Way didn't say that "modern science" is nihilistic, but "modern thought". — Gnomon

Insofar as modern thought takes science to be the arbiter of reality, and insofar as science construes the world as solely consisting of objects and relations, then plainly it posits a meaningless world. It is of course true that that is something of a caricature, but then again, it’s also not far from the facts of the matter.

Insofar as modern thought takes science to be the arbiter of reality — Wayfarer

You mean "modern thought" which includes being espoused by (philosophers like) Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Marx, Bergson, Peirce, Husserl, Cassirer, Wittgenstein, Adorno, Sartre et al? (Please spare me / us your usual litany of cherry-picked quotations in lieu of your own reasoning or arguments) Your anti-science 'scientistc reduction' of "modern thought" (i.e. the cultural west), Wayfarer, is not even wrong. :eyes:

You mean "modern thought" which includes being espoused by (philosophers like) Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Marx, Bergon, Peirce, Husserl, Cassier, Wittgenstein, Adorno, Sartre et al? — 180 Proof

No, much narrower than that. Modern thought as in the accepted wisdom, what the man in the street thinks. And please spare me your antagonistic cynicism.

the accepted wisdom, what the man in the street thinks — Wayfarer

:rofl: :rofl: :rofl: Ludicrous, cop-out Wayf, even for a lifelong working class, prole like me!

your usual litany of cherry-picked quotations — 180 Proof

You want cherry picking? Here's some for ya:

You think that the idea humans are machines is a metaphor, but I tell you as a scientist, the vast amount of information we have about the human body says we are as mechanistic — Restitutor

The human body with skin pulled back is obviously mechanical with muscle, bone and tendon obviously arrange to maximize the efficiency of mechanical tasks — Restitutor

Laypeople really have no idea (sorry laypeople). — Restitutor

How neurons work is no less mechanical, — Restitutor

science would suggest that even the brain is deterministic, — Restitutor

Please understand, you do not have enough of a scientific background to understand how mechanistic science has shown the human body and all “life” to be — Restitutor

Science is screaming at us that the fundamental nature of existence is mechanistic — Restitutor

Of course, nobody actually *thinks* this stuff. 180 knows better. :lol:

) Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Marx, Bergon, Peirce, Husserl, Cassier, Wittgenstein, Adorno, Sartre et al? — 180 Proof

None of those are examples of the kind of materialism I had in mind. If I could be bothered, I could produce a list of those who were.


But I can't be.

@180 Proof I'm pretty clear about what I'm attacking, but you're not at all clear about what you're defending. I'm criticising the effects of scientific materialism on modern philosophy, specifically, the tendency to view the world and or the beings in it through the lens of mechanism, as this OP set out to do, and which, I note, you also criticized. That this tendency is widespread in modern culture, generally, is hardly something that I've invented.

Of those philosophers you mentioned, only Marx and Sartre were arguably materialist, but Marxist economic materialism is a different thing to the kind of mechanist materialism I have in mind, and which the OP represents. Schopenhauer and Kant were both trenchant critics of materialism, as were Bergson, Husserl, Cassirer and Wittgenstein.

My critique of scientific materialism is that it is based on extrapolating the scientific metholody for which classical physics was the paradigm to the wider domain of philosophy and wisdom about life in general. And this is a pervasive tendency deeply embedded in modern culture, as many of those same philosophers you have mentioned also attest. As Ray Monk, Wittgenstein's biographer said, 'His work is opposed, as he once put it, to "the spirit which informs the vast stream of European and American civilisation in which all of us stand." Nearly 50 years after his death, we can see, more clearly than ever, that the feeling that he was swimming against the tide was justified. If we wanted a label to describe this tide, we might call it "scientism," the view that every intelligible question has either a scientific solution or no solution at all. It is against this view that Wittgenstein set his face.'

As do I. So why my posts provoke such a never-ending stream of vituperation from you is not at all clear to me, but it is exceedingly tiresome, and the least productive and useful aspect of my participation here, so you will forgive me if in future I fail to response to your needless provocations.

As do I. So why my posts provoke such a never-ending stream of vituperation from you is not at all clear to me, but it is exceedingly tiresome, and the least productive and useful aspect of my participation here, so you will forgive me if in future I fail to response to your needless provocations. — Wayfarer

seems to envision his role on this forum as a Socratic gad-fly pecking & poking the transcendent pretensions of quixotic philosophy. But in practice, he sounds more like Poe's rapping-tapping raven, constantly croaking "nevermore", and preaching "despair" for those who wish to distinguish idealistic Philosophy from pragmatic Science. You'll do well to not open the door. :cool:

PS___But sometimes it's hard to resist responding to some blood-dripping tid-bit of provocation. That may be because he so craftily encapsulates the essence of shadowy Scientism into open-ended leading questions. :joke:

What you've written here has no bearing on the discussion where I left off with

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/855848

You're flapping around, sir, out of your depth again.

I see the Galileo connection more than the Newton one. I feel like you could almost call 20th century reductive materialism "neo-mechanism," because it turns back to "particles in contact" as the ground of ontology.

Newton's influence seems less clear to me because the idea of sui generis forces that act at a distance allowed for all sorts of ideas that included purpose. You had purpose coming from vital force as its own essential unique type of "fundemental force," and all sorts of "scientistic mysticism" in the late 19th century.

IMO though, the success of neo-mechanism has plenty to do with the philosophical, religious, and social context of the late-19th and early 20th century. It didn't just support a new way of looking at the sciences, but an entire "world view," on a level with the religion its advocates were self-consciously attempting to supplant.



Purpose seems to explain plenty to me, from the shape of hemoglobin to why people will face the wrong way in an elevator if everyone else is doing it.

It seems to me like the case for the abandonment of purpose in explanations is tied to formulations of the causal closure principle when it is paired with certain assumptions about what must be ontologically basic and "fundemental." I do think this is a major mistake in modern thinking. There is nothing even approaching consensus for a way CC can be coherently formulated. Despite this, even critics of CC will say things like:

What this means is that our universe exists as a closed system where things of the physical nature such as atoms can only be influenced by other physical things. If this principle is to be believed, then any type of explanation that is not based in scientific law cannot be used when describing the causal story of physical things. Thus, explanations such as purposeful ones become impossible.

But the above is only true if we assume that the emergence of purpose in the world is necessarily non-physical and/or not fundemental. Note how the above conflates "physical and ontologically fundemental," with the label "physical." Yet purpose is quite obvious to us, so if CC is true, purpose must be accounted for coherently.

And, while CC can't be properly defined, neither can "physical" (Hemple's dilemma). This leads me to think the CC is mostly just a good way to accidently beg a whole boat load of questions. If you don't have a good definition of "physical," and what it means for "all things to be physical" despite the ostentatiously true fact of "mental life existing," then I don't see what CC does for us that the Principle of Sufficent Reason didn't already do with less problems. The big thing for me is that the entire "mental causes"/"physical causes" seems to presuppose a sort of dualism that I don't believe is warranted, let alone something that should be dogmatically enforced.

There is plenty of empirical evidence to support the idea that the mental and the physical flow into each other seemlessly. But if CC is formulated in terms that "the mental is physical," then I don't think it explains much of anything. It reduces to "all real things have only real causes."

:clap: Agree!

Newton's influence seems less clear to me because the idea of sui generis forces that act at a distance allowed for all sorts of ideas that included purpose. You had purpose coming from vital force as its own essential unique type of "fundemental force," and all sorts of "scientistic mysticism" in the late 19th century. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I meant that Newton’s laws of motion were universal not in the sense of explaining everything - gravity being the obvious omission - but in unifying so many hitherto disparate phenomena under a single set of laws. That was the context in which physics starting to be seen as paradigmatic for all science and indeed all knowledge. ‘All I see’, said one of the Enlightenment philosophes ‘are bodies in motion’.

Furthermore that the predictions of the physical sciences were independent of context. That is where the big difference is found with biology in which every process is contextual.

I mentioned the essay What do organisms mean? by Steve Talbott. As the theme of this essay is directly relevant to this OP, hereunder a summary:

Talbott contrasts the language of physics, which adheres to strict, invariable mathematical laws, with the language of biology, which is imbued with meaning and intention. Physical laws do not require interpretation, they are fixed and deterministic. However, the biological world relies on what is termed the "because of reason" – an understanding that goes beyond mechanical interactions to include purpose, adaptation, and intentional action. Biological entities don't just follow physical laws; they interact in ways that create and respond to meaning, shaping their identity and function in relation to their environment. (Hence the adoption of biosemiotics.) This dynamic, expressive interaction is likened to language, where context and intent are essential. The biologist, therefore, must consider the full tapestry of meaning, which encompasses aesthetics, intention, and wholeness, to understand organisms fully. This approach rejects a purely mechanistic view and emphasizes the interconnectedness of all living things within a "community of meaning." The text suggests that biology's true challenge is to reconcile its language of meaning with the underlying physical laws, moving beyond a dated language of mechanisms to one that acknowledges the rich, interconnected fabric of life.

Steve Talbott emphasizes that biological processes and entities, while obeying physical laws, are imbued with an 'inwardness' or 'meaning' not found in inanimate objects (this is the origin of the hard problem). Meaning in biology does not necessarily equate to human consciousness but is a form of directed nature seen in cellular processes and organic behaviors. Biological systems, from the molecular to the organismal level, are governed by a "because of reason" that is more qualitative and less deterministic than the laws of physics.

The text also touches on the concept of causality, distinguishing it from the laws of physics. It argues that causes in biology are more context-dependent and less predictable than physical laws, which are more invariant and universally applicable. Biological organisms are complex systems where multiple factors and processes interact in a dynamic and meaningful way, and this complexity cannot be fully captured by simple cause-and-effect explanations. Furthermoe organisms are invariably situated in and conditioned by an environment, which to all intents can be disregarded for the purposes of physics.

Finally, the text challenges the traditional materialist view in science, which neglects the qualitative aspects of life and inwardness of organisms, and suggests that understanding organisms requires acknowledging and studying these qualitative aspects. It calls for a biology that not only respects physical laws but also appreciates the rich, meaning-laden interactions that characterize living beings. This involves recognizing that organisms are more than mere machines and that the because of reason is fundamental to understanding biological processes. The text implies that biology may offer a more foundational understanding of the world than physics because it deals directly with life and meaning, which are closer to our own experience as living beings.

https://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/what-do-organisms-mean

IMO though, the success of neo-mechanism has plenty to do with the philosophical, religious, and social context of the late-19th and early 20th century. It didn't just support a new way of looking at the sciences, but an entire "world view," on a level with the religion its advocates were self-consciously attempting to supplant. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The classical mechanistic model of physics was formulated by Newton*1, but I wasn't familiar with the Neo-Mechanistic Model (NMM)*2. My understanding is that Newton's deterministic mechanics was called into question by the indeterminism of Quantum physics. Yet, for most practical scientific purposes, classical physics is still applicable, on the macro scale. But, what about the cosmic scale?

For speculative philosophical purposes, Newton's notion of a divinely-designed Cosmic Mechanism was forced to adapt to the new reality of a non-mechanical foundation. Fundamentally, the world mechanism seems to have some degree of freedom to evolve in unpredictable directions. Some might interpret that uncertainty to directionless randomness, while others will see it as providing opportunities for progression in complexity, and perhaps for freewill choices.

A quick google makes NMM sound like the doctrine of Scientism*3 : the world is a physical mechanism grinding on interminably, without original impulse or final output. Hence no direction or reason. And especially, no creation event or transcendent origin. So, I'm guessing that NMM is more of a reactionary*4 worldview than a scientific model. It retains Newton's Laws, but omits G*D's Laws. Does that inference sound correct to you?

As you suggested, Scientism seems to provide some of the essential functions of a religious worldview*5 --- except of course, the emotional values that stem from belief in a prescient guiding hand behind the vagaries of nature. Perhaps the universal extent & power of physical Nature is close enough for pragmatic purposes*6. In the Age of Spiritual Machines*7, I suppose online forums may serve the communal purpose of a church. :smile:



*1. Classical mechanics :
The "classical" in "classical mechanics" does not refer to classical antiquity, . . . Instead, the qualifier distinguishes classical mechanics from physics developed after the revolutions of the early 20th century, which revealed limitations of classical mechanics.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Classical_mechanics

*2. The Neo-Mechanistic Model :
They seek to explain how something works and not make claims about the ultimate reality of things.
https://www.intechopen.com/chapters/81693

*3. Doctrine of Scientism :
"The belief that the methods of natural science, or the categories and things recognized in natural science, form the only proper elements in any philosophical or other inquiry", or that "science, and only science, describes the world as it is in itself, independent of perspective" with a concomitant "elimination of the psychological [and spiritual] dimensions of experience".
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientism
Note --- For philosophical (cultural science) purposes, personal perspectives are inherent, since their objects are entirely subjective. And their focus is primarily on psychological "experience". Which is obviously "natural", but clearly not empirical.

*4. Reactionary : return to status quo

*5. What is the philosophical definition of religion?
Religion attempts to offer a view of all of life and the universe and to offer answers to most , if not all, of the most basic and important questions which occur to humans all over the planet. The answers offered by Religion are not often subject to the careful scrutiny of reason and logic.
https://www.qcc.cuny.edu/socialSciences/ppecorino/PHIL_of_RELIGION_TEXT/CHAPTER_1_OVERVIEW/Philosophy_of_Religion.htm
Note --- Even philosophical Reason is suspect for those opposed to traditional religions. In its place we substitute documented Observation. Ironically, for some of us secular Philosophy provides universal answers without the necessity for a formal Creed or Authorized Bible. Adherents of Scientism seem to assume that there is, somewhere out there, an official document of scientific Truth --- but I haven't seem it.

*6. Scientism :
Mathematician Alexander Grothendieck, in his 1971 essay "The New Universal Church", characterized scientism as a religion-like ideology that advocates scientific reductionism, scientific authoritarianism, political technocracy and technological salvation, while denying the epistemological validity of feelings and experiences such as love, emotion, beauty and fulfillment.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientism

*7. The Age of Spiritual Machines is the ultimate guide on our road into the next century.
https://www.amazon.com/Age-Spiritual-Machines-Computers-Intelligence/dp/0140282025

PS___ Perhaps the primary advantage of Scientism is that, in theory, it provides hard (empirical) evidence to disprove aspects (beliefs) of traditional religions that one does not agree with. But, in practice we still seem to have never-ending philosophical dialogs & disputes about those age-old non-empirical open-questions. :cool:

What is the fundamental difference between information processed by a mechanical computer and a brain? — Restitutor

Feelings. These play a significant role in the choices we make. We could simulate the role of feelings in software, but neither the hardware nor software would actually experience feelings.

A look at John Neumann’s The Computer and The Brain, could lead to a more accelerated process of prediction.

What is the fundamental difference between information processed by a mechanical computer and a brain?
— Restitutor
Feelings. These play a significant role in the choices we make. We could simulate the role of feelings in software, but neither the hardware nor software would actually experience feelings. — Relativist

I am often surprised by how others feel about things. A woman once asked me how I was able to react the way I had, because she would have been angry, and wanted to learn how to be otherwise. I asked what on earth she was talking about, because I didn’t remember anything happening that should’ve made me angry. When she told me, I was just as stunned, because there is no reason I should’ve been angry about what happened. I'm sure we all witness people reacting with different emotions to things than we would have.

We might sometimes be surprised by our own emotional reactions to things.

So while we could program reactions into software that would give the outward appearance of an emotion we think we would feel to a given situation, aside from, as you say, it being a sham, we would all sometimes disagree with the programming. So who gets to decide?

IMO, our emotional reactions to events are the product of genetics and experiences - so these feelings are still part of an algorithmic process, although unpredictable because of the hidden, internal processes of a unique organism. But the actual feelings (pain, fear, lust...) don't seem reducible to the physical- so we can't build a machine that has them.

As to "dogmatic" attitudes against teleology, I came across this today. Generally, it's not considered good form liken opponents to immature children or proffer psychoanalytical explanations of other's disagreement, but this is a topic where it seems very common (particularly surrounding the EES debate).

This really is what you might have expected all along. You are replacing a spiritual view of the world with a secular one. You are replacing one with meaning by one without meaning. You can try to keep as much as you can of the old picture, but you should not be surprised if in the end you lose things that were considered absolutely crucial. That is what the move from the sacred to the secular is all about. Some of us call it a loss. Others of us call it “growing up.”

Anyhow, IMO teleology seems alive and well, it's just been naturalized and given the name "function," or gets framed in terms of "constraint." I see nothing wrong with this. There is definitely a sense in which "eyes are for seeing." If eyes didn't see, we wouldn't have them.

But it's useful to distinguish between teleological explanations that appear to invoke first person experience and volition versus ones that simply focus on the appearance or likellyhood of an end state given the characteristics of that end state.

End states can't "cause themselves," without retrocausality. But even explanations of purposeful human behavior don't hinge on retrocausality, so this opposition turns out to be simply a strawman.

The fact is that, even if end states are causally inefficacious, equilibrium-based explanations have significant explanatory power. E.g., "why do balloons take on their spherical shape?" The equilibrium-based answer is based on the characteristics end state (equalizing pressure), and while we could explain it in other terms, it doesn't seem possible to explain a good deal of physics without taking into accounts the idea of constraint. For example, I have only seen explanations of the formation of quark condensate in terms of the overall stability of fields.

What we have here seems to be a difference between "top down" and "bottom up" explanations. The first appeals to general principles, laws, etc. that dictate ends, whereas the latter deals with decomposition and parts.

The preference for bottom up explanations is sometimes grounded in the idea that only these can explain the "causal chain of events" undergirding phenomena. This seems justifiable in some cases, but not all. We can't describe the process by which a volume of hydrogen gas reaches equilibrium in terms of the collisions of molecules as mechanism supposed. Top down law like behavior ends up being essential to explain why we end up with a classical world that at first glance looks like it will require only bottom up explanations.

This is important because the demand for only bottom up explanations and the rejection of any form of telology, no matter how naturalized, seems to be grounded in metaphysical assumptions about how wholes must decompose into their parts. I don't think such assumptions are generally warranted.

At the same time, the teleological explanation the focuses on the end state can often be more accurate and parsimonious. Indeed, we often build our causal theories of how equilibrium is reached only after equilibrium laws are formulated, a sort of retroactive and often speculative flip to preference the bottom up explanation. Similarly, the empirical support for the top down tendency can be great, while support for the supposed bottom up causal mechanism can be weak (e.g. market equilibriums). This is a problem when it makes us conflate our certainly regarding the general tendency with a certainty regarding our explanation of it.

I used to think this had to do with the preferencing of the more "certain" sciences. E.g., Vico's list of "the new science," where mathematics is the most certain, then physics, then chemistry, etc. But I've realized this can't be right, because these fields very often focus on top down explanations. Rather, it seems more grounded in a metaphysics of decomposablity, the belief in a single "fundemental level" to being.

Maybe such a thing can be discovered. But even if it is, it still seems like it might be impossible to preference one type of explanation over an other, which means the characteristics of end states will remain important in explaining how they come into being - telology or telonomy if you like.

I suppose you can still see top down explanations as "mechanistic," but they seem more "organic" in ways.

What we have here seems to be a difference between "top down" and "bottom up" explanations. The first appeals to general principles, laws, etc. that dictate ends, whereas the latter deals with decomposition and parts.

The preference for bottom up explanations is sometimes grounded in the idea that only these can explain the "causal chain of events" undergirding phenomena. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Unfortunately, all of us world observers are physically limited to seeing open-ended "chains" of events without beginnings or endings. Admittedly, we star-gazing homo sapiens, having emerged in the middle of the story of cosmic evolution, can physically see only the mid-range links in the chain of change. But some of us curious creatures are un-satisfied with our physical limitations, so we engage our metaphysical powers (reason) in order to expand our view to see over the horizon.

For example, by combining current observations with rational imagination, astronomers were able to construct a hypothetical model of the sudden beginning of the space-time continuum. And yet, that based-on-actual-events fictional picture of a Big Bang is necessarily fuzzy, and subject to various interpretations. Likewise, ancient philosophers, sans telescopes, traced their historical chain-of-events back toward the beginning, and inferred the logical necessity for a First Link. Consequently, they also deduced the necessity for a Final Link in a mechanical causal process that shows no signs of being self-existent.

The philosophers seem to think in terms of whole systems, while the mechanists are content to deal only with the parts of the system that come readily to hand. So, teleology is a holistic worldview, while teleonomy is a more narrowly-focused cosmology. Unfortunately, the rigidly-hierarchical unitary perspective is now associated with some disreputable behaviors by the human rulers of top-heavy imperial religions in the past. Therefore, those who have suffered the abuses of centralized power, are wary of heavy-handed top-down command ; apparently preferring the vagaries of a piecemeal fragmented process of cosmic construction.

But, what if adamant law-based top-down Design is combined with the freedom of bottom-up Exploration of options (descent with modifications). That's what Darwin observed in his theory of a deterministic Selection Algorithm choosing from among indeterminate Randomized Options. Since the origins of the evolutionary chain are shrouded in the mists of obscure events, maybe semi-autonomous Teleonomy is more apt than autocratic Teleology to describe the wandering world-system we experience. :smile:


Teleology vs Teleonomy :
By “decomposing” the universe into free-floating chunks, materialists can more easily avoid dealing with indications of Teleology in evolution. “The idea would be to eliminate the more robust commonsense notion of function and replace it with a deflationist theoretical conception – to replace teleology with teleonomy”. Teleonomy is future-oriented only in retrospect, not in prospect. However, for higher holistic organisms, teleological intention is a sign of rational, self-interested behavior. However, in altruistic humans, self-interest includes the interests of the community as a whole, and loved-ones in particular. That’s why Feser raises the “explanatory gap” in science regarding the emergence of Life, Consciousness, and Rationality. “The Aristotelian holds that sentient life is irreducible to merely vegetative life . . . . And the Aristotelian holds that rational life is irreducible to mere sentience”. That’s because those holistic functions are more-than the sum of their parts. The emergence of a new whole system (or sub-system; or holon) is always accompanied by novel properties and functions.
https://bothandblog6.enformationism.info/page76.html

PS___ Those who, like Ed Feser, argue in favor of top-down Teleology --- read by Atheists as "Theology" --- like to use the term "irreducible", because their concept of cosmology is Holistic instead of Reductionistic. Yet, Holism seems anachronistic (e.g. New Age) to those whose worldview began in 17th century Europe with Mechanism & Materialism. So, in order to dodge that anti-religion bias, I'm willing to use the tepid term Teleonomy, to keep the discussion on a philosophical plane. :cool:

Anyhow, IMO teleology seems alive and well, it's just been naturalized and given the name "function," or gets framed in terms of "constraint." I see nothing wrong with this. There is definitely a sense in which "eyes are for seeing." If eyes didn't see, we wouldn't have them.

But it's useful to distinguish between teleological explanations that appear to invoke first person experience and volition versus ones that simply focus on the appearance or likellyhood of an end state given the characteristics of that end state. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Interestingly enough Aristotle does distinguish telos from ergon, which is usually translated as 'function'; and furthermore, in defining ergon, he does seem to equivocate between the activity involved and the end-product. Thus the ergon of a sculptor is a sculpture - the product of doing 'well'; whereas the ergon of the eye is seeing - the process of visually apprehending 'well'.

The ergon of a human being in this context is eudaimonia, living 'well' in the sense of 'good' living.

I wonder if this distinction might illuminate the machine/organism distinction. Both machine and organism may have ergon/function, but the telos is a feature of the living 'purposive' being, even if the telos is no more than Darwin's survival to reproduce.

If you chaps would have read Bateson, you might have accumulated the conceptual tools to think this through rather more clearly. Alas, there was not much interest in that careful thinker.

tldr: Feedback produces circular causation, like a thermostat regulates a heating system that operates the thermostat. This produces "in effect" a system with a purpose - to maintain a temperature between limits. Human bodies and living things do the same or similar things to maintain themselves in dynamic equilibrium. It would be foolish to try and understand a heating system without reference to its purpose; one could make no sense, for example, of its having "gone wrong". Understanding is another purposive relationship with feedback.