It is impossible that I moved the bishop and won the game, because I moved another piece and lost. — unenlightened

So maybe I considered moving the bishop and decided to do something else. When I did something else, it was no longer possible. But it was possible when I considered it. Surely?

It would have been someone else. — schopenhauer1

How could it be someone else if I don't exist?

How could it be someone else if I don't exist? — Ludwig V

Yes, I guess that's the point I am making too. But when discussing the past, it's always going to be in relation to the YOU existing now.

So maybe I considered moving the bishop and decided to do something else. When I did something else, it was no longer possible. But it was possible when I considered it. Surely? — Ludwig V

Epistemically possible? Sure.

Metaphysically possible? I don't know of any good reason to think so.

Well, bits of metaphysics that I can never know do not concern me greatly. I'm funny like that.

Well, bits of metaphysics that I can never know do not concern me greatly. I'm funny like that. — Ludwig V

I don't think you're interpreting that right, but @wonderer1 can chime in. I think he is saying that there are some moves that are necessitated as non-possibilities.

But when discussing the past, it's always going to be in relation to the YOU existing now. — schopenhauer1

In a sense, yes. Which is why I went back to the past before I existed - when there was no me for anything to be in relation to.

To put the point another way, if any discussion about the past is always going to be in relation to Ludwig V, is it always going to be in relation to schopenhauer1, my sister Mary Anne and the postman. Why am I so special?

In a sense, yes. Which is why I went back to the past before I existed - when there was no me for anything to be in relation to. — Ludwig V

Yes, and I would agree with that characterization. It is exactly that reason that this issue is interesting. There wouldn't even BE a YOU to begin with. It's a non-starter. It's something you can imagine in hindsight, but is not a possibility in actuality.

But, supposing I am the first child of my parents, there would still be a first child. Why wouldn't that be me, but different?

I happen to know that they intended to call their first child Ludwig if it was a boy. I forget what the choice would have been if I had turned out to be a girl.

And then, presumably, the name Ludwig would have rigidly designated their first child if it was a boy, or their second if that was a boy and so on. Then gametes would be irrelevant.

But, supposing I am the first child of my parents, there would still be a first child. Why wouldn't that be me, but different? — Ludwig V

That's the point I'm refuting (and you seemed to agree with in your last posts?). That is to say, the first child would be different, and therefore that is not the YOU who is reflecting now. That would be that guy who may or may not reflect back on himself as YOU are doing now. And even if he reflects back about his birth, the "definite description" of the "first born son of the union of so and so" would not be you, just as if someone else was president that was not George Washington, that would not be him, even though he does fit the definite description of first President of the United States.

I happen to know that they intended to call their first child Ludwig if it was a boy. I forget what the choice would have been if I had turned out to be a girl. — Ludwig V

And even if it was another George Washington, that was not the George Washington that we know of. And that is very much now making my point that part of the differentiator of identity is not contingencies like the ones you are saying, but the exact set of gametes that was to become that person.

And then, presumably, the name Ludwig would have rigidly designated their first child if it was a boy, or their second if that was a boy and so on. Then gametes would be irrelevant. — Ludwig V

Indeed it would have rigidly designated but now you are making a sort of category error. The person is unique in its designation. There are many Ludwigs and George Washingtons, but that it picks out that one is the point. And this question goes further and asks, "And what makes it that one as opposed to another one?

I am claiming that it is necessary not sufficient, which is harder to say about almost any of the other subsequent things in the causal history. If we took those away, they might or might not contribute to identity, but what is absolutely needed is that initial gamete combination and blueprint. — schopenhauer1

So what is it about the gametes here is the important thing?

Edit: I may as well ask to clarify specifically about why exactly the timing bit is important since that comes under the original question too.

I think I need more information before I decide whether to agree with you.

Before I answer, I’d like to ask you to look at some of my responses in previous lists as I think I could covered this. To summarize, the gametes are not a blank slate and the experiences and contingent biochemistry adds to identity, it combines with that initial blueprint. Experiences aren’t by themselves just free floating. And yes, the causal link to the start of a person matters too. Before the gametes there was no person.

So maybe I considered moving the bishop and decided to do something else. When I did something else, it was no longer possible. But it was possible when I considered it. Surely? — Ludwig V

Well yes for sure, back then I may have considered it, and back then I could have chosen it. But back then it wasn't a counterfactual, but an imagined future to which there was no fact for it to be counter to. Then I made my move. The constrained scenario of a chess game is quite instructive here because it is full at each move of imagined moves, and imagined countermoves, and it is very instructive to go through an old game of one's own with an experienced player who can point out problems one had not seen and possibilities one did not consider, and all of these are counterfactual, but constrained by the clear rules to possible legal moves and their outcomes. It doesn't change the outcome of the game one is studying, but it can potentially change the outcome of future games if one becomes a better player, and a better imagineer of move sequences. One sees how useful the imaginary can be, and some of the ways it can function in thought..

You could say that the job of a counter-factual is to consider impossible possibilities.

Hopefully, it means that one might sometimes survive gene therapy. — unenlightened

Maybe the genotype can be altered, but then the result of the alteration would presumably be unique to the individual whose genotype had been altered.

I agree with you that the existence of any entity is enough to establish its identity; conversely, we must know its identity, in the sense of being able to identify it, in order to know it exists or has existed. Obviously, it is also true that the existence of an entity is easier to establish than its genotype. You would need to establish its existence first, identify it correctly, in order to be able to know you are testing for the genotype of any one particular entity.

In terms of counterfactual scenarios, though, I think @schopenhauer1 is correct to say that, in consideration of the genesis of any particular organism, any circumstances which would have produced a different genotype at conception, would result in a different entity existing.

For example, if the sperm that "won the race" in your case had not made it, someone else, not you, would have existed in your place; and such a thing may have happened if your parents began sexual intercourse just a few moments later or if they had been more or less energetic, and so on; just the tiniest variation could have resulted in your failing to have existed..

Yes, I get the intuition. It seems to make sense, more from the causal link standpoint than the blueprint one because I am not sure that DNA can be identified with us as opposed to picking out us in a way that is somewhat incidental.

But then again when I think about identity or what it means for a counterfactual person to be you, I don't really find sound criteria or meaning anyway.

But then again when I think about identity or what it means for a counterfactual person to be you, I don't really find sound criteria or meaning anyway. — Apustimelogist

I see it as a necessity but not sufficient as being a biological being and its unique genetic combination that contributes to your identity both biologically and neurochemically.

The reason this is important, is that it then establishes some other more interpretive things. That is to say, you cannot in reality have a person born under different circumstances (prior to the point of conception) because those circumstances would almost certainly result in a different set of gametes, and hence a different person than the one that is reflecting back on the altered history. — schopenhauer1

This is incorrect. There are various factors that happen prior to conception that contribute to development.

Circumstances are effectively ‘the environment’ and given that the environment is forever changing what happens prior to conception has an obvious effect on items within said environment. The only way out of this is belief in some form of dualism.

So saying that person A is person A is basically a waste of time. There is nothing here and I confused why there is a needless back and forth debating why YOU is important as some non-existent being that is never non-existent because YOU exist. It is just words used to screen clarity I feel.

That a thing cannot itself is kind of true, but to say that something cannot be effected by anything else is rather silly.

it is very instructive to go through an old game of one's own with an experienced player who can point out problems one had not seen and possibilities one did not consider, — unenlightened

Quite so. I think the difficulty here is that if one is looking forwards, possibilities could become actual. But if one is looking backward, they could not. If one then says that the moves one actually made are now necessary, it looks as if someone is trying to deny that what was a possibility then, is not a possibility now. If that were true, one could not consider them after the game. Which is absurd.
The idea that what is, is necessary is an exaggeration of the familiar point that a move that was possible in the middle of the game can no longer be made after the game is over.

In terms of counterfactual scenarios, though, I think schopenhauer1 is correct to say that, in consideration of the genesis of any particular organism, any circumstances which would have produced a different genotype at conception, would result in a different entity existing. — Janus

But then, any circumstances after conception that affect the development of the DNA will also result in a different entity existing. Surely? The development from DNA to person is not a railway track, but a path through rough country - to an indeterminate destination.

The fact that, on this account, the DNA is a necessary condition, but not sufficient, allows for the possibility that there are other conditions that could have produced the same result. No?

Yes, I get the intuition. It seems to make sense, more from the causal link standpoint than the blueprint one because I am not sure that DNA can be identified with us as opposed to picking out us in a way that is somewhat incidental. — Apustimelogist

Well, a DNA molecule is not a person, so it seems clear that the identity of the molecule is not equivalent to the identity of the person. The DNA molecule is not the resulting person, but one of the causal conditions that produces that person. But then, some people think that causal conditions are necessary, which seems to me to abolish the meaning of "contingent" and so deprive "necessary" of its own meaning.

There is nothing here and I confused why there is a needless back and forth debating why YOU is important as some non-existent being that is never non-existent because YOU exist. — I like sushi

I think that's why it is important not to frame these issues by reference to the first or second person. They are a lot clearer if one asks the questions in the third person.
The other thing that muddles this debate up is the idea that if Theseus' ship has the tiniest, most unimportant part of itself replaced, it is a different ship. Surely we all know that the point at which the changes to the ship make it a different ship is not clearly defined.

If one then says that the moves one actually made are now necessary, it looks as if someone is trying to deny that what was a possibility then, is not a possibility now. If that were true, one could not consider them after the game. Which is absurd. — Ludwig V

Absolutely. But it's interesting, because it is very unlikely that one will again come across the exact same chess position, and be able to make a different choice in the exact same situation, and yet one learns how to look, and how to analyse other positions and make other choices better. So counterfactuals function as useful notions here.

If the sperm that "won the race" in your case had not made it, someone else, not you would have existed in your place. — Janus

But What function does this counterfactual serve? And more, what rules does it follow such that the consequence can be drawn? The answer is none. and it comes down pretty much to If things had been different, they wouldn't have been the same.' I must remember to make sure the right sperm wins the race tonight. But how?

I am being told nothing useful, but out of that I am supposed to learn that I am not allowed to use exactly the same form of expression in ways that can usefully exercise an empathic understanding - "If i had been a soldier in Cromwell's New Model Army, I would have been having difficulty with the harsh discipline." - because "wrong sperm and egg".

No, not at all, I say! If I had been a soldier in Cromwell's army, then necessarily the right sperm and egg would have miraculously come together at the appropriate time to make that happen. And there can be no objection that imaginary miracles do not happen in reality, because we are not talking about reality, and imaginary miracles occur all the time - I wish I was on a Caribbean beach right now. This whole thread is a case of overreach by the thought police.

Surely we all know that the point at which the changes to the ship make it a different ship is not clearly defined. — Ludwig V

It is pretty clear. Piece by piece if every part is replaced it is still ‘the original’ as it is their ship. Someone collecting and reassembling the parts produce their own ship not someone else’s ‘original’ ship.

Words can sometimes trick the mind.

This whole thread is a case of overreach by the thought police. — unenlightened

Is this meant seriously? If so, it seems like a bizarre reaction to the thread to me.

Isn't this topic the same that is addressed in some of the posts in "Reasons for believing in the permanence of the soul"? Even Theseus' ship is mentioned. Though this thread seems to focus on physical things instead of metaphysical, which I think is pointless when talking about identity.

Yup, I was just saying that when I think about it more deeply, I just discard identity or self from an objective standpoint entirely.

The genes obviously contribute but seems intuitive one might change genetic information or phenotypic traits of a person and retain the identity. Its not clear where the dividing line is. I can even conceive of changing lots of genetic information which otherwise has little effect on the parts of the person crucial for its identity.

Some random shower thoughts on the issue

I think really in physical systems of many components the whole notion of objective identity might be moot because we can draw the boundaries where we like on same/different.

Often we can pre-stipulate identity on counterfactuals though. What if I were born in Rome in 1823?

One question is if counterfactual causal chains leading to the development of gametes would mean different gametes (even if same genetic components), meaning different people? Is the counterfactual of "What if I was born in Rome in 1823" make it trivially that I am not that person since the causal chains leading to the gametes would be different necessarily?

What if I was synthesized of artificial components and artificial genetics but the same biological development and identical history of events?

I guess that certainly wouldn't be me (or would it?) but then can't I just imagine myself if that was the case? Whose to say that isn't me if I am imagining it (it isn't real anyway). If thats what counterfactuals are... just postulating what if... and postulate changes to relevant part.

What then exactly does it mean to say that different gamete wouldn't be me other than pre-stipulating the gamete is me? Must have another consequence other than just labelling it as me or not me. If we use the distinction of causal chains to say something is me or not, there must be some substance to what that me is other than just pragmatic bookkeeping? But again, that seems moot on the physical components case.

I think it must have something to do with experience. The other gamete would not be having my experiences that I am having. I would never have been born, no lights would have been turned on (a common phrase I have heard to describe phenomenal experience) in the same way that I know someone else right now is having experiences I am not having and don't have access to.

Other than that, its hard for me to envision what it actually means for the other gamete to not be me. But then again, I think this is getting into a awkward metaphysical territory surrounding identity in experiences and also things like the hard problem of consciousness. It might even be presupposing a kind of dualism I don't agree with. What does it mean to be having my own experiences as opposed to someone else's (in the sense of previous paragraph)? Doesn't seem well defined to me.

My intuition is that if experience has is its basis in the degrees if freedom found in biology and physics, it will have similar moot problems of identity as with physical component systems.

If we have the momentary unfolding of biophysical processes or functions in flux then is the continuity of consciousness illusory?

If knowledge and memory is also embedded in this momentarily unfolding flux then is there a fact of the matter about being the same as I was 5 minutes ago? After all, to generate the right expressions of memory or knowledge only requires the right momentary states in terms of physical states of my neuronal membranes. Continuity is not necessary and it is questionable whether my brain is ever in the same two states even for similar experiences at different times.

It is pretty clear. Piece by piece if every part is replaced it is still ‘the original’ as it is their ship. Someone collecting and reassembling the parts produce their own ship not someone else’s ‘original’ ship. — I like sushi

Well, I'm not sure about that, but it seems to be the standard answer these days. What I was after was the doctrine that any change, not matter how small, make it is different ship, or a different person.

Is this meant seriously? — wonderer1

Seriously, but not literally. just as philosophers can be likened to therapists, so they can be likened to the policemen of thought, keeping thoughts in order, and in this case trying to arrest perfectly ordinary thoughts going about their lawful business. Its an analogy, Jim, but not as we know it.

The genes obviously contribute but seems intuitive one might change genetic information or phenotypic traits of a person and retain the identity. Its not clear where the dividing line is. I can even conceive of changing lots of genetic information which otherwise has little effect on the parts of the person crucial for its identity. — Apustimelogist

Still has a causal link tied with it. The start of an object isn’t just the substance so it was more nuanced. Also isn’t there volumes of philosophical literature on identity, essence, and similar issues?

Seems rather dismissive, so I wonder if it’s just you don’t like when I argue it rather than X “legitimate” philosopher in SEP.

Still has a causal link tied with it. — schopenhauer1

Yes, I already said. It is interesting though to think though what if you could replace it with something else functionally identical? Would that interrupt the identity?

The start of an object isn’t just the substance so it was more nuanced. Also isn’t there volumes of philosophical literature on identity, essence, and similar issues?

Seems rather dismissive, so I wonder if it’s just you don’t like when I argue it rather than X “legitimate” philosopher in SEP. — schopenhauer1

Not sure what you're getting at.

Not sure what you're getting at. — Apustimelogist

This seems dismissive of a large topic in philosophy:

Yup, I was just saying that when I think about it more deeply, I just discard identity or self from an objective standpoint entirely. — Apustimelogist

In one sentence you dismiss the work of many philosophical writings in that subject, because you thought about it deeply.