I already told you: "interpersonal 'oughts'." — Leontiskos

Like “you ought to listen to my music, it’s really good”?

Like “you ought to listen to my music, it’s really good”? — Michael

Sure, suggestion, advice, command, remonstrance, etc. These are all interpersonal 'oughts'. I gave my fuller account here: .

Sure, suggestion, advice, command, remonstrance, etc. These are all interpersonal 'oughts' — Leontiskos

Doesn’t seem like a moral obligation though so I think you need to revise your definition.

I don't think you managed to address it at all. Do you believe that we ought not hold contradictory positions, or do you disagree? — Leontiskos

I don't think there is any moral fact of the matter, though there is certainly pragmatic value in continually wiping the mirror.

I don't think you have considered what I proposed seriously enough. (Although understandably it's likely to take some time for you to develop some relevant recognitions.) I recommend looking into Zen for some useful tools for breaking down weakly trained intuitions.

One thing I think might be worth considering, is the way that you yourself have just demonstrated the monkey mindedness I was referring to. Another is your propensity for jumping to conclusions.

Fair warning, I spent the prior 15 years as a regular atheist poster on William Lane Craig's (now shuttered) forum. Here's a thread you might find surprisingly educational:

Does being in a blaming state of mind amount to Monkey Mindedness?

I was debating on creating a new thread, but didn't see the need since this thread essentially morphed into a debate about moral realist accounts vs. moral subjectivism. But, I went ahead and reverted it and created a thread for archive purposes of this thread.

- Thanks, I appreciate that. I think it is important that the thread titles and OPs match the content of the threads.

Doesn’t seem like a moral obligation though... — Michael

Well we've already been through this. I give a definition of 'moral' and demonstrate a moral claim; you say it isn't moral; I ask what you mean by 'moral'; and then you say you have no idea (e.g. ). I'm going to step off the merry-go-round and simply point back to my post <here>, which was intended for any who have a serious interest in this topic.

Edit: The other problem here is that you have consistently ignored the central question of whether A3 is moral. The evasiveness that you have been displaying becomes particularly rarefied when it comes to this question, which was a central question in the first place. Whenever possible, you say, "That claim is not moral." Yet you can't do this with A3, and so the evasion becomes more pronounced in that case ().

Added in an edit to the earlier post:

Your argument was that contradictions inevitably occur, and therefore they are not bad. Wounds also inevitably occur. Are they bad? Should they be avoided? Should we apply bandage and salve, or leave them to fester? — Leontiskos

Doesn’t seem like a moral obligation though... — Michael

How can you make such a claim if you do not know what "moral" is?

That's what they deserve.

How can you make such a claim if you do not know what "moral" is? — Banno

I can remember what sorts of things other people describe as moral.

You made an assessment; this is not a moral obligation; as if you understood what a moral obligation is.

This begins to look like the sort of situation Ciceronianus had in mind.

Your argument was that contradictions inevitably occur, and therefore they are not bad. Wounds also inevitably occur. Are they bad? Should they be avoided? Should we apply bandage and salve, or leave them to fester? — Leontiskos

I already said that there is practical value to resolving one's contradictory beliefs. However, it is no more an indication of moral badness to find that one holds contradictory beliefs than it is an indication of moral badness to find that one has been wounded.

It is simply a consequence of having an evolved brain, that develops intuitions in response to the limited evidence/training available to each individual to learn from, that results in fallible humans having conflicting intuitions. Sure ongoing learning, like bodily hygiene, is practically valuable. However, morally judging people for not being omniscient seems more than a tad unreasonable to me. Do you agree?

I say that a claim like “you ought listen to my music” isn’t a moral claim because I recognise how people use moral language and recognise that they don’t use moral language to describe such a claim.

I accept that a claim like “you ought not hurt puppies” is a moral claim because I recognise how people use moral language and recognise that they use moral language to describe such a claim. But I don’t know what they mean when they describe it as a moral obligation, which is why I’m asking you to explain it.

The issue is that your suggested explanations would include claims that most people wouldn’t describe using moral language and so it seems that your explanations fail in their task.

So I’ll try to make this simple. Here are two interpersonal normative claims:

1. You ought listen to my music
2. You ought not hurt puppies

If the first isn’t a moral obligation but the second is then a) what does it mean to say that the second is a moral obligation and b) what evidence or reasoning determines that the first isn’t a moral obligation but the second is?

You made an assessment; this is not a moral obligation; as if you understood what a moral obligation is. — Banno

No, I just understand how people use moral language.

I know that quarks can be up, down, strange, etc., but I don’t know what this means.

( p & ~p )⊃ q


A contradiction allows anything to be true. That's why they are best avoided - they are unhelpful.

You pretend to understand how moral language is used but not what moral language is. That's somewhat disingenuous.

But the word "moral" - which we inherited from the original title - is far from being unproblematic. "Ethical" is perhaps better, but still not without complexity. "Ought" is somewhat better still, since it at least refocuses on action. We've come to the point where a much broader analysis of action is needed to clear up a morass of misuse. Without that, the thread will just be folk talking past each other.

Angry dolphins.

Cross porpoises.

Cheers.

You pretend to understand how moral language is used but not what moral language is. That's somewhat disingenuous. — Banno

It’s not pretend. There is a significant amount of well reasoned literature on anti-realist metaphysics, whether that be non-cognitivism, error theory, subjectivism, fictionalism, etc., all of which recognise which claims are supposed moral claims but none of which agree on the meaning (or truth) of such claims, so your apparent suggestion that anyone who doesn’t accept your “common sense” realism is being disingenuous is itself disingenuous.

anyone who doesn’t accept your “common sense” realism is being disingenuous is itself disingenuous — Michael

That's not what was suggested at all, of course. We talk about what might be done, what ought be done, what's the best thing to do, and so on. Whatever word you choose for this behaviour, it would be absurd to deny that you engage in it.

We talk about what might be done, what ought be done, what's the best thing to do, and so on. Whatever word you choose for this behaviour, it would be absurd to deny that you engage in it. — Banno

None of this requires positing the existence of moral facts. We can do all of this without introducing moral language.

So when do you get to the part where you make sense of morality?

Nice. I'd be interested to hear more from you on this, perhaps in a different thread. :wink:

We can do all of this without introducing moral language. — Michael

You do not have to call our talk of "what might be done, what ought be done, what's the best thing to do, and so on" moral, if you do not wish to. That's neither here no there. But there are such sentences, and some of them are true. QED.

That's neither here no there. But there are such sentences, and some of them are true. QED. — Banno

You think non-cognitivists and error theorists don’t say that I should brush my teeth or that it’s best if I don’t eat too much sugar?

I don't really care. It's true that you should brush your teeth. We can work from that rather than assigning "ism"s.

I'm going to step off the merry-go-round — Leontiskos

Yep. Michael's direction is absent. We still have the problem of What To Do.

I don't really care. It's true that you should brush your teeth. We can work from that rather than assigning "ism"s. — Banno

If you don’t recognise the difference between a moral obligation and a pragmatic suggestion then you ought try reading some philosophy.

I don't think that's me. I suggested sorting out such terms earlier this morning. This conversation is swinging in the breeze. Several times, I've asked you to give your account some direction. I haven't seen any, and still don't. What remains is that there are conversations about what we ought to do, and that these conversations include true statements. The lengths to which folk go to avoid admitting this are extraordinary.

Yawn.

I am not surprised that you would pat yourself on the back like this, with no account in sight. It occurs constantly. I find your own thoughts on most subjects to be vacuous, and yes, thread-derailing. For example, your post <here> was one of the most unintelligent things I have read on this forum. — Leontiskos

I hadnt intended those remarks on realist and subjectivist morality for you, although it’s true that I figured you would see them. That I find certain approaches to morality unpalatable does not mean that I dont accept their value for those who embrace them, it just means that they don’t work for me. As far as back-patting, I think we should all pat ourselves on the back, don’t you? Each of us feels a secret sense of superiority over others, an illusion born of knowing ourselves better than we know anyone else.

I recognize that your arguments are based on careful reading of the relevant theological and philosophical scholarship. So if I were to directly engage with you on these topics I would attempt to form a bridge between your background and mine. Who knows, the interchange might even be non-vacuous.

You do not have to call our talk of "what might be done, what ought be done, what's the best thing to do, and so on" moral, if you do not wish to. That's neither here no there. But there are such sentences, and some of them are true. QED. — Banno

Right.

You think non-cognitivists and error theorists don’t say that I should brush my teeth or that it’s best if I don’t eat too much sugar? — Michael

Nope, because the central issue is the is-ought divide, and, "I should brush my teeth" is an 'ought'. They will reduce it to a hypothetical claim and avoid giving any sort of non-hypothetical support to that claim. Conceived as a binding or non-hypothetical 'ought', they would have as many problems with it as anything else.

I say that a claim like “you ought listen to my music” isn’t a moral claim because I recognise how people use moral language and recognise that they don’t use moral language to describe such a claim.

I accept that a claim like “you ought not hurt puppies” is a moral claim because I recognise how people use moral language and recognise that they use moral language to describe such a claim. But I don’t know what they mean when they describe it as a moral obligation, which is why I’m asking you to explain it. — Michael

But you also vacillate on things like A3, so it's hard to believe these ever-shifting tactics are in earnest:

Edit: The other problem here is that you have consistently ignored the central question of whether A3 is moral. The evasiveness that you have been displaying becomes particularly rarefied when it comes to this question, which was a central question in the first place. Whenever possible, you say, "That claim is not moral." Yet you can't do this with A3, and so the evasion becomes more pronounced in that case (↪Michael). — Leontiskos

With A3 you shift tactics, saying, "That's just a command. I see nothing but a command." (Well of course it's not a command, because it's the conclusion of a practical syllogism!)

Else, consider when you claimed that the dilemma you posed () was an "inclusive or" ().

-

If the first isn’t a moral obligation but the second is then a) what does it mean to say that the second is a moral obligation and b) what evidence or reasoning determines that the first isn’t a moral obligation but the second is? — Michael

You are the one claiming that they are different, not me. You are the one presuming your own definition of moral without defining or defending it. I have given two definitions now. You have given none, despite making claims about what is and is not moral.

If you don’t recognise the difference between a moral obligation and a pragmatic suggestion then you ought try reading some philosophy. — Michael

When you speak of a "moral obligation" you are clearly speaking of a Kantian moral obligation. I think I understand this better than you do. I am not a Kantian. I don't think Kant's Groundwork holds up. I have directed you to freely available academic articles illustrating the problems and context of such an approach. You are the one who ought to try reading some philosophy.

The lengths to which folk go to avoid admitting this are extraordinary. — Banno

Agreed. "You can lead a horse to water..." There are a lot of folks here who are not genuinely interested in doing philosophy, and others who are capable of doing philosophy but choose not to on certain topics.

This is why Plato was so harsh on the Sophists: because Sophistry is Philosophy's evil twin, in large part indistinguishable from it. I wrote <a post> looking at Plato's conditions for philosophical dialogue, and that passage of the Meno is something I occasionally return to.

I haven't written a thread on morality because I am convinced the moral sophists are too thick on the ground for it to be fruitful. The only reason I wrote that <reference post> is because I came to believe that there were people who were genuinely interested in and troubled by Anscombe's thesis. Or in other words, that some people are interested in serious moral philosophy. I'm sure moral realists would be more willing to expound their theses if they believed that they would meet with genuine philosophical interaction.