Last time, swear

@Banno @Ludvig @Corvus @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank @Richard B @Janus @creativesoul

Just to loop back to Lec. VIII where Austin countered Ayer in saying an illusion was a case where we see something where something else is, in Lec. IX Austin directly addresses that we can choose which way to say what we “see” (p. 99), which doesn’t depend on “my” perception but on what needs to be pointed out given the situation—our “interest in this aspect or that of the total situation” (p. 100). This differs from philosophy’s fixation that there must be a universal chair for all particulars, rather than at times that we have different interests in how we judge a chair to be a chair. And so, “…there will sometimes be no one right way of saying what is seen…”, not a “surface” or a sense-data. Or, as @Ludvig puts it: “it isn't clear that there is any description that is truly neutral” perhaps forgetting that there is always a context for a case. I will only point out that at other times there will be a right way of saying what is seen.

I also find it fascinating that Austin recognizes Wittgenstein’s work on seeing an aspect of something, “see…as…” as Austin says, though only allowing it for “special cases”. Not as empathetic as Wittgenstein I think, for whom seeing an aspect is part of treating a person as if they have a soul (PI, p.178), or seeing (acknowledging) the aspect of them as a person writhing in pain p.223.

On the two languages issue, Austin reports Ayer as saying that "..they find it 'convenient' to extend this usage (sc. that what is experienced in delusive cases is a sense-datum) to all cases', on the old, familiar ground that 'delusive and veridical perceptions' don't differ in 'quality' and that he is disposed to accept the recommendation with the comment "'it does not in itself add to our knowledge of empirical facts, or even make it possible for us to express anything that we could not have expressed without it. At the best it enables us only to refer to familiar facts in a clearer and more convenient way.' (P 87 Sense and Sensibilia. This is hardly a ringing endorsement. One wonders why he is so cautious.

Translating "I see a table" into sense-datum language (a patch of colour of this shape here and a patch of another colour of that shape there) would be extremely cumbersome and the only advantage that I can see would be to maybe remove the possibility of being wrong. I don't rule out the possibility that such a representation might be useful in some circumstances. But clarity and convenience are hard to discern.

"You kicked the door" IFF "You kicked the painted piece of wood" — Banno

Yes, of course. I'm only saying that having the same truth value isn't the end of the story and so isn't the same as equivalence for all purposes. A Plea for Excuses does indeed take the point further.

And so, “…there will sometimes be no one right way of saying what is seen…”, not a “surface” or a sense-data. Or, as Ludvig puts it: “it isn't clear that there is any description that is truly neutral” perhaps forgetting that there is always a context for a case. I will only point out that at other times there will be a right way of saying what is seen. — Antony Nickles

Yes, I agree with both points.

May I gently point out that there seems to be a typo here. There is a member called "LUDVIG" on this site, but that isn't me, but you were quoting me. I wouldn't want to miss something.

It's just how often the term appears in Google Books, — Banno

Thanks. That makes sense.

It is odd, though, that "J. L. Austin" is apparently mentioned in 1900, when he was born in 1911. I know - it's someone else with the same name. But since, so far as I can see, the same is happening for both the others, it seems that even full names are much more common that one might have thought.

Austin has argued that Ayer makes use of the Argument from Illusion, but that a closer reading shows Ayer does not actually believe the argument. That is, Ayer does not reach the conclusion, that what we directly perceive are sense data, as a consequence of consideration of the Argument from Illusion. Rather, Ayer has other reasons for his view, and uses the Argument for Illusion only rhetorically, as a post hoc justification. — Banno

The old "illusion" of a chequerboard with a shadow cast across it such that dark square A is 'surprisingly' shown to be "the same exact shade" as light square B ...

... seems to me to demonstrate that we precisely do not see the sense data, (patches of identical grey) but the interpretation thereof. We read the difference into the same data and see the result. One reads the flat screen as if it were representing the world. Just as one does not see the black worms all over the screen, but the meaning of the writing.

Likewise, I am told that the eye vibrates, and this produces a 'flicker' at the edges of objects that aids edge detection. One does not experience the vibration or the flicker, but the edges of objects.

Likewise a spear fisherman learns to see round the corner of the water's surface to where the fish really is so that when his spear bends as it enters the water, it will hit the fish. And the architect, the artist and the fashion designer all use 'trompe l'oeil' with equal proficiency. Only philosophers actually look for the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow.

Hume's scepticism is the scepticism of the power of pure reason. His fight is with a rationalism that tries to prove what cannot be proved but must be discovered. Reason cannot get an ought from an is, or a will-be from a has-been, or a world from experience. This is because it is limited to words and talk and can only keep language in order at best.

This is the sense in which it cannot affect the world. And the sense in which it certainly can affect the world is that when one orders coffee the waiter tends to bring one coffee. The tree is not listening, but the lumberjack is. Now if one cannot allow that both these senses are perfectly valid, then it is rationality that has a problem, because the world accommodates both with no trouble at all.

Thus Hume is rejecting rationalism in favour of empiricism, and it looks like Austin is doing the same, while Ayer and co are trying to rehabilitate a form of rationalism

I don't know what makes this understanding "proper". It is defensible as a view. But people often do things that they think are in their interests, but actually bring them harm. Moreover, it clearly wasn't Plato's view. (Only philosophers can understand what the real good is) — Ludwig V

If the person acts on it, it must be a "real" good, because it caused the person to act. Whether it is later judged as being a mistaken act is irrelevant to whether or not the good which is acted on is "real". It is necessary that this "good" the one which is acted on, is real in order that it may be said to cause action.

This is a very important point in understanding Plato because it brings actuality, "act" into the idealist realm of intelligible objects, resolving the so-called interaction problem which is intrinsic to the prior theory of participation. Now the objects of the intellect may be understood as real and actual. Through the medium of "the good" intelligible objects can be known as prior to, and cause of all artificial material objects which are like shadows or reflections of the intelligible objects, making the intelligible as higher in priority. "The good" is said to illuminate intelligible objects in a way which is analogous to the way that the sun illuminates visible objects (Republic Bk.6), the will to know. It provides the basis for Aristotle's conception of "final cause". I say it is the "proper" understanding because it is the only way to make "real good" intelligible, rather than the incoherent mess which Ayer presents us with.

If the person acts on it, it must be a "real" good, because it caused the person to act. Whether it is later judged as being a mistaken act is irrelevant to whether or not the good which is acted on is "real". It is necessary that this "good" the one which is acted on, is real in order that it may be said to cause action. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, that's one way of putting it. But I can't see that it is Plato's way. Surely, for him, there is only one real good, i.e. the Form of the Good? The good things of this world may participate in the Form, but they are "shadows" of the Good and so not real (really) good. I accept that the addict who pursues their addiction believes that it is a good thing. But for the rest of us, before and after the action(s), it isn't. This is the problem of akrasia. I don't see why you insist that alcohol is a good thing for an alcoholic, just because the alcoholic believes that it is - though that could be said if one had a thoroughly subjectivist view of what good is. But that would be incompatible with any Platonic view, so I don't suppose it will appeal to you.

I agree that the alcohol can be regarded as a cause of the alcoholic's actions (in some sense of "cause"). But nothing follows as to whether it is a good thing for the alcoholic or not.

I can see that you are trying to develop a solution to a key problem with the theory of Forms. But your concept of cause is very different from modern usage, though it may fit with the Greek concept of aitia. However, there are other problems with the theory of Forms that make it hard for me to see much benefit in "solving" this one.

I'm inclined to think that this discussion, interesting though it may be, does not fit well with the main topic of this thread. So perhaps we should leave this there, until another opportunity arises.

May I gently point out that there seems to be a typo here. There is a member called "LUDVIG" on this site, but that isn't me, but you were quoting me. I wouldn't want to miss something. — Ludwig V

I tried to tag everyone doing the reading when I wrote up my notes on a section; you have been spared all that. Not them.

Distribution lists are tricky. I usually leave someone off and get rebuked.

Austin directly addresses that we can choose which way to say what we “see” (p. 99) — Antony Nickles

It's so close to meaning as use, that what we say is so much more contextual than had been previously supposed - and is still supposed by many today, it seems, amongst those who think language is just "communication" or "information", as if that were any clearer, or as if that might account for everything we do with words.

The zeitgeist was primed for ordinary language to come to the fore. Anscombe would not have been the only one moving between Oxford and Cambridge. Anscombe would have been at lectures presented by Austin. She seems to have preferred the mysticism of Wittgenstein to Austin's dry pragmatics. "She believed that attending Wittgenstein’s lectures freed her from the trap of phenomenalism that had so plagued her". Many hereabouts remain trapped in phenomenalism.

I agree entirely that one major theme running through these pages is that the issues here need not have one solution, or even any solution. The plot twist in this story, as we find in Lecture X, is that - spoiler alert - Ayer's Logical Positivism derives not from the argument from illusion and not the two languages or anything other than his desire for "incorrigible" proposition - for there to be only one solution.

...the only advantage that I can see would be to maybe remove the possibility of being wrong — Ludwig V

That is why Ayer invents sense data, and it is what Austin shows to be misguided.

...that having the same truth value isn't the end of the story.. — Ludwig V

Yep, but it is perhaps a minimum achievement for an interpretation or translation of a statement in one language into another.

Have you looked at the Ngram for your own name? Mine peaks in 1987, but is first mentioned in 1865. My nom de plum dates to the 1600's.

..we precisely do not see the sense data, (patches of identical grey) but the interpretation thereof. — unenlightened

I'll agree, perhaps with some reservations about "interpretation".

There was a recent, very odd discussion in the Case for Transcendental Idealism thread - , and apparently insisting that they see only in two dimensions, only imagining the third... I couldn't make sense of it.

But the reason I drove her home was that I promised - an ought from an is, in a manner of speaking, that at least superficially contradicts your "Reason cannot get an ought from an is...". There's more here.

I tried to tag everyone doing the reading — Antony Nickles

Which raises the question, who is actually doing the reading?

Well, that's one way of putting it. But I can't see that it is Plato's way. Surely, for him, there is only one real good, i.e. the Form of the Good? The good things of this world may participate in the Form, but they are "shadows" of the Good and so not real (really) good. — Ludwig V

I suggest you read Plato more closely. The "Form of the Good" is unknowable, even to the philosopher. So what Plato talks about is "the good", and the good is particular to the circumstances. Whether or not a particular good participates in the Form of Good can never be known, because the Form of Good cannot be known. Are you familiar with Plato's Euthyphro? This is where such an independent "Form of Good", which the goods of this world would participate in, is shown to be an incoherent idea. This is the start to Plato's refutation of the theory of participation. Look at The Republic, there is no such thing as the Form of Justice, which all instances of "the just" would participate in, there is only individual ideas as to what "just" means.

I agree that the alcohol can be regarded as a cause of the alcoholic's actions (in some sense of "cause"). But nothing follows as to whether it is a good thing for the alcoholic or not. — Ludwig V

Consider precisely what "good" means in the context of Plato's philosophy. It is what motivates a person to act, what Aristotle called "the end", 'that for the sake of which', and what we call the goal or objective. As such, the "real" good must be what motivates a person to act. If the desire for alcohol has motivated an alcoholic to act, then we must say that it was the real good. If you want to make a further judgement about whether alcohol is "a good thing" for the alcoholic, then you are going to need a completely different sense, a different meaning, of "good".

This different meaning of "good" is based in some moral principles or some other standards. But these standards suffer the problem pointed out in the Euthyphro. We cannot say that this meaning of "good" is anything real or independent, because it is only supported by a code of ethics or something like that, and the attempt to make it something "real" produces incoherency. Therefore we can only say it is an apparent good not a real good.

So when you judge whether the alcohol is a good thing, or not a good thing for the alcoholic, this judgement is only as it appears to you. There cannot be any real truth or falsity to this judgement because it is only based in appearance, how things appear to you through the application of some standards. However, when we see that the desire for alcohol motivates the alcoholic to act, as an end, or a goal, what Plato called "the good", and Aristotle called "final cause", we can definitely say that the alcohol is a "real" good, because it has caused real activity, in the real world.

I'm inclined to think that this discussion, interesting though it may be, does not fit well with the main topic of this thread. So perhaps we should leave this there, until another opportunity arises. — Ludwig V

Perhaps our discussion is a little off topic, but it points to the fundamental problem being discussed in the thread, concerning the difference between the philosophical use of words, and the ordinary use of words, and how this difference starts to significantly mislead us when it comes to discussing the meaning of words like "real".

See, ordinary language would have us believe that "good" refers to some judgement based in a code of ethics. However, if we try to make this ordinary language sense of "good" into something "real" we end up with incoherency which would incline us toward a fundamentally incoherent definition of "real" in order to make this sense of "good" the real good. And this demonstrates why, when doing philosophy, we must adhere to rigorous philosophical meanings of the terms, and not be corrupted by ordinary language, because this corruption leads us into incoherent metaphysics.

Yep, but it is perhaps a minimum achievement for an interpretation or translation of a statement in one language into another. — Banno

It applies well enough to the kicked wood/door. But it might be more complicated to apply to the duck-rabbit. It is satisfied in an objective sense, but not everyone always sees both interpretations straight off, so you would have to phrase it carefully.

There was a recent, very odd discussion in the Case for Transcendental Idealism thread - ↪Gregory, ↪Corvus and ↪RussellA apparently insisting that they see only in two dimensions, only imagining the third... I couldn't make sense of it. — Banno

Perhaps they are not aware that our ears deliver spatial information about the source of the sound "directly"; however, the information is deduced from the difference between the information from one ear and the other. That's why the sound from earphones often sounds as if it were located in your own head. Binocular vision delivers spatial information in the same way as an old-fashioned range-finder; however,, that method only works at limited distance. Further away, we use internal clues.

However, I'm sure that we learn about space and that action in space is critical to understanding it. But ideas about what is perceived are also important, so I wouldn't be surprised if someone who was convinced by the arguments "saw" in two dimensions; but it is an interpretation, just as seeing in three dimensions is an interpretation.

That's not a coherent view, I know.

But the reason I drove her home was that I promised - an ought from an is, in a manner of speaking, that at least superficially contradicts your "Reason cannot get an ought from an is...". There's more here. — Banno

That sounds like an interesting discussion.

Which raises the question, who is actually doing the reading? — Banno

We'll never know.

And this demonstrates why, when doing philosophy, we must adhere to rigorous philosophical meanings of the terms, — Metaphysician Undercover

Perhaps there can be specialized philosophical terms. But they can only amount to a dialect of English. So ordinary language is inescapable.

Consider precisely what "good" means in the context of Plato's philosophy. — Metaphysician Undercover

An interesting line of argument. But I can't engage with it without reading or re-reading the texts and I'm afraid I simply don't have the time to do that. Sorry.

There was a recent, very odd discussion in the Case for Transcendental Idealism thread - ↪Gregory, ↪Corvus and ↪RussellA apparently insisting that they see only in two dimensions, only imagining the third... I couldn't make sense of it. — Banno

As Oscar Wide said:"There is only one thing in life worse than being talked about, and that is not being talked about.”

It depends what you mean by "see".

According to the Merriam Webster Dictionary, two possible meanings of "see" are i) to perceive by the eye and ii) to imagine as a possibility.

Therefore, both the following statements are true: "I can only see in two dimensions" and "I can also see in three dimensions", dependent on whether the word "see" is being used literally or metaphorically.

Metaphors are a legitimate part of language. In What Metaphors Mean, Donald Davidson wrote:"Metaphor is a legitimate device not only in literature but in science, philosophy, and the law; it is effective in praise and abuse, prayer and promotion, description and prescription."

Yes, as Davidson points out, language is full of inherent ambiguities, when he wrote: "Another brand of ambiguity may appear to offer a better suggestion. Sometimes a word will, in a single context, bear two meanings where we are meant to remember and to use both."

Therefore, both the following statements are true: "I can only see in two dimensions" and "I can also see in three dimensions", dependent on whether the word "see" is being used literally or metaphorically. — RussellA

Which use is literal and which is metaphorical?

Metaphors are a legitimate part of language. — RussellA

I don't think there's any doubt of that, though "metaphor" is a somewhat slippery term. I'll put the book on my wish-list.

But how does this help us understand this topic?

https://hartzog.org/j/davidsonmetaphor.pdf

it's a good read, showing that understanding a metaphor involves understanding its literal meaning.

What I deny is that metaphor does its work by having a special meaning, a specific cognitive content.

But yes, what this has to do with seeing in two or three dimensions remains obscure.

t's a good read, showing that understanding a metaphor involves understanding its literal meaning. — Banno

It is a good reading. Thank you for sharing the paper.

A metaphor makes us attend to some likeness, often a novel or surprising likeness, between two or more things. This trite and true observation leads, or seems to lead, to a conclusion concerning the meaning of metaphors. Consider ordinary likeness or similarity: two roses are similar because they share the property of being a rose; two infants are similar by virtue of their infanthood. Or, more simply, roses are similar because each is a rose, infants, because each is an infant

.

Perhaps, then, we can explain metaphor as a kind of ambiguity: in the context of a metaphor, certain words have either a new or an original meaning, and the force of the metaphor depends on our uncertainty as we waver between the two meanings. Thus when Melville writes that "Christ was a chronometer," the effect of metaphor is produced by our taking "chronometer" first in its ordinary sense and then in some extraordinary or metaphorical sense.

This reminds me of Austin's arguments on chapter VII, when he states: Consider the expressions 'cricket ball', 'cricket bat', 'cricket pavilion', 'cricket weather'. If someone did not know about cricket and were obsessed with the use of such 'normal' words as 'yellow', he might gaze at the ball, the bat, the building, the weather, trying to detect the 'common quality' which (he assumes) is attributed to these things by the prefix 'cricket'. But no such quality meets his eye; and so perhaps he concludes that 'cricket' must designate a non-natural quality, a quality to be detected not in any ordinary way but by intuition.

Perhaps there can be specialized philosophical terms. But they can only amount to a dialect of English. So ordinary language is inescapable. — Ludwig V

The point though is that ordinary language misleads us when we discuss the nature of reality, therefore the philosopher must be very wary about this. Take the example of "see" discussed by . It appears like the ordinary use of "see", being the activity that the specific sense, the eye is involved in, is the "literal" use of the term. But just like in my example of "good", ordinary language is based in what "appears" to us, and it often has no consideration for what is "real", i.e. reality, as in what is really the case. This misdirection from ordinary language inclines us to alter our definition of "real", such that it fits with what is apparent to us through the senses, rather than adhering to rigorous logic in determining what is "real". That is the problem which Plato's cave allegory exposed. The vulgar are looking at the appearance of shadows as if they are the real things, because that's how the vernacular leads them.

However, the philosopher sees beyond this. What really happens in the act of seeing is that the brain produces an image, and it is not the eyes which are producing the image, nor is it the eyes which are "seeing". The eyes are the medium, a tool used in the act of seeing. Then the real, more literal sense of "see" is the one based in the imagination of the mind, rather than the one based in the sense. And that this must be "the real meaning" of the term is evident because it refers to what is really occurring in both situations, seeing with the eyes, and imagining, rather than simply referring to what appears to be occurring. This is demonstrated more clearly with my example of "good", and it is the reason why the common, vulgar or naive people, who will not resist the restraints imposed by common language, will remain in Plato's cave, refusing to follow the philosopher's ascent.

Which use is literal and which is metaphorical? — Ludwig V

Clearly, the first is meant literally and the second metaphorically.

If "see" means literally "to perceive by the eye", when standing in front of an object such as an apple I can only see the front of it. If "see" means metaphorically "to imagine a possibility", when standing in front of an object such as an apple, I can also see the back of it.

Is there anyone who thinks that we can literally "see the future", "see into her mind", "see the solution", "see what you mean", "see the end of time", "see the other side of the Universe", "see atoms", "see evolution happening", "see Caesar's dilemma" or "see gravitational waves".

But how does this help us understand this topic? — Ludwig V

I'm not here to help you understand Austin's Sense and Sensibilia, I'm here to specifically respond to @Banno by pointing out that different meanings of the word" see" shouldn't be conflated.

Though, as an aside, as a Christian author could write an article evaluating Atheism and unsurprisingly find it wanting, Austin, as a believer in Ordinary Language Philosophy, has written an article evaluating sense-data theory and has unsurprisingly find it wanting. From Austin's Ordinary Language point of view, I may well agree that sense-data is irrelevant, but that does mean that the sense-data theory is irrelevant.

Cheers. Davidson has some powerful ideas. This is not one of his more central papers, but part of a program he instigated intent on showing how to interpret natural languages in first-order logic. Metaphors had been offered as a counter instance, since if metaphorical expressions had two meanings the question arrises as to which meaning is the correct translation; so it became important for him to show that metaphors had but one literal meaning, and to add that they had a further pragmatic force, allowing us to see something afresh.

Davidson is certainly not amongst the natural language philosophers. He is among the next generation who returned to examining language in formal terms. He was certainly influenced by Wittgenstein; I'm not sure how much Austin was present in his thinking, although the separation of literal and pragmatic meaning can be traced to How to do things with words.

And despite all that, it is far from clear what any of this has to do with the contention that we only see in 2 dimensions, which is just plain wrong.

Reading Lecture X, I'm struck by how much of the argument is dependent on a view of the structure of language that I have taken as a given, but that might not be so obvious to all. To a large extent that view is expressed in Austin's How To Do Things With Words, but it is also found elsewhere and is accepted cannon. Lack of familiarity might explain earlier misunderstandings. A rough outline might be useful.

Perhaps this should all be in a different thread, since it runs the chance of leading us off topic. but I'll drop it here to see what transpires.

Words can be strung together into sentences. Those sentences are of various sorts - statements, questions, commands, and so on. These can to a large extent be marked by differences in the sequence of words: "The door is shut", "Is the door shut?", "Shut the door!" and so on.

Philosophers have a tendency to give priority to statements, mostly because it is these that are either true or false, and that are constitutive of beliefs.

Sentences can be used in "utterances", somewhat of a term of art for philosophers, since it includes verbal and written texts. An utterance is a particular use of a sentence to perform some act - make a statement, ask a question, issue a command. It's of course not necessary for the sentence to match the utterance - one can ask a rhetorical question, which can be to use the sentence form of questioning in order to utter a statement.

Our utterances are of course actions. There is a further step where we do things using an utterance. "I name this ship the Queen Mary" in the appropriate circumstances names the ship. "I now pronounce you husband and wife" marries the couple. These are not only the act of saying something, but are an additional act performed by or in saying something.

Austin's contribution was to carefully seperate out these elements, to elucidate where they might on occasion go astray - infelicities of misfire and abuse - and to begin a classification. His student Searle ran with the classifications, turning it into a career. Austin attempted to explain language in terms of convention, but this was later found inadequate without also including intent.

I'm not suggesting that this is the only, or even the correct, way to understand how words work, just that it is implicit, and sometimes explicit, in Sense and Sensibilia and so ought be understood. Nor was Austin the only one suggesting ideas along these lines.

He was certainly influenced by Wittgenstein; I'm not sure how much Austin was present in his thinking, although the separation of literal and pragmatic meaning can be traced to How to do things with words. — Banno

I promise I had similar thinking after reading the paper, but I wasn't confident enough to express that the work of Davidson was influenced - or reminds me of - Wittgenstein, so I am happy to know that you have the same thought. Yet I mentioned Austin because it is the principal subject of this thread, but it is true that 'literal and pragmatic' belong to 'How to do things with words'. Well, fair enough with that interesting paper you shared previously, I don't want to get off-topic and disturb your - and the rest of the folks - analysis on 'Sense and Sensibilia'.

This reminds me of Austin's arguments on chapter VII, — javi2541997

There's a intricate issue here. There's no doubt that the meaning of "cricket" is being extended but I don't think it is being transformed in quite the way that a metaphorical use would extend it. "Cricket" is defined as a noun and we understand how it is constituted. But "cricket" in Austin's example is being used as an adjective, in a different category. This change, or stretching, is different from a metaphorical use.

The point though is that ordinary language misleads us when we discuss the nature of reality, therefore the philosopher must be very wary about this. — Metaphysician Undercover

Whether ordinary language misleads us is precisely the question. Though there's no doubt that language can mislead - as it is clearly misleading Plato when he concludes that all we see is shadows.

What really happens in the act of seeing is that the brain produces an image, — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm afraid I don't agree that the brain produces an image. If it did, there would be a question how we perceive the image that the brain produces.

Clearly, the first is meant literally and the second metaphorically. — RussellA

I can only see the front of it. — RussellA

If you know that there's another side to the apple, you know that you are looking at a three-dimensional object, so you are not seeing in two dimensions. Seeing in two dimensions occurs when you see a picture of an apple. You do not confuse the image of the apple with an apple; you do not confuse the back of the picture with the back of the apple, (except when you are deceived and do not know which you are seeing). Hence seeing in two dimensions is the metaphor, not the reality.

I'm not here to help you understand Austin's Sense and Sensibilia, — RussellA

I'm sorry if I misunderstood. I thought that helping each other to understand Austin's text was the point of the thread.

Sentences can be used in "utterances", somewhat of a term of art for philosophers, — Banno

Forgive my pedantry, but "utter" in this sense seems to me to be a revival of the classic and original use of "utter", which survives in the law. When one uses a forged £5 note, in law, one "utters" it. When one presents a forged passport, one "utters" it. And so on. Creating the forgery is distinct from using it and the creator does not necessarily use it. So the distinction matters.

When one utters "I name this ship" in the right circumstances, one uses the words. We're not used to it, but it isn't a philosophical invention.

The post in which I invoked @RussellA was a reply to , where he had in turn replied to my post concerning Austin's point that the Ayer had been somewhat disingenuous in his use of the Argument from Illusion...(!)

The point Austin makes against Ayer can be made against those who suppose that we only see in two dimensions - that the evidence is to the contrary! To think otherwise one must have somewhat extreme and external motives... an ideology.

Ah - I like that.

Though there's no doubt that language can mislead - as it is clearly misleading Plato when he concludes that all we see is shadows. — Ludwig V

The cave allegory is explicitly presented as a metaphor, that's why it's known as an "allegory". Plato does not conclude that all we see is shadows, he presents that as a symbolic representation to elucidate how the average person is wrong in one's assumptions about the nature of reality. And as I explained, it is the common way of using language which misleads us in this way.

A tree falling