that appears is the boundary between self-and-not-self. After all, death is merely dissolution, isn't it? That the elements comprising a specific individual organism dissolve back into the periodic table. It is the ability of organisms not to simply succumb to chemical entropy that is the hallmark of organic life, isn't it? — Wayfarer

Seems to be.

Another fact to reflect on is that every being occurs as 'me' from their first person point of view. Every living being experiences themself as 'me' but it's not until the being becomes attached to a particular set of sensations and memories that it is differentiated as an individual self or soul by the thought 'this is me, I am this, this is mine'. Of course, from the p-o-v of a specific individual, every other being is 'not-me' (cf Kastrup's 'dissociated alters') as within their first-person perspective there is only one 'me', as due to their identification with ego. That's why it's said in the Upanisads that the awakened see themselves in every being and every being in themselves. — Wayfarer

This is another topic, but this kind of parallels our debate for why it matters whether one has achieved some "unity" of this monism (aka Nirvana), or nothingness. What if there were no lifeforms, as was the case prior to 4.5 billion years ago, give or take? Energy and matter on their own don't seem to need liberation from anything. It seems at the least, the problem is biological as much as it is existential, as existential matters not without the biological. And thus, this is contra to the always existing mind of idealism.

I think you're saying that the particular sperm/ovum combination that produced you is essential to being you. That combination is your historical origin, but isn't your subsequent history also essential to being you? This history would distinguish you from your identical twin, if you had one.

Is all your history essential to being you? If not, then how do you non-arbitrarily draw the line? — Relativist

Again, it's necessary, not sufficient because of its role in its unique combination. It's also causal and spatially variant, thus accounting for the difference between twins and clones. Surely, experience plays a role in identity. Even two rocks from the same molten volcano are roughly similar but are separated by a boundary when they cool. One rock may end up being smooth and one crushed up and jagged. Surely, part of the identity of that rock is the substance that the rock is composed of and arrangement of chemical compounds. When identifying if certain objects came from certain areas in archeology, you can use their unique patina "fingerprints" see if they came from the same location originally.

experience plays a role in identity — schopenhauer1

The Schopenhauer1 of 1999 lacked all the experiences of the Schopenhauer1 of 2023. This is why I previously asked: "Are you the same person (same identity) today, than "you" were yesterday (or 20 years ago)?"

Strict identity does not persist over time, where strict identity fits the principle of identity of indiscernibles. So individual identities have to be defined differently than strict identity. In terms of properties, it would mean identifying which properties are essential (necessary and sufficient) to that identity.

Consider a particular rock. It has a very specific shape and molecular structure. What changes could you make and still consider it the same rock? I don't think there's an objective answer to this. One could define some subset of properties that we identify as existing over some period of time, but there's arbitrariness to any selection of the properties we might choose as "necessary and sufficient".

Are people different? We've noted that monozygotic twins start out with the same genetic makeup, so that set of DNA can't be sufficient. Is it even necessary? No, because our DNA mutates over time, so the DNA you have today is not identical to the DNA "you" had as a zygote or at birth. So you can't even say a specific set of DNA is a necessary condition.

I think you're saying that the particular sperm/ovum combination that produced you is essential to being you. That combination is your historical origin, but isn't your subsequent history also essential to being you? This history would distinguish you from your identical twin, if you had one.

Is all your history essential to being you? If not, then how do you non-arbitrarily draw the line? — Relativist

I'd agree that one's entire history is essential to being exactly as you are at any time. If determinism
is true this could not have been otherwise. If indeterminism is true then you could have been different due to having encountered different circumstances throughout your life, but you still would have been you, a different you, just as the you next week will be a different you,

one's entire history is essential to being exactly as you are at any time. — Janus

In that case, then "Janus, at this exact day and time", would not exist if indeterminism is true and a different history had occurred.

"Surely, experience plays a role in identity. Even two rocks from the same molten volcano are roughly similar but are separated by a boundary when they cool. One rock may end up being smooth and one crushed up and jagged. Surely, part of the identity of that rock is the substance that the rock is composed of and arrangement of chemical compounds. When identifying if certain objects came from certain areas in archeology, you can use their unique patina "fingerprints" see if they came from the same location originally" — schopenhauer1

I suggest that you are assuming the rock has an enduring identity, as a premise, and then identify some of the things that would have to be entailed. But the fact is, it is not possible to identify some subset of its properties and history that give that rock a unique identity.

Again, it's necessary, not sufficient because of its role in its unique combination. — schopenhauer1

What exactly are you saying is necessary? Your DNA mutates throughout your life, so if your specific DNA sequence is necessary, you are not the same person your mother gave birth to.

It's also causal and spatially variant, thus accounting for the difference between twins and clones. — schopenhauer1

This reflects a subset of your history.

My position is that 100% of your history is essential to being "you" at a point of time. There is a causal relation between the "yous" of each point of time - and "you" are that cross-temporal causal sequence; you have temporal parts. This is perdurance theory of identity.

What exactly are you saying is necessary? Your DNA mutates throughout your life, so if your specific DNA sequence is necessary, you are not the same person your mother gave birth to. — Relativist

The combination of the DNA code from the set of gametes. The fact that this has slight changes over time or whatnot does not invalidate this.

My position is that 100% of your history is essential to being "you" at a point of time. There is a causal relation between the "yous" of each point of time - and "you" are that cross-temporal causal sequence; you have temporal parts. This is perdurance theory of identity. — Relativist

The causal-temporal sequence still works off of certain genetic information. It isn't just any genetic information. There is a start to the sequence. For example, one gamete is not a necessary or sufficient. You need both sets. But it can't be any set of gametes, it has to be that set and not another. Whatever else comes of the causal-temporal sequence of another set, even if that had a roughly similar life as you, that is not you.

n that case, then "Janus, at this exact day and time", would not exist if indeterminism is true and a different history had occurred. — Relativist

Yes, that certainly seems to follow, an alternative version of me would have existed instead. We have no way of knowing whether nature is determinsitic or indeterministic. It will always appear indeterminstic due to our inability to predict the future.