It might be helpful if you substantiate your notion of "obligation". I'm not aware of any normative account where moral imperatives are literally obligatory. If so there would be no moral questions, people would simply act as morality dictates.

Even if morality were a subjective matter, just personal preference, your own conscience carries a normative weight, and violating it comes at a cost. — hypericin

I would say that in the realm of speculative reason there is the law of non-contradiction, which no one directly denies, but which they do indirectly deny. Are we obliged to obey the law of non-contradiction? Yes, I think so. Are we necessitated to obey it? Yes and no. People contradict themselves, but not directly and on purpose. See my conversation with .

The same holds in the realm of practical reason. Things which we know (or believe) to be good are things that we know we ought to do. Things which we know (or believe) to be bad or evil are things that we know we oughtn't do. Are we obliged to obey this first principle of practical reason? Yes, I think so. Are we necessitated to obey it? Yes and no. People do what they believe to be evil, but not directly and on purpose. They justify evil acts by re-specifying them according to some other perspective, and in relation to a highly desirable end.*

So although we know A3, there are nevertheless times when we cause suffering in unjust ways, and when we do this we are "looking away" from, or failing to apply our obligation, just as when someone contradicts themselves they are "looking away" from, or failing to apply the law of non-contradiction. We know that obeying things like the law of non-contradiction and A3 is required of us, but we are nevertheless capable of distracting ourselves from this obligation and carrying out bad acts, in both the speculative and practical realms.


* For example, "[Kant's] own rigoristic convictions on the subject of lying were so intense that it never occurred to him that a lie could be relevantly described as anything but just a lie (e.g. as "a lie in such-and-such circumstances"). His rule about universalizable maxims is useless without stipulations as to what shall count as a relevant description of an action with a view to constructing a maxim about it" (Anscombe, "Modern Moral Philosophy," p. 2).

b) (as suggested by Anscombe, Wittgenstein, and Schopenhauer) the very concept of obligations sans a rule-giver or punishment and reward categorical imperatives is vacuous, and — Michael

You could think of obligations in terms of punishment and reward if you like. "If you do that you will suffer," or, "If you do that you will regret it." I don't think this captures the full sense, but it is something.

Then perhaps you could explain what obligations "truly" are. — Michael

Perhaps the answer is that moral language is complex and cannot be adequately explained by a single metaethics. — Michael

Note that in that thread you give a disjunctive syllogism. You say something like, "Obligation could be x, y, or z, but since it is none of those things we are in a pickle" (you speak about "a moral claim's truth conditions").

To me, this is like saying, "The car could be red, green, or blue, but since it is none of those things it has no color." But what if there are other colors? What if obligation is not reducible to descriptive facts, or modal logic (necessitation), or mechanistic science? What if teleology and orderedness exists?

If we accept the is-ought distinction one might be tempted to think that the only possible ground of morality is brute 'oughts'. But what if there are other realities which are neither is/ought, but which ground 'oughts'? I am thinking of something like the nature of suffering. Once we experience suffering and come to understand what it is, then A1 follows, and A1 is an 'ought'. Thus there is a tertium quid between valueless 'is' truths and 'ought' truths.

The response here is apparently, "Well A1 doesn't fit into my categories, therefore I reject it." Of course it doesn't fit into your categories! That's the whole point. Your categories are too narrow, and there are obvious truths which burst those categories.

I would say that in the realm of speculative reason there is the law of non-contradiction, which no one directly denies, but which they do indirectly deny. Are we obliged to obey the law of non-contradiction? Yes, I think so... — Leontiskos

Do you think it is a moral failure for people to have inconsistent beliefs?

Do you think it is a moral failure for people to have inconsistent beliefs? — wonderer1

"Things which we know (or believe) to be bad or evil are things that we know we oughtn't do." We know it is bad or evil to simultaneously hold contradictory propositions, and therefore we know we ought not do so. Whether one wants to call this a moral failure will depend on their definition of moral. I have given two definitions, one which would apply and one which would not.

What do you think?

I have rewritten the OP to reflect the developing changes in my moral subjectivist view as I have conversed with many people on this forum: the original OP is at the button titled ‘Original OP’ for archive purposes. The purpose of the revamped edition is to provide a full defense of moral subjectivism. — Bob Ross

You shouldn't just rewrite the OP and the title of a thread after 30+ pages of discussion. I'd say this shouldn't even be allowed, but I realize the forum can't currently enforce edit-timers. I'd suggest changing it back instead of giving the mods a headache with strange cases like this. If you want to rewrite your OP from scratch then make a new thread.

(This is a great real-time example of an 'ought', by the way)

I think that is a fine description of moral obligation. To refresh, my question was a response to:

I would say that, by the very substance of anti-realist metaethics, obligations aren't obligatory [...] If the anti-realist theory intends to be merely descriptive, then it is denying the existence of true obligations and substituting some faux placeholder. — Leontiskos

In the sense of obligation you described, how does moral subjectivism fail to provide "true obligations", where moral subjectivism is defined as "moral values and judgements are personal, but are deeply informed by both enculturation (moral training) and moral instincts (empathy and a sense of justice/fairness)."

I think that is a fine description of moral obligation. — hypericin

:up:

In the sense of obligation you described, how does moral subjectivism fail to provide "true obligations", where moral subjectivism is defined as "moral values and judgements are personal, but are deeply informed by both enculturation (moral training) and moral instincts (empathy and a sense of justice/fairness)." — hypericin

Well, here's the dilemma again:

If the anti-realist theory intends to be normative, then [...] If the anti-realist theory intends to be merely descriptive, then [...] — Leontiskos

You said:

Even if morality were a subjective matter, just personal preference, your own conscience carries a normative weight, and violating it comes at a cost.

Also, I'll note that anti-realist theories seldom if ever intend to be normative. — hypericin

You say that a subjective conscience morality is normative, but that anti-realist theories (including subjectivism) seldom if ever intend to be normative. Is your subjective conscience theory intended to be normative?

The first thing I would want to know about any theory is whether it intends to be normative.

(I don't think @Banno or myself have been equivocating between theories about morality and moral theories; I think it is the subjectivists who are doing this. Therefore I would like them to be candid about whether their theory is intended to be normative.)

You say that a subjective conscience morality is normative, but that anti-realist theories (including subjectivism) seldom if ever intend to be normative. Is your subjective conscience theory intended to be normative? — Leontiskos

No. I would say not that one should listen to their conscience, but that one does.

No. I would say not that one should listen to their conscience, but that one does. — hypericin

Is it possible to ignore and act contrary to your conscience?

Of course.

- Okay, so you are saying that it is not that one should listen to their conscience, but rather that people often do listen to their conscience? So we have a sort of statistical idea? Something like, "Lots of people listen to the advice of their parents. I am not saying that anyone should do so, only noting that a lot of people do."

Yes, people often do listen to their conscience. Conscience is just how one's moral sensibility expresses itself to ourselves. "Listening to one's conscience" means acting according to our moral sensibility.

Yes, people often do listen to their conscience. Conscience is just how one's moral sensibility expresses itself to ourselves. "Listening to one's conscience" means acting according to our moral sensibility. — hypericin

But do you see how you are toeing the line between normativity and non-normativity, which I have complained about several times throughout this thread?

Should we act according to our moral sensibility or not? Should we listen to our conscience or not? Should we follow the majority or not? Is this a normative theory or not? At some point clarity and precision need to be brought to the position you are advocating so that we know what you are saying and what you are not saying. If that doesn't happen then I will try to follow you in one direction or another, and then four posts down the road you will complain that I am misrepresenting your position, saying that it is not normative at all. "The first thing I would want to know about any theory is whether it intends to be normative."

But do you see how you are toeing the line between normativity and non-normativity, which I have complained about several times throughout this thread? — Leontiskos

No, I can't say that I can see how I'm toeing the line. AFAICT everything I have been saying has been descriptive, not normative.

Should we act according to our moral sensibility or not? Should we listen to our conscience or not? — Leontiskos

These are your questions, not mine. I think we probably should, but that is not the focus here.

These are your questions, not mine. I think we probably should, but that is not the focus here. — hypericin

But what is the focus, if not 'shoulds', 'oughts', and the "I thinks" of subjectivism?

Are there moral facts, and if so are they objective? I believe there are, and that they are subjective. You believe they are objective. The goal is a description of what these purported "moral facts" are, and how they operate. "Moral facts" involve "should", "ought", so in that sense they are the focus. But the idea is to describe, not prescribe.

Are there moral facts, and if so are they objective? I believe there are, and that they are subjective. You believe they are objective. The goal is a description of what these purported "moral facts" are, and how they operate. "Moral facts" involve "should", "ought", so in that sense they are the focus. But the idea is to describe, not prescribe. — hypericin

But if a theory is using 'ought' in a non-normative way, then it is "denying the existence of true obligations and substituting some faux placeholder" (). 'Ought' is a normative term. Do you really say that 'ought' is a non-normative term?

Further, starting with conscience and calling it a non-normative reality is a fraught way to begin such an account, given that conscience is universally accepted to be the very thing that we should listen to. "People do listen to their conscience, but I am not saying that you should listen to it." It feels like bait in a trap.

Please note that when I spoke about the law of non-contradiction and the first principle of practical reason, I was clear that they are normative/obligatory (). Conscience is an exact parallel, perhaps influenced by my examples, and yet you pivot in the opposite direction and call it non-normative/non-obligatory. In law and morality conscience is thought to be so binding that it is said that an erring conscience binds, i.e. one must listen to their conscience even if their conscience is wrong. This is why "conscience rights" prescind from whether the conscience is right or wrong. Such laws recognize that asking someone to disobey their conscience would be a grave assault on them.

I'm going to focus on the thing you say is not the focus:

I think we probably should [listen to our conscience]... — hypericin

If you think we should listen to our conscience, then your theory of conscience is normative, and it is a "moral theory" (). You add "probably," but this is the tentativeness that I addressed earlier on:

To judge an action is to hold that it should have occurred or should not have occurred, with reference to the person acting. It doesn't matter whether we "think," "suggest," "opine," "suppose," "admonish," "argue," "force," et al. In each case the judgment of action is occurring (moral judgment). Tentative judgments are still judgments. Abductive judgments are still judgments (judgments to the best possibility, or judgments from significantly limited information). Judgments which are open to correction or revision are still judgments.

The posts of yours that I have read always contain something like, "Well, the judgment is abductive so it isn't really a moral judgment." That's not right. It's still a moral judgment, it's just a moral judgment formed or acted upon with less certitude. — Leontiskos

Yes, people often do listen to their conscience. Conscience is just how one's moral sensibility expresses itself to ourselves. "Listening to one's conscience" means acting according to our moral sensibility. — hypericin

I think conscience is just self talk. People’s conscience also tells them they should have killed that rapist when they had the chance. They should have kept the money they found, etc. We call self-talk conscience when the talk seems to match conventional behavioural expectations as we might find them in church or a popular sitcom. Many people regret not stealing or lying or beating the shit out of someone, although they might find comfort behind a pretence of having done the ‘right thing.’

Yet one cannot wait until our ethical considerations are all settled and our morality derived from a foundation of certainty before one acts; That you choose not to eat babies - to return to your example - shows that you act ethically, and this despite not having the firm foundation you crave.

What about those of us who are not here necessarily to figure out how to act on a personal level, but wish to discuss the theoretical underpinnings of moral systems purely out of intellectual curiosity? All you're giving them is a gigantic dodge.

Well, if we define morality according to justice, as the realm of interpersonal 'oughts', then A3 is a moral truth. — Leontiskos

So to say that something is moral is to say that it is just? That just shifts the question to a new mystery. What is the ontological status of justice? Is it a natural or non-natural property? Is it a fact we discover, like physics, or is it a fact we construct through social convention? How do we verify or falsify a claim that something is just?

Do you think it is a moral failure for people to have inconsistent beliefs?
— wonderer1

"Things which we know (or believe) to be bad or evil are things that we know we oughtn't do." We know it is bad or evil to simultaneously hold contradictory propositions, and therefore we know we ought not do so. Whether one wants to call this a moral failure will depend on their definition of moral. I have given two definitions, one which would apply and one which would not.

What do you think? — Leontiskos

I think evil is in the eye of the beholder, in that evil is something our evolved monkey minds tend to project on things in the world. The notion of a HUD, where things which aren't actually part of the world get projected on top of more straightforward perceptions, might help illustrate this notion.

As we social primates do, in the heat of the moment I'm prone to see people as evil and act on the basis of such mental projections. However in this era, where dishing out the law of the jungle is seldom well advised, I think it is generally better to recognize one's mental projection of evil, for the monkey mindedness that it is, and try to achieve a more enlightened perspective. If I am able to step back from seeing red and recognize my projection of evil for what it is, I tend to be able to act in a more productive way.

Contrary to your claim that, "We know it is bad or evil to simultaneously hold contradictory propositions, and therefore we know we ought not do so.", I understand that it is simply an aspect of human learning that we will often find ourselves holding contradictory propositions. It doesn't make much sense to see oneself as evil for exemplifying such a human characteristic. Of course it is valuable to resolve self contradictory beliefs to the extent one is able, but that hardly makes a person with unresolved self contradictions evil.

A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines. With consistency a great soul has simply nothing to do. He may as well concern himself with his shadow on the wall. Speak what you think now in hard words, and to-morrow speak what to-morrow thinks in hard words again, though it contradict every thing you said to-day. — 'Ah, so you shall be sure to be misunderstood.' — Is it so bad, then, to be misunderstood? Pythagoras was misunderstood, and Socrates, and Jesus, and Luther, and Copernicus, and Galileo, and Newton, and every pure and wise spirit that ever took flesh. To be great is to be misunderstood.

― Ralph Waldo Emerson, Self-Reliance: An Excerpt from Collected Essays, First Series

I think conscience is just self talk. People’s conscience also tells them they should have killed that rapist when they had the chance. They should have kept the money they found, etc. We call self-talk conscience when the talk seems to match conventional behavioural expectations as we might find them in church or a popular sitcom. Many people regret not stealing or lying or beating the shit out of someone, although they might find comfort behind a pretence of having done the ‘right thing.’ — Tom Storm

I’m with you here. I find both moral realism and moral subjectivism to be fairly nauseating, but my own touchstones on the subject of morality are so far removed from these ways of thinking that bringing them in would just derail the thread. Of course, that won’t stop me from sneaking in a quote from Ken Gergen:

We commonly suppose that suffering is caused by people whose conscience is flawed or who pursue their aims without regard for the consequences to others. From a relational standpoint, we may entertain the opposite hypothesis: in important respects we suffer from a plenitude of good.

As we social primates do, in the heat of the moment I'm prone to see people as evil and act on the basis of such mental projections. However in this era, where dishing out the law of the jungle is seldom well advised, I think it is generally better to recognize one's mental projection of evil, for the monkey mindedness that it is, and try to achieve a more enlightened perspective. — wonderer1

You god-denying heretic

You god-denying heretic — Joshs

You left off, "and vile thread derailer". :wink:

So to say that something is moral is to say that it is just? That just shifts the question to a new mystery. — Michael

I already told you: "interpersonal 'oughts'." :roll:

A3 is a true interpersonal 'ought'.

I see the atheist trolls have begun to arrive (, ).

I see the atheist trolls have arrived (↪wonderer1, ↪Joshs). — Leontiskos

Ah, the warm glow of Christian love.

Anyway, I gave a serious response to your question. What do you think?

Anyway, I gave a serious response to your question. — wonderer1

I don't think you managed to address the central question. Do you believe that we ought not hold contradictory positions, or do you disagree?

Your argument was that contradictions inevitably occur, and therefore they are not bad. Wounds also inevitably occur. Are they bad? Should they be avoided? Should we apply bandage and salve, or leave them to fester?

I find both moral realism and moral subjectivism to be fairly nauseating, but my own touchstones on the subject of morality are so far removed from these ways of thinking that bringing them in would just derail the thread. — Joshs

I am not surprised that you would pat yourself on the back like this, with no account in sight. It occurs constantly. I find your own thoughts on most subjects to be vacuous, and yes, thread-derailing. For example, your post <here> was one of the most unintelligent things I have read on this forum. I think I'll start my New Year's resolution early by ignoring the vacuous back-patter. :wink: