@Banno @Ludwig V @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank @Richard B @Janus @creativesoul

Lecture X: skipping seven pages in, past the Ayer/Carnap muck, we finally get to the truth. @Banno or others will be better at telling this story, but, traditionally, I would assert something (“The tree is green”) and the assertion is true if the fact is correct, thus all the worry about whether we can be sure that the tree is really green, that we see it (“perceive” it) correctly. Also, some will claim that only a certain type of sentence can be true or false, thus the “assertion” (or “proposition”).

Austin will claim that it is neither the form of the sentence that makes it capable of being true or false nor on what it is even claiming (its “meaning”) because the truth will “turn on… the circumstances in which it is uttered.”(p.111) If you and I are looking at a tree, and you say “The tree is green”, I could say “No [that’s false], Aspens are green, that’s a Maple, it’s brown.” But, if you say, “I meant the leaves.” I would admit “Okay, sure [that assertion is true (however banal).]” But now when you say “It just seemed too cold for leaves not to have turned yellow.” I might see what you describe, and say “Huh [that’s true].” And that is not a true fact, but an acknowledgement of the remark, and based only on a vague calculation of fall.

@Banno @Ludwig V @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank @Richard B @Janus @creativesoul

Lecture X: I was amused to see Austin describe philosophy’s desire for certainty in a few lines (it takes Wittgenstein half his book). Descartes starts his Meditations with “Some years ago I was struck by how many false things I had believed….” Austin characterizes this as the regret that in claiming some truths, we “stick our necks out further.” (P.112) The point being that philosophy hasn’t wanted to know the truth, or knowledge, but just to never get egg on its face (especially in the shadow of science). Austin uses the example of generalizing the case we make (retreating from claiming to know the name of the star, to only knowing that it is a star) to show that Philosophy wants to find a place from which it can “take no chance at all, my commitment is absolutely minimal; so that in principal nothing could show that I had made a mistake, and my remark would be “incorrigible”. (Id. Bold added)

The generalization of Austin’s example is one way that philosophy has tried to not be wrong. It struggles with moral loggerheads, but it only takes up the best case for knowledge (the easiest to prove) in: “seeing an object” (it uses “pain” as an example of the other because it is unavoidable, constant, etc. as well), and then it wants to universalize its findings back to ethics (and wonders why it has nothing to say).

Also, you will notice that I emphasized that Austin is aware that when we make a claim, we are making a “commitment”; we are committing ourselves to what we have said, to be responsible for “amending” the meaning, to be subject to the implications of how it is judged (or “retract” it)(p.112). In wanting to be “incorrigible” (as Banno has pointed out) philosophy not only wants something foundational for knowledge, but to rule out even the possibility of being corrected, which means forsaking the part we play in making a claim (or making it poorly, as to magenta on p. 113), which it does by assuming that “the words alone can be discussed…” not only by “neglecting the circumstances in which things are said” (p.118) but apart from a person having said it (“expressed” it Wittgenstein will record this as).

Yep. But there is so much to unpack here.

I was amused to see Austin describe philosophy’s desire for certainty in a few lines (it takes Wittgenstein half his book). — Antony Nickles

I laughed out loud. He's certainly succinct. In truth, I'm somewhat surprised, and very pleased, at how opposed to philosophy Austin is. He shares the antiphilosophy usually attributed to Wittgenstein. I don't recall being aware of this in previous readings.

I'll get to the point of attempting a summary. Still mulling stuff over. By all means, please go ahead with further comments. I'm waiting for your overview; I'm sure you have some critique of Austin waiting in the wings.

I haven't paid much attention to Carnap, his approach just didn't seem to me to get off the ground; but I'm told Chalmers makes use of Carnap's approach, so it may have some present relevance.

There's no doubt that the meaning of "cricket" is being extended but I don't think it is being transformed in quite the way that a metaphorical use would extend it. "Cricket" is defined as a noun and we understand how it is constituted. But "cricket" in Austin's example is being used as an adjective, in a different category. This change, or stretching, is different from a metaphorical use. — Ludwig V

Honestly, I think Austin is not using 'cricket' as an adjective, but a prefix. According to him, this noun is 'always-the-same' meaning. If someone did not know the significance of 'cricket', he/she couldn't match it with other words such as 'ball', 'bat', 'pavilion', etc. This is why he states that the person might gaze at those words trying to find out a common factor.
...
The factor here is the prefix cricket.

It is similar to a metaphorical use. This is why Donald Davidson states: Thus, when Melville writes that "Christ was a chronometer," the effect of metaphor is produced by our taking "chronometer" first in its ordinary sense and then in some extraordinary or metaphorical sense.

'Christ' is always-the-same meaning, while chronometer is a word whose significance can vary. It can work as a noun or in a metaphorical sense.

Plato does not conclude that all we see is shadows, he presents that as a symbolic representation to elucidate how the average person is wrong in one's assumptions about the nature of reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, he is cautious about it presentation of it. He's no fool. But that caution is eerily reminiscent of Austin's remark "There's the bit where you say it and the bit where you take it away". Only Plato gets the bit where you take it away in before he says it.

Perhaps it is a symbolic representation. If so, it is a representation like the Escher staircases.

Surely Plato does differentiate between the Forms and the ordinary world? The traditional view, as I understand it, is that he believes that the Forms are in some sense superior to the ordinary world. How would you describe that difference?

And as I explained, it is the common way of using language which misleads us in this way. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm afraid the question is whether it is us or Plato who is being misled.

my commitment is absolutely minimal; so that in principal nothing could show that I had made a mistake, — Antony Nickles

The shift from worrying about true or false to commitment and retraction is definitely helpful. One would have to how this works in the context of incorrigible first person statements of experience. The assumption that the language is being used in standard, or at least shared, ways would be one point. The possibility of self-correction is another. (Austin mentions both of these.)

Isn't there a doctrine - it is present in my memory, but I've lost any sense of where it can be found - that logical truths are true in all circumstances and consequently empty and trivial. In other words, I'm not sure that this idea is distinctively Austinian. I believe that Wittgenstein relies on a similar point in his argument about "I am in pain". It is not only first person statements that are incorrigible.

Much discussion of this seems to rely on a clear distinction between statements that are true or false and statements that are neither. I doubt if either Austin or Wittgenstein would really want to defend the usual binary (simplistic, context-independent) position. Certainly, it seems to me that "I am in pain" has similarities to both. On the one hand, it is like "Ouch" (an expression) and on the other, it is like "He is in pain" (true/false). Wouldn't a similar point apply to "I see a turquoise patch"? There are differences, of course. For example, I don't know what the equivalent of "Ouch" would be for "I see a turquoise patch". Not sure where this goes.

The point being that philosophy hasn’t wanted to know the truth, or knowledge, but just to never get egg on its face — Antony Nickles

That is certainly the outcome of philosophical practice at least since Descartes. But I'm not sure it is fair to put it in that way. I would rather say that philosophers have become so focussed on avoiding error and so fascinated with a particular truth-game, that they have lost perspective and tried to deny the truths that they cannot pack into their box.

his approach just didn't seem to me to get off the ground; — Banno

I was inclined to think that Carnap is not actually particularly interested in Ayer's problem, but focused on the practices that we call science. What he says makes sense in that context, but it is true that in Ayer's (and Austin's) context, it falls apart.

This is why he states that the person might gaze at those words trying to find out a common factor. — javi2541997

Yes. I think that's right.

It is similar to a metaphorical use. — javi2541997

I agree with that. But what you say implies also that this use is also different from the paradigm cases that are usually offered to explain what they word means. "Metaphor" is a slippery word, so I don't think there is any future in arguing about whether it is correct or not to classify this use as a metaphor or not. We seem to have a pretty much common understanding of what it going on here.

If you know that there's another side to the apple, you know that you are looking at a three-dimensional object, so you are not seeing in two dimensions. — Ludwig V

In what sense are you using the word "see".

From the Merriam-Webster dictionary, the word "see" can have several meanings, including "to perceive by the eye" and "to imagine a possibility".

You say that because you know that you are looking at a three-dimensional object then you are not seeing in two-dimensions.

By this, do you mean either i) you are perceiving by the eye a three-dimensional form or ii) you are imagining a three-dimensional form?

The problem with Austin

The problem with Austin is that he is taking his Ordinary Language philosophy too far, even further than the Ordinary Man would take it.

For example, in the expression "I see an apple", Austin's approach is to ignore any possible metaphorical meaning for its so-called "ordinary" usage, thereby turning a blind eye to the range of possible meanings as laid out in the Merriam-Webster dictionary.

As he wrote: For reasons not very obscure, we always prefer in practice what might be called the cash-value expression to the 'indirect' metaphor. If I were to report that I see enemy ships indirectly, I should merely provoke the question what exactly I mean.' I mean that I can see these blips on the radar screen'-'Well, why didn't you say so then?'

For Austin, "I see an apple" is all one needs to know. However, for Ayer, it is an important metaphysical question when looking at an apple whether I am perceiving by the eye a three-dimensional form or I am imagining the possibility of a three-dimensional form.

I thought that helping each other to understand Austin's text was the point of the thread. — Ludwig V

That's why I included my understanding of Austin's position regarding sense-data in page 5 of this thread, which has neither been supported nor opposed.

Though, as an aside, as a Christian author could write an article evaluating Atheism and unsurprisingly find it wanting, Austin, as a believer in Ordinary Language Philosophy, has written an article evaluating sense-data theory and has unsurprisingly find it wanting. From Austin's Ordinary Language point of view, I may well agree that sense-data is irrelevant, but that does mean that the sense-data theory is irrelevant.

I lied

@Ludwig V

The problem with Austin is that he is taking his Ordinary Language philosophy too far, even further than the Ordinary Man would take it.

For example, in the expression "I see an apple", Austin's approach is to ignore any possible metaphorical meaning for its so-called "ordinary" usage, thereby turning a blind eye to the range of possible meanings as laid out in the Merriam-Webster dictionary. — RussellA

Ordinary Language Philosophy has nothing to do with common sense or with the ordinary man, as I tried to explain here (and elsewhere as referenced in that post), it is a philosophical method, not a position.

Also, “nothing could be produced that would show that I made a mistake” (p.114) about “That’s a pig”, because the “circumstances are such” (p.115), not because of some belief in isolated sentences.

!@@#$@$$!!!

I often feel much the same way.

X

The pursuit of the incorrigible is one of the most venerable bugbears in the history of philosophy.

Ayer's word, "incorrigible', can be taken as either "so good that it cannot be improved" or as "that cannot be proved false." As mentioned earlier it is the latter for which Ayer is cited in the OED.

This is to be contrasted with Certainty: "Established as a truth or fact to be absolutely received, depended, or relied upon; not to be doubted, disputed, or called in question; indubitable, sure."

Being incorrigible is not so demanding of some proposition as being certain.

So to his credit, and Austin seems to grant this, Ayer is not looking for certainty, as Descartes and others did. He will settle for the best he can get, or at least avoiding being proven false. Ayer is after knowledge, rather than truth.

The following is worth quoting in full:

In a nutshell, the doctrine about knowledge, 'empirical' knowledge, is that it has foundations. It is a structure the upper tiers of which are reached by inferences, and the foundations are the data on which these inferences are based. (So of course-as it appears-there just have to be sense-data.) Now the trouble with inferences is that they may be mistaken; whenever we take a step, we may put a foot wrong. Thus-so the doctrine runs-the way to identify the upper tiers of the structure of knowledge is to ask whether one might be mistaken, whether there is something that one can doubt; if the answer is Yes, then one is not at the basement. And conversely, it will be characteristic of the data that in their case no doubt is possible, no mistake can be made. So to find the data, the foundations, look for the incorrigible. — Austin, p. 105

This lecture is about why this is a misguided approach.

From the Merriam-Webster dictionary, the word "see" can have several meanings, including "to perceive by the eye" and "to imagine a possibility". — RussellA

The first sense and I mean that I am perceiving by the eye a three-dimensional form - except when I am looking at a two-dimensional picture.

For example, in the expression "I see an apple", Austin's approach is to ignore any possible metaphorical meaning for its so-called "ordinary" usage, thereby turning a blind eye to the range of possible meanings as laid out in the Merriam-Webster dictionary. — RussellA

I wouldn't say he ignores metaphorical meanings for "apple". He explicitly draws attention to one kind of relevant metaphor in the passage you quote. He also draws attention to the difference between that metaphorical use and the literal use. That is not mentioned in the Merriam Webster definition.

However, for Ayer, it is an important metaphysical question when looking at an apple whether I am perceiving by the eye a three-dimensional form — RussellA

As it happens, in the example you cite, "I" am perceiving by the eye (in future, I will write "see" instead of this cumbersome form) two dimensional forms which I know give me information about the three-dimensional world. I can't see any important metaphysical questions from this.

Though, as an aside, as a Christian author could write an article evaluating Atheism and unsurprisingly find it wanting, — RussellA

Yes, it is common to dismiss the arguments of people who believe in God because they arrive at the conclusion they started from. But actually, that's a lazy mistake. It is perfectly possible for someone who believes in God to formulate an argument for the existence of God that deserves to be taken seriously. Some of them do beg the question. But that's not the same thing. For example, if you say “I got the most votes because I won the election”, your premise (I won the election) relies on the conclusion (I got the most votes) rather than providing evidence for it. Nothing to do with what you or I believe.

Austin, as a believer in Ordinary Language Philosophy, has written an article evaluating sense-data theory and has unsurprisingly find it wanting. — RussellA

That's not the same thing as begging the question. Ordinary Language Philosophy is a method of evaluation and he is using it to evaluate Ayer's argument and he comes to the conclusion that the argument is invalid. It would be up to a supporter of Ayer to show that the mistakes and confusions that Austin has identified are not mistakes and not confused. This argument would invalidate any criticism or evaluation of any argument - it would, as they say, - prove too much.

From Austin's Ordinary Language point of view, I may well agree that sense-data is irrelevant, but that does mean that the sense-data theory is irrelevant. — RussellA

I think there's a typo in the sentence, isn't there? You seem to be saying that the sense-data theory is irrelevant. I would agree with that.

Whether ordinary language misleads us is precisely the question. Though there's no doubt that language can mislead - as it is clearly misleading Plato when he concludes that all we see is shadows. — Ludwig V

The irony here is that those who rely on what you go on to call the "traditional view" are chasing shadows. The shadows are the opinions that influence how and what we see, including what we see when we read Plato through the lens of the opinions of this tradition.

Surely Plato does differentiate between the Forms and the ordinary world? — Ludwig V

The distinction is between what is and what things seem to be for us. The ordinary world is the world of our opinions. Ontology determined by epistemology, or, as the problem has been articulated at least since Parmenides, the problem of thinking and being. Although the term 'ontology' is a modern neologism, its etymology points not to what is, but to what we say and think about what is. The Forms are hypothetical:

So I thought I must take refuge in discussions and investigate the truth of beings by means of accounts [logoi] … On each occasion I put down as hypothesis whatever account I judge to be mightiest; and whatever seems to me to be consonant with this, I put down as being true, both about cause and about all the rest, while what isn’t, I put down as not true.

(Phaedo 99d-100a)

See also the discussion of dialectic in the Republic:

Well, then, go on to understand that by the other segment of the intelligible I mean that which argument itself grasps with the power of dialectic, making the hypotheses not beginnings but really hypotheses—that is, steppingstones and springboards—in order to reach what is free from hypothesis at the beginning of the whole.

(Republic 511b)

We are, however, never free from hypotheses. We remain in the realm of opinion. We never attain knowledge of the beginning (arche) of the whole. It is not that Plato is misled by language. Quite the opposite. He recognizes the limits of what can be said. The Forms are philosophical poiesis, images of the truth and knowledge that those who desire wisdom strive for.

@Banno @Ludwig V @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank @Richard B @Janus @creativesoul

The shift from worrying about true or false to commitment and retraction is definitely helpful. — Ludwig V

Just to tweak this a bit, Austin is not “shifting” from true and false to commitment (abandoning truth), but only adding that a claim (even to truth) is made in a circumstance, and I am only underlining his recognition that one of the pieces of the circumstance is that it is made by a person subject to the future (responsible to it, to further intelligibility—his “amending” or “retracting” as only examples) rather than philosophy’s desire to try to solve for the future, avoid the possibility of error entirely (be incorrigible, abstractly, universally—thus, also removing our part).

One would have to show this works in the context of incorrigible first person statements of experience. The assumption that the language is being used in standard, or at least shared, ways would be one point. The possibility of self-correction is another. (Austin mentions both of these.) — Ludwig V

Again, Austin’s claim is not that statements are ordinarily (not metaphysically) incorrigible because they are made by me (first-person), but because of the circumstances that make, say, “I am in pain” intelligible, for example, that I am informing you so that you might help me, even if I am not in pain, which is not a matter of it being “wrong”, but of me lying (p. 113, 118), which is always a possibility in that case (without recourse). My understanding is that neither Austin nor Wittgenstein claim that first-person statements are incorrigible (even mine to myself) based on their being made by me. However, in the sense above, it is important that it is me that is making this claim (with respect to my responsibility to it).

Also, saying that Austin is relying on “standard, or at least shared, ways” overlooks the fact that we might not find a right answer (p.66), that he leaves the whole matter of judgment open to new circumstances (though I can’t find that part again, maybe p. 74), and, in any event, any discussion is only brought up when it is under “suspicion” or is questioned, as “if there is never any dilemma or surprise, the question [of doubt, thus criteria] simply doesn't come up” (p.76). This is not a general foundation, but, again, pointing out that a question only comes up in a specific situation. Wittgenstein is read as claiming a foundation based on much the same thing, but he also ultimately finds an end to all that (rules, “my” “mental processes”, “language games”, etc.) and looks at much the same circumstances when investigating “continuing a series”, among other things.

The fundamental point is that what matters is the fact that claims are made in a situation. The conclusion is the same for first-person statements as with identification of a pig, or a color. And not only do they have different criteria (which is more Wittgenstein’s focus), but the application of those criteria still depends on the circumstance (what the “use” or “sense” is of something in that instance Wittgenstein would say).

Isn't there a doctrine - it is present in my memory, but I've lost any sense of where it can be found - that logical truths are true in all circumstances and consequently empty and trivial. — Ludwig V

The whole point here for Austin is that the more stringent our presumed standard (incorrigibility), the less cases that actually meet that requirement. Again, this is why philosophy reduces itself to the best-case of objects (or first-person claims). In fact, no case actually meets that requirement for certainty (not as a lack, but categorically/mechanically—thus philosophy makes up something, e.g., sense-data). As I stated above, Austin addresses this, among other places, in discussing the desire for, and outcome of, generalization (p.112), but also that it is less likely to cover “novel situations” (p. 130). Emerson refers (in “Experience”) to this as everything slipping through our fingers the harder we try to grasp (which Heidegger alludes to in “What is Called Thinking?”).

:up:

This lecture is about why this is a misguided approach. — Banno

I'm going to venture into uncertain territory here. His dismantling of Ayer's approach is convincing, as always. I'm convinced, but not satisfied and I think this raises difficult questions.

On p.121 he says "We learn the word 'pig', as we learn the vast majority of words for ordinary things, ostensively-by being told, in the presence of the animal, 'That is a pig'; and thus, though certainly we
learn what sort of thing it is to which the word 'pig' can and can't be properly applied, we don't go through any kind of intermediate stage of relating the word 'pig' to a lot of statements about the way things look, or sound, or smell. The word is just not introduced into our vocabulary in this way."

This is all very well, and relevant. But formal definition and various kinds of entailment do have a place, whether inside or outside ordinary language. So, though it may be unfair, I'm inclined to think that Austin has over-generalized here.

In the footnote on that page he says "Another way of showing that 'entailment' is out of place in such contexts: Suppose that tits, all the tits we've ever come across, are bearded, so that we are happy to say 'Tits are bearded.' Does this entail that what isn't bearded isn't a tit? Not really. For if beardless specimens are discovered in some newly explored territory, well, of course we weren't talking about them when we said that tits were bearded; we now have to think again, and recognize perhaps this new species of glabrous tits. Similarly, what we say nowadays about tits just doesn't refer at all to the prehistoric eo-tit, or to remote future tits, defeathered perhaps through some change of atmosphere."

Rather than try to find a place of impregnable safety, adapt to the unforeseen when it occurs. Very helpful when dealing with philosophical certainty.

But there's another concern. If we were to take Newtonian mechanics and argue that the terms of that theory were nonsense from the point of view of ordinary language - (and even from the point of view of some non-ordinary language, since the law of gravity violates the prohibition of action at a distance) - we would meet a battery or arguments that our criterion was in appropriate and that the theory had did make sense and had various other virtues. Of course, that isn't a philosophical theory. But how do we distinguish philosophical theories which can be debunked by appeal to ordinary language from other theories, physical, psychological - without begging the question?

I think where I'm going with this is something like - ordinary language is not a distinct philosophical method, it is embedded at least as a starting-point in all philosophy and in all theory. A clean sheet of paper is simply not available.

that I am informing you so that you might help me, — Antony Nickles

More tweaking. I think Wittgenstein's point is that "I am in pain" is not simply passing on information, but is an expression that elicits a response ("Ouch!"). Actually one could use "I am in pain" in the same way as one might use "he is in pain" - to give information. Which use I'm making of it will depend on circumstances.

that first-person statements are incorrigible (even mine to myself) based on their being made by me. — Antony Nickles

I don't quite understand this. What else would they be based on?

This is not a general foundation, but, again, pointing out that a question only comes up in a specific situation. — Antony Nickles

That is a really important point.

But how do we distinguish philosophical theories which can be debunked by appeal to ordinary language from other theories, physical, psychological - without begging the question? — Ludwig V

The term “ordinary language philosophy” is confusing and made up. First, “ordinary” is only in contrast to “metaphysical”, here, sense-data. And it isn’t about “language”, it is about the everyday criteria and cases shown in contrast to the singular criteria of certainty (incorrigibility) and an abstract generalized case. And it is not an “appeal”, as if ordinary criteria are in competition with or replacing metaphysics (nor is the use of “ordinary language” the goal). It is a method of doing philosophy by examining specific cases and “what we say when…” in order to draw conclusions about the way things work (and don’t).

Austin mentions that we learn criteria when he says “certainly we learn what sort of thing it is to which the word 'pig' can and can't be properly applied” (p. 121 my bold). What I think he is pointing out is that we do not “define” a pig, nor do we need to check off a list of entailments (as in prerequisites), but that criteria are just the bounds of distinctions (categories), for example, between a donkey and a horse, which only come up when necessary. And so not that it can’t be a pig unless it checks all the (entailed) boxes, because we don’t know which, if any, criteria to apply until there is a situation, which may be novel, and thus require stretching or changing or ignoring our ordinary criteria.

So, has metaphysics seeped into scientific theories? I’m not going to answer that because I don’t want to go down the road of saying most neuroscience is operating under a number of misconceptions (whoops, now I’ve done it). But, of course, science is not searching for philosophical certainty; it has its own: if I apply its method, I come up with the same answer (so does everyone).

"I am in pain" is not simply passing on information, but is an expression that elicits a response — Ludwig V

Which is what I was trying to say, only said better. Of course we need not only be doing one thing either, and so this is to “give information” as well (and why we shouldn’t be said to “use” language), though, yes, the circumstances would need fleshing out. You would need to be unaware I was in pain, and also be someone who would be expected to do something about it, say, the host at a party, or a doctor. If you just walk up to me and say it, I am likely to respond, for lack of a better way to read it, “Yeah, we’re all getting old.”

[Austin does not claim] that first-person statements are incorrigible (even mine to myself) based on their being made by me.
— Antony Nickles

I don't quite understand this. What else would they be based on? — Ludwig V

Well, “based on” is a distracting word here—of course the only one capable of expressing myself may be me (though others can read me). But, obviously (ordinarily), we can be lying, and even lying to ourselves (“I’m angry” as an expression of sadness). More to the point here, what about not being wrong about statements about me is necessary? “I’ve been shot! Wait, no.” Perhaps we are afraid we won’t or don’t know ourselves, but this is a legitimate possibility. Or maybe I don’t have authority in the eyes of others to report on myself (a child, or a captive). This is to say, first-person statements might not be incorrigible at all, and, even if they are, the fact I am making them is not of the only importance.

Surely Plato does differentiate between the Forms and the ordinary world? The traditional view, as I understand it, is that he believes that the Forms are in some sense superior to the ordinary world. How would you describe that difference? — Ludwig V

The Forms are prior to what you call "the ordinary world", and it is this priority which makes them more real. The "priority" in this sense, is the sense of a temporal priority, such that the Forms are causal. Being the cause of the things of the ordinary world is what makes them as you say "superior". The "ordinary world" would mean how we perceive things to be, through sensation.

So the people in the cave see the world of artificial, ordinary things. 'Ordinary things' we can describe as temporal things, coming into existence and going out of existence in time having a temporal beginning and end. The people in the cave do not understand that these artificial ordinary (temporal) things are just a copy, representation, or "shadow" of the idea or form from which they are created. An ordinary bed is made as a copy of an idea of what a bed is. "The good" is the purpose for which the thing is created, and in the allegory it is the source of light, the fire. The good, along with the idea, cause the existence of artificial, temporal things. Once a philosopher comes to understand how this is the cause of existence of these temporal things, one can go beyond the existence of artificial things (leave the cave) and understand that the cause of all natural temporal things must be a similar causal process.

I'm afraid the question is whether it is us or Plato who is being misled. — Ludwig V

That is a good question, and with some effort of philosophical inquiry it can be answered. First, we'd have to address the scenario in the cave. Is it true that the idea, or form, of an artificial thing is prior to, and along with the purpose, is in some way a cause of existence of the material thing in the ordinary world.

If we decide that Plato is correct in this representation, i.e. not being misled, or misleading us, then we proceed to the second step, as Aristotle did in his Metaphysics. This is the question of in what ways is the coming into being of natural things similar to that of artificial things. And this is a much more difficult question which requires education in metaphysical principles.

@Banno @Ludwig V @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank @Richard B @Janus @creativesoul

So are we prepared to accept that:

many kinds of sentences may be uttered in making statements which are in fact incorrigible-in the sense that, when they are made, the circumstances are such that they are quite certainly, definitely, and un-retractably true. — Austin, p.115

Now it seems to me that the first thing philosophy will want to do is qualify this, as: not “incorrigible” in the same way, or not “truth”, or not “a fact”. And we must grant that we are not talking about “true” in all occasions and for all time, and thus not always the case (a fact set in stone), even given similar circumstances. But all of this perfection has been shown to be a fantasy based on fear and desire; the satisfaction of conclusive verification is not a foundation, but only what is demanded in this situation (our “real need” Wittgenstein will say). So, yes, the “truth” Austin is proposing is qualified in that the circumstances must allow for it, and may not sustain it, but, nevertheless, we have something true, and not, as may also be claimed, that it is only good enough for “everyday or practical or ordinary purposes.” P.119

That being said, and without yet having read the final chapter, I will only convey what I know of what Cavell claims are limitations of his old teacher (this @Banno is perhaps the only shoe I have to drop, having been pleasantly surprised that Austin addresses more than I had before considered, if only peripherally). I think we can agree that Austin says that we only know how to (or need to) address a concern if there is reason for asking, and that we have everyday ways of distinguishing and identifying, etc., though they may not always answer the question. Cavell (through Wittgenstein) takes the skeptic’s generic claims more seriously (where Austin is more… condescending?), though not on their terms either (towards certainty). Austin’s examples of objects and identification, etc., work to his advantage, where Wittgenstein is pulling back another layer in discussing pointing, rule-following, continuing a series, understanding, doubting, etc. The difference in these examples is that our not finding an answer reveals not our ordinary means of resolving cases, but that the mechanics of our lives reveal more than just about knowing how to answer questions. This, of course, is for another day—perhaps “Other Minds”?

Meta is notable for apparently not having even mentioned Austin on a thread about Austin.

@Banno @Ludwig V @javi2541997

In the end, I don’t think people take Austin seriously enough, to be as impactful as he should be, so thanks for taking him up. What I appreciate most is that he makes me realize that what you say matters, and that the truth can matter more than we realize, more than our cynicism, laziness, narcism, self-absorption, delusion, aggrandizement, and on and on. In honor of that, his best from the last Lecture:

“It all runs quite smoothly, there's positively no deception: and yet in the end that baby has somehow been spirited down the waste-pipe.”

“He gets off to rather a bad start, however, which reveals him as already at least half-way to perdition.”

“You've got to get something on your plate before you can start messing it around.”

Meta is notable for apparently not having even mentioned Austin on a thread about Austin. — Banno

I'm afraid that I'm partly responsible for that. I was curious about his take on Plato (which seemed to be based on some serious reading and thought). But it was also because Plato seems to me to be an early progenitor of the mistakes we are talking about, because he believes that ordinary perceptions are all false and develops something that is close to sense-datum theory in the "cave" metaphor. But he takes the central point (that ordinary perceptions are deceptive) and runs off in an entirely different direction with it, because he has an alternative concept of what is really real. But that's of interest itself. My understanding of Kant is that he also takes the central idea to show that there is a "reality" "behind" the phenomena), rather than believing that the phenomena are the only reality (cf. Berkeley).

True, that's partly based on the accident of my biography, that I've always been involved with Plato, though not at a serious (research) level. The later dialogues were simply beyond me. I couldn't take them seriously enough to get my head round them.

There is an interesting and, so far as I know, unusual, idea there.

The Forms are philosophical poiesis, images of the truth and knowledge that those who desire wisdom strive for. — Fooloso4

And it isn’t about “language”, it is about the everyday criteria and cases shown in contrast to the singular criteria of certainty (incorrigibility) and an abstract generalized case. — Antony Nickles

I think this is a much better way of putting what's going on. Perhaps it is helpful to reflect that lawyers arguing a point in case law are in a similar position. The practice of the courts, rather than legislation needs to be examined in order to arrive at justice. It strikes me that Austin's examples can be treated as simply (counter-) examples. The ordinariness of the language is beside the point

But there is the suspicion of technical or specialized concepts. Here's the rub. It is impossible for someone who does not accept the term "quale" or "qualia" as being capable of coherent use to join in the discussion. The only possible strategy is to demonstrate the incoherence of the proposed usage.

It is a method of doing philosophy by examining specific cases and “what we say when…” in order to draw conclusions about the way things work (and don’t). — Antony Nickles

Exactly. The ordinariness of the language is beside the point.

And so not that it can’t be a pig unless it checks all the (entailed) boxes, because we don’t know which, if any, criteria to apply until there is a situation, which may be novel, and thus require stretching or changing or ignoring our ordinary criteria. — Antony Nickles

.. and it may well be helpful in such situations to articulate and formalize our habits in order to be better able to focus arguments and settle those difficult cases.

But, of course, science is not searching for philosophical certainty; it has its own: if I apply its method, I come up with the same answer (so does everyone). — Antony Nickles

I'm probably unusual in that I'm rather suspect that there is really no such a thing as a or the scientific method. Blame Feyerabend. (I know he's persona non grate for two good reasons, but if he's right, he's right. I can accept that without approving or excusing some of the things he's probably done). I prefer the idea that science is simply organized common sense.

Which is what I was trying to say, only said better. — Antony Nickles

.. and you elaborated further and I agree with all of that.

This is to say, first-person statements might not be incorrigible at all, and, even if they are, the fact I am making them is not of the only importance. — Antony Nickles

Quite so. That's a consequence of the private language argument. But then, there's the issue whether psychosomatic pains and illnesses are "real" or not. I'm in the camp that says they are not deceptions or illusions, even though the usual causal pathways are not involved.

Cavell (through Wittgenstein) takes the sceptic's generic claims more seriously (where Austin is more… condescending?), though not on their terms either (towards certainty). — Antony Nickles

Yes. Austin thinks that sense-datum theory can be disposed of or dissolved. Cavell, writing some time later, is taking seriously 1) the survival of scepticism (and sense-data) post Wittgenstein, and 2) Wittgensteins remark about "our real needs" being at the heart of the issues. But his phenomenological turn, though plausible, is not, I think, particularly illuminating. On the other hand, I'm not sure where else to go. However, our discussion of the pursuit of certainty is helpful.

I am perceiving by the eye a three-dimensional form — Ludwig V

Before I can comment, it depends what you mean.

Do you mean either i) at one moment in time when looking at an object I am perceiving by the eye a three-dimensional form or ii) at several moments in time when walking around an object I am perceiving by the eye a three-dimensional form.
===============================================================================

I wouldn't say he ignores metaphorical meanings for "apple". He explicitly draws attention to one kind of relevant metaphor in the passage you quote. He also draws attention to the difference between that metaphorical use and the literal use. — Ludwig V

When looking at a radar screen the technician would ordinarily say "I see the enemy ships", inferring that they see the enemy ships directly rather than indirectly. This suggests that the expression "I see the enemy ships" is not to be taken literally but metaphorically.

However, there is more to it than that, in that within Austin's Ordinary Language Philosophy the words within the metaphor are to be taken literally rather than figuratively. This is in the same way as described by Donald Davidson in his article What Metaphors Mean.

In Ordinary Language Philosophy, the expression "I see the enemy ships", although classified as a metaphor, is intended to be taken literally, in the same way that a Direct Realist when saying "I see a red postbox" means not only that they see a red postbox but that the postbox is literally red.

This leads into the debate between Direct Realists who argue they directly see an object in the world and the indirect Realist who argue that they directly see the sense-data from an object in the world.
===============================================================================

As it happens, in the example you cite, "I" am perceiving by the eye (in future, I will write "see" instead of this cumbersome form) two dimensional forms which I know give me information about the three-dimensional world. I can't see any important metaphysical questions from this. — Ludwig V

The relevance is linguistic, in that the word "see" has several meanings, including "to perceive by the eye" and "to imagine a possibility".
===============================================================================

It is perfectly possible for someone who believes in God to formulate an argument for the existence of God that deserves to be taken seriously. — Ludwig V

True, but it would be more difficult for someone who believes in God to formulate an argument for the non-existence of God.
===============================================================================

Ordinary Language Philosophy is a method of evaluation and he is using it to evaluate Ayer's argument and he comes to the conclusion that the argument is invalid. — Ludwig V

An Ordinary Language Philosophy as a philosophical methodology would be agnostic about Ayer's metaphysical sense-data theory, but Austin's Sense and Sensibilia is clearly more than a philosophical methodology as it concludes that Ayer's metaphysical sense-data theory is wrong.

Austin and Ayer hold two independent positions. Austin, as the name Ordinary Language Philosophy suggests, that of linguistics, and Ayer that of metaphysics. The problems of linguistics are different to and independent of the problems of metaphysics.

Ordinary Language Philosophy is about the meaning of an expression such as " I see an object in the world", whereas sense-data theory is about whether we see an object in the world directly or do we see the sense-data from that object directly. These are two very different things and shouldn't be conflated.

I believe that sense-data are metaphysically true, and I also believe that sense-data is irrelevant to linguistics. For linguistics to try to prove or disprove the metaphysical theory of sense-data is like asking a person to describe something they don't know about.

Linguistics and metaphysics are two independent fields of study, and the existence of one neither proves not disproves the existence of the other.
===============================================================================

You seem to be saying that the sense-data theory is irrelevant. — Ludwig V

I agree that from Austin's Ordinary Language point of view the sense-data theory is irrelevant.

I believe that sense-data are metaphysically true, and I also believe that sense-data is irrelevant to linguistics. — RussellA

That's one of the questions. The difficulty is that arguments about metaphysics have to be expressed in language. If the (attempts to express) metaphysical argument result in self-contradiction or absurdity, they cannot be correct. No?

True, but it would be more difficult for someone who believes in God to formulate an argument for the non-existence of God. — RussellA

I don't know. I don't believe in God, yet I can tell you what the arguments for and against are. What's the problem?

The difficulty is that arguments about metaphysics have to be expressed in language. If the (attempts to express) metaphysical argument result in self-contradiction or absurdity, they cannot be correct. — Ludwig V

True, the argument for sense-data theory can only be expressed in language.

However, if the argument results in self-contradiction or absurdity, it is possible that it is the argument that is self-contradictory or absurd, not the topic of the argument.
===============================================================================

I don't believe in God, yet I can tell you what the arguments for and against are. What's the problem? — Ludwig V

Your arguments for the existence of God haven't persuaded you of the existence of God, so they cannot be very persuasive.

Plato seems to me to be an early progenitor of the mistakes we are talking about, because he believes that ordinary perceptions are all false and develops something that is close to sense-datum theory in the "cave" metaphor. — Ludwig V

It is not at all close to a sense-datum theory.

This is what Socrates says, the image of the cave is:

... an image of our nature in its education and want of education, likening it to a condition of the following kind.

(Republic 514a)

The images whose shadows we see are not sense-data, they are:

... statues of men and other animals wrought from stone, wood, and every kind of material ...

(514c)