Science of morality terminology is designed for a scientific framework, not a philosophical one

Mark S

Traditional moral philosophy (ethics) can be understood to seek answers to two ought questions, “How should I live?’ and “What are my obligations”, and a question about what ‘is’ with ought implications, “What is good?”

Science of morality investigators seek answers to questions about what ‘is’, “Why do cultural moral norms and our moral sense exist?” and “How can answers to this question help us achieve our goals?” (Science of morality investigators sometimes go further with claims about what those goals ought to be, but these are philosophical, not scientific claims.)

Shared terminology between the two fields, such as “moral” and “universally moral”, refer to different things and even different categories of things. Communication between scientists and moral philosophers can be almost impossible if this is not understood.

Could scientific discussions about morality terminology such as “moral” and “universally moral” be usefully restricted to meanings within traditional moral philosophy’s framework? No, scientists are talking about a different subject. The traditional philosophical meanings of these terms are incoherent within the framework of understanding why cultural moral norms and our moral sense exist.

Could traditional moral philosophy’s intellectual framework be expanded to include “Why do cultural moral norms and our moral sense exist?” and “How can answers to this question help us achieve our goals?” I don’t see why not; it is simple science.

In any event, new science of morality terminology might help. Below are my proposals for cooperation, exploitation, conditional ought, imperative ought, and universally moral.

In case it is not already understood, I want to first expand on the status of the science of morality framework these terms are intended to serve.

The science of morality has answered the question, “Why do cultural moral norms and our moral sense exist?” by explaining them as parts of cooperation strategies. Evolutionary processes selected for and encoded these norms in our cultures and in the biology underlying our moral sense based on the benefits of cooperation they produced.
Evidence supports this concept of morality (Morality as Cooperation Strategies) being as innate to our universe and cross-species universal as the mathematics that define the cooperation/exploitation dilemma and the cooperation strategies that solve it.
However, being innate to our universe does not necessarily imply any innate, imperative bindingness - what we ought to do regardless of our needs and preferences.
Rather, Morality as Cooperation Strategies’ bindingness will come from a combination of 1) Individuals and groups choosing to advocate it as a matter of preference and 2) hypothetical future philosophical arguments that might argue it is “What everyone morally ought to do regardless of their needs and preferences”.

Consistent with the above framework for a scientific understanding of cultural moral norms and our spontaneous moral judgments, we can define:

Cooperation is the process of working together to the same end. Motivation to cooperate comes from less effort commonly needed to achieve that end. For example, moral norms and moral judgments are heuristics (usually reliable but fallible, rules of thumb) for parts of cooperation strategies. The Golden Rule and “Do not lie, steal, or kill” advocate initiating indirect reciprocity, which implies the (often unconscious) ends of “being treated as you would like to be treated”, not being lied to, stolen from, or killed. Violators of these norms are commonly judged to deserve punishment, though they may not be punished except by damage to their reputation.
Exploitation (usually called “defection” in game theory) is selfish behavior that harms other cooperators in ways that discourages future cooperation. For example, free riders (those accepting the benefits of living in cooperative societies but selfishly choosing not to reciprocate) exploit others’ cooperation efforts. Also, Ingroups (sometimes called coalitions in game theory) can cooperate to exploit outgroups. The descriptively ‘moral’ norms “women must be submissive to men” and “homosexuality is evil” are examples of ingroups cooperatively enforcing norms that exploit outgroups. This norm about women directly exploits them to increase the benefits of cooperation for the ingroup – men. The norm about homosexuals indirectly exploits them as imaginary threats and (in condemning the behavior) markers of membership in the ingroup, which can motivate increased cooperation within the ingroup. In summary, if there is a power imbalance, exploited outgroups may be unable to refuse to cooperate (unfair as that is when they are being exploited), and cooperation with exploitation can be sustainable in the long term.
The cooperation/exploitation dilemma is how to sustainably obtain the benefits of cooperation without exploitation destroying motivation to continue to cooperate. This is a dilemma because exploitation is virtually always the winning strategy (virtually always achieves the most benefits for the exploiter) in the short term, and, in the case of power imbalances, exploitation can be a winning strategy in the long term.
“Conditional oughts” are oughts of the form, “If you desire X, then you ought to do Y”. These are the only oughts that science, even the science of morality, innately provides. (One might also call them “hypothetical imperatives” in Phillipa Foot’s terminology.)
“Imperative oughts” are oughts of the form “What you morally ought to do regardless of your needs and preferences”. (Perhaps one might also call them “categorical imperatives” in Kant’s terminology, but to me, Kant’s nomenclature is needlessly obscure. Also, the use of a term specific to science may reduce confusion.)
“Universally moral” in the science of morality context is the subcomponent of descriptively moral behaviors that are necessary for all cooperation strategies. As necessary parts of all cooperation strategies, they will be cross-culturally and cross-species moral (universally moral). It appears to be the case that “universally moral” behaviors (in the scientific sense) are parts of cooperation strategies that do not exploit others. Of course, there is no necessary reason that what is universally moral in the scientific sense will be what we imperatively ought to do (a meaning of universally moral in the philosophical sense).

Terminology for describing results from the science of morality is not settled. Suggestions for more useful terminology and definitions are welcome. The best terminology will be equally useful for scientists working in the field and for moral philosophers.

javra

↪Mark S

A very well thought-out OP.

I don't know if I should throw this monkey-wrench into the wheels, but I will. For science and philosophy to converge on the issue of morality, what is first needed is a common understanding of the the term "good" references in all cases, irrespective of whether moral or not.

The mass murderer considers murdering innocent bystanders a good pleasure to obtain - this in terms of their own mind's workings. What then, for example, unifies as an underlying facet of all conceivable behaviors that which is good to the unconstrained mass murderer with that which is good to, for example, Mother Teresa?

Here is not addressed the issue of cooperation (which can be at the very least inferred from empirical observations), cooperation's mores, and the societal (or even universal) morality that can thereby obtain as a facet of these mores. Here is addressed why any such optimal means of cooperation is deemed - maybe in an a priori way - something good to begin with. In contrast, for one possible to conceive example, there is the the good(ness) to be aspired toward of a cosmically obtained absolute nonbeing - this as entertained by most, if not all, antinatalists - wherein the very process of cooperation is deemed to be a deficit of that which is good and, thereby, in this sense alone, an existential bad (for some measure of suffering will yet occur in such cooperation at least at times).

So what makes optimal cooperation, rather than absolute nonbeing, good? (as an aside, with a heads up that notions such as that of Nirvana entail being - this in contrast to the nonbeing longed for by the antinatalist)

Philosophically, the issue is not - or at least, is not foundationally - that of "what proposition specifies that which is in fact good" but, instead, "what universal attribute(s) constitute the very existential occurrence of good and bad (and, by extension when applied to psyches, the potential for evil)". Here circumscribing everything from a good piece of pie, to a good argument, to a good killing (from a vengeful murder's point of view just as much as from a hunter's or farmer's that kills for strict sustenance, etc.), to a good morality (such as the morality of female circumcision can be for some, but is not so deemed by most of the West - etc.) ... and everything else under the sun.

The later philosophical issue enquirers into something that cannot be empirically observed - but is instead presumed in empirical observations. And while i grant that not all philosophers are concerned with this issue, many are.

In sum, it so far seems to me that science and philosophy can only happily, satisfactorily, converge on the issue of morality only if both agree on what the meaning of "good" (regardless of the language in which it is expressed) can and does signify, and what it applies to in all its conceivably instantiations. (Again, including what Stalin deemed to be good for himself (and others) and what Mother Teresa deemed to be good for herself (and others) both here being individual instantiations of this very same meaning - of that which is good - as its meaning is here equally applicable to both). And this underlying issue of what I deem to be meta-ethics I find cannot be obtained via science but, instead, potentially only via philosophy.

Mark S

In sum, it so far seems to me that science and philosophy can only happily, satisfactorily, converge on the issue of morality only if both agree on what the meaning of "good" (regardless of the language in which it is expressed) can and does signify, and what it applies to in all its conceivably instantiations. — javra

Remember that:

Science of morality investigators seek answers to questions about what ‘is’, “Why do cultural moral norms and our moral sense exist?” and “How can answers to this question help us achieve our goals?” — Mark S

Science does not address the broad question of the meaning of good, so agreement with moral philosophy on “the meaning of good” is impossible. And I have yet to hear that moral philosophers have agreed on the meaning of good.

But science can provide culturally and philosophically useful information about a subset of what is good. “Good behaviors” regarding interactions with others are science’s playground of objective knowledge. Objective knowledge about what is good (even this limited subcategory of good) could be useful in moral philosophy in broader discussions about what is good.

I’ve talked about objective knowledge in the form of Morality as Cooperation Strategies. But the same approach can also be applied to answering the broader question, “Why do our intuitions about what is good exist?”

Objective knowledge about why our shared intuitions about good are what they are could be similarly useful.

javra

Objective knowledge about why our shared intuitions about good are what they are could be similarly useful. — Mark S

I don't disagree with this, but find it agreeing with my previous post. "Objective knowledge" cannot be interpreted as a (physical) object whose attributes are thereby equally applicable to all co-existent minds in impartial manners. Hence, I so far can only interpret it as "impartial knowledge" regarding our shared intuition about the good. Yet, to in fact be impartial, this knowledge will need to be equally applicable in valid manners to all minds the world over - if this is at all possible. And this, again, is not a theme for science to discover but, instead, one for meta-ethics to investigate.

If I'm missing something let me know.

Mark S

"Objective knowledge" cannot be interpreted as a (physical) object whose attributes are thereby equally applicable to all co-existent minds in impartial manners. Hence, I so far can only interpret it as "impartial knowledge" regarding our shared intuition of about the good. — javra

Objective knowledge from science about our moral intuitions is “impartial” and even mind-independent. Obtaining mind-independent knowledge is the standard goal in science.

For example, is guilt triggered by our moral sense good? Guilt is not physical, but science can objectively tell us why it exists. Guilt exists because it is a punishment strategy – internal self-punishment to motivate not repeating immoral behavior.

Science can tell us the function of guilt is to motivate moral behavior in terms of cooperation with others. That is all.

javra

Objective knowledge from science about our moral intuitions is “impartial” and even mind-independent. Obtaining mind-independent knowledge is the standard goal in science. — Mark S

While I fully agree that objective knowledge - hence either perfectly impartial knowledge or a relatively impartial knowledge that aims toward the former - is the goal of the empirical sciences as an enterprise (all aspects of the scientific method function so as further approach this end), I'm not at all in agreement that any knowledge - including one that can by hypothesized as completely impartial - can ever be awareness independent. And I can here only interpret "mind-independent knowledge" to be just that: knowledge whose occurrence is not in any way dependent on awareness.

This disagreement might then likely be an insurmountable impasse for us.

Science of morality terminology is designed for a scientific framework, not a philosophical one

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