One of them is the definition of identity. You seem to have what I think of a strict definition of identity. Any change is a change of identity. This follows from a strict application of the Identity of Indiscernibles and it seems to follow that the identity of anything consists only of a series of time-slices of what is represented as a single enduring object in "common sense". I don't share that view but recognize that the other view is, in some sense, possible, because I don't think that there is a conclusive refutation of it.

On the other hand, there is the fact that people, unlike beings and objects that are not self-aware, are capable of making choices about what changes in themselves make a difference to their identity and what changes do not. Their choices may not be the same as the choices of other people, and this may create problems. The decision that some change does not imply a change of identity, I characterize as deciding that change is "minor".

You identity the other issue by your comparison with Ryle's argument about Waterloo, which I think is correct, when you think about the problem before conception. But your strict view of identity seems to suggest that, once I am conceived, everything is inevitable and there are no possibilities - and no uncertainties - in my life. In other words, a fatalist view of my life. — Ludwig V

I don't think you're quite getting my argument. I am saying that it is a sort of contradiction (as implied by Ryle as well I think), to talk about YOU as anyone other than what YOU are (currently). In other words, you could NEVER have been anyone but what you are now when discussing your initial conception and birth. If a different sperm fertilized the egg, that would be someone else. Not you. If there was any other circumstance that changed the arrangement of the exact moment you were conceived, that would not have been YOU.

You can entertain the notion in your imagination of what it might have been like to grown up this way or that way, but that could never have actually been a reality. Because in reality, that would no longer be YOU, that would be some other person.

@Banno

Just catching up with the preface. I find it ironic that the book is entitled Dilemmas when Ryle says his examples are only when two thinkers have “divergent goals” “from the beginning” (p. 1, emphasis added). Ryle wants to say philosophers only take themselves as conflicting when (unbeknownst to them it would seem) they are actually addressing two different problems (answering two different questions). Ryle does say it is not our logic, but our relationship to others that is the problem. (p.1)

We learned in reading Austin that we paint a picture as black-and-white in only taking into consideration one example rather than first looking at a variety of cases. Wittgenstein felt the same as Austin about variety but starts one step back to say that it is “having a goal” at all before you start (say, a requirement for crystalline purity. PI #107) that forces your mind into one picture (and maybe in this case, against another). Perhaps Ryle will say that we see others as rivals because of our pushing an agenda (“goal”) from the start, much as we fixate only on the example that makes our best case (pain, illusion, etc.) Hegel would say we are programmed to see things as dichotomies, and that the trick is to let things be what they are on their own (as will Heidegger) and from a larger perspective (as will Wittgenstein).

First Ryle describes the (imagined) fight of, let’s call it, the skeptic, who takes there to be an “unbridgeable crevasse” (p. 2) between us and the world, and the naturalist, who picks up their utensils without doubt. But Ryle is not concerned about the minutiae of the supposed disagreement, only to find out why the two feel they are at odds (or perhaps why we take them to be at odds). Ryle does hint at how they can’t actually connect enough to conflict because the skeptic’s case is based on reason (“theoretical”, p. 3), and there are no arguments for accepting the world.

Second is the argument without victor between free will vs. causation. He says “no one wants further evidence” (p.5) of either position but it is philosophy’s job to understand the “rights and obligations” (id) of the positions. He appears to be doing this in saying that a question about whether we can be moral is different than a question about whether an act was (morally) mine or determined by circumstances. (Id) In the same way a question of how we sensed something in a certain case is not answered by asking the question of how we sense at all. (p.5-6) I would venture that Ryle is highlighting confusion between a generalization and particular cases, but, too early to tell.

Lastly, he separates theology and science from tangling over “truth” by putting them in different “categories” because not only are their subject matters different, but also “the kinds of thinking they require” (p.8), meaning that their questions are different in their “terms and concepts”. (p.9) Ryle though is only saying that one question is not judged the same as another, because a ”category” is only generally created “by showing in detail how the metiers in ratiocination [means of reasoning] of the concepts under pressure are more dissimilar from one another or less dissimilar from one another”. (p.11)

The most important thing here seems to be “what is at stake” (different than what each litigant feels is) and what “considerations” should matter in each case. (p.12), which appears will be a matter of the concepts of the “highway”, the “underlying non-technical concepts employed as well in [technical theories] as in everyone else's thinking.” (Id) So, @Ludwig V, I do take the focus on particulars, dichotomies, goals, means of reasoning, criteria of what matters, similarities and differences, case-specific categories, and considerations in each case, to be right up the same alley as Austin and Wittgenstein. But we shall see.

In other words, you could NEVER have been anyone but what you are now when discussing your initial conception and birth. — schopenhauer1

Well, this is just a special application of the general argument framed by the fatalist. I guess you are not impressed by Ryle's arguments. It would be interesting to know why.

At first sight, you seem to be applying a criterion of causal continuity between conception and now. That's an understandable choice and does presuppose that our identity is not what the identity of indiscernibles proposes. I have no problem with that. Whether your choice in this case is reasonable is another question.

Your formulation is a bit confusing, since your use of "anyone" suggests that we are talking about people, but your use of "what I am" suggests that you are talking about things. Since, at conception, I am not (yet) a person, you are not asking the interesting question, which is "WHO I am". The difference between those two questions needs a bit of sorting out before we could begin answering either question.

Most people take birth as the moment when a person's life begins, though they also accept that there's a long way before one becomes an adult, fully-grown person. The question of identity in the case of human beings is complicated for that reason.

Another reason why it is more complicated than you seem to allow that I can, and do, make decisions about my own identity, and, although one might say that those choices should be respected, other people also make decisions. Conflicts are, in some cases, very difficult to resolve.

That would be an interesting thread, but for this thread, the interesting and relevant question is why you are not impressed with Ryle's arguments against fatalism.

So the so-called world of science which, we gather, has the title to replace our everyday world is, I suggest, the world not of science in general but of atomic and sub-atomic physics in particular, enhanced by some slightly incongruous appendages borrowed from one branch of neuro-physiology. — Ryle

I am questioning nothing that any scientist says on weekdays in his working tone of voice. But I certainly am questioning most of what a very few of them say in an edifying tone of voice on Sundays. — Ryle

What follows (P.75) is an extended analogy that has unfortunately been taken literally in the UK and the US, in the case of university colleges, and other institutions and become The social model that is taken to be the whole human political world. It was intended to show the folly of such thinking as applied to fundamental physics as a reductio ad absurdum. Alas, the argument from economic analogy now needs to be considered literally on its own merits as well.

I guess you are not impressed by Ryle's arguments. It would be interesting to know why. — Ludwig V

I actually think I'm in agreement.

Your formulation is a bit confusing, since your use of "anyone" suggests that we are talking about people, but your use of "what I am" suggests that you are talking about things. Since, at conception, I am not (yet) a person, you are not asking the interesting question, which is "WHO I am". The difference between those two questions needs a bit of sorting out before we could begin answering either question.

Most people take birth as the moment when a person's life begins, though they also accept that there's a long way before one becomes an adult, fully-grown person. The question of identity in the case of human beings is complicated for that reason.

Another reason why it is more complicated than you seem to allow that I can, and do, make decisions about my own identity, and, although one might say that those choices should be respected, other people also make decisions. Conflicts are, in some cases, very difficult to resolve.

That would be an interesting thread, but for this thread, the interesting and relevant question is why you are not impressed with Ryle's arguments against fatalism. — Ludwig V

So, I think you are again misconstruing what this claim is saying.

Can you explain exactly where the breakdown is?

Do you agree, a different set of gametes would be a different person? How can a differently conceived person, a person who is from a different set of gametes, ever be YOU? That would not be YOU. It's like you are taking the naive view that your "soul" or something like this is transposed into a different body. Is that what you are proposing? I don't think so, but I don't see any other way you can misconstrue this idea that a differently conceived person would not be you.

Thank you very much for this.

So, Ludwig V, I do take the focus on particulars, dichotomies, goals, means of reasoning, criteria of what matters, similarities and differences, case-specific categories, and considerations in each case, to be right up the same alley as Austin and Wittgenstein — Antony Nickles

Yes. I was more interested in the differences between the three than the similarities. But I didn't mean to suggest that there were no similarities. I was, I admit, concerned to bring out how little OLP was ever a school or a movement in a conventional sense. So I wouldn't argue with what you say here.

However, I do think that

Ryle does say it is not our logic, but our relationship to others that is the problem. (p.1) — Antony Nickles

is a bit misleading. It took me a while to realize what was going on.

Ryle has a rather ornate style and a great fondness for metaphors, preferably a collection at the same time. Look at what he does in paragraph on p.1 seems to be para 3:-
"There often arise quarrels between theories, or, more generally, between lines of thought, ... A thinker who adopts one of them ... In disputes of this kind, we often find one and the same thinker - very likely oneself - strongly inclined to champion both sides. ... He is both well satisfied with the logical credentials of each of the two points of view, and sure that one of them must be totally wrong if the other is even largely right. The internal administration of each seems to be impeccable but their diplomatic relations with one another seem to be internecine."
I don’t say he’s wrong. On the contrary. But it is clear that the problem can be characterized at many levels, and no characterization seems to have any special place.

But you are right, actual people do have a special place. Theories can be compatible or incompatible, points of view contradictory, and so forth. But you can see where people are special in p.11 para. 2:- "Sometimes thinkers are at loggerheads with one another, not because their propositions do conflict, but because their authors fancy that they conflict. ... It can be convenient to characterize these cross-purposes by saying that the two sides"
Believing wrongly that propositions conflict is not something that theories or points of view can do. They can apparently conflict – and who can grasp an apparent conflict except a person? A new meaning for "to err is human."

I

Perhaps Ryle will say that we see others as rivals because of our pushing an agenda (“goal”) from the start, much as we fixate only on the example that makes our best case (pain, illusion, etc.) — Antony Nickles

This is right. He does say, in the first sentence of the same para. 3 p.1 "… which are not rival solutions of the same problem, but rather solutions or would-be solutions of different problems, and which, none the less, seem to be irreconcilable with one another." But this is only the first version of what he says. Take the three examples he offers:-

Of the first case, he says "This point is sometimes expressed by saying that the conflict is one between a scientist's theory and a theory of Common Sense. But even this is misleading." He means that common sense is not a theory, so the issue is not a conflict between theories; I think he would express it as a conflict between points of view. I think also that it is important that the one actually undermines the other. By the way, I think that his formulation of this issue is different from the standard formulations, just because the skeptic does not feature; instead, we have a working physiologist. That helpfully (to me, at least) puts the argument in a different context.

Of the second, he says on p. 4 para 1:- "Consider, next, a very different sort of dilemma." and so it is. "We feel quite sure both that a person can be made moral and that he cannot be made moral; and yet that both cannot be true." This is not a conflict between theories with different goals; it is, I shall say, a conflict between points of view within common sense.

He introduces the third example on p. 6 para 3 with:- "I want now to illustrate this notion of litigation between theories or bodies of ideas with another well-known example in order to bring out some other important points."
In this case, there is certainly an issue about the pursuit of different agendas, but (and this is me speaking, not Ryle) they share an ambition - to explain everything in the terms that suit their business. Not quite Hume’s “augmentation”, but next door to it.

Ryle's discussion of categories is similarly confusing. At first sight, Ryle seems to think that this concept is cure-all and for a long time, I bought that story. But by the time he has finished his discussion (pp. 9 - 11), he has said that rejected any systematic classification of them and we are left with the concept as "not more than convenient". The real business is "showing in detail how the metiers in ratiocination of the concepts under pressure are more dissimilar from one another or less dissimilar from one another than the contestants had unwittingly supposed." – as you said at the beginning of your post.

I don't see any other way you can misconstrue this idea that a differently conceived person would not be you. — schopenhauer1

I could have fair hair and still be me. I could be six inches shorter than I am and still be me. I could have musical talent as opposed to competence and still be me. Minor changes don't matter. The issue is what features of me matter - and not all of them matter. You can decide as you wish, but others will decide as they wish.

By the way, almost all of my features are the result of a combination of genes and environment.

I could have fair hair and still be me. I could be six inches shorter than I am and still be me. I could have musical talent as opposed to competence and still be me. Minor changes don't matter. The issue is what features of me matter - and not all of them matter. You can decide as you wish, but others will decide as they wish.

By the way, almost all of my features are the result of a combination of genes and environment. — Ludwig V

How do your examples address what you just quoted?

I was more interested in the differences between the three than the similarities. — Ludwig V

Malcolm tells the following story:

In response to a comment about Hegel by Drury, Wittgenstein said: 'Hegel seems to me to be always wanting to say that things which look different are really the same.Whereas my interest is in showing that things which look the same are really different.' He had thought about using a sentence from King Lear, 'I'll teach you differences', as a motto for his book.

I don't see any other way you can misconstrue this idea that a differently conceived person would not be you. — schopenhauer1

Well, I have quoted the bit I just quoted again here. You originally said that just after you quoted a long argument from me, trying to explain why I thought you were wrong. But all you give me is a claim that I am misconstruing the idea. There's no explanation of what the misconstruction is. So I have nothing to engage with (apart from the rather surprising remark that you agree with Ryle's argument against fatalism, again without explanation). But apparently you do not accept that what you say is an application of the fatalism argument to this special case, but you do not explain what the relevant difference is.

And so we go back and forth. To no purpose. What do you think is needed to break the cycle? From my point of view, it seems that I present examples to you that seem to me to be incompatible with what you say, but you ignore them, without explaining what is wrong with them. What do you think?

Yes, I've heard that story. As a result that quotation has become one of my favourites. But actually, you can't just go on about differences without acknowledging similarities. It's just that most philosophers like similarities and tend to ignore differences and panic when they are faced with them, fearing that they have encountered that boogey-man of all philosophy - a counter-example. But it's the combination that makes the world go round.

And so we go back and forth. To no purpose. What do you think is needed to break the cycle? From my point of view, it seems that I present examples to you that seem to me to be incompatible with what you say, but you ignore them, without explaining what is wrong with them. What do you think? — Ludwig V

Because you haven't seemed to grasp the main point of my argument which is that if a set of parents, even your own, had two gametes that were different than the ones that created you, that is indeed a different person. This isn't even controversial. If 10 seconds later, the there was another sperm, that is no longer you. That was someone else. We'd have to establish we agree here.

But actually, you can't just go on about differences without acknowledging similarities. — Ludwig V

Right. In order to show that things that look the same are different one needs to acknowledge similarities since they would not look the same if there were not similarities.

Because you haven't seemed to grasp the main point of my argument which is that if a set of parents, even your own, had two gametes that were different than the ones that created you, that is indeed a different person. This isn't even controversial. If 10 seconds later, the there was another sperm, that is no longer you. That was someone else. We'd have to establish we agree here. — schopenhauer1

There you go again. I agree that you can call that a different person, but I claim that I can decide on a case-by-case basis whether the difference warrants a change of identity or not. In addition, I claim that a fertilized egg is not a person - yet.

There you go again. I agree that you can call that a different person, but I claim that I can decide on a case-by-case basis whether the difference warrants a change of identity or not. In addition, I claim that a fertilized egg is not a person - yet. — Ludwig V

Sure, if you’re getting caught on conception versus birth, we can say, is going to be a different person once born. That isn’t the substantive issue at hand. It’s just agreeing that when that person is born it won’t be you, and that this is a matter of fact and not interpretation. And thus, you cannot say “I could have been born in x, y, x different scenarios” because the initial conditions of that conception (and then birth) of that person would not be you. The reason I bring up conception is not because I think that’s when someone becomes a person (personhood debate). I’m not trying to debate the abortion issue. I’m literally trying to explain how it is that this person who would be born would not be you (conceived in different conditions whereby the set of gametes was different than the ones that comprise you). So no, you could not have been born in a different scenario.

conceived in different conditions whereby the set of gametes was different than the ones that comprise you — schopenhauer1

OK. I'll skip the issue whether the baby that is born is the person who will develop over the next twenty years or so. But there is a development process there which is recognized in most societies (all that I know of).

You have two criteria there. Suppose I had been born in different circumstances (but the same parents) and the same DNA. For example suppose I was born as a second child, not the first. Would I be the same person? I say, yes. What would you say?

On the other hand, I can imagine (just about) having been born in China in 1947. But that's imagining me born in China in 1947, or rather imagining being in the circumstances of China in 1947. I accept that I cannot imagine the person that would be me having been born in China in 1947.

My point here is that there is a wild forest of circumstances that might have been different. In some of them, I would be the same person. In others, I would not. In some, I might not be able to decide. For example, suppose I was born - same parents, same DNA - in 1947. I think that's undecidable.

You have two criteria there. Suppose I had been born in different circumstances (but the same parents) and the same DNA. For example suppose I was born as a second child, not the first. Would I be the same person? I say, yes. What would you say? — Ludwig V

Well, you are slightly moving the goal post. All I am establishing is that if the gametes are different than the one that was your set of gametes, whatever the case may be (whether they are similar to you or not), THAT person who was conceived a second before or after with different gametes is not you. I really want to establish THIS point, at the least. That THIS point is not a matter of debate or interpretation, but just a fact that that person born from a different set of gametes is not you.

The reason this is important, is that it then establishes some other more interpretive things. That is to say, you cannot in reality have a person born under different circumstances because those would almost certainly have been a different set of gametes, and hence a different person. If a matter of seconds matters to whether it being a different person, then all the other circumstances that led to the conception would also be different and almost certainly would be a different person. So you can only IMAGINE after the fact that you could be different, but not ever in fact be different.

After we establish this agreement (which I think you would be), then we can possibly get into arguments of identity after the conception/birth of the person. If the person born was from the same gametes as you, would that person in fact really "be" you with various changes in their upbringing, etc.. You can even at this point, ask about indiscernibles regarding twins or clones because those are about the same genetics, and same gametes. I think for example, the case of maternal twins (twins from the same cell that splits), proves that identity is not necessarily wrapped up in genetic origin, otherwise twins would be considered the same person, which would seem absurd. In order for a person to be identified as a separate "person" or "being", one would have to take into account that they have their own X to some degree (body, and/or mind). And then, that body or mind is subject to changing experiences that could alter the course of their outlook, life, personality, etc. At that point, you can argue identity. But in no way, a person born of different gametes, even given the same set of experiences, would be "you". It would be an approximately similar person, however. So being of the same gametes is necessary but perhaps not sufficient to identity.

That being said, a TON of counterfactual ideas about "being you" are discounted if you at least admit that prior to conception, there is no way any other set of circumstances would have been the YOU who is reflecting back on their counterfactual history because any slight change in the antecedent causes would have affected the set of gametes that would have been conceived, if they were to even be conceived at all.

Well, you are slightly moving the goal post. — schopenhauer1

That's what a discussion is about, surely. Listen to the other guy, adjust your view and on we go. With luck, we might even reach agreement!

However, we have some way to go, and I'm a bit concerned that this issue is clearly off-topic. One of us could start a different thread, and I think that would be a good idea. How about it?

I'll wait for you reply before actually replying to that message. You won't be surprised that I have a good deal to say.

For the moment, I notice that you don't say that the fertilized egg is me; I'm assuming that you mean that it is the origin of me.

And in response to

All I am establishing is that if the gametes are different than the one that was your set of gametes, whatever the case may be (whether they are similar to you or not), THAT person who was conceived a second before or after with different gametes is not you. — schopenhauer1

That can't be true. A clone of me (such as a possible identical twin) would not be me, either. And if you look carefully at what is written about DNA, there is a possibiity (several million to one) that someone else might be born with the same DNA as me.
I admit that DNA is treated as a unique identifier for me. But this is an empirical relationship, like the supposed unique pattern of my fingerprints (or, I understand, my palm-print or ear-print). I mean that the uniqueness of DNA was established on the basis of our understanding of personal identity. So it doesn't establish any logical relationship.

Anyway, let me know about the new thread.

That can't be true. A clone of me (such as a possible identical twin) would not be me, either. And if you look carefully at what is written about DNA, there is a possibiity (several million to one) that someone else might be born with the same DNA as me.
I admit that DNA is treated as a unique identifier for me. But this is an empirical relationship, like the supposed unique pattern of my fingerprints (or, I understand, my palm-print or ear-print). I mean that the uniqueness of DNA was established on the basis of our understanding of personal identity. So it doesn't establish any logical relationship. — Ludwig V

It looks like you didn't read this part here:

After we establish this agreement (which I think you would be), then we can possibly get into arguments of identity after the conception/birth of the person. If the person born was from the same gametes as you, would that person in fact really "be" you with various changes in their upbringing, etc.. You can even at this point, ask about indiscernibles regarding twins or clones because those are about the same genetics, and same gametes. I think for example, the case of maternal twins (twins from the same cell that splits), proves that identity is not necessarily wrapped up in genetic origin, otherwise twins would be considered the same person, which would seem absurd. In order for a person to be identified as a separate "person" or "being", one would have to take into account that they have their own X to some degree (body, and/or mind). And then, that body or mind is subject to changing experiences that could alter the course of their outlook, life, personality, etc. At that point, you can argue identity. But in no way, a person born of different gametes, even given the same set of experiences, would be "you". It would be an approximately similar person, however. So being of the same gametes is necessary but perhaps not sufficient to identity. — schopenhauer1

But yeah, I'll start a new thread then.

So being of the same gametes is necessary but perhaps not sufficient to identity. — schopenhauer1

I did read it. But I guess I didn't pay enough attention to that last sentence.

“ So being of the same gametes is necessary but perhaps not sufficient to identity.”

-schopenhauer



Perhaps,, but even if it’s insufficient, it may ought to be more then sufficient.

-

I can't say this thread is working very well, but if two or three people are interested and actually reading the book, I'm perfectly happy to continue.

It is pretty clear that there is no reaction to lecture I, so I'm thinking of moving on to lecture II.

But I need some guidance, particularly from you, Antony. Are you cogitating any comment on lecture I? If so, I'm happy to wait. If not, perhaps it is time to move on.

I can't say this thread is working very well, but if two or three people are interested and actually reading the book, I'm perfectly happy to continue — Ludwig V

Certainly if one can introduce these lectures succinctly and clearly express what Ryle’s main point is, this may help a little with engagement. His particular style of writing feels like a lot of foreplay without a crescendo.

His particular style of writing feels like a lot of foreplay without a crescendo. — Richard B

I'll do my best. As to the problem with his style, I can understand that would be disappointing. Perhaps my introduction should make it clear what the climax is.

However, we have some way to go, and I'm a bit concerned that this issue is clearly off-topic. One of us could start a different thread, and I think that would be a good idea. How about it? — Ludwig V

Oh by the way, what I am discussing versus a specific identity versus a general future event, is not so indirectly related to this passage in Ryle:

But one thing he could not do--
logically and not merely epistemologically could not do. He
could not get the future events themselves for the heroes or
heroines of his story, since while it is still an askable question
whether or not a battle will be fought at Waterloo in 1815, he
cannot use with their normal force the phrase ' the Battle of
Waterloo' or the pronoun 'it'. While it, is still an askable
question whether my parents are going to have a fourth son, he
cannot use as a name the name 'Gilbert Ryle' or use as a pronoun designating their fourth son the pronoun 'he'. Roughly,
statements in the future tense cannot convey singular, but only
general propositions, where statements in the present and past
tense can convey both. More strictly, a statement to the effect
that something will exist or happen is, in so far, a general statement. When I predict the next eclipse of the moon, I have indeed
got the moon to make statements about, but I have not got her
next. eclipse to make statements about.

@Banno I am reading Lecture 1 still but your welcome to move forward.

I'm reading Lecture 2 but have been distracted in my posts. I'll make some greater effort.

@Ludwig V @Banno (if anyone else is actually reading this book, please let me know.)

Without having read the whole of Lecture I, I want to point out that Ryle is actually using Austin’s and Wittgenstein’s methods. As I have not gotten to the part where Ryle points out how two arguments which we take to clash are merely answering different questions, as alluded to in the introduction, I don’t think it is important (or it is at least premature) to consider the arguments themselves.

He is, however, making claims about the ordinary ways we—in the quote below—help (or hurt) ourselves, contrary to fatalism’s conclusion.

this argument… that nothing can be helped…goes directly counter to the piece of common knowledge that:
some things are our own fault,
some threatening disasters can be foreseen and averted, and
there is plenty of room for precautions, planning and weighing alternatives. — Ryle, p.16, broken apart by me

He is asking that the description of the mechanics of these acts be accepted on their face. Not that they are unassailable (foundational, undoubtable), say: because they are “common sense” or the opinion of “ordinary people”, but that the rationale to be made for these claims can only be done by yourself, to see for yourself; or to reject them, which is to say: point out how “fault”, “forseeing”, and actions to mitigate the foreseen, do not work this way, or that help in the face of destiny does not refute determinism.

He is pointing to what Wittgenstein will call the “grammar” of our activities (“practices” Witt says). And the method involves drawing out what we do by looking at what we would say, when…

Very often, though certainly not always, when we say 'it was true that ... ' or 'it is false that ... ' we are commenting on some actual pronouncement made or opinion held by some identifiable person…. — Ryle, p.17 emphasis added

Thus he is claiming that how our relation to the future works is dependent on an individual (and not a force) making a guess. (Wittgenstein points out that “belief”, in one sense, works as a guess (a hypothesis, PI p.190) and not as an unjustified lesser claim to knowledge.)

If you make a guess at the winner of the race, it will turn out right or wrong, correct or incorrect, but hardly true or false. These epithets are inappropriate…. — Ryle, p.18

You will note that the claim is that true and false are “inappropriate”, which is to say their implications do not apply, their criteria have nowhere to measure against, because our relation to the future is not a matter of knowledge (outside of science, which is based on repeatability, predictability; as maybe determinism would like itself to be).

Ryle is not as generous and skilled at drawing out the details of the argument for determinism as Austin was with perception (nor are these examples as various and in-depth), so I think there will be more to do in working out on what terms Ryle takes these views to stand, and thus how they miss each other from different perspectives, if that is the case.

That's fine by me. These summaries - at least in the case of this book - are not that easy to do, so I will appreciate having some extra time. That doesn't mean I don't appreciate your comments, for which I thank you.

I agree with you. The only thing I would add is that it is a surprise, at least to me, to realize that "While it, is still an askable question whether my parents are going to have a fourth son, he cannot use as a name the name 'Gilbert Ryle' or use as a pronoun designating their fourth son the pronoun 'he'. Roughly, statements in the future tense cannot convey singular, but only general propositions, where statements in the present and past tense can convey both. More strictly, a statement to the effect that something will exist or happen is, in so far, a general statement. When I predict the next eclipse of the moon, I have indeed got the moon to make statements about, but I have not got her next. eclipse to make statements about."

What is new to me is the idea that the future tense is different from present and past because we cannot refer to things that do not yet exist.