In your other thread you ask if something like A1 is a moral claim or a pragmatic claim.

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Why can't it be both? — Leontiskos

I accept that I have a pragmatic reason to not cause myself suffering. But what do you mean by saying that we also have a moral reason to not cause myself suffering? What does the term "moral" add? And what evidence or reasoning suggests that, in addition to being pragmatic, avoiding suffering is also moral?

In all the theorising in this thread we may lose track of the purpose of ethical thinking: to decide what to do. Ethics has to be about the relation between belief and action. — Banno

Lots of things we do have nothing to do with ethics. Lots of things we do are amoral. I don't sleep with men, play baseball, or cut my wrists.

So when do we get to the part where you actually explain morality?

So when do we get to the part where you actually explain morality? — Michael

I have been. A shame you seem to have a sort of blindness to it. It looks as if you have decided that you cannot act unless you are certain of what to do, and yet you must act and without certainty. So you are stuck.

I accept that I have a pragmatic reason to not cause myself suffering. But what do you mean by saying that we also have a moral reason to not cause myself suffering? What does the term "moral" add? And what evidence or reasoning suggests that, in addition to being pragmatic, avoiding suffering is also moral? — Michael

I don't think you know what you mean by 'moral' any more than Kant did.

Here's the question: Do you agree with me that, ceteris paribus, one ought not cause suffering for themselves? Remember, I am concerned with binding normative propositions (). I don't know what you mean by 'moral', and I don't think you do either.

It looks as if you have decided that you cannot act unless you are certain of what to do, and yet you must act and without certainty. So you are stuck. — Banno

I don't need to posit something like "moral obligations" to decide how to act. Wants and pragmatic concerns are more than sufficient.

Do you agree with me that, ceteris paribus, one ought not cause suffering for themselves? — Leontiskos

As a pragmatic matter, yes. But I'm asking about morality.

I don't need to posit something like "moral obligations" to decide how to act. Wants and pragmatic concerns are more than sufficient. — Michael

If that were so, your presence in this forum seems inexplicable.

As a pragmatic matter, yes. But I'm asking about morality. — Michael

You don't see the incongruity here?

- What's with these popcorn replies? Are you reading my posts? I said:

I don't know what you mean by 'moral', and I don't think you do either. — Leontiskos

You replied:

But I'm asking about morality. — Michael

What do you mean by it? Apparently you mean <things we should do for no reason at all> (). Are you surprised that you haven't discovered any things we should do for no reason at all?

If that were so, your presence in this forum seems inexplicable. — Banno

Why?

You don't see the incongruity here? — Banno

No. Unless you want to argue for some form of naturalism where "moral" just means "pragmatic"? In which case see Moore's open question argument.

You're the one who said that not causing suffering is both pragmatic and moral, so I'm asking you what you mean by "moral" when you say this.

You're the one who said that not causing suffering is both pragmatic and moral, so I'm asking you what you mean when you say this. — Michael

But you're the one who objected that something cannot be pragmatic and moral in the first place, so obviously the burden is on you. You are the one claiming that there is some distinction. I don't even know what it means to say that something cannot be pragmatic and moral. I don't know what definition of 'moral' could account for such a strange approach.

Else, getting away from Ross' language, I would say moral anti-realism is the idea that, <There are no moral propositions that are binding on all>, or what I count as the same thing, <There are no normative propositions that are binding on all>. — Leontiskos

But you're the one who objected that something cannot be pragmatic and moral in the first place — Leontiskos

I'm not saying that they can't be. I'm only saying that "pragmatic" and "moral" don't mean the same thing (see Moore's open question argument). When I asked you if it was pragmatic or moral, interpret it as an inclusive or.

This conversation is well off the rails. Ethics is fundamentally about action and belief - about what to do. Yet one cannot wait until our ethical considerations are all settled and our morality derived from a foundation of certainty before one acts; That you choose not to eat babies - to return to your example - shows that you act ethically, and this despite not having the firm foundation you crave.

You seem to be in a position parallel to @Corvus, who denies certainty of the "external world" while interacting with it through the forums.

This conversation is well off the rails. — Banno

Because you won't address what I'm saying.

Not every action is ethical. Not every choice requires ethical deliberation. My decision to play, or not play, baseball has nothing to do with ethics at all.

So you need something other than vague references to "actions" and "choices" if you want to make any sense of, and justify, all this seemingly unnecessary talk about morality. We don't need it. We can get by perfectly well just considering what we want and what's pragmatic.

I'm only saying that "pragmatic" and "moral" don't mean the same thing. — Michael

I am repeating myself, but I think the moral and the normative are the same. I don't think there are non-moral 'oughts'. I also don't think 'ought' claims that admit of exceptions are non-moral (hence my "ceteris paribus"). I think consequentialism is a moral theory. I think the Kantian understanding of morality expressed by your thread is vacuous, and I think our culture labors under it needlessly.

I think you need to read Simpson's, "Autonomous Morality and the Idea of the Noble." — Leontiskos

(I'm probably going to leave it there for now. I'm a bit tired of this fast-food approach to philosophy.)

You seem to be in a position parallel to Corvus, who denies certainty of the "external world" while interacting with it through the forums. — Banno

I think you may agree with me that Kant's epistemology was as impossible as his moral theory, and I would say, with Simpson, that this is no coincidence. Granted, the epistemological problems preceded Kant, but he managed to fit morality into that square circle.

I don't think there are non-moral 'oughts'. — Leontiskos

Seems inconsistent with ordinary language.

I ought to brush my teeth. I ought to buy my groceries whilst the sale is on. I ought not go out in the rain without an umbrella. I ought not move my pawn backwards.

This is a perfectly acceptable use of language. Why introduce a new ontological category of "moral" facts? What purpose do they serve?

Why introduced a new ontological category of "moral" facts? What purpose do they serve? — Michael

Ask Kant.

Not every action is ethical. Not every choice requires ethical deliberation. My decision to play, or not play, baseball has nothing to do with ethics at all. — Michael

Of course it is. In choosing to play a game you are choosing not to volunteer to fight in Ukraine. Ethics pervades everything you do.

Kant's epistemology was as impossible as his moral theory — Leontiskos

yep.

In choosing to play a game you are choosing not to volunteer to fight in Ukraine. Ethics pervades everything you do. — Banno

What does choosing not to volunteer to fight in Ukraine have to do with ethics?

And it must be exhausting for you to have to consider "should I go fight in Ukraine instead?" every time you choose to do something.

Seems inconsistent with ordinary language. — Michael

I should say that I am perfectly open to the definition of morality as justice (i.e. pertaining to interactions with others). Normative justice claims, if you like. I think either definition is fine, but the justice definition is closer to ordinary usage.

What does choosing not to volunteer to fight in Ukraine have to do with ethics? — Michael

That leaves me somewhat nonplused. We've found why we are talking past each other?

What does choosing not to volunteer to fight in Ukraine have to do with ethics? — Michael

The idea here is probably that the act involves a moral omission.

The idea here is that the act involves a moral omission. — Leontiskos

And that needs to be explained, not simply asserted. I don't know what this word "moral" means. Does it refer to some natural property in the world? If so, what? If not then I need someone to actually make sense of it and justify its existence. It seems superfluous. What mystery about the world does it answer?

Meanwhile, I'm going to watch some TV and not worry about whether or not watching TV is "moral". I do it simply because it interests me, and that's enough.

And that needs to be explained, not simply asserted. — Michael

I think you're just being contentious at this point. You consistently refuse the burden of proof, refuse to give substantive answers, and nitpick everything that is said.

You say A1 is not 'moral' by the mysterious definition you have consistently refused to provide. What about A3? Is that 'moral'?

A1. Ceteris paribus, I should not cause suffering for myself
A2. Others are like me
A3. Therefore, ceteris paribus, I should not cause suffering for others — Leontiskos

I think you're just being contentious at this point. You consistently refuse the burden of proof, refuse to give substantive answers, and nitpick everything that is said.

You say A1 is not 'moral' by the mysterious definition you consistently refuse to provide. What about A3? Is that 'moral'? — Leontiskos

I don't know what "moral" means so I can't answer. It's pragmatic, sure. So what else is there? You're the one positing the existence of some other quality. The burden is on you to explain it and justify it.

I don't know what "moral" means so I can't answer. — Michael

That's odd, given that you have consistently objected that my claims are non-moral. How do you object on the basis of a concept you do not know?

It's pragmatic, sure. So what else is there? — Michael

You spoke of ordinary language. Is, "Do not needlessly cause others to suffer," moral according to your understanding of ordinary language?

That's odd, given that you have consistently objected that my claims are non-moral. How do you object on the basis of a concept you do not know? — Leontiskos

I don't think I've said this. I've only said that "one ought not X" can be understood in pragmatic terms, and that if Moore's open question argument is correct then "moral" doesn't mean "pragmatic".

It might also be understood in moral terms, but that's on you to explain, not me.

You spoke of ordinary language. Is, "Do not needlessly cause others to suffer," moral according to your understanding of ordinary language? — Leontiskos

Again, I don't know what "moral" means. I only interpret that statement as a command. Someone is telling me what to do. "Don't cause others to suffer", "don't forget to brush your teeth", "don't go outside today because it's raining", etc.

I don't know what this word "moral" means. — Michael

Ayer would be proud.

Again, I don't know what "moral" means. — Michael

Well, if we define morality according to justice, as the realm of interpersonal 'oughts', then A3 is a moral truth.