By the very substance of anti-realist metaethics, obligations aren't objective/absolute/intrinsic/inherent/unconditional/categorical or however you want to phrase it. — Michael

I would say that, by the very substance of anti-realist metaethics, obligations aren't obligatory. If the anti-realist theory intends to be normative, then this makes it incoherent. If the anti-realist theory intends to be merely descriptive, then it is denying the existence of true obligations and substituting some faux placeholder. Folks in this thread flip back and forth between those two options, wanting to have their cake and eat it, too; to have obligations while simultaneously holding that nothing is truly obligatory.

I think the problem is that you have a realist conception of the meaning of "ought" that you (rightly) find incompatible with an anti-realist conception, but your seeming suggestion that anti-realist obligations aren't "real" obligations is begging the question. — Michael

Remember when you yourself made the same point I am making? See:

We can also defend this with reference to Wittgenstein. In our ordinary language use, as understood by any competent speaker, when someone claims that one ought not X we understand them as attempting to express an objective fact. As such, moral subjectivism is inconsistent with ordinary language use, and so it must be that if moral statements are truth-apt then either moral realism or error theory is correct. — Michael

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The only possible meaningful obligations are those that are conditional on some relevant rule-giver. Asking why one ought obey this rule-giver is a meaningless question given the actual meaning of "ought". — Michael

I don't think so, but you are free to develop this.

I agree with @Banno that glancing blows on moral realism are occurring. I gave my account earlier:

I am thinking of moral anti-realism as the idea that, to use your own words, <There are no "subject-referencing prescriptive statements" that are objectively binding on all>. — Leontiskos

Else, getting away from Ross' language, I would say moral anti-realism is the idea that, <There are no moral propositions that are binding on all>, or what I count as the same thing, <There are no normative propositions that are binding on all>. Of course, I haven't insisted on this definition in the thread, but each time these equivocations occur I point to it. It may not divide things up in quite the same way, but I think it helps get at what we are actually interested in discussing.

I think this may help avoid these strange ideas where "ought" is entirely redefined, or what is said to be "obligatory" is very clearly non-obligatory. Meta-ethics is, in part, about what 'ought' means, but it is very obvious that it does not mean, "Society says not to" (). You yourself have agreed with this: .

Ok. That all makes sense. It's sounds like more of a long term project than a thread, hence the large bibliography. — Banno

Right. I don't really expect anyone to engage those ideas here. I mostly wanted to have something to point to when people ask me about the crux at the heart of Anscombe's paper, and this seemed as good a place as any other.

I agree with Banno that glancing attacks on moral realism are occurring. — Leontiskos

I apologise :P

At least i now have some understanding, and grasp what i'm denying :sweat:

I apologise :P

At least i now have some understanding, and grasp what i'm denying :sweat: — AmadeusD

No worries. :smile: The difficulty is that SEP is trying to take all sorts of significantly different views and fit them into neat categories. To some extent this works, and to some extent it doesn't. We've become hung up on the edge cases, and I would say needlessly. Michael is interested in the taxonomy, but in general I would prefer just focusing on the views that participants actually hold.

Anscombe's "Modern Moral Philosophy"

This remains for me the central and most troubling article in Ethics. It's what drove me to virtue ethics. — Banno

That thread looks interesting, but instead of resurrecting it I am just going to make a one-off comment or two here. I was looking through a few things and I found a book by Duncan Richter, Anscombe's Moral Philosophy. In chapter three he comments on this debate, and I will just point out one or two things that popped out at me.

He notes that several philosophers have drawn attention to Anscombe's antecedents who have made very similar claims, two being Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein:

Every ought is . . . necessarily conditioned by punishment or reward. . . . But if those conditions are thought away, the concept of ought or obligation is left without any meaning: and so absolute obligation is certainly a contradicto in adjecto. . . . Putting ethics in an imperative form as a doctrine of duties, and thinking of the moral worth or worthlessness of human actions as the fulfillment or violation of duties, undeniably spring, together with the obligation, solely from theological morals, and accordingly from the decalogue.[42]

42. Arthur Schopenhauer, On the Basis of Morality, trans. E. Payne (Providence, RI: Berghahn Books, 1995), 55-56, quoted in Roger Crisp, “Does Modern Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?”, in O’Hear, 75-93, 77, note 7. — Schopenhauer criticizing Kant

“what does the word ‘ought’ mean? A child ought to do such-and-such means that if he does not do it something unpleasant will happen. Reward and punishment. The essential thing is that the other person is brought to do something. “Ought” makes sense only if there is something lending force and support to it—a power that punishes and rewards. Ought in itself is nonsensical.”[50]

50. This is Wittgenstein according to Friedrich Waismann in Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle, trans. Schulte and McGuinness, Oxford, 1979, 118, quoted in Charles Pigden, “Anscombe on ‘Ought,’ ” The Philosophical Quarterly 38, no. 150 (January 1988): 20-41, 32-33, note 10. — Wittgenstein

Richter argues that there are important instances of early non-religious philosophers who maintain strong obligations, including Aristotle and Cicero. Richter is arguing in large part from scholarly authorities, but I think he is surely correct. For example:

To conclude: Anscombe’s conceptual thesis is based on an historical claim—that the moral Ought is a Christian product. Cicero’s On Duties demonstrates that this is false. Analogues of the modern moral concepts antedate Christianity. Her argument for giving up the moral Ought fails since it is founded on factual error.[54]

54. Charles Pigden, “Anscombe on ‘Ought,’ ” The Philosophical Quarterly 38, no. 150 (January 1988): 40. — Charles Pigden

I think this is a rather important point. Richter's book is sympathetic to Anscombe, so after admitting that the argument has force, he says:

...But Anscombe’s thoughts on the cause of the problem are speculative. Her main claim is that contemporary philosophers use words such as ‘ought’ in bad ways. Nothing about Cicero can disprove this. If Anscombe is making much the same claim about ‘ought’ as Wittgenstein made, after all, then it is noteworthy that there is nothing historical in what Wittgenstein is reported to have said. It is true that Anscombe’s history is questionable (I am not saying that it is wrong). It is not true that this matters much except to historians and, perhaps, Catholic propagandists (of whom Anscombe was undoubtedly one). But if the best defense that I can offer of Anscombe’s history is that it is irrelevant to her main point, then we should perhaps return to that point. — Duncan Richter, Anscombe's Moral Philosophy, ch. 3

He of course goes on to explain her "main point."

Anscombe is a careful thinker and writer, and I think she could be defended in various ways, but the point for our purposes is that, although her dilemma is pressing, her historical thesis is flawed. The second paper by Peter Simpson that I referenced is meant to identify the historical lineage of just this sort of dilemma, which is acute for the modern tradition ().

(This is also very much related to 's older thread, particularly the quote above from Schopenhauer.)

her historical thesis is flawed — Leontiskos

Interesting. Working through this post and it's references (only insofar as they are directly relevant and retrievable) I got the feeling that I agree with Schopenhauer on the nature of obligations, but didn't think it required any kind of relegation to theology to support.

Having not read Anscombe, but knowing she was a Catholic, that seems more like protecting the roost than it does actual historicity (which i guess Richter points on half of). But, the idea that obligations arise from artificial moral systems predicated on results seems pretty clear to me.

Interesting. Working through this post and it's references (only insofar as they are directly relevant and retrievable) I got the feeling that I agree with Schopenhauer on the nature of obligations, but didn't think it required any kind of relegation to theology to support. — AmadeusD

So the formalization that has pointed out is in an archived SEP article:

Here is the straightforward interpretation in simple modus ponens form:

(1) If religiously based ethics is false, then virtue ethics is the way moral philosophy ought to be developed.
(2a) Religious based ethics is false (at least for her interlocutors)
(3a) Therefore, virtue ethics is the way moral philosophy should be developed.

But one person’s modus ponens is another person’s modus tollens:

(1) If religiously based ethics is false, then virtue ethics is the way moral philosophy ought to be developed.
(2b) It is not the case that virtue ethics is the way to develop moral philosophy
(3b) Therefore, it is not the case that religiously based ethics is false. — SEP | Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe

But the central premise of the argument is something like this:

3. There are no obligations without a rule-giver — Michael

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Having not read Anscombe, but knowing she was a Catholic, that seems more like protecting the roost than it does actual historicity (which i guess Richter points on half of). — AmadeusD

Not actually, given that Anscombe's thesis is contrary to mainstream Catholic tradition, and she inevitably knew this. Ironically, Anscombe is going against Catholicism in this case. But it does look that way to the uninitiated. I think this provided two important motivations for Anscombe to write a very tight article and argument, for she would have to defend herself on two fronts.

Not actually, given that Anscombe's thesis is contrary to Catholic tradition — Leontiskos

Also, very interesting. I have a good number of Catholics friends who are practicing, and as best i can tell, they practice virtue ethics. I should probably say, if their calculations conflict with a piece of scripture they can bring to mind at the time, then that raises obstacles; but, in general, they seem to have learned from their church-going that you can't stringently rule what is right and wrong and so improving one's character, holistically (though, this is billed as 'enhancing/improving/deepening a relationship with God' so there are implications of serious limits there)is how one reaches more, and more moral viz. virtuous, positions (intellectual/emotional positions). This may be why it felt her position was 'protecting the roost'.

But, in hindsight, that seems more superficially humanist or unitarian.

Granted, that doesn't say much about Catholic tradition, but I found that an interesting little incongruence.

Also, very interesting. I have a good number of Catholics friends who are practicing, and as best i can tell, they practice virtue ethics. I should probably say, if their calculations conflict with a piece of scripture they can bring to mind at the time, then that raises obstacles... — AmadeusD

Well, you're affirming the consequent of (1). That one practices virtue ethics does not mean that one denies religiously based ethics.

Granted, that doesn't say much about Catholic tradition... — AmadeusD

I'm Catholic. How do you think we could send atheists to Hell if they don't know right from wrong? :joke:

How do you think we could send atheists to Hell if they don't know right from wrong? — Leontiskos

lol.

I was under the impression went sent ourselves to Hell...

Is it this idea? — Leontiskos

Yes. The claim is that these sort of objections you and Banno give only apply to moral theories, not theories about morality.

I would say that, by the very substance of anti-realist metaethics, obligations aren't obligatory. If the anti-realist theory intends to be normative, then this makes it incoherent. If the anti-realist theory intends to be merely descriptive, then it is denying the existence of true obligations and substituting some faux placeholder. — Leontiskos

It might be helpful if you substantiate your notion of "obligation". I'm not aware of any normative account where moral imperatives are literally obligatory. If so there would be no moral questions, people would simply act as morality dictates.

Even if morality were a subjective matter, just personal preference, your own conscience carries a normative weight, and violating it comes at a cost.

Also, I'll note that anti-realist theories seldom if ever intend to be normative.

This thread is fast becoming inane. — Banno

Your participation is profoundly optional.

The meaning of a word is its use in an utterance. — Banno

Well I think that implies a very deflated notion of truth which basically aligns with what I just said there.

I would say that, by the very substance of anti-realist metaethics, obligations aren't obligatory. If the anti-realist theory intends to be normative, then this makes it incoherent. If the anti-realist theory intends to be merely descriptive, then it is denying the existence of true obligations and substituting some faux placeholder. Folks in this thread flip back and forth between those two options, wanting to have their cake and eat it, too; to have obligations while simultaneously holding that nothing is truly obligatory. — Leontiskos

Then perhaps you could explain what obligations "truly" are.

Remember when you yourself made the same point I am making? — Leontiskos

The complication is that:

a) (as I said earlier) when someone claims that one ought not X we understand them as attempting to express an objective fact,

b) (as suggested by Anscombe, Wittgenstein, and Schopenhauer) the very concept of obligations sans a rule-giver or punishment and reward categorical imperatives is vacuous, and

c) (as @Banno has suggested many times, and which I think is consistent with ordinary language philosophy) it's something of a truism that we have certain obligations (such as to not kick puppies)

(a) and (b) together would suggest error theory, (a) and (c) together would suggest robust realism, (b) and (c) together would suggest non-objectivism, and all appear to be true.

Perhaps the answer is that moral language is complex and cannot be adequately explained by a single metaethics.

b) (as mentioned by Anscombe, Wittgenstein, and Schopenhauer) the very concept of obligations sans a rule-giver or punishment and reward is vacuous, and — Michael

That may not be true.

Seems like the demonstrably provable negative affects/effects stemming from not honoring one's voluntarily obligations(promises) should work just fine in lieu of a rule-giver and/or reward/punishment. Look no further than the sheer numbers of Americans who rightly do not trust politicians as proof of the vital importance of all that. Knowledge of inevitable consequences seems to me to do a better job than God or reward/punishment when it comes to knowledge of how keeping one's word is imperative to a successful society of self-governing interdependent people. I think that that is true regardless of what anyone thinks about it.

Seems like the demonstrably provable negative affects/effects stemming from not honoring one's voluntarily obligations(promises) should work just fine in lieu of a rule-giver and/or reward/punishment. — creativesoul

Sure.

What I was getting at is that the unconditional phrase "one ought not X" being true is vacuous. It is only meaningfully true if implying something like "according to Y, one ought not X" or "one ought not X or Y will happen".

Much like the phrase "X is beautiful" being true must be understood as implying "according to Y, X is beautiful". Beauty is in the eye of the beholder.

So, (1) and (3) but not (2) as written???

Because there is no need for a rule giver(God) or reward/punishment but rather just good ole knowledge of causality. Hence, it is not the case that obligation is vacuous sans a rule giver and/or reward/punishment.

Because there is no need for a rule giver(God) or reward/punishment but rather just good ole knowledge of causality. Hence, it is not the case that obligation is vacuous sans a rule giver and/or reward/punishment. — creativesoul

My use of the phrase "reward and punishment" was meant as an inclusive phrase to account for any desirable or undesirable consequence.

My use of the phrase "reward and punishment" was an inclusive phrase to account for any desirable or undesirable consequence. — Michael

Unnecessarily multiplying entities. Reward and punishment requires a judge. Causality does not.

Unnecessarily multiplying entities. Reward and punishment requires a judge. Causality does not. — creativesoul

You're being unnecessarily pedantic. I've clarified my meaning.

Drawing and maintaining a distinction between reward/punishment and causality is not unnecessary regarding (2).

Your rendering makes (2) true. Mine does not.

So, (1) and (3) but not (2) on my rendering and all three on yours.

Here, we look at the consequences of drawing the distinction or not, and we can all see that it is not an unnecessarily pedantic endeavor.

What I was getting at is that the unconditional phrase "one ought not X" being true is vacuous. It is only meaningfully true if implying something like "according to Y, one ought not X" or "one ought not X or Y will happen". — Michael

"One ought not kick puppies."

How do your claims quoted above cover that one? Seems perfectly meaningful and true from where I sit despite not needing to be bolstered by what you suggest all such claims require.

"One ought not kick puppies."

How does your claims quoted above cover that one? Seems perfectly meaningful and true from where I sit despite not needing to be bolstered by what you suggest all such claims require. — creativesoul

That's the exact problem. "One ought not kick puppies" seems meaningfully true and yet the concept of categorical imperatives seems vacuous. I don't know how to resolve this contradiction.

I have something like a visceral acceptance of such categorical imperatives but I cannot rationally accept the almost magical, wishful thinking of them.

Ah I see. So that serves as a clear cut counterexample to the notion that all claims in the form of "One ought not X" imply conditionals.

So that serves as a clear cut counterexample to the notion that all claims in the form of "One ought not X" imply conditions. — creativesoul

If the categorical imperative "one ought not kick puppies" is true then it would be a counterexample to the claim that all imperatives are hypothetical, but it hasn't been proven that the categorical imperative "one ought not kick puppies" is true.

Perhaps dropping the notions of categorical and hypothetical imperatives would help?

Perhaps dropping the notions of categorical and hypothetical imperatives would help? — creativesoul

That's the very thing being discussed.

1. A categorical imperative is just "one ought not X".
2. A hypothetical imperative is "according to Y, one ought not X" or "one ought not X or Z will happen."

I cannot rationally justify the truth of any (1), and yet many seem to be true. It's something of a cognitive dissonance.

Ah... sorry, I'm a bit late to the discussion and I did not perform the due diligence of reading enough to know that...