But I don't think that Ryle plays that card in this book. I could be wrong. — Ludwig V

Ryle influenced Dennett who is a part of the "eliminativist materialism" notion.

According to IEP:

Eliminativism holds that there is no hard problem of consciousness because there is no consciousness to worry about in the first place. Eliminativism is most clearly defended by Rey 1997, but see also Dennett 1978, 1988, Wilkes 1984, and Ryle 1949. On the face of it, this response sounds absurd: how can one deny that conscious experience exists? Consciousness might be the one thing that is certain in our epistemology. But eliminativist views resist the idea that what we call experience is equivalent to consciousness, at least in the phenomenal, “what it’s like” sense. They hold that consciousness so-conceived is a philosopher’s construction, one that can be rejected without absurdity. If it is definitional of consciousness that it is nonfunctional, then holding that the mind is fully functional amounts to a denial of consciousness. Alternately, if qualia are construed as nonrelational, intrinsic qualities of experience, then one might deny that qualia exist (Dennett 1988). And if qualia are essential to consciousness, this, too, amounts to an eliminativism about consciousness.

What might justify consciousness eliminativism? First, the very notion of consciousness, upon close examination, may not have well-defined conditions of application—there may be no single phenomenon that the term picks out (Wilkes 1984). Or the term may serve no use at all in any scientific theory, and so may drop out of a scientifically-fixed ontology (Rey 1997). If science tells us what there is (as some naturalists hold), and science has no place for nonfunctional intrinsic qualities, then there is no consciousness, so defined. Finally, it might be that the term ‘consciousness’ gets its meaning as part of a falsifiable theory, our folk psychology. The entities posited by a theory stand or fall with the success of the theory. If the theory is falsified, then the entities it posits do not exist (compare P.M. Churchland 1981). And there is no guarantee that folk psychology will not be supplanted by a better theory of the mind, perhaps a neuroscientific or even quantum mechanical theory, at some point. Thus, consciousness might be eliminated from our ontology. If that occurs, obviously there is no hard problem to worry about. No consciousness, no problem!

But eliminativism seems much too strong a reaction to the hard problem, one that throws the baby out with the bathwater. First, it is highly counterintuitive to deny that consciousness exists. It seems extremely basic to our conception of minds and persons. A more desirable view would avoid this move. Second, it is not clear why we must accept that consciousness, by definition, is nonfunctional or intrinsic. Definitional, “analytic” claims are highly controversial at best, particularly with difficult terms like ‘consciousness’ (compare Quine 1951, Wittgenstein 1953). A better solution would hold that consciousness still exists, but it is functional and relational in nature. This is the strong reductionist approach. — Hard Problem of Consciousness

So I guess, if you can't explain it, eliminate it. That thing you think you experience as "red" is not that. But then you get the problem of "illusion" which has to be explained. And the hidden dualism and homunculus continues! The illusion exists, and has to be explained qua the illusion. That is the THING to be explained. It is always somehow assumed in the premise, even by way of "it is learned" what "red" is. Well, what is it that this "learning" is DOING by causing "red" in its discriminatory fashion (red is not not-red, red is not green, red is not blue, etc.etc.)?

I agree. I'll post my summary later to-day.

The discussion of categories is complicated. But I think the basic idea is quite simple. Since Ryle wrote, there has been a lot of discussion and comment. There's a tendency to over-use and extend good ideas like this one - somewhat as since Kuhn invented paradigms, they seem to have appeared all over the place and are no longer the rare solutions to major issues - if you read the literature.

Formal logic consists of a variety of different kinds of symbol - variables for names and predicates, operators, quantifiers, truth-values etc. Each kind of variable has rule for its uses, which explain the contribution each makes to the meaning of the sentence or proposition they occur in. No kind of variable can make a sentence/proposition on its own; it is the combination of different kinds of variable that makes the sentence. Different kinds of variable are in different categories. (By the way, if I've understood the metaphor correctly, categories don't carve anything up. That privilege is reserved to concepts in certain categories. That is "category" is in a different category from "concept".)

Natural language has a huge variety of categories, but the principle is the same.

One demonstrates the rules for the use of words by showing when they are broken. So a category is revealed by sentences that seem grammatically well-formed, but are not merely empirically false, but nonsense.

Ryle's last lecture is entitled "Formal and Informal Logic". I'm sure this is the culmination of the series and that he will have a great deal more to say about this in that.

For what it is worth, I think that Ryle was mistaken about inter-theory negotiation. The development of scientific practice since he wrote shows that specialists are quite capable of sorting out inter-theory and inter-disciplinary issues, mostly in the context of specific problems. But I also think he is right to claim public concepts for philosophy, even though the border country between public and private is far from clearly demarcated.

The proof of the pudding is in the eating. So let's look at the pudding that Ryle provides in the next lecture.

Why do some of these philosophers have a hard time with the idea of imaginary concepts?

A bald king of France drives them crazy. There does not exist a category of kings of France. Therefore any person of that category cannot exist. Any person said to be if that category, does not exist. It’s like logicians would have a heart attack parsing out thousands of words to describe a fictional work. Gandalf would take up reams of ridiculous existential quantifiers! :sweat:

The quote is Ryle, not I; so it's not I who does not say. — Banno

But he does say. And what he says is not to be found it what you quoted.

One charitably presumes that here, in the first chapter, he is setting a direction, on which he continues in the remainder of the book. — Banno

This is why attention should be paid to what is said in the beginning wherthe direction being set.

It seems from this that you think making a category error as carving stuff up wrong. — Banno

Yes, that is the question:

The question arose for me .... — Fooloso4

But further, your critique looks misplaced. — Banno

When you misquote by leaving out the beginning of what I said it may look this way, but you carve it up wrong.

I hope it's clear from the SEP article that it's more about taking a term from one category and misapplying it in another. — Banno

It should be clear from my quotes from Ryle himself that this point has been made.

The discussion of categories is complicated. — Ludwig V

This is why common examples such as "the number two is blue" are problematic. It has the advantage of illustrating a clear difference between categories, but with the exception of someone with synesthesia no one conjoins them. One might easily get the impression that philosophers waste their time with things that no one in their right mind would have the least concern with.

(By the way, if I've understood the metaphor correctly, categories don't carve anything up. That privilege is reserved to concepts in certain categories. — Ludwig V

I think they both do, but will focus on the second lecture.

One might easily get the impression that philosophers waste their time with things that no one in their right mind would have the least concern with. — Fooloso4

The obsession with non-sense is an attempt to chart the limits of sense. One way of discovering a boundary is by probing beyond it.

I think they both do, but will focus on the second lecture. — Fooloso4

@Ludwig V

Ryle's idea of logical consequences and practical inescapability reminds me of other distinctions made in determining principles of sufficient reason. Schopenhauer especially comes to mind. He made the distinction between the grounds of "knowing" and the grounds of "becoming". Knowing is basically about the realm of propositional reasoning and becoming is the realm of cause and effect of objects.

I liken Ryle's idea of a "contradiction" of an event that already occurred (e.g. Waterloo, your own birth, etc.), as similar to one I've raised on this forum before in a bit different way... Here is what I basically said:

We often think in counterfactual notions like, "What happened if I was born a different person?". But that is false (in the spirit of Ryle, "incorrect" or an "error" :smile:) to even think in those terms. Your identity is tied up in "you", so if another person was born, it would certainly not be "you". Could "you" have been born in other circumstances? It probably would not be you, if that was the case, is the point.

Eliminativism holds that there is no hard problem of consciousness because there is no consciousness to worry about in the first place. (you quote from "Hard Problem of Consciousness).....So I guess, if you can't explain it, eliminate it. — schopenhauer1

Well perhaps so. But this has nothing to do with Ryle - or Wittgenstein, either. Ryle does wish to eliminate Cartesian consciousness, but that's a different story because it's about a conception of consciousness, not consciousness. BTW I have very little time for Dennett's idea that consciousness is an illusion; he should have read Austin before developing that illusory idea.

But this is a side-issue. We're moving on.

A bald king of France drives them crazy. — schopenhauer1

Yes, some people do make a terrible meal of it. But they are mostly logicians. 'nuff said.

Well perhaps so. But this has nothing to do with Ryle - or Wittgenstein, either. Ryle does wish to eliminate Cartesian consciousness, but that's a different story because it's about a conception of consciousness, not consciousness. BTW I have very little time for Dennett's idea that consciousness is an illusion; he should have read Austin before developing that illusory idea.

But this is a side-issue. We're moving on. — Ludwig V

:lol: Yes, agreed with Dennett. I don't think it's totally disconnected from Ryle (perhaps in these lectures more so). Rather, if Ryle is against Cartesian consciousness, that usually implies a sort of rejection understanding of basic sensory things such as "red" and "sound", let alone more abstract things like "imagination". I'm sorry, you can't put that in the category of what, "behavioral disposition??"

if Ryle is against Cartesian consciousness, that usually implies a sort of rejection understanding of basic sensory things such as "red" and "sound", — schopenhauer1

Why on earth would that be true? What is a "rejection understanding"? All that is at stake is a philosophical theory, a way of thinking about things.

If someone explains to you about rainbows, are they denying the existence of rainbows? There are, or used to be, people who said that rainbows had been explained "away". Is that true? There are others who said that the scientific explanation "reduced" rainbows (to raindrops and light) and took away their magic. I maintain that nothing is "taken away". I'm even prepared to say that if you want magic, the process that produces rainbows should be magic enough for anyone.

I don't think it's totally disconnected from Ryle — schopenhauer1

No, I don't suppose it is, given that he was taught by Ryle. But it doesn't follow that whatever Dennett thought is something Ryle thought.

Why on earth would that be true? What is a "rejection understanding"? All that is at stake is a philosophical theory, a way of thinking about things. — Ludwig V

Should be rejection OF understanding...

If someone explains to you about rainbows, are they denying the existence of rainbows? There are, or used to be, people who said that rainbows had been explained "away". Is that true? There are others who said that the scientific explanation "reduced" rainbows (to raindrops and light) and took away their magic. I maintain that nothing is "taken away". I'm even prepared to say that if you want magic, the process that produces rainbows should be magic enough for anyone. — Ludwig V

The way I interpret his "Cartesian" rejection, is that he is rejecting that subjective experiences as something that can be considered in the realm of science. Certainly if he means "Cartesian substance dualism" almost everyone can agree that can be jettisoned. I don't think people are going to say mental states are some sort of "substance" like an ectoplasm or some such. If he means in the broader sense, some sort of subjective experiential mental states altogether, then one is simply eliminating what is to be explained. Perhaps I misread it. He seems to reduce it to behavior. Behavior is something you can ascribe to processes like atoms, neurons and the like. What is behavior in terms of the actual experience of "red" or "red car", or all the perceptual things that one can have? Dennett takes it a step further I believe, and discusses optical illusions, and how the brain edits events. But that simply answers the wrong question (the hard problem). It's actually a category error of how the brain operates for why there is this illusory sense of the world or what this "is" other than a synonym for "illusion".

Odd, how again folk will do anything to avoid actually reading the text that is the very topic of the thread.

The dilemma known as “fatalism” has been around for a very long time. In one form or another, it is found in pre-Islamic Arabia, in India and China as well as the West. Aristotle has a version of it. See Fatalism - Wikipedia for more details. Ryle thinks that it has occasionally troubled everyone, though not very seriously, but thinks it plays a role in the more serious dilemmas known as Determinism and Predestinationism.

Since there are so many versions of it, he formulates his own. “At a certain moment yesterday evening I coughed and at a certain moment yesterday evening I went to bed. It was therefore true on Saturday that on Sunday I would cough at the one moment and go to bed at the other. But if it was true beforehand - forever beforehand - that I was to cough and go to bed at those two moments on Sunday, 25 January 1953, then it was impossible for me not to do so. … Whatever is, was to be. So nothing that does occur could have been helped and nothing that has not actually been done could possibly have been done.” P.15

“Now the conclusion of this argument … goes directly counter to the piece of common knowledge that some things are our own fault, that some threatening disasters can be foreseen and averted, and that there is plenty of room for precautions, planning and weighing alternatives.” P.16

Predestinationism is a different, though related, issue. (p.16) Nor is it about any actual (p.17) or possible (p.18) predictions that someone may have made. He does not seem to think that these are serious explanations, but rather background associations that may distract us from the core issue.

So he comes to the idea that fatalism is about truth and falsity.

The mistake here is to think that because 'true' and 'false' and ‘correct' and ‘incorrect' are adjectives, we tend to treat them as qualities or properties like “sweet” and “white” applied to sugar. “But … ‘deceased', ‘lamented' and ‘extinct' are also adjectives, and yet certainly do not apply to people or mastodons while they exist, but only after they have ceased to exist”. So we should think of ‘correct' as “a merely obituary and valedictory epithet, as ‘fulfilled' more patently is.” (p.20)

His next tactic is to “suppose that someone produced the strictly parallel argument, that for everything that happens, it is true for ever afterwards that it happened.” and points out that we don’t make a similar argument in such cases. We confuse the logical necessity in the fatalist’s argument with causal necessity. (p.21)

So now he considers “the notions of necessitating, making, obliging, requiring and involving on which the argument turns.” (p. 22) He consider first how “requiring” and “involving” are related to “causing” and, not surprisingly, identifies more than one way that one truth may require or involve another. So he can extract the causal menace from the argument and leave only a trite and dull proposition behind.

So we come to the question what does logical necessity mean? Ryle argues that the fatalist argument “tries to endue happenings with the inescapability of the conclusions of valid arguments. … The fatalist has tried to characterize happenings by predicates which are proper only to conclusions of arguments. He tried to flag my cough with a Q.E.D.” (p.24)

Ryle’s next move seems a bit strange. “If a city-engineer has constructed a roundabout where there had been dangerous cross-roads, he may properly claim to have reduced the number of accidents. He may say that lots of accidents that would otherwise have occurred have been prevented by his piece of road improvement. But suppose we now ask him to give us a list of the particular accidents which he has averted. He can do nothing but laugh at us.” (p. 24/25) How does this relate to fatalism? His conclusion is “Averted fatalities are not fatalities. In short, we cannot, in logic, say of any designated fatality that it was averted-and this sounds like saying that it is logically impossible to avert any fatalities.” (p.25)

He finally concludes “The question 'Could the Battle of Waterloo have been unfought?', taken in one way, is an absurd question. Yet its absurdity is something quite different from the falsity that Napoleon's strategic decisions were forced upon him by the laws of logic.” and that one cannot suppose that a specific event that did take place did not take place. (p.26)

His general diagnosis of the difference between future tense statements and present and past statements is “Roughly, statements in the future tense cannot convey singular, but only general propositions, where statements in the present and past tense can convey both.” Stated in isolation, this is hard to understand, but in context ( p.27), it makes more sense.

Now, he explains why he has chosen this dilemma for his first case (p.28) and then moves on to “some general morals which can be drawn from the existence of this dilemma and from attempts to resolve it. It arose out of two seemingly innocent and unquestionable propositions,...” (p. 29)

The big issue that this raises is “How is it that in their most concrete, ground-floor employment, concepts like will be, was, correct, must, make, prevent and fault behave, in the main, with exemplary docility, but become wild when employed in what are mere first-floor generalizations of their ground-floor employments?” (pp. 30/31) No answers here, but a promise of ”something of an answer” later.

Two final issues. One is that what is involved here is not a collection of individual concepts, but teams or structures of concepts (pp. 31/32). The other is a re-iteration of the importance and inescapability of everyday, unofficial concepts, as opposed to the regulated and disciplined concepts of technical and scientific disciplines. (pp. 34/35)

The way I interpret his "Cartesian" rejection, — schopenhauer1

I'm sorry. I don't have the bandwidth to take this on right now. I've already said that I don't think his version of behaviourism is satisfactory.

Ryle’s next move seems a bit strange. “If a city-engineer has constructed a roundabout where there had been dangerous cross-roads, he may properly claim to have reduced the number of accidents. He may say that lots of accidents that would otherwise have occurred have been prevented by his piece of road improvement. But suppose we now ask him to give us a list of the particular accidents which he has averted. He can do nothing but laugh at us.” (p. 24/25) How does this relate to fatalism? His conclusion is “Averted fatalities are not fatalities. In short, we cannot, in logic, say of any designated fatality that it was averted-and this sounds like saying that it is logically impossible to avert any fatalities.” (p.25) — Ludwig V

I rather like this. It raises more than one issue. Ryle was writing before possible world semantics gave us a way to formalise and so clarify such issues. But the point seems to remain.

So we can stipulate a possible world in which the crossroads were not replaced, and yet that does not help us in listing which fatalities were avoided. We can even stipulate a world in which the crossroads were not replaced, and yet the number of accidents was reduced.

Yes, I thought it was terrific! It seemed to me an application of the point that you can't identify a specific object and then say it doesn't exist.

He generalizes this when he says "Roughly, statements in the future tense cannot convey singular, but only general propositions, where statements in the present and past tense can convey both."

I'm bothered about someone having a heart attack, and getting to hospital where they prevent his death. Can we not say that his death was averted? Perhaps we can say that it was averted last Sunday, but not that his death last Sunday was averted.

So we can stipulate a possible world in which the crossroads were not replaced, and yet that does not help us in listing which fatalities were avoided. We can even stipulate a world in which the crossroads were not replaced, and yet the number of accidents was reduced. — Banno

You'll think I'm ill educated, but what I read here is "So we can envisage the possibility that (i.e. It is possible that) the cross-roads were not replaced and yet that does not help us in listing which fatalities were avoided. We can even envisage the possibility that (i.e. It is even possible that) the crossroads were not replaced, and yet the number of accidents was reduced." Am I missing anything relevant?

No problem, did you see my post on lecture 2 above?

No, I didn't see that.

Knowing is basically about the realm of propositional reasoning and becoming is the realm of cause and effect of objects. — schopenhauer1

It does seem to be a similar point. Except that Schopenhauer puts it in metaphysical mode, where Ryle puts it in linguistic mode and uses the idea of a categories. What the difference is and whether it matters is another issue.

I liken Ryle's idea of a "contradiction" of an event that already occurred — schopenhauer1

Yes. I guess, from the problem you raise below, that you do recognize that Ryle is saying that there can't be a contradiction of an event, for the reason that Schopenhauer identifies.

On that, the identity of people has an additional complication, that they can decide what criteria of their own identity are important (to them) and those criteria may not be the same as the criteria used by everyone else. I think that many people must have the slightly dizzying experience of contemplating the possibility that their actual parents could have married - or whatever - someone else. I understand their bewilderment, though I don't think it is necessary.

On that, the identity of people has an additional complication, that they can decide what criteria of their own identity are important (to them) and those criteria may not be the same as the criteria used by everyone else. I think that many people must have the slightly dizzying experience of contemplating the possibility that their actual parents could have married - or whatever - someone else. I understand their bewilderment, though I don't think it is necessary. — Ludwig V

I think it’s a huge issue and opens a can of worms but, I don’t see how you can defend a claim that if you were born in different “circumstances”, then you would still be “you”; it’s is not even something you can entertain in any real sense beyond imagining after the fact.

I think it’s a huge issue and opens a can of worms but, I don’t see how you can defend a claim that if you were born in different “circumstances”, then you would still be “you”; it’s is not even something you can entertain in any real sense beyond imagining after the fact. — schopenhauer1

I agree in the sense that it is a very difficult issue to give a clear answer to.

But what circumstances are sufficiently different to make a problem? For example, I might, quite easily, have been born five days before, or five days after, my actual birthday. That might well not be important. But suppose I discover that I was born a year later than I thought. Whether that matters or not (i.e. is sufficiently different to make a difference) is moot. The issue is further complicated by the fact that my parents, friends, society might decide differently from me.

Then there's the meaning of entertaining, never mind imagining, the possibility. I suggest that one could deduce some factual differences. If I had been born in India, I would be living in a very different climate and a very different society. The part that I cannot imagine, or even seriously entertain, is what difference that would make to "me". And here I remember Berkeley's "master argument", which points out that when imagining those circumstances, I will be imagining myself in those circumstances, not imagining the person I would (might) have been. (Berkeley uses this point for his own ends, but I think the point applies here, as well.)

When I said that the bewilderment is not necessary, I didn't mean that answers would be easy to come by, but that it is possible to reflect that it is, in one sense, up to me to decide what matters.

But I'm afraid that I can't pursue this right now. As I said before, I have limited bandwidth.

By the way, for those reading this thread, an interesting article by Ray Monk (known as Wittgenstein's biographer) on Gilbert Ryle, R G Collingwood, and the analytic-continental divide. (It's partially paywalled but free if you haven't visited the site already.)

'No ear for tunes'.

I'm not sure if this will be helpful, but Bateson derives a notion of 'category error' from Russell's theory of logical types.

One of the first things that Russell and Whitehead observed in attempting this was that the ancient paradox of Epimenides - "Epimenides was a Cretan who said, 'Cretans always lie' " - was built upon classification and metaclassification. I have presented the paradox here in the form of a quotation within a quotation, and this is precisely how the paradox is generated. The larger quotation becomes a classifier for the smaller, until the smaller quotation takes over and reclassifies the larger, to create contradiction. — Bateson

For the abstract presentation, consider the case of a very simple relationship between two organisms in which organism A has emitted some sort of sound or posture from which B could learn something about the state of A relevant to B's own existence. It might be a threat, a sex­ual advance , a move towards nurturing , or an indication of membership in the same species. I already noted in the discussion of coding (criterion 5) that no message, under any circumstances, is that which precipitated it.
There is always a partly predictable and therefore rather regular rela­tion between message and referent, that relation indeed never being direct or simple. Therefore, if B is going to deal with A's indication, it is absolutely necessary that B know what those indications mean. Thus, there comes into existence another class of information, which B must assimilate, to tell B about the coding of messages or indications coming from A. Messages of this class will be, not about A or B, but about the coding of messages . They will be of a different logical type. I will call them metamessages.
Again, beyond messages about simple coding, there are much more subtle messages that become necessary because codes are condi­tional; that is, the meaning of a given type of action or sound changes relative to context, and especially relative to the changing state of the relationship between A and B. If at a given moment the relation be­ comes playful, this will change the meaning of many signals. — Bateson

[My bold]

Emoticons are very often just such metamessage qualifiers that can indicate irony, or hyperbole, or indeed playfulness.

I agree in the sense that it is a very difficult issue to give a clear answer to.

But what circumstances are sufficiently different to make a problem? For example, I might, quite easily, have been born five days before, or five days after, my actual birthday. That might well not be important. But suppose I discover that I was born a year later than I thought. Whether that matters or not (i.e. is sufficiently different to make a difference) is moot. The issue is further complicated by the fact that my parents, friends, society might decide differently from me.

Then there's the meaning of entertaining, never mind imagining, the possibility. I suggest that one could deduce some factual differences. If I had been born in India, I would be living in a very different climate and a very different society. The part that I cannot imagine, or even seriously entertain, is what difference that would make to "me". And here I remember Berkeley's "master argument", which points out that when imagining those circumstances, I will be imagining myself in those circumstances, not imagining the person I would (might) have been. (Berkeley uses this point for his own ends, but I think the point applies here, as well.)

When I said that the bewilderment is not necessary, I didn't mean that answers would be easy to come by, but that it is possible to reflect that it is, in one sense, up to me to decide what matters. — Ludwig V

So my point is that "you" would not be "you" in any altered history of causation leading to "who" you are. You mentioned being born in a different country, different parents, etc. Do you see the contradiction here? If there was a set of people who were not your parents, or had children at a different time, whatever that person is, it would not be YOU! Even if you were conceived a few seconds later, it would NOT be YOU. Causally speaking, the argument is absurd that you could be anyone but YOU, if there were other circumstances. That isn't an identity issue, it's a causality issue. In that sense, this ties into Ryle's idea that Waterloo wouldn't EVEN be Waterloo if it was a different set of circumstances. You can only retrospectively imagine what someone who is NOW you, would have been like under different circumstances. But in a sense of actual personhood, that person who you are imagining could not have been the person who is doing the retrospective imagining!

I agree with what you say, particularly about the discovery that one's parents are not the people who are bringing you up. But I also think that minor variations do not make a difference. Are you seriously trying to tell me that if I had been born five minutes earlier, or five hours earlier, it would not have been me that was born? I concede that someone might decide to take it that way, but, under otherwise normal circumstances, most people, I am sure, would not.

Yes, I can think I can see what Bateson is getting at. Forgive me for being dense, but I'm not clear how this relates to Ryle's use of the idea.

Ryle was not really sure he has conclusively refuted fatalism. He says at the end of this lecture “I have produced quite an apparatus of somewhat elaborate arguments, all of which need expansion and reinforcement. I expect that the logical ice is pretty thin under some of them.” p.29 , so I feel justified in posting some of my – doubts, let’s call them – about this lecture. There are two main issues:-

1. In the first place, Ryle’s argument about the cross-roads ( pp. 24 – 27) is all very well. But I don’t quite see how it affects the fatalist’s argument. Surely, I can say that the annual village fete will be held next Sunday afternoon, and it can be true! What’s more, if it rains and the fete is cancelled, I can say that the annual village fete was cancelled (or prevented, or averted). And I can’t think of a reformulation that would work. I don’t quite trust his generalization that future tense cannot refer to events that have not yet taken place. I see that it works in some contexts, but it doesn’t follow that it works in all contexts.

2. The arguments he gives pp. 16 – 18 discuss the way that knowledge (especially God’s), and predictions, especially of anyone else are involved in the premiss of the fatalist’s argument. Then he gets to the hard core issue of truth and falsity. Now, I’ve always believed that “true” and “false” are timelessly true. Thus Pythagoras’ theorem is not true at any particular time, or at all particular times. In the case of more ordinary truths, the tenses are embedded in the that-clause. (The fete will be held, is being held, was held) The truth predicate is in the timeless present. That’s where the problem originates. Ryle seems to want to bring that into doubt.

Hi first argument (pp.17 – 18) consider what might have been meant by a timelessly true proposition like “Ryle will cough and go to bed on the evening of Sunday (day/month/year). Not an actual prediction, not an impersonal prediction (“The forecast is for rain tomorrow”), but a possible prediction (if anybody had predicted rain tomorrow, it would have come true.) He dismisses that, in an argument that is reminiscent of the argument in 1. But I don’t think it is the slam-dunk that philosophers seek to achieve by relying on logic. (Slam-dunk is the point of logic, isn’t it?)

His first move is “There is something of a slur in ‘false’ and something honorific in ‘true’, some suggestion of the insincerity or sincerity of its author, or some suggestion of his rashness or cautiousness as an investigator.” p. 18. I would call this a sub-text, and likely dependent on context. It certainly isn’t the kind of thing you expect to find in a philosophy text – and it might be argued that it depends on context anyway. I think philosophers might want to call it part of the illocutionary force of a speech act – and Ryle was writing well before they were invented.

He reinforces the point:- “This is· brought out by our reluctance to characterize either as true or as false pure and avowed guesses. If you make a guess at the winner of the race, it will turn out right or wrong, correct or incorrect, but hardly true or false.” p. 18 Well, I can’t argue that he is wrong, and it would make sense if his sub-text is correct. But he recognizes at the top of p.19 that the sub-text he has proposed is not always there but nevertheless, makes a crucial move - “But, for safety's sake, let us reword the fatalist argument in terms of these thinner words, 'correct' and ‘incorrect'.” H’m. Maybe.

There’s a persuasive paragraph on p. 20 about categories, but Ryle doesn’t expect any more than our feeling “more cordial” to the idea that the right predicates to apply are ‘correct’ or ‘fulfilled’, but not ‘true’.

From there we get to prophecies being “fulfilled” or not rather than being “true” or not, and so to the idea that the fatalist’s premiss is not, strictly speaking, true or not, but correct or fulfilled or not. I think he has shown that it is possible to present the fatalist’s premiss in that way, but not that it is impossible to present it in the fatalist’s way. Which is a step forward, but far from conclusive.

I'm not clear how this relates to Ryle's use of the idea. — Ludwig V

When considering the parents' duties, we have no doubt that they are to blame if they do not mould their son's conduct, feelings and thoughts. When considering the son's behaviour we have no doubt that he and not they should be blamed for some of the things that he does. Our answer to the one problem seems to rule out our answer to the other, and then at second remove to rule itself out too. — Ryle

Can you not see the same shape in this description as in my first Bateson quote about the lying Cretan? Two mutually undermining claims tied together in a knot like "the set of all sets that are not members of themselves".

Our moral judgement is made to judge itself unfavourably.

I agree with what you say, particularly about the discovery that one's parents are not the people who are bringing you up. But I also think that minor variations do not make a difference. Are you seriously trying to tell me that if I had been born five minutes earlier, or five hours earlier, it would not have been me that was born? I concede that someone might decide to take it that way, but, under otherwise normal circumstances, most people, I am sure, would not. — Ludwig V

How do minor variations not make a difference? Certainly if the event of your parents conceiving 5 minutes earlier or later happened, a different set of gametes would be there, so "you" wouldn't be "you" any more. That would be another person. One that might not be on a philosophy forum to be so indignant about this. As far as being "born" five minutes earlier or later, I'm not even suggesting that kind of thing. Rather, I am simply suggesting that if you were conceived (not born) under any other circumstances, it's no longer "you" we are talking about. Now, after conception, we may start discussing ideas about identity.. In that case, indeed, we might have a "you" that was different from various contingent circumstances of place and happenstance. Perhaps a "you" that lived in India is different than a "you" somewhere else in some sense because you would have had a different course of events happen, even though much of your brain chemistry might react similarly to such events. But in that case. But I am not even going down that route. I'm simply saying, that there is no way you "could have" been any other person than "you".

Actually, now that I think of it, I am even saying that "you" couldn't even BE anything but what was conceived. If you had a different circumstances that necessarily entails you were conceived different, so.. forget the part about being born even in different circumstances. It's a non-starter! In that sense, this seems to align with Ryle's understanding of Waterloo after the fact versus before the fact. The event was necessarily entailed in its happening, otherwise it's a general possibility not tied to any identical entity in the world! You can't say something like, "What if Waterloo took place in America", because then that would not be all the things that made Waterloo Waterloo to begin with! That would be something else!

Our moral judgement is made to judge itself unfavourably. — unenlightened

Thank you for drawing my attention to that case. I missed it because I was focused on the second lecture.

I had thought that there were two separate judgements (as suggested by Ryle's formulating the dilemma as from the parents' point of view or from the son's point of view) which contradicted each other. Hence "dilemma" instead of paradox.

On the other hand, there is a paradox in here, prompted by the paradox that if God wants to create moral beings, they need to create beings who will choose to follow their precepts freely. But then, there's an equivalent paradox that, as moral beings, we need to choose freely to follow god's precepts. There is the additional issue is that a "precept" that may be followed or not is probably not a precept, but advice or exhortation. The same could be said of parents and children - and indeed teachers and students.

This is a new thought to me.

The question now is whether Bateson (or you) think that all dilemmas are really paradoxes, or that paradoxes are one form of dilemma. Ryle, so far as I can see, seems to think that there are different forms of dilemma. I'm inclined to agree with Ryle.

I think that there are two issues at stake here.

One of them is the definition of identity. You seem to have what I think of a strict definition of identity. Any change is a change of identity. This follows from a strict application of the Identity of Indiscernibles and it seems to follow that the identity of anything consists only of a series of time-slices of what is represented as a single enduring object in "common sense". I don't share that view but recognize that the other view is, in some sense, possible, because I don't think that there is a conclusive refutation of it.

On the other hand, there is the fact that people, unlike beings and objects that are not self-aware, are capable of making choices about what changes in themselves make a difference to their identity and what changes do not. Their choices may not be the same as the choices of other people, and this may create problems. The decision that some change does not imply a change of identity, I characterize as deciding that change is "minor".

You identity the other issue by your comparison with Ryle's argument about Waterloo, which I think is correct, when you think about the problem before conception. But your strict view of identity seems to suggest that, once I am conceived, everything is inevitable and there are no possibilities - and no uncertainties - in my life. In other words, a fatalist view of my life.

And then there is your point:-

But I am not even going down that route. I'm simply saying, that there is no way you "could have" been any other person than "you". — schopenhauer1

To which I reply that is true. But the question is, who am I? I would ask, in addition, who decides who I am?