"Thinking about a cup" seems to me a fairly good description of thinking about a cup. But thinking about something takes place; thinking is a process. We think in certain circumstances. We don't think about a cup when we look at it. We might think about a cup when we need to use it and wonder where we left it, for example. When we do that, an image of the cup doesn't suddenly form in our mind; we don't begin scanning objects around us comparing them with the image. "Is that the cup? No, it's a toaster--it comports with the thought of a toaster in my mind, not the thought of a cup." That doesn't happen. We know what a damn cup is; we refresh our steps, we check the cupboards we normally put cups in, or the dishwasher.

It's a dirty job, but someone's got to do it. Not me necessarily.
— Tom Storm
I've noted your playing at cat-and-mouse on this thread. — Banno

It's probably more the case that I'm ambivalent and therefore inconsistent.

...science assumes the separation of subject and object... — Wayfarer

That's what they say. I set out a little story on that for you, which we didn't finish chatting about.

Which raises the question of whether that is disposition or strategy...

:wink:

I think the intuition behind philosophy is something wrong with what we understand as the reality of existence, that there's some kind of deep error in the way we understand the world, which can't be mitigated by glib phrases about flies and bottles. — Wayfarer

That's an interesting frame. I quite like it. I've generally thought that there is something wrong with the plethora of contradictory values humans hold, which seem to cause conflicts and suffering at wholesale levels. Mostly people seem to lack critical thinking skills - I'm not sure it even gets to philosophy for the most part, but of course all positions rest on presuppositions which are philosophically derived. But there is a problem of attribution at work here. It's all too easy to identify a 'paradise lost' scenario, or to claim that enlightenment thinking and the loss of gods has lead to untrammeled capitalism/climate change/Trump/apocalypse.

Saw this yesterday: Žižek: his key ideas explained. Your comment reminded me of the stuff there on Ideology.

I've come to realise that my orientation is basically existentialist. Oddly enough, I only realised that because of the way 'existential threat' has started to appear in media commentary on (for example) climate change, or as circumstances being an 'existential threat' to a company or institution. I'm starting to understand the progression from Kant to pheneomenology to other existential philosophy. It's taken a good while, but then I guess that's what I've been discussing here for the last decade or so. Which I noticed in this earlier post:

This cup on the table is bound to my mental grasp of it being a cup, and this latter defines the extent the understanding can know the cup. But what about the irrational feels and fleshy tonalities (Michel Henry talks like this) and the bare presence of this thing?

There is, of course, a lot written about this, but the point would go like this: when we turn our attention to this conscious grasp of its object, and we turn explicitly away from its contextual and logical placings, which is to say we shut up about it and thereby allow (Heidegger borrows the term 'gelassenheit' to talk about this yield to the world as opposed to applying familiar categories) the world to speak, so to speak, the presence of the object steps forth. This is an existential move, not a logical inference, away from all that makes the cup the usual familiar cup. — Astrophel

which I thought a very good but mainly un-noticed post. It goes on:

It is existential, like an awakening, because one realizes for the first time in this discovery that one actually exists. This is the existential foundation of religion. Of course, this take practice and study, but this is the brass ring of philosophy. — Astrophel

:ok:

I think the resonance that has for me is what is called 'tathata' in Buddhism - suchness, or just-so - and also quiddity in Scholastic philosophy, in which an essential nature is grasped at a glance.

"Thinking about a cup" seems to me a fairly good description of thinking about a cup. — Ciceronianus

Well, but only fairly good. Put it this way: Before time T, I'm not thinking about a cup. At time T, and for a certain time after, I am thinking about a cup. Let's stipulate that no new "thing" has come into the world at time T. The question is, What has changed? To reply, "I've thought about a cup" doesn't help enough. We know that; what we want to know is, How are we to understand this thought event if it isn't a thing and it isn't an image? (though I think it is, sometimes). Again, it won't do to keep saying, "Thinking about a cup" or "It's a process" in reply. Surely a neuroscientist wouldn't be satisfied with such an answer, and I'm suggesting that a good old metaphysical phenomenologist wouldn't be either.

That said, your description of how we use thinking about a cup to find a cup is accurate and well reported -- which for me only adds to the sense that we know very little about what's going on here.

Your comment reminded me of the stuff there on Ideology. — Banno

An Australian friend traveling in America got to slightly know a homeless African American man and his young son. They were sleeping rough and begging near the hotel. It was cold and the son needed medical treatment they could not afford. My friend asked them, "Would free health care be a useful policy?" The man shuddered and became angry. 'We are not Communists. This is America."

We might be in agreement here, I'm not sure. Some folk would read the above as diminishing the import of verbal disputes. — Banno

Right, I don’t at all mean to diminish the significance of identifying and, if possible, resolving verbal disputes in philosophy. Ordinary language philosophy, practiced in the modest way that I believe its originators intended, can be enormously helpful. So can metaphysical investigation, though I know you’re less enamored of that.

But take the question up a level. How do we decide the meta-question of “Is this merely a verbal dispute, or is there some genuine issue that could be settled by further thought and/or empirical investigation?”? What I’m saying is that this question can’t be settled using a result obtained at the original level. That would be arguing in a circle, or elaborately begging the question. Rather, it’s a genuine fresh question requiring a new argument.

I just do not know where to go with that.

I don't think anyone does.

So can metaphysical investigation, though I know you’re less enamored of that. — J

As I said earlier, metaphysics is inevitable. Analytic philosophy is particularly helpful in showing inconsistencies and lack of clarity in metaphysical suppositions.

That would be arguing in a circle, or elaborately begging the question. — J

One of the few useful things I found in studying management was the Cynefin framework, especially the notion of the chaotic context. See this Harvard Business Review article.

In a chaotic context, searching for right answers would be pointless: The relationships between cause and effect are impossible to determine because they shift constantly and no manageable patterns exist—only turbulence...
In the chaotic domain, a leader’s immediate job is not to discover patterns but... first act to establish order...

Metaphysics sets out the background against which the world is ordered, and is as much fiat as observation. One can avoid the circularity by recognising this.

Mostly people seem to lack critical thinking skills - I'm not sure it even gets to philosophy for the most part, but of course all positions rest on presuppositions which are philosophically derived. But there is a problem of attribution at work here. It's all too easy to identify a 'paradise lost' scenario, or to claim that enlightenment thinking and the loss of gods has lead to untrammeled capitalism/climate change/Trump/apocalypse. — Tom Storm

To address that point more directly - I think that, for me, this is where Buddhist faith comes into the picture. It too teaches that the normal state is radically deficient, and analyses the root cause of that state of dissatisfaction ('dukkha') - whereas much of the thrust of secular culture is to accomodate and normalise that unsatisfactory state of being. I don't claim to have any resolution and am still plagued by numerous hindrances and doubts but there it is. (As I've mentioned a number of times, this is where T R V Murti's book Central Philosophy of Buddhism has been formative in my case, at it contains comparisons between idealist and Buddhist philosophy.)

I'm starting to understand the progression from Kant to pheneomenology to other existential philosophy. It's taken a good while, but then I guess that's what I've been discussing here for the last decade or so. — Wayfarer

That is interesting.

You may like Kierkegaard.

This cup on the table is bound to my mental grasp of it being a cup, and this latter defines the extent the understanding can know the cup. But what about the irrational feels and fleshy tonalities (Michel Henry talks like this) and the bare presence of this thing?

There is, of course, a lot written about this, but the point would go like this: when we turn our attention to this conscious grasp of its object, and we turn explicitly away from its contextual and logical placings, which is to say we shut up about it and thereby allow (Heidegger borrows the term 'gelassenheit' to talk about this yield to the world as opposed to applying familiar categories) the world to speak, so to speak, the presence of the object steps forth. This is an existential move, not a logical inference, away from all that makes the cup the usual familiar cup.
— Astrophel

which I thought a very good but mainly un-noticed post. It goes on: — Wayfarer

It's rich material for speculation, but I am unclear what it tangibly provides me with. I have often felt this way as a boy. Everything around us has a strangeness if you're able to park your lifeworld, sense making approach.

To address that point more directly - I think that, for me, this is where Buddhist faith comes into the picture. It too teaches that the normal state is radically deficient, and analyses the root cause of that state of dissatisfaction ('dukkha') - whereas much of the thrust of secular culture is to accomodate and normalise that unsatisfactory state of being. — Wayfarer

The funny thing is that almost any religion or political philosophy, if followed closely in a coherent (and loving) way by all, would probably deliver us from most of our ills. And yes, this might create new problems too.

The key issues we are also grappling with are incoherence and pluralism. Now I'm all for pluralism... but it also includes a fair few fuck-knuckles who can kick predictability and ontological safety into dangerous places.

I don't "need" to concern myself with essences to put food on the table. I just enjoy sampling possibilities, like fine wine, searching for that sine qua non. — Gnomon

Nice place to be. But how is it different to collecting antiques?

If you have "no need", or desire for metaphysics, why are you posting on a philosophy forum? What does it "add to your experience"? — Gnomon

It's because of my conversations with others about metaphysics that I have arrived my position. And note, I didn't say 'no need for metaphysics', I said no need for certain speculative forms thereof. Quite different. I enjoy reading about what others think and why, and, parenthetically, should I learn something new, I might be able to use it. I didn't think there was any particular way to use a forum like this (other than being respectful).

Are you simply looking for arguments against Idealism & Metaphysics? — Gnomon

I look for good arguments against and for any number of positions, from physicalism to idealism.

I don't see why we should take any interest in your acts of faith. — Banno

Never liked the word faith. Endorses silliness. But if you take a few years to study and actually come to understand what this post Kantian tradition in philosophy is about, then you would realize you've been duped. It has been very clear for a long time that conversations in analytic philosophy are no more than painfully well written justifications for avoiding metaphysics. I mean, absent metaphysics, there is really nothing to say. This reduces philosophy to a trivial play of words, and does little to advance an understanding of the world at the most basic level.

MY acts if faith?? Look, someone told you long ago not to read certain philosophy, and they were wrong.

Look, someone told you long ago not to read certain philosophy, and they were wrong. — Astrophel

No. I read certain philosophy, and found it was wrong. There's a tad too much presumption in your prognosis. And very little of any substance to your replies.

To say that the our fields of perception alone give us phenomena i think is contrary to phenomenology, which Kant may have have been the first author of. Mentally we have, or for now have, a "frame" and we put all our sensations on this 2d frame in order to organize it. The phenomena of the window behind me is behind me, and the noumena could be anywhere. I even think sounds exist objectively. A reality outside of us

Mentally we have, or for now have, a "frame" and we put all our sensations on this 2d frame in order to organize it. — Gregory

Again, why 2d?

Where were we?

You'd kindly listed some of the argument so far.

1. New scientific discoveries nullify transcendental idealism;
2. It is awkward to speak about things-in-themselves;
3. Things-in-themselves don’t matter if we can know nothing about them;
4. Two worlds argument; (which was after my post you are responding to here); and
5. 180 proof’s argument (which was also after this post). — Bob Ross

To be sure, (1) was that we understand vastly more of what lies behind our perceptions than in the science that Kant had access to, well over two hundred years ago. "Awkward" in (2) was used somewhat sardonically; "impossible" would presumably be more accurate. (3) was not just that they don't matter, as that they are irrelevant. That the two worlds argument is so central to Kantian Exegesis demonstrate an at least apparent incoherence. And @180 Proof's argument - which one?

Should we get back to the topic at hand?

I am still saying that, just the red patch colour visual perception would be more meaningful than the scientific instrument reading of the red patch emission of 700nm to the most ordinary people — Corvus

Yes, as you say, most ordinary people can understand Naïve Realism.

Even if the supposed Atom images are seen in the microscope, how do you know they are atoms? — Corvus

Yes, even the atom is a representation of something deeper, which is why my position is that of Indirect Realism. As the IEP article on Objects of Perception writes:
The indirect realist agrees that the coffee cup exists independently of me. However, through perception I do not directly engage with this cup; there is a perceptual intermediary that comes between it and me. Ordinarily I see myself via an image in a mirror, or a football match via an image on the TV screen. The indirect realist claim is that all perception is mediated in something like this way. When looking at an everyday object it is not that object that we directly see, but rather, a perceptual intermediary. This intermediary has been given various names, depending on the particular version of indirect realism in question, including “sense datum, ” “sensum,” “idea,” “sensibilium,” “percept” and “appearance.”

Sorry, but I don't think there is such a thing as a "thought of a cup." — Ciceronianus

In order to write the sentence "Sorry, but I don't think there is such a thing as a "thought of a cup."" you must have had the thought of a cup.

Are you not familiar with the depth perception due to parallax? Is there really any such things as a two-dimensional image? Even lines and the paper they are on are really three-dimensional. — Janus

Parallax can be used to determine the distance of an object, as nearby objects show a larger parallax than farther objects, but it doesn't allow us to see the back of a three-dimensional object.

What is parallax doing? Is it giving us information about the distance of an object from us or is it giving us information about the three-dimensional space that the object occupies?

The atom used to be the stand-in for 'simple' in that it was 'indivisible', not composed of parts. Regrettably, nature did not oblige, as it turns out atoms are far from simple. — Wayfarer

:up:

Have you managed to find Sense and Sensibilia? — Banno

Thanks, I have downloaded a copy and will read it. :up:

===============================================================================

You don't see the cup as having depth? Odd. — Banno

Are you using the word "see" metaphorically?

In my field of vision, I can only see the surface of any object facing me, which appears two-dimensional, but in my mind I can imagine the three-dimensional space the object occupies.

===============================================================================

It's a very odd thing for RussellA to say - even folk with one eye have depth perception. — Banno

I didn't actually say that, but even if I had, I would be in good company.

The BBC Science Focus notes that:
For example, we know the size of things from memory, so if an object looks smaller than expected we know it’s further away.

you must have had the thought of a cup. — RussellA

Might be closer to the case to say, there had to have been the thought “cup”, simply from the fact “you must have had” is already given by the thought itself.

And even that isn’t as close to the case as, there must have been a judgement that the conception represents “cup”.

It may do well to note, in addition, as long as we’re “making a case for transcendental idealism”, that since it is merely the thought “cup”, there is already the experience of that particular object by the same subject to which the thought belongs, for otherwise the subject would’ve not had the authority to represent it by name.

2. It is awkward to speak about things-in-themselves; — Bob Ross

"Awkward" in (2) was used somewhat sardonically; "impossible" would presumably be more accurate. — Banno

Wittgenstein in para 293 of Philosophical Investigations makes a strong case that we can speak about things-in-themselves.

He writes:
But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language?—If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty.—No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is. That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant.

A word such as "red" does not describe a thing-in-itself, but replaces the thing-in-itself, allowing us to sensibly talk about things-in-themselves.

IE, in Wittgenstein's terms, there is an equivalence between the words "red", as in "I see a red post-box", and "beetle".

2. It is awkward to speak about things-in-themselves; — Bob Ross

Hello Bob,

What you argue is pretty interesting, but I don't know to what extent you accept or deny the existence of things-in-themselves. On the other hand, I see your premises and arguments as a subject of Philosophy of Language. I hope I am not on the wrong path to understanding it either.

The mind analyses every stretch of language as some mixture of memorized chunks and rule-governed assemblies.

Last summer, we had a funny debate on the trick word: 'Jack-in-the-box' and its big debate on pluralize such word. I have to quote @Dawnstorm here, because he made a precise analysis and maybe you could be interested in reading it:

The discussion here about "jack-in-the-box" is mostly humorous, but it does show that grammar and thought needn't be the same. You can't deviate too much from the word, or you many people won't recognise it as the plural of a common word.

This thread could in theory lead to a discussion about what grammar is. I come from linguistics, and I've often felt confused about how philosophers use the term grammar. It sometimes feels like philosophers think grammar is the structure of thought, when it's just the structure of language.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/825242

By the way, what @RussellA has previously said in his latest post is very interesting too. This thread is exquisite for rookies like me who wants to keep learning on Philosophy of Language - or metaphysics -.

IDK, some systems seem to vocally criticize the attempts to make philosophy like mathematics. It seems to vary.

It may do well to note, in addition, as long as we’re “making a case for transcendental idealism”, that since it is merely the thought “cup”, there is already the experience of that particular object by the same subject to which the thought belongs, for otherwise the subject would’ve not had the authority to represent it by name. — Mww

How can a thought be named ?

Is it the case that we have the thought of a cup and then name it, or is Wittgenstein correct
in his belief that we cannot think without language. He wrote in the Tractatus para 5.62: “the limits of my language mean the limits of my world.”

If Wittgenstein is correct, then the mere act of writing "the thought of a cup" presupposes the thought of a cup.