If we have a reason for choosing something, then those reasons determine our actions....The "choice," between S1 and S2 has to be based on something for us to do any "choosing."...........................so it seems like we can be free in gradations and we are more free when our choices are "more determined by what we want them to be determined by," not when they are "determined by nothing."..................a sort of recursive self-aware self-determination, as opposed to a free floating non-determinism. — Count Timothy von Icarus

As I understand you, I agree that if we were totally free to do whatever we wanted at any moment in time, with no constraints on our actions, we might freely decide not to eat or drink, we might freely decide to jump off a cliff or we might freely decide not to get out of the way of a speeding truck.

But this would be unworkable. Sentient life can only succeed if a limit has been placed on the range of choices available to it within any particular situation. Limits not determined by another mind, but determined by the physical nature of the world. Within limits there is freedom to choose a particular course of action. A certain freedom of choice within a restricted range of possibilities seems an effective evolutionary solution for the development of life.

The question is, what is the nature of this freedom. We feel free to choose between a pre-determined range of available possibilities, but is this freedom in fact an illusion. Is it the case that the range of available possibilities is so restricted that in fact our free will is non-existent.

We are at state S2 and prior to that we were at state S1. Either we are free to choose between moving to future states S3 or S4 or our choice has been pre-determined by state S1.

I can understand the mechanics of Determinism, in that our choice at state S2 has been pre-determined by state S1, but the mechanics of free will elude me, causing me to come to the conclusion that the world is Deterministic and our belief that we have free will is just an illusion.

Suppose free will can cause state S2 to move equally to either S3 of S4, meaning that state S2 can spontaneously and without prior cause move of its own accord equally to either states S3 or S4. This gives us the problem of a spontaneous change in the absence of a prior cause that is not random and somehow determined.

What kind of mechanism can explain a spontaneous change without priori cause that is not random and somehow determined.

Both the Indirect Realist and Direct Realist see a red postbox. — RussellA

Not as I understand it.The indirect realist does not and knows it; the direct realist does not but thinks he does.

For the Indirect Realist, the name is of the representation in the mind. For the Direct Realist, the name is of a material object in the world . — RussellA

Yes, which fits with what I just said, but doesn’t fit with both seeing a red postbox.
—————

But there is nothing whatsoever in the perceiving from which knowledge of the perception follows.
— Mww

This problem applies to both the Indirect and Direct Realist. — RussellA

It can’t apply to the direct realist, for he knows the name of the object from the perception of it, which makes explicit there is knowledge in the mere perception. Because of this condition, the direct realist should be able to name the red postbox even if he didn’t even know what a red postbox was. In effect, it is a red postbox for no other reason than it is seen, re: I see a red postbox.

the Direct Realist believes that the object is red, whereas the Indirect Realist believes that only their perception of the object is red. — RussellA

Not quite. The indirect realist conceives the color red as one of a multiplicity of properties belonging to the phenomenon representing the thing he has perceived. It takes more than “red” to be “postbox”, right?

Depends on what you mean by the word "see". — RussellA

It shouldn’t. To see is that mode of perception in which a sensation is given from that sensory apparatus susceptible to being affected by light. No human can see with his eyes closed.
————-

We know that if there has been an effect there must have been cause, even if we don't know what the cause was. Let us name the cause of the broken window A. — RussellA

Ok. You name it A, but because neither of us know the cause, I’m perfectly authorized to call that same cause, B. It follows that anybody that doesn’t know the cause, can call it anything they like. Pretty slipshod method for acquiring knowledge, I must say.

IE, we have named something even if we don't know what it is. — RussellA

Sure. We name stuff all the time without knowing what it is. But in the case at hand, the cause is something, and as soon as it is possibly a certain something, it is determinable. As soon as it is determinable, it cannot be a thing-in-itself.
—————

The Indirect Realist approach is that of metaphysics, whereas the Direct Realist approach is that of Linguistic Idealism. — RussellA

I can handle that. It might stand as an initial condition, or a major premise in a syllogistic argument, sure.

….both approaches are valid, and each has its own place in our understanding. — RussellA

Perhaps. It then becomes simply a question of which is the more parsimonious, and the less in conflict with what Nature demands.

Kant's response to Hume was that we ARE time and space. Both held the world to be phenomena but Kant held that world to be inside us in a sense. If we are time and space than the world would appear to us falsely because we usually experience time and especially space as outside us. Hence the noumena is the world minus time and space — Gregory

What does one make of this Kantian claim? AN excellent question for me is, How does one reasonably defend the limitation of what stands outside phenomena, if one's perspective is solely within phenomena. That is, how is it that this notepad stands outside the ontology of what is absolutely real? It would require the real to be somehow exclusive of this notepad, which sound absurd, because such a line would require an understanding on both sides to makes sense and a line (Wittgenstein made an argument like this in his Tractatus).

Seems clear to me that that is precisely the wrong way around. We do not go from propositional and cognitive understanding to non-propositional and non-cognitive understanding. There is no such thing as non-cognitive understanding. There is such thing as non-propositional thought, belief, knowledge, and understanding. It's what precedes the propositional. — creativesoul

It is a tough cookie, but take the cognitive dimension of a model proposition like: the cup is on the table. What is the cognitive part of this? It lies with the understanding, in the Kantian way of putting it, and as he says, the synthetic work of the mind to apply universal concepts like 'cup' in an instantiation. I would point out the "blind" sensory intuition ("intuitions without concepts are blind") part of the equation. Put it ike this: in order for this to make any sense at all it has to be that one cna even talk about intuitions absent a concept, but this is impossible, because such talk would itself possess a "blind" claim. Kant can't talk alike this, in other words, for this is just nonsense to talk of a blind anything in this way.

But, and here is the point, we clearly CAN talk like this. I can apprehend the, call it X that is designated by the term 'red'. There is a presence I can existentially grasp as something that, while held within the cognitive act, is identified as altogether noncognitive.
This opens the door to certain existential claims Kant never imagined.

There is also the humoncular regress to consider. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The homunculus, and the informal fallacy of the argument, disappears from a cognitive system as such. For the subject that is the thinker by means of that system, anything that represents that subject, also as a thinker, to the very self that thinks, is superfluous.

It is quite absurd to consider that there is a theater in the brain, so why would a theory describing a method for what goes on in the brain, make room for one?

I can understand the mechanics of Determinism, in that our choice at state S2 has been pre-determined by state S1, but the mechanics of free will elude me, causing me to come to the conclusion that the world is Deterministic and our belief that we have free will is just an illusion.

The mechanics of compatibilist free will, as I see it, are the same as the mechanics of determinism. Questions about freedom are questions about: "to what extent we are self-determining as opposed to being externally determined." This also explains how we can be unfree when constrained by internal causes. E.g. the agoraphobic who cannot attend their daughter's college graduation because they lack control over their fear of leaving the house, the alcoholic who wants to quit drinking, agrees it is the better choice, but cannot resist their urges, etc.

We can be alien to ourselves and lack self-control, and indeed, a good deal of the freedom we care most about is freedom over ourselves, freedom to engage in self-determination. Self-knowledge becomes crucial here as well, as we can be manipulated or choose things out of ignorance. Crucially, gaining knowledge is itself a transcendent act. Learning involves going beyond current beliefs and desires, the expansion of the self. By expanding the self, we can become more self-determining.

Mechanically, it works the same as fatalism, but fatalism seems to ignore the ways in which we also "determine ourselves." We can identify with and exercise control over what determines our actions. For example, if our work is a very important part of our life, then switching to a job with a very horizontal, consensus-based management style gives us more freedom, in important ways. We are freer in that we do more to determine our actions and feel ownership over our work. Likewise, we are always determined by the politics of our locale. But if we identify with our polity and exert influence on it, then the political determination of our actions becomes less external determination, more internal determination, in that we identify with the previously external force that determines our actions and exert causal control over it. But the control we exert still works through deterministic means. An absolute monarch is deterministically influenced by their polity, and yet, they also clearly possess great internal causal powers vis-a-vis their state.

It is quite absurd to consider that there is a theater in the brain, so why would a theory describing a method for what goes on in the brain, make room for one?

:up:

But then it seems to me that "representation" is really more about how we describe relations within the parts from which the cognitive system emerges, not the relations that obtain between the whole cognitive system and the objects of experience. Our sight of a tree is not a tree, but nonetheless, I feel confident in saying we "see trees," as opposed to "representations of trees," in an important sense. Information is, by its nature, relational, so "in-itselfness" itself seems to be a fraught abstraction.

it seems to me that "representation" is really more about how we describe relations within the parts from which the cognitive system emerges…. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I’d have agreed, if it had said, representation is really more about how we describe relations within the parts of the cognitive system as a whole. I don’t think we should say the system emerges from the description of relations, but the relations described emerge from a kind of system capable of it.

…..not the relations that obtain between the whole cognitive system and the objects of experience. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That would be fine, as long as the cognitive system as a whole wasn’t comprised of relations. There are established metaphysical theories predicated on just that being the case.

I feel confident in saying we "see trees”….. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Oh certainly. It is the convention to speak in those terms. I suspect only the philosopher or the philosophy student would use the more precise terminology. I understand no one knows how it is we think, but the average joe barely even knows he thinks. He says, I think this, I think that, but hasn’t a farging clue what that means.

….“in-itselfness" seems to be a fraught abstraction. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yep, agreed. There’s only one use for the term, nothing else need ever be said about it.

Is this possible?

Is it possible to have a thought about an internal logical process, when the internal logical process has caused the thought in the first place?

In other words, can an effect cause itself? — RussellA

I don't see why it has to have caused itself. I think it's commonly known as "reflection".

I don't see why it has to have caused itself. I think it's commonly known as "reflection". — Metaphysician Undercover

Logically, how can something reflect on itself?

Not as I understand it.The indirect realist does not and knows it; the direct realist does not but thinks he does.................Yes, which fits with what I just said, but doesn’t fit with both seeing a red postbox......................No human can see with his eyes closed. — Mww

There are at least two aspects to the question of Indirect and Direct Realism, the metaphysical and the linguistic. When considering an expression such as "I see the red post-box" the metaphysical and the linguistic should not be conflated

As regards the metaphysical, Indirect Realism makes more sense than Direct Realism. We know that when an object emits a wavelength of 700nm we see the colour red. The Indirect Realist would argue that the colour red exists in our minds. The Direct Realist would argue that the object is red.

As regards the linguistic, Direct Realism is more appropriate than Indirect Realism. As Wittgenstein discusses in Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty, words exist within language games, and within language games are certain hinge propositions on which the language game is founded. These hinge propositions are always true within the language game of which they are part. They are not intended to correspond with the world they describe, but create the world that they describe, in that the proposition "I see a red post-box" is true even if in the world is a flying pink elephant.

When considering the proposition " I see the red post" linguistically rather than metaphysically, it should be remembered that any particular world may have many different meanings. For example, according to the Merriam Webster dictionary, the word "see" as a transitive verb may mean:

1 a = to perceive by the eye
b = to perceive or detect as if by sight

2 a = to be aware of : RECOGNIZE - sees only our faults
b = to imagine as a possibility : SUPPOSE - couldn't see him as a crook
c = to form a mental picture of : VISUALIZE - can still see her as she was years ago
d = to perceive the meaning or importance of : UNDERSTAND

3 a = to come to know : DISCOVER
b = to be the setting or time of - The last fifty years have seen a sweeping revolution in science
c = to have experience of : UNDERGO - see army service

4 a = EXAMINE, WATCH - want to see how she handles the problem
b = READ - to read of
c = to attend as a spectator - see a play

5 a = to make sure - See that order is kept.
b = to take care of : provide for - had enough money to see us through

6 a = to find acceptable or attractive - can't understand what he sees in her
b = to regard as : JUDGE
c = to prefer to have - I'll see him hanged first.

7 a = to call on : VISIT
b (1) = to keep company - had been seeing each other for a year
(2) = to grant an interview to : RECEIVE - The president will see you now.

8 = ACCOMPANY, ESCORT - See the guests to the door.

9 = to meet (a bet) in poker or to equal the bet of (a player) : CALL

The word "see" as an intransitive verb may mean:

1 a = to apprehend objects by sight
b = to have the power of sight
c = to perceive objects as if by sight

2 a = to look about
b = to give or pay attention

3 a = to grasp something mentally
b = to acknowledge or consider something being pointed out - See, I told you it would rain.

4 = to make investigation or inquiry
===============================================================================

the direct realist should be able to name the red postbox even if he didn’t even know what a red postbox was. — Mww

As I don't know the Arabic name for "red post-box" without having first learnt it, the Direct Realist cannot name an object without having first learnt its name.
===============================================================================

The indirect realist conceives the color red as one of a multiplicity of properties belonging to the phenomenon representing the thing he has perceived. It takes more than “red” to be “postbox”, right? — Mww

Yes, objects have many properties. The colour red is a useful example to make a philosophical and linguistic point.

As a side point, it is not the case that objects have properties, but rather objects are a set of properties.
===============================================================================

You name it A, but because neither of us know the cause, I’m perfectly authorized to call that same cause, B — Mww

Yes, I can name it A and you can name it B. However, the point is that an unknown thing, a thing-in-itself, has been named.
==============================================================================

. As soon as it is determinable, it cannot be a thing-in-itself. — Mww

True, but until it has been determined, it is still a thing-in-itself.

Here’s a language game for ya: when “carrying on” a conversation, the worst one can do is repeat himself.

the point is that an unknown thing, a thing-in-itself, has been named. — RussellA

Nope. We named a possible cause, which could be a possible experience. A thing-in-itself will never be one, by definition.

Say it is the case thing-in-itself is a name. What am I given by it? What does that name tell me?

but until it has been determined, it is still a thing-in-itself. — RussellA

Yep. The catch being, it never will be determined, because……once again, repeating myself…..it is undeterminable, by definition.

This is like telling Henry Ford he didn’t invent the Model T. Or, the Model T he did invent, wasn’t really a Model T. You can’t just take something meant in one way, and make it something else. If Model T’s aren’t your thing, go drive something more adaptable to your way of getting around.

Logically, how can something reflect on itself? — RussellA

Start with the premise that this "thing" has a memory. And the thing's existence has temporal extension. Memory allows the thing to revisit its past existence. That is called "reflection". Reflection allows a person to reconsider one's actions relative to one's thought processes and see where the actions did not follow logic.

Say it is the case thing-in-itself is a name. What am I given by it? What does that name tell me? — Mww

That it exists.

That it exists. — RussellA

But what if its non-existence is impossible?

I suppose there’s nothing inherently wrong with naming an existence as such. But naming a mere existence doesn’t tell me as much as naming the object of my experience.

There is also the humoncular regress to consider. If we "see representations" by being "inside a mind" and seeing those representations "projected as in a theater," then it seems we should still need a second self inside the first to fathom the representations of said representations, and so on. Else, if self can directly access objects in such a theater, why not cut out the middle man and claim self can just experience the original objects? — Count Timothy von Icarus

We can avoid the homuncular regress by acknowledging that the self is not separate to the representations but the self is the representations.

Questions about freedom are questions about: "to what extent we are self-determining as opposed to being externally determined.".............We can be alien to ourselves...............We can identify with and exercise control over what determines our actions. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This raises the question of how we can be self-determining. We say, "I think I will have a coffee rather than a tea". Such a thought did not exist at a prior moment in time, so what caused the thought to come into existence. Either a prior state of affairs, which is Determinism, or the thought itself caused itself to come into existence, which is Free Will.

How can something cause itself to come into existence?

I suppose there’s nothing inherently wrong with naming an existence as such. But naming a mere existence doesn’t tell me as much as naming the object of my experience. — Mww

I have an experience which has the name "the colour red". I know that this experience has had a cause, but although I don't know what the cause was, I do know that the cause existed. I can name this unknown cause "A". I can then talk about the cause of my seeing the colour red as "A" and the cause of my seeing the colour green as "B". I don't know what "A" and "B" are, other than that they exist. Something that is unknown yet exists can be named as a "thing-in-itself". Both "A" and "B" are things-in-themselves.

It is true that the names "A" and "B" don't tell me as much as the names "the colour red" and "the colour green", but they do tell me something, that "A" and "B" exist and that "things-in-themselves" exist.

Ok. Thanks.

My understanding of Kant on this point is that if the world is timeless and without space, objects are eternal and the becoming we see is like the motion of the experience of motion pictures. The vase is real but it's eternity acting as becoming, presence showing life. We don't really know what things are in eternity but we can speak of them while in time by observing them acting outside eternity. Try not asking first what noumena is and instead focus time and space being intuitions. Then maybe noumena come into focus

My understanding of Kant on this point is that if the world is timeless and without space, objects are eternal and the becoming we see is like the motion of the experience of motion pictures. The vase is real but it's eternity acting as becoming, presence showing life. We don't really know what things are in eternity but we can speak of them while in time by observing them acting outside eternity. Try not asking first what noumena is and instead focus time and space being intuitions. Then maybe noumena come into focus — Gregory

Kant wouldn't put it like that, but there is something close in what you say. His question really is, how are apriori synthetic judgments possible? Take causality: before me lies a context of causally related things, like two pool balls on a collision course with each other. Causality explains the possibility of their altered trajectories at the time of impact. But can you even imagine one pool ball just changing course all by itself? This not just a case of pure logicality, of agreement in a tautology; this is in-the-world impossiblity. Regarding things out there, among the trees and lamp posts, I have knowledge that is apodictic, as Kant put it, apriori, universally and necessarily true, and this isn't supposed to happen. KNowledge about the world like this should be at best inductively acquired. How do we know about gravity? We observe the world and things fall to the grounded repeatedly and without exception. But this doesn't mean things MUST fall to the ground. They just do. But causality tells you something must be the case, just as logic does, e.g., modus ponens or the principle of contradiction.

How does one account for this apriori knowledge IN the outside world? Apriority is supposed be confined to mental constructions. It must be that the outside world isn't "outside" in the usual sense at all. The perceiving agency must be making a contribution to its empirical existence.

Anything that bears the mark of apriority must have its origin in the perceiver's mind, and this goes for time and space, the very formal conditions for the possibility of objective experience. Space and its geometry, time and its sequential structure, both have apriority in their analysis.

It is true that the names "A" and "B" don't tell me as much as the names "the colour red" and "the colour green", but they do tell me something, that "A" and "B" exist and that "things-in-themselves" exist. — RussellA

That will be a tough sell. Things-in-themselves, for Kant, did not lie in the perceptual world at all. But this here sounds more like Husserl's things-themselves, referring to the eidetically structured visual presence before one's eyes. Philosophers today tend away from this kind of thing, which suggests some kind of non propositional knowledge of red that is there prior language and naming.

Things-in-themselves, for Kant, did not lie in the perceptual world at all. — Astrophel

Of course they do. In what other world would they lie?

They do not lie in the perceived world.

A thing-in-itself is still just a thing.

Philosophers today tend away from this kind of thing, which suggests some kind of non propositional knowledge of red that is there prior language and naming. — Astrophel

There needs to be some flexibility in what we mean by knowledge. For example, I have the innate ability to see the colour red but not the colour ultraviolet. The distinction between knowing how and knowing what is relevant here, a distinction that was brought to prominence in epistemology by Gilbert Ryle who used it in his book The Concept of Mind. (SEP - Knowing-How and Knowing-That). I am born with the innate knowledge of how to see the colour red even if I don't have the innate knowledge of what the colour red is.

In today's terms, we can account for our a priori knowledge by Innatism and Enactivism, given that life has been evolving in synergy with the world for at least 3.7 billion years. We are born with a brain that has a particular physical structure because of this 3.7 billion years of evolution.

Enactivism says that it is necessary to appreciate how living beings dynamically interact with their environments. From an Enactivist perspective, there is no prospect of understanding minds without reference to such interactions because interactions are taken to lie at the heart of mentality in all of its varied forms. (IEP - Enactivism)

Innatism says that in the philosophy of mind, Innatism is the view that the mind is born with already-formed ideas, knowledge, and beliefs. The opposing doctrine, that the mind is a tabula rasa (blank slate) at birth and all knowledge is gained from experience and the senses, is called empiricism. (Wikipedia - Innatism)

Innatism and Enactivism explain our non-propositional knowledge of red.

His question really is, how are apriori synthetic judgments possible? Take causality — Astrophel

We see a snooker cue hit a stationary snooker ball and see the snooker ball begin to move. It is not our ordinary experience that snooker balls on a snooker table are able to spontaneously move. Whenever we see a snooker ball start to move we have seen a priori cause, either another snooker ball or a snooker cue.

Where does our belief in causality come from? For Kant, our knowledge of causality is a priori because the Category of Relation includes causality. In today's terms, our knowledge of causality is a priori because of the principle of Innatism, in that the principle of causality is built into the very structure of our brain. The brain doesn't need Hume's principle of induction to know that one thing causes another, as knowing one thing causes another is part of the innate structure of the brain.

Suppose we perceive the colour red, which is an experience in our minds. As we have a priori the innate knowledge of causality, we know that this experience has been caused by something. We don't know what has caused it, but we know something has caused it. We can call this unknown something "A", or equally "thing-in-itself."

The fact that we know "The most distant objects in the Universe are 47 billion light years away" does not mean that we know 47 billion light years. The fact that we know "for every effect there has been a prior cause" does not mean that we know priori causes. Both these statements are representations, and the fact that we know a representation does not mean that we know what is being represented. Confusion often arises in language when the representation is conflated with what is being represented. What is being represented is often named after the representation. For example, Direct Realism conflates what is being perceived when we say "I see a red post-box" with the object of perception, a red post-box.

So what exactly is "thing-in-itself" describing? When we say "our experience of the colour red has been caused by a thing-in-itself", the thing-in-itself exists as a representation in our mind not something in the world.

Of course they do. In what other world would they lie?

They do not lie in the perceived world.

A thing-in-itself is still just a thing. — Mww

No. Things in themselves are neither apriori nor aposteriori. They are not empirical, not in time and space; just postulates. Pure reason is only shown in our visible affairs. They themselves cannot be witnessed.

Things in themselves are neither apriori nor aposteriori. — Astrophel

Agreed. Those are conditions related to experience or the absence of it. Things-in-themselves, as such, in and of themselves, have nothing to do with the conditions of our experience.

They are not empirical, not in time and space….. — Astrophel

Space and time are the conditions for the objects of our experience. Things-in-themselves are not objects of experience, therefore space and time are irrelevant with respect to them.

…..just postulates. — Astrophel

For their place in transcendental philosophy, they are transcendentally deduced conceptions, postulated as empirical existences necessary to explain things that appear to sensibility.

Pure reason is only shown in our visible affairs. — Astrophel

Pure reason is never shown, if that be taken to mean demonstrated; it is pure transcendental thought and judgement, having no real objects belonging to them. It is, “….the faculty which contains the principles of cognizing anything absolutely à priori….”.

They themselves cannot be witnessed. — Astrophel

Agreed, having space and time already eliminated from them as conditions for being appearances. But it remains that they were conceived for some purpose, and it turns out there were two.

Say it is the case thing-in-itself is a name. What am I given by it? What does that name tell me?
— Mww

That it exists. — RussellA

Where does it exist?

You agree that a screen in a flat surface. What is the difference between seeing a portrait of a person in an art gallery and seeing a portrait of a person on a screen. Don't both these appear the same in our visual field, ie, as two-dimensional images? — RussellA

I think we've already covered this: of course, we refer to some images as two-dimensional and I have pointed out that they are not really two-dimensional, although for all intents and purposes the elements in such images all appear to be on the same plane. That was not the salient point though: you had claimed that our visual field itself is two dimensional and that is what I took issue with, and I asked you to support that assertion with argument, which you have so far failed to provide.

Maybe the noumena is that which connecs the appearances to reason, not behind but within

There needs to be some flexibility in what we mean by knowledge. For example, I have the innate ability to see the colour red but not the colour ultraviolet. The distinction between knowing how and knowing what is relevant here, a distinction that was brought to prominence in epistemology by Gilbert Ryle who used it in his book The Concept of Mind. (SEP - Knowing-How and Knowing-That). I am born with the innate knowledge of how to see the colour red even if I don't have the innate knowledge of what the colour red is.

In today's terms, we can account for our a priori knowledge by Innatism and Enactivism, given that life has been evolving in synergy with the world for at least 3.7 billion years. We are born with a brain that has a particular physical structure because of this 3.7 billion years of evolution.

Enactivism says that it is necessary to appreciate how living beings dynamically interact with their environments. From an Enactivist perspective, there is no prospect of understanding minds without reference to such interactions because interactions are taken to lie at the heart of mentality in all of its varied forms. (IEP - Enactivism)

Innatism says that in the philosophy of mind, Innatism is the view that the mind is born with already-formed ideas, knowledge, and beliefs. The opposing doctrine, that the mind is a tabula rasa (blank slate) at birth and all knowledge is gained from experience and the senses, is called empiricism. (Wikipedia - Innatism)

Innatism and Enactivism explain our non-propositional knowledge of red. — RussellA

But of course, you know this is miles from Kant. Ryle thinks within a tradition that explicitly against Kantian phenomenology and those who follow through in what is called continental philosophy. This tradition has the utmost respect for science and well supported theory of evolution, and does not dismiss any reasonable thing it says. But then, this is not Kant at all. Start talking about an account for the apriority in the structure of thought, and the way hard wired organic brains produce phenomena that have this sense of logicality making all that we experience appear as rigid rules of thought, and you will have to face the obvious question begged: This whole structred conception of evolution itself is just this, a phenomenological consturction, leading right into Kantisn thinking's hands, which is that the true source of rational thought is transcendence.

We see a snooker cue hit a stationary snooker ball and see the snooker ball begin to move. It is not our ordinary experience that snooker balls on a snooker table are able to spontaneously move. Whenever we see a snooker ball start to move we have seen a priori cause, either another snooker ball or a snooker cue.

Where does our belief in causality come from? For Kant, our knowledge of causality is a priori because the Category of Relation includes causality. In today's terms, our knowledge of causality is a priori because of the principle of Innatism, in that the principle of causality is built into the very structure of our brain. The brain doesn't need Hume's principle of induction to know that one thing causes another, as knowing one thing causes another is part of the innate structure of the brain.

Suppose we perceive the colour red, which is an experience in our minds. As we have a priori the innate knowledge of causality, we know that this experience has been caused by something. We don't know what has caused it, but we know something has caused it. We can call this unknown something "A", or equally "thing-in-itself."

The fact that we know "The most distant objects in the Universe are 47 billion light years away" does not mean that we know 47 billion light years. The fact that we know "for every effect there has been a prior cause" does not mean that we know priori causes. Both these statements are representations, and the fact that we know a representation does not mean that we know what is being represented. Confusion often arises in language when the representation is conflated with what is being represented. What is being represented is often named after the representation. For example, Direct Realism conflates what is being perceived when we say "I see a red post-box" with the object of perception, a red post-box.

So what exactly is "thing-in-itself" describing? When we say "our experience of the colour red has been caused by a thing-in-itself", the thing-in-itself exists as a representation in our mind not something in the world. — RussellA

This account of causality is one example how absurd this account can get. First, it should be made clear that what we call causality is actually an historical construct, and the term is, like all terms, merely a hermeneutical designation, a taking something up "as" causality. This point here being that our language is essentially a pragmatic mode of engagement, so we use this term and refer to soemthing in the world, an intuition, a nonverbal apprehension, like the color red or, here, the impossibility is imagining a spontaneous cause, and this referring is done in a context of an entire body of coherent language use that is implicitly in play as a contextual matrix out of which meanings arise. In other words, there are no stand alone meanings, no one to one correspondence between the term causality and any given occasion of its appearing. Meanings and worldly designations are "whole language" phenomena" and to see this argued out, one should go first to Sausseure's Semiotics, and then on to Derrida. Not that Derrida really cancels the dignity of individual references, but he does undo any confidence we might have in language's ability speak about the world. Second, the absurd part, which is just mind blowing: Localizing the apodicticity of what we call causality in a brain's structure suggest that outside such that this the principle would not apply. So what is outside of a brain? Well, a brain is a finite object in the company of other objects, so outside would indicate being among these other objects---plants and hills and stars and cats and dogs, etc., and the conclusion is, that these objects are not subject to the principle of causality, not being IN the brain matrix, and my pencil may start rolling across the desk with movement being ex nihilo!

Sorry, perhaps I am missing something. Anyway, as I see it, phenomena, and the logical intuitions that bind them in causality and other principles, are all that is and that ever will be experienced. Brains must therefore be phenomenologically conceived; but brains are also what generate phenomena, that is the appearances acknowledge routinely. Therefore, the brain is a construct of the brain.

But, as I like to remind people, it gets far worse: So causality is an innate, brain generated manifestation? But how does brain generated anything produce a reality that is anything but brain generated somethings? This writing I am producing is reducible to brain activity, and so the term brain activity, is also this, as are all sentential constructions, thoughts and any other manifestations, which includes self referencing. One is literally nowhere.

Agreed, having space and time already eliminated from them as conditions for being appearances. But it remains that they were conceived for some purpose, and it turns out there were two. — Mww

I can't see where we disagree, then.

Maybe the noumena is that which connecs the appearances to reason, not behind but within — Gregory

Yes, I ma sure this is right, but it is not going to be a causal connectivity, as causality in itself is a term that belongs to finitude. What causality really is is like asking what modus ponens really is: it belongs to Kant's impossible metaphysics. As I see it, Kant drew boundaries where he should have. Can one really talk about where eternity and its absolute being ends and finitude begins?