Do you agree? — wonderer1

Not so much. I do appreciate your more serious recent posts, and I shouldn't have allowed Joshs' comments to poison the well of your posts. At the same time, I think you are prone to twist things in a rhetorical direction instead of addressing the central issues. I am not really interested in a rhetorical focus on terms like "moral badness," "evil," "blame," etc. In my philosophical lexicon these are all very precise terms, used to address serious questions. Yet in your mouth they seem to be merely pejorative, and your posts end up becoming a kind of excoriation of these terms conceived as pejorative.

For example, if you look at my first post you will see that I sidelined the question of whether the failure is moral as rather unimportant, purely definitional (). I gave my reasons why I believe it is bad, why it is a failure, why it should be avoided, etc. In contrast, both in the post I was responding to and the post you responded with, you are are preoccupied with rhetorical-pejorative terms, such as "moral failure," "evil," etc. (and this is a little bit ironic given your allusion to Zen).

People shouldn't contradict themselves or make intellectual mistakes. They do happen, and then we correct them (because we know they are bad). "One swallow does not make a summer." But those who contradict themselves with abandon and without qualms, or assert and publish what they know to be false, are intellectually dishonest and intellectually depraved. They have made a habit out of bad intellectual acts, and have hence become unreasonable and untrustworthy in matters of the intellect. I don't really care whether we call this a moral failure. I don't think most people have any precise idea what they mean when they use that term, "moral."

Do you really say that 'ought' is a non-normative term? — Leontiskos

No. And I'm really beginning to doubt you truly understand the distinction between normative and descriptive, or an ethical and metaethical theory.

You asked me whether my theory was descriptive or normative, and I very clearly answered that it is descriptive. Then you demand that it contain normative claims. What sense does that make? To describe things like "ought" without making ought-claims is not to deny that "ought" is normative.

If you think we should listen to our conscience, then your theory of conscience is normative, and it is a "moral theory" — Leontiskos

I personally believe that one should follow their conscience. But this 'should' has no place in a descriptive moral theory. That "one should follow their conscience" is a moral claim like any other. An it is far from obvious. It is reflective of an ethos of individualism. More authoritarian or collectivist ethos don't place much value on following your conscience, at least when it contradicts the state or party.

No. And I'm really beginning to doubt you truly understand the distinction between normative and descriptive, or an ethical and metaethical theory. — hypericin

Just so you know, normative/non-normative does not map to ethics/meta-ethics. It's a conflation that pops up occasionally, but this is the first time in this thread.

You asked me whether my theory was descriptive or normative, and I very clearly answered that it is descriptive. Then you demand that it contain normative claims. What sense does that make? To describe things like "ought" without making ought-claims is not to deny that "ought" is normative. — hypericin

My concern is that you purport to provide a non-normative theory and then begin flirting with normativity, and given the large number of times I have seen subjectivists flip-flop, I am keen to address this from the beginning.

I personally believe that one should follow their conscience. But this 'should' has no place in a descriptive moral theory. That "one should follow their conscience" is a moral claim like any other. — hypericin

I agree.

But think about that. You simultaneously hold that one should follow their conscience, while at the same time considering yourself a non-normative subjectivist who is propounding a non-normative theory. Your non-normative theory says, "Many people do follow their conscience but I do not say you should follow your conscience." Yet you simultaneously hold the belief that one should follow their conscience. You simultaneously say that 'You should follow your conscience.' It would seem as if your beliefs contradict your system (and this has of course been my main contention in conversations with subjectivists).

So how do you resolve this apparent contradiction?

Just so you know, normative/non-normative does not map to ethics/meta-ethics. It's a conflation that pops up occasionally, but this is the first time in this thread. — Leontiskos

You are right. I thought I was just adopting your terminology, but there is a difference. What I meant, and what I think this whole thread has been discussing, is metaethics.

My concern is that you purport to provide a non-normative theory and then begin flirting with normativity, — Leontiskos

Except I haven't, you haven't shown that I have, and it seems like you are insisting my theory is not normative enough!

You simultaneously hold that one should follow their conscience, while at the same time considering yourself a non-normative subjectivist who is propounding a non-normative theory. — Leontiskos

There is no contradiction between holding a metaethical theory describing what ethics is, while holding normative views on what one ought do. Both may reside comfortably in the same brain. And here they do not contradict one another. Being subjectivist does not mean that there is no normativity. It means that normativity is rooted in subjective values, rather than objective facts about the world.

There is no contradiction between holding a metaethical theory describing what ethics is, while holding normative views on what one ought do. — hypericin

There is a contradiction if they follow Hume in his is-ought distinction, for in that case a non-normative metaethical theory will not account for a normative ethical theory.

Both may reside comfortably in the same brain. And here they do not contradict one another. — hypericin

Hypericin, you have literally contradicted yourself in this thread:

I would say not that one should listen to their conscience... — hypericin

I personally believe that one should follow their conscience. — hypericin

Do you not admit that this is an apparent contradiction?

There is a contradiction if they follow Hume in his is-ought distinction, for in that case a non-normative metaethical theory will not account for a normative ethical theory. — Leontiskos

Why should one thing I believe be accounted for by another? My subjectivist view on moral realism does not account for the particulars of my moral beliefs.

Do you not admit that this is an apparent contradiction? — Leontiskos

I admit that this is an apparent contradiction, due to your taking the two quotes out of context. as well as some honestly poor wording on my part. The first quote was a response to:

Is your subjective conscience theory intended to be normative? — Leontiskos

A better wording would be something along the lines, "I would phrase the theory not that one should listen to their conscience, but that one does".

Why should one thing I believe be accounted for by another? — hypericin

Given that metaethics is about the grounding, foundation, and rationale of moral statements, a metaethic which allows no room for normativity does not provide an adequate foundation for a normative ethics.

I admit that this is an apparent contradiction... — hypericin

Thanks.

A better wording would be something along the lines, "I would phrase the theory not that one should listen to their conscience, but that one does". — hypericin

When I was speaking about the law of non-contradiction and the first principle of practical reason, I would have said, "We should and we do." You say something distinctly different, "It's not that we should, but that we do." If you wish to change the claim to say, "We should and we do," then you are free to do that. That is what I would say.

...due to your taking the two quotes out of context. — hypericin

I insist that this is not the case. The claim that you originally made follows with logical necessity from the non-normativity of your theory. Your theory, if it is to be non-normative, must affirm that, "It is not true that one should follow their conscience." It is no coincidence that you affirmed this proposition, even if the proposition was not the sole or primary purpose of the sentence to which it belonged. Note, too, that you were answering my question, "Is your subjective conscience theory intended to be normative?" To answer that question requires answering the 'should' question.

(The theory you hold denies normative truths and yet you "personally" affirm normative truths.)

What remains is that there are conversations about what we ought to do, and that these conversations include true statements. The lengths to which folk go to avoid admitting this are extraordinary. — Banno

I don't avoid admitting it. I've admitted it several times, in fact. What I see you and others avoiding is actually addressing the issues of cognitivist meta-ethics. What does it mean for an obligation to be moral? Are moral obligations discovered or socially constructed (or other)? How does one verify or falsify a supposed moral obligation?

That's what they deserve. — Banno

This I would call making a virtue out of necessity, that you refuse to provide justification has nothing to do with who is deserving of it or not, and everything to do with your own inability to do so.

meh. Take it up with Wittgenstein.

Take it up with Wittgenstein. — Banno

Why blame him?

You are the one claiming that they are different, not me. — Leontiskos

You said that moral obligations are concerned with justice. Are you saying that the normative claim “you ought listen to my music” is concerned with justice? If not then you recognize that they are different, and so my questions need answering.

If you think that it is concerned with justice then the same questions can be asked about justice itself. It certainly seems like an unusual use of language to describe listening to my music as being “just” (and presumably not listening to my music as being “unjust”).

But you also vacillate on things like A3 — Leontiskos

I don’t vacillate. I accept that it’s true in the sense that it’s a reasonable pragmatic suggestion (much like “you ought brush your teeth”).

I don’t know what it means for it to be something more which is why I’m asking you to make sense of this “something more”.

But incidentally the syllogism is invalid. The first premise should be “I should not cause suffering for anything like me”.

(The theory you hold denies normative truths and yet you "personally" affirm normative truths.) — Leontiskos

Sigh.

a) no moral sentence is truth-apt (non-cognitivism)
c) no moral sentence is true (error theory)
e) no moral sentence is true if nobody believes so (non-objectivism)
f) some moral sentence is true even if nobody believes so (robust realism) — Michael

I’ve only had a brief look into it, but Derek Parfit’s non-realist cognitivism is an interesting take. The theory is that there are true moral sentences but that there are no (natural or non-natural) moral properties in the world.

It’s a moral objectivism without a realist ontology.

both in the post I was responding to and the post you responded with, you are are preoccupied with rhetorical-pejorative terms, such as "moral failure," "evil," etc. (and this is a little bit ironic given your allusion to Zen).

People shouldn't contradict themselves or make intellectual mistakes. They do happen, and then we correct them (because we know they are bad). "One swallow does not make a summer." But those who contradict themselves with abandon and without qualms, or assert and publish what they know to be false, are intellectually dishonest and intellectually depraved. They have made a habit out of bad intellectual acts, and have hence become unreasonable and untrustworthy in matters of the intellect. I don't really care whether we call this a moral failure. I don't think most people have any precise idea what they mean when they use that term, "moral." — Leontiskos

I’m not sure how you would formally define the concept of blame, but it seems hard to avoid the connotation of blame when one accuses another of being intellectually bad, dishonest, unreasonable, depraved and untrustworthy. Would you use such terms to describe the behavior of someone who has recently suffered a head injury that makes it difficult for them to recall or process information?
I would assume not, because you might point out that that person cannot help their deficits. They are not deliberately intending to contradict themselves with abandon, to lie or misinform. These behaviors are the result of something they has no control over and would not endorse.

What makes a person blamefulness, culpable, responsible in our eyes in an ethical sense is connected to how we understand the concept of intent or will. There are vitally important practical implications associated with how our moral philosophy makes sense of the process of intending or willing. We can see these implications manifested in the free will vs determinism debate. For instance, modern attempts to defang concepts of moral blame begin with moral responsibility, or blame, skepticism, which has historically been defended by Spinoza, Schopenhauer and Voltaire. Contemporary representatives of this group like Galen Strawson, Derk Pereboom and Martha Nussbaum argue that our blame practice is morally inappropriate because we lack free will or a certain kind of knowledge
These approaches endeavor to take the sting out of blame, resulting in a less violent understanding of moral action. For instance, Pereboom rejects the idea of blame as moral responsibility because he claims that:

what we do and the way we are is ultimately the result of factors beyond our control, whether that be determinism, chance, or luck, and because of this agents are never morally responsible in the sense needed to justify certain kinds of desert-based judgments, attitudes, or treatments—such as resentment, indignation, moral anger, backward-looking blame, and retributive punishment.” “In the basic form of desert, someone who has done wrong for bad reasons deserves to be blamed and perhaps punished just because he has done wrong for those reasons, and someone who has performed a morally exemplary action for good reasons deserves credit, praise, and perhaps reward just because she has performed that action for those reasons (Feinberg 1970; Pereboom 2001, 2014; Scanlon 2013). This backward-looking sense is closely linked with the reactive attitudes of indignation, moral resentment, and guilt, and on the positive side, with gratitude (Strawson 1962); arguably because these attitudes presuppose that their targets are morally responsible in the basic desert sense.” (Caruso 2018)

I wonder how your Aristotelian-Thomistic approach compares to the position of blame skeptics like Pereboom and Nussbaum.

Sigh. — hypericin

See your own response:

This feels like a narrow account of subjectivism that few would endorse.

In my view, people ultimately make moral judgements and decisions according to their own values and moral sense. These values and this sensibility are in turn informed by enculturation and group-think, but also by biologically based moral instincts (innate senses of fairness and justice, empathy), as well as individual experiences and preferences. This is "subjectivism" as none of these are objective features of the world (right?), but seems poorly captured by "if everyone were to say so". — hypericin

---

I'm tired of chasing you guys around in your circles. I think this is a good place to leave it, and in my opinion my recent posts to have saddled him squarely with the contradiction at hand.

---

@Michael, on the other hand, has been reduced to a flow chart approach, designed for evading philosophical dialogue:

1. If someone makes a claim which implies, in any way, that another normative proposition is true, and my intuition does not find that normative proposition to be a "moral" proposition, then I say, "Ah, but such-and-such implies that a non-moral proposition is moral."
2. If someone asks me what I mean by "moral," then I say, "I don't know what that word means."
3. If someone demonstrates a normative proposition which is moral according to my intuitions, then I say, "Ah, but that's a command, and nothing more. I don't know why I should listen to commands."

(A sophistical way to ward off any possible objections and circumvent deeper moral inquiries.)

it, and in my opinion my recent posts to ↪hypericin have saddled him squarely with the contradiction at hand. — Leontiskos

Lol, another victory lap after a series of senseless posts. You are a classic time waster, and you don't know what the hell you you are talking about.

Lol, another victory lap after a series of senseless posts. You are a classic time waster, and you don't know what the hell you you are talking about. — hypericin

I must stop at some point. Of the thousands of philosophical conversations I have had, this conversation with you has been one of the most definitive. Only very few times have I seen someone contradict themselves as obviously as you have contradicted yourself in these recent posts. At such a point it is very easy to walk away, for the evidence speaks for itself, and beyond that, there is nothing more to be done on my part. In any case, you are the one who failed to respond to my final post: . One could of course ridicule such a person for their irrationality and self-contradiction, or respond to their angry outbursts which occur as a result of their self-apparent irrationality. I do not find this to be necessary in this case. In all seriousness, good luck. I hope you change your position.

(I only request that you do not edit these recent posts and falsify the record.)

(I only request that you do not edit these recent posts and falsify the record.) — Leontiskos

:rofl:
No one gives a shit, but yeah the record speaks for itself just fine

What exactly is wrong with my approach? You offer a definition and I provide counter examples that might show the inadequacy of the definition. If you’re willing to accept the counter examples as being a true consequence then just say so.

Ought you listen to my music? Does it then follow that you are morally obligated to listen to my music? Does it then follow that it is an injustice for you to not listen to my music?

All I am saying is that this seems inconsistent with how moral language is actually used. That strikes me as a justified descriptive claim. Perhaps you want to say that moral language isn’t actually used correctly?

What exactly is wrong with my approach? — Michael

It's purely defensive or eristic and not inquisitive. It looks more like fly-swatting or contradicting than philosophy. And as far as I'm concerned, to reject a definition without providing an alternative is bad faith argumentation. It's, "Effort for thee, but not for me." You're the one with a self-contradictory moral philosophy (). Maybe you should be doing a bit of the work?

All I am saying is that this seems inconsistent with how moral language is actually used. That strikes me as a justified descriptive claim. Perhaps you want to say that moral language isn’t actually used correctly? — Michael

Common usage is characteristically imprecise. Adverting to that imprecision is no way to do philosophy.

1. "You ought to let me stitch you up. You're bleeding out."
2. "You ought to take this bandage. Your wound is exposed to the debris."
3. "You ought to take this food. You look hungry."
4. "I have some peanuts here, would you like some?"
5. "You enjoy Radiohead? I have their newest album on my phone. You should have a listen."
6. ...
7. "You shouldn't execute that innocent man."
8. "You should free your slave."
9. "You shouldn't steal from that impoverished woman."
10. "You shouldn't use racist language."
11. "You shouldn't cut in line."
12. "You shouldn't smoke near your children."
13. "You should adopt a rescued dog."
14. "You shouldn't throw recyclables in the garbage."
15. "You should donate to help save the whales."
16. "You should speak in a kinder and softer voice to my pet."
17. "You should watch where you are walking so you don't step on any ants."
18. "You should keep out of the shadows to keep the demons away."

Which of these are moral utterances? Where should we draw the arbitrary line?

It's purely defensive or eristic and not inquisitive. It looks more like fly-swatting or contradicting than philosophy. — Leontiskos

Proof by contradiction is a valid argumentative response.

And as far as I'm concerned, to reject a definition without providing an alternative is bad faith argumentation. It's, "Effort for thee, but not for me." — Leontiskos

I’m not the one claiming that there are moral facts.

Which of these are moral utterances? Where should we draw the arbitrary line? — Leontiskos

Is it arbitrary? Or is it a fact that some sentences are moral sentences and some sentences aren’t? There may be cases where we’re not sure if a sentence is a moral sentence, but it’s certainly not the case that every sentence is a moral sentence.

Proof by contradiction is a valid argumentative response. — Michael

"That's not moral and I refuse to say what I mean by 'moral'," is not a proof by contradiction, it's just sophistry.

I’m not the one claiming that there are moral facts. — Michael

You are precisely the one claiming there are moral facts. I am the one claiming there are binding normative propositions. ()

"That's not moral and I refuse to say what I mean by 'moral'," is not a proof by contradiction, it's just sophistry. — Leontiskos

I am saying that these are not the sort of sentences that are usually described as being moral sentences. This is a straightforward empirical observation of actual language use.

My hairdresser tells me that I shouldn’t wash my hair every day because it makes the hair brittle. I don’t know anyone who will say that this is a moral obligation. Most will say that this is just a pragmatic suggestion.

You are precisely the one claiming there are moral facts. — Leontiskos

No I’m not.

I am the one claiming there are binding normative propositions. — Leontiskos

But you refuse to explain what this means or how one can verify or falsify the claim that some proposition is normatively binding.

- Dude, I'm not here for eristic. The only philosophical thread I've published is an anti-eristic thread. If you're looking to argue for the sake of argument, you'll need to find someone else to do it with. I was under the impression that you cared to resolve your moral self-contradiction. Apparently I was mistaken. You're a half step removed from Monty Python's "Argument Clinic."

Dude, I'm not here for eristic. The only philosophical thread I published is an anti-eristic thread. If you're looking to argue for the sake of argument, you'll need to find someone else to do it with. — Leontiskos

I don’t understand this. This is a philosophy forum. Our entire purpose here is to argue the merits of some philosophical theory. Are you just here to evangelise?

Dude, I'm not here for eristic. The only philosophical thread I published is an anti-eristic thread. — Leontiskos

"Eristic"! This guy is too much.

I was under the impression that you cared to resolve your moral self-contradiction. — Leontiskos

:gasp: :rofl: :lol:

Are you just here to evangelise? — Michael

Sometimes I feel he mimics the form of philosophical debate.

:gasp: :rofl: :lol: — hypericin

You are projecting your "gotcha" mentality onto others. This was not a joke. Michael freely admits that his moral theory contains unresolved contradictions. My academic reference post was a direct response to his quandary (link).

Of course, not everyone is able to recognize the obvious contradictions in their thought. :wink:

One could of course ridicule such a person for their irrationality and self-contradiction, or respond to their angry outbursts which occur as a result of their self-apparent irrationality. I do not find this to be necessary in this case. — Leontiskos

Some believe that it is best not to assume a direct correlation between a person’s philosophical perspective and their behavior in social situations. Others believe that the latter are a reflection of the former. In this case, I am inclined to argue that Leontiskos’s above personal comments are guided, and limited, by the strictures of their moral philosophy. Depending on one’s perspective, one can take this as praise for the clarity of a foundational morality, or as putting into question the thinly disguised authoritarianism and empathy-blindness that such a fundamentalism generates.

Oh please. A confused little boy like Leontiskos doesn't have the balls to be an authoritarian.