The fact that quantum physics appears to undemine the concept of objectivity — Wayfarer

And how does it "appear to undermine" "objectivity"? With objective findings. Your argument(?), sir, is as self-refuting as a 'positivist' argument. :lol:

You really don't understand the point, do you. Oh well, no point labouring it.

:rofl:

Did you look at the ATP synthase YouTube video?. — Restitutor

I did look at the video. I thought it was fun. It's interesting that the language of the commentary cannot help leaning into a metaphorical vocabulary. One structure was 'designed' in a certain way; 'desires' were imputed to proteins; emotions were ascribed in order to explain the strength of certain forces. Of course it would be a dry commentary without these lively ways of speaking, but they are a nagging reminder of how human organisms are: teleological, purposive, feeling stuff: features we find problematic when applying them to 'machines'.

There's a recent paper by Esposito and Baravalle on the machine-organism relation, which oddly enough seems to me to lend some support to all sides of this debate. They explore the ill-defined definitons of 'machine' and more specifically of the purported analogies between machine and organism. The ATP Synthase can usefully be described by analogy with a machine, but that is not an argument either that (a) it *is* a machine, whatever that might be; nor (b) that the organism of which it is a component part can usefully be described by analogy with a machine.

Here's the paper (I found by fiddling about I could get at the pdf):

https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40656-023-00587-2

The fact that quantum physics appears to undemine the concept of objectivity
— Wayfarer
And how does it "appear to undermine" "objectivity"? With objective findings. Your argument(?), sir, is as self-refuting as a 'positivist' argument — 180 Proof

I would say that rather than undermining objectivity, approaches within science studies and physics( Rouse, Fine, Harraway, Barad) re-situate the basis of objectivity within intersubjectivity. Not just human intersubjectivity but the intra-agential relations within non-human nature.

Classical epistemological and ontological assumptions, such as the ones found to underlie Newtonian physics, include the existence of individual objects with determinate properties that are independent of our experimen­tal investigations of them. This accounts for the fact that the process of measurement is transparent and external to the discourse of Newtonian science. It is assumed that objects and observers occupy physically and conceptually separable positions. Objects are assumed to possess individu­ally determinate attributes, and it is the job of the scientist to cleverly discern these inherent characteristics by obtaining the values of the corresponding observation-independent variables through some benignly invasive mea­surement procedure. The reproducibility of measured values under the methodology of controlled experimentation is used to support the objectivist claim that what has been obtained is a representation of intrinsic properties that characterize the objects of an observation-independent reality. The transparency of the measurement process in Newtonian physics is a root cause of its value to, and prestige within, the Enlightenment culture of objectivism.

Bohr called into question two fundamental assumptions that support the notion of measurement transparency in Newtonian physics: (1) that the world is composed of individual objects with individually determinate boundaries and properties whose well-defined values can be represented by abstract universal concepts that have determinate meanings independent of the specifics of the experimental practice; and (2) that measurements involve continuous determinable interactions such that the values of the properties obtained can be properly assigned to the premeasurement properties of objects as separate from the agencies of observation. In other words, the assumptions entail a belief in representationalism (the independently deter­minate existence of words and things), the metaphysics of individualism (that the world is composed of individual entities with individually determi­nate boundaries and properties), and the intrinsic separability of knower and known (that measurements reveal the preexisting values of the proper­ties of independently existing objects as separate from the measuring agen­cies).
( Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway)

But plainly that is a fact of neither mechanics nor physics but if biology. In all of what you’re saying ‘machines’ are a metaphor. Furthermore you’d never learn about genetics by studying physics, the fact you can call on ‘emergence’ as a kind of universal ad hoc gap filler notwithstanding. — Wayfarer

No, this is basic science you just don't understand it in anything like a sophisticated way. The fact you call the idea of emergence a "ad hoc gap filler" is profoundly ignorant. All scientists believe in emergence and the fact that you don't explains why you are so profoundly confused about how physics and biology relate to each other.

Physics gives rise to chemistry and chemistry gives rise to biology, this is all that is meant by emergence. To say emergence doesn't exist is to say chemistry isn't a product of physics and to say biology isn't a product of chemistry. Intellectually you have to know, if you change the laws of something like quintom electro dynamics (physics), you would change chemistry and there for change biology.

An atom is simply the product of quarks and electrons following the rules layer out in the standard model. Molecules are just atoms following the rules of quintom electro dynamics. Biology is simply a lode of molecules we call protein, RNA and DNA interacting through rules of charge and thermodynamics as it relates to hydrophobic and hydrophilic interactions. All of it is mechanistic and all of it relates back ultimately to the laws of physics.

You seem to think that there is some great sacred divide between biology and everything else and there isn't. Biology is just chemistry that is dependent on the catalysts and such produced by the template called DNA. The template does allow for new rules to emerge and some of them are both complicated and very powerful such as evolution but evolution isn't magical, it also has to follow the mechanistic rules of physics.

You don't seem to get the fact that we know how biology works to a level of detail that strips it right back down to chemistry and we know how chemistry works that strips it right back down to physics. You are just profoundly ignorant of this science, preferring dusty quotes from out of date scientists.

Did you watch the video about ATP synthase? You need to understand we are build out of many sextillion of molecular machines. These things are millions of times smaller than anything that you can even see but they operate mechanically. This is what makes life special and capable of generating properties that clunky made made machines can't. It is this rather than you bizarre idea that that biology is somehow unrelated from physics and doesn't operate causally.

The scientifically grounded notion of information is also important in understanding biology and i think that you may be interpreting the role of information in biology as making it non-causal or non-mechanistic. The information in the DNA of an organism for example is important and generate properties that are hard to see as mechanistic but information is integral to modern notions of physics.

Your thinking is rather last decade. The systems that run modern AIs use many interconnected processors operating in parallel, and a complex ballet of distributed processing is a more accurate metaphor than an assembly line. Furthermore,neuromorphic hardware that will massively increase the degree of parallelism while also dramatically dropping the power consumption is around the corner. — wonderer1

Again, your aspersion has missed the point of the original question : What are the philosophical consequences of science saying we are mechanistic?

Parallel processing --- multiple assembly lines --- increases Mechanical through-put, but has nothing to do with Consciousness, or Philosophy. Neuromorphic hardware is an attempt to mechanically mimic the structure of the human brain. But the salient Function of the brain, for its owner, is not fast thinking, but the creation of Awareness & Self-Consciousness. In this 20th decade of the 20th century, can you point to a working example of Machine Consciousness? As I said before : "computing" is easy compared to "knowing". :smile:


Neuromorphic Machine Consciousness :
These questions are rooted in what is called machine consciousness. How do we create consciousness when we don't understand it or its objective in humans?
https://www.servomagazine.com/magazine/article/rise-of-the-neuromorphic-machines


ChatGPT: Has a chatbot finally achieved self-awareness? :
So, ChatGPT knows that it has an internal state which reflects the memory of what has been said so far. But it still vehemently insists on not having feelings or consciousness.
https://lamarr-institute.org/blog/chatgpt-has-a-chatbot-finally-achieved-self-awareness/

Not being as such, but of the objects of experience. Questions about what objectively exists are different to questions about the nature of existence, which are much broader in scope. — Wayfarer

You are confusing what you would like to be for what is.

Yes physics talks about what objectively exists but that doesn't mean it isn't saying anything about the "nature of existence". You just don't like what it is saying.

Standard physics and science in general is saying the nature of existence is mechanistic and deterministic. Science says this ever time a scientists makes a production based on the belief that the nature of the world and everything that exists in it is mechanistic and then make an observation consistent with that prediction. This happens thousands of times a day.

Science is screaming at us that the fundamental nature of existence is mechanistic and deterministic but because this isn't what you want to hear you don't listen.

Evidently quantum mechanics is probabilistic rather than deterministic with the deterministic world emerging from this probabilistic world. If you want to argue that the world is probabilistic at the most fundamental level this is fine by me.

Thanks i will read the paper. Thank you for suggesting it.

Honestly, what we define as the word machine as is semantics and distracts from the core reality. The core reality is that both organic and non-organic machines are simply conglomerations of unthinking atoms mechanistically obeying the laws of physics to generate what ever emergent properties the machine generates.

Intellectually doesn't matter if if you use a narrow human centric view of the word machine like wayfarer does and then and use it at as a metaphor or you use the word machine more broadly but not as a metaphor. The statement above still stands.

Unfortunately the word machine is however rhetorically important as calling human a machines is the only thing that seems to make people realize that science says biology is just as mechanistic and deterministic as any object engendered by a human.

Wow, I bet Wayfarer has never heard any of that. You must have really opened his eyes. He should be grateful.

What is the fundamental difference between information processed by a mechanical computer and a brain? How can there be a fundamental difference in what is happening if all we are is mechanistic?
What is the implication of this for the idea that computers are just too mechanical to be, conscious, to love, to generate or understand meaning, to have a self or to have free will? How would changing notions of consciousness, meaning, morality, free will and self to make them fit with bodies as mechanical as any robot change these psychologically important notions? — Restitutor

You have a strong mechanistic intuition, which is fair enough. So we take that as axiomatic, which is as good a starting point as any. So what happens when we come across a concept that doesn't easily fit the model? Do we change the concept or the model? We should try both, no? And see which is more fruitful? What if the concept seems just as axiomatic as the model?

The fact that quantum physics appears to undermine the concept of objectivity was part of the major news out of the Solvay Conference in 1927. Why was Albert Einstein compelled to ask the question 'doesn't the moon continue to exist if we're not observing it?' The later Bohr-Einstein debates were mainly about this. Hey, don't take it from me, here it is from John Wheeler: — Wayfarer

As usual, the implicit debate within the dialog is between the utility of Practical Realistic Physicists (Feynman) versus the futility of Philosophical Idealistic Physicists (Wheeler, Heisenberg). The former produce tangible results --- television, computers, cell phones, and nuclear weapons --- while the latter postulate abstract concepts --- words, ideas, principles, etc.

So, we're talking past each other, about apples vs appleness ; specifications vs generalities ; objectivity vs subjectivity ; matter vs mind. But, why are we talking about Apples & Bombs on a philosophy forum? You can't eat "appleness", so what good is it? Apparently, for some of us, a full belly is better than a satisfied mind. Why don't the fruitful utilitarian belly-fillers just go away and leave us fruitless futilitarian mind-fillers alone? :joke:


What is the difference between a philosopher and a physicist?
Physics is concerned with unravelling the complexities of the universe from the smallest to the largest scale. Philosophy deals with foundational questions of the most general kind: what there is, what we know and how we came to know it, and how we ought to act and structure our lives.
https://www.ox.ac.uk/admissions/undergraduate/courses/course-listing/physics-and-philosophy

The fact you call the idea of emergence a "ad hoc gap filler" is profoundly ignorant. — Restitutor

Well some times emergence-of-the-gaps is used a bit like a God-of-the-gaps. Of course, lots of instances of novel properties emerging from systems is entirely reasonable and comprehensible. But sometimes people come pretty close to saying "emergence-did-it" without offering convincing details, most obviously when arguing that consciousness is an emergent property of brain activity.

It's not reasonable to say "I think consciousness emerges from brain activity but I don't know how"?

Well some times emergence-of-the-gaps is used a bit like a God-of-the-gaps. Of course, lots of instances of novel properties emerging from systems is entirely reasonable and comprehensible. But sometimes people come pretty close to saying "emergence-did-it" without offering convincing details, most obviously when arguing that consciousness is an emergent property of brain activity. — bert1

There is a big difference however, in that instances of emergence are observed all over the place, whereas omniscient minds existing for no reason aren't.

It's not reasonable to say "I think consciousness emerges from brain activity but I don't know how"? — flannel jesus

Somewhat, yes. I'd want to know why someone thinks consciousness emerges from brain activity. The usual answer is that changes in brain activity result in changes in experience. It's also hard to make sense of the claim. If consciousness just is brain activity it seems odd to say it emerges from that brain activity. If it isn't brain activity, what exactly is it and how does it connect with the brain activity?

Same with god-did-it. I want details. Why do you think that? What is God and why is it an explanation that out-competes other explanations?

... re-situate the basis of objectivity within intersubjectivity. Not just human intersubjectivity but the intra-agential relations within non-human nature. — Joshs

:ok:

There is a big difference however, in that instances of emergence are observed all over the place, whereas omniscient minds existing for no reason aren't. — wonderer1

But sometimes (not always) the appeal to emergence is just as much of a non-explanation as appealing to a notion of God. In both cases, we need convincing details.

I'd want to know why someone thinks consciousness emerges from brain activity. The usual answer is that changes in brain activity result in changes in experience. It's also hard to make sense of the claim. If consciousness just is brain activity it seems odd to say it emerges from that brain activity. If it isn't brain activity, what exactly is it and how does it connect with the brain activity? — bert1

Can you articulate the alternative to emergence here?

Can you articulate the alternative to emergence here? — flannel jesus

Either panpsychism or eliminativism I think. Those plus emergence are mutually exhaustive of the possibilities it seems to me.

okay well panpsychism still requires some emergence to get to human consciousness - the type of information processing and thoughts that are typical of human beings. You haven't removed emergence from the equation, you've just kind of given a shortcut to the genesis of raw consciousness and then allowed the emergence of the rest of the stuff we associate with human consciousness to still come from a brain. I'm not a panpsychist but I am extremely open to it - I don't think it's a bad idea at all.

I don't really take elimitavism as a serious contender, personally. But even if I did, I feel like there's still some emergence in there - I'm sure elimitavists would disagree, but I don't see a way around it.

I don't know if it's been clear up to now, when I say "emergence" I don't mean the strong variety.

okay well panpsychism still requires some emergence to get to human consciousness — flannel jesus

Sure, I'm not criticising the concept of emergence in all contexts, just in the context of the move from non-conscious systems to conscious ones.

the thing that stops me from being a pansychist is, if consciousness is fundamental, then that means (by my reckoning) everything is conscious. Atoms, amoebas, blood cells, chairs, maybe even things like societies. But if everything is conscious.... there's still only one thing in the world that writes the words "I'm conscious", and that's human beings. Atoms and amoebas and blood cells and chairs don't write those words.

Our consciousness is at the very least especially unique, because it is causal. I think it's causal. It would be very weird of my body to write "I'm conscious" if my consciousness wasn't part of the causal chain. But consciousness doesn't seem to be causing anything else to communicate about consciousness, only humans. So even if pansychism is true, SOMETHING specifically about humans and human brains is emerging (not strongly, in my opinion, though it's hard to justify) that makes our consciousness more tangible, somehow, then the consciousness of everything else around us.

And if it's fundamentally more tangible in us, maybe it's also true that it's emerging in us to begin with, and not some kind of fundamental feature of reality at all.

These are the intuitions keeping me off pansychism

Our consciousness is at the very least especially unique, because it is causal. I think it's causal. — flannel jesus

I think it is causal too, but not just in humans. One way to solve the problem of overdetermination (psychological causes compete with physical causes as the explanation for human behaviour) is to suggest that all causation is fundamentally psychological. But I think you are right to point out the problem of when to introduce consciousness-as-cause, as this is as much as an issue for panpsychists as anyone else. A thoroughgoing panpsychist might take the line that if matter was not conscious, it wouldn't do anything. All the behaviour we see around us in the physical world is only doing what it is doing because of how it feels.

All the behaviour we see around us in the physical world is only doing what it is doing because of how it feels. — bert1

That seems a bit like it fails the Occam's Razor sniff test to me. The only behaviour that truly needs "feelings" in order to explain, that I can see, is people who talk about feeling feelings. (well, and some animal behaviours, but animal consciousness or proto-consciousness seems pretty agreeable to everyone). Everything else seems more simply explained by physics, whose operators don't seem to have any reference to feelings. That compounds with the fact that the thing we frequently refer to as 'feelings' themself seem emergent - someone on antidepressents feels different feelings than when they're not, so feelings seem to be a high-level phenomenon to humans, "emerging" from the chemical interactions in our brains.

Like I said before, I don't think poorly of pansychism in general, there may indeed be "something it's like" to be an atom, but I'm certainly skeptical that that "something it's like" involves anything recognizable as "feelings".

Or maybe I'm interpreting your use of that word too literally. Who knows?

he fact you call the idea of emergence a "ad hoc gap filler" is profoundly ignorant. All scientists believe in emergence and the fact that you don't explains why you are so profoundly confused about how physics and biology relate to each other. — Restitutor

But you keep making sweeping statements that 'all scientists believe this' and 'all science says the universe is a machine'. There are plenty of criticisms of reductionism and physicalism within science. Furthermore there is a distinction between the domains of science and philosophy, although as a philosophical distinction it might be hard to appreciate from a scientific perspective.

You seem to think that there is some great sacred divide between biology and everything else and there isn't. — Restitutor

It's an ontological distinction, not a 'sacred divide'.

Yes physics talks about what objectively exists but that doesn't mean it isn't saying anything about the "nature of existence". — Restitutor

It doesn't consider the human condition, the plight of human existence. It deals solely with the behaviour of objects.

Science is screaming at us that the fundamental nature of existence is mechanistic and deterministic but because this isn't what you want to hear you don't listen. — Restitutor

Not "science" - you're screaming that.

I bet Wayfarer has never heard any of that. You must have really opened his eyes. He should be grateful. — bert1

:lol:

Do you have an opinion of how information exists, mechanistically or otherwise, only an abstraction or something physical? I've noticed some physicalists use information as an abstraction without identifying a means for it to physically exist.

An observation would be that information has specific content so how would you bridge the mechanistic with specific information content?

I couldn't agree with you more. Emergence has a tendency to be used as a magic wand. Your point is very well talk, as is your highlighting of the fact that is is real even if it does get abused.

But sometimes people come pretty close to saying "emergence-did-it" without offering convincing details, most obviously when arguing that consciousness is an emergent property of brain activity. — bert1

That's what I was getting at.

Science says humans are mechanisms and what we think and feel are products of that mechanism, — Restitutor

Although many people believe this, and have been trying to prove it, they have not succeeded. Christof Koch, a more than fair neuroscientist, paid off his 25-year old bet to Chalmers because of this lack of success. Many say it must be the case, and science will eventually prove it. But that is not evidence that it is there case, or that science will prove it.

There are no properties of particles, states of matter, laws of physics, physical processes, or anything else known to science, that explain how the matter and energy of the universe can be conscious under certain circumstances. There's no logic or science behind the idea that, if you put enough physical things together, they will, by virtue of nothing but their physical characteristics, become conscious.