True, — RussellA

True, — RussellA

We seem to be in agreement. :cool: :up:

A Metaphysician asks "what are numbers". An engineer asks "what does 130 plus 765 add up to". The engineer in designing a bridge doesn't need to know the metaphysical meaning of numbers. — RussellA

True, but the problem is the engineer would sometimes say, all metaphysical knowledge is invalid, because it deals with things that we cannot see or touch. At that moment, the engineer has forgotten that he has transformed himself into a metaphysician in undercover, and claiming metaphysical statements. Metaphysics is invalid form of knowledge is also a Metaphysical claim, which is contentious i.e. true or false depending on what we are talking about.

It would hardly be surprising that as we are also animals, there are some things that are unknown and unknowable to us also because of the physical limitations of our brains. — RussellA

So your interpretation seems to say that there is a thing-in-itself as legitimate existence out there, but the human brain cannot know it due to the limitation of what the brain can know. Fair enough.

My interpretation was similar in that, human perception cannot catch every properties of perceptual objects in one single sense data, hence there are always parts of the perceived object, unperceived.  That is thing-in-itself.  It is not known, but we know it exists.

On the next perception of the same object, the unperceived properties of the objects might be perceived, and the thing-in-itself gets clearer in its nature due to more meditation, by chance, or from different angle of perspectives etc.  And one day the thing-in-itself becomes totally known object (ideally) hopefully.  Some thing-in-itself objects are not likely ever to be perceived at all, but we can still feel, intuit or reason about them such as God, human soul and the universe.

the engineer would sometimes say, all metaphysical knowledge is invalid, because it deals with things that we cannot see or touch — Corvus

Harsh on engineers. The engineer wouldn't say that the physicists knowledge of string theory was invalid because we cannot see or touch one-dimensional objects called strings.

human perception cannot catch every properties of perceptual objects in one single sense data — Corvus

Yes, as regards the apple in front of me, I am unable to perceive the quarks that make it up.

On the next perception, the unperceived properties of the objects might be perceived, and the thing-in-itself gets clearer in its nature. — Corvus

Yes, we now have photographs of individual atoms.

Some thing-in-itself objects are not likely ever to be perceived at all, but we can still feel, intuit or reason about them such as God, human soul and the universe. — Corvus

I don't agree. There is as much a chance of humans being able to feel, intuit or reason about some things-in-themselves as a cat will ever be able to feel, intuit or reason about Western Literature.

As a cat cannot transcend the physical limitations of its brain, neither can a human.

What the Kantian concept fails to see is that noumena is all pervasive. This obviates the nonsense about ontological divisions: there are none

Upon further reflection, I completely agree (with everything you said): the noumena would be perfectly unintelligible, which undermines our reasons to even think they exist in the first place. I mean, if I can't say logic pertains to the things-in-themselves, then why think that things-in-themselves even excite my sensibility, let alone that I have sensibility?

As a cat cannot transcend the physical limitations of its brain, neither can a human. — RussellA

But, for the cat's brain to actually register something, that thing has to already fit with its perceptual schema. There is an experiment I keep citing where a meaningless tone that is within the cat's audible hearing range is played, but the cat's brain does not appear to register having heard the tone. Subsequently, after the tone is associated with something meaningful, the cat's brain will display the signature of auditory stimulation.

So it is "mechanically" possible that there are exactly such unregistered events as Corvus is postulating. With what concomitant causes, who is to say?

Harsh on engineers. The engineer wouldn't say that the physicists knowledge of string theory was invalid because we cannot see or touch one-dimensional objects called strings. — RussellA

Wasn't it what Bob Ross and his supporters were claiming in his previous thread "Metaphysics as illegitimate source of knowledge"? I was sure they were the engineers transformed into the metaphysicians undercover. hmmm your short memories :rofl:

I don't agree. There is as much a chance of humans being able to feel, intuit or reason about some things-in-themselves as a cat will ever be able to feel, intuit or reason about Western Literature. — RussellA

From here, suppose it is up to personal opinion. Of course, if you are a dedicated esoteric magician, you could see thing-in-self God, human soul no problems, and the Kabbalistic Tree of Life would be your universe :D

Because without real things that impact us there is no accounting for sensations

But the “real objects” which excite your sensibility could be fabrication by a higher power, could they not?

Likewise, it could be the case that, if real things are required for sensibility, there is no sensibility but there are intuitions (which we self-fabricate).

The mind is represented conceptually, but no mere conception is an experience. To represent the mind for experience requires the intuition of it as phenomenon, which requires the mind to be a real object conditioned by space and time, which contradicts the conception

The underlined portion is where I think you went wrong: just because there is a set of intuitions which contains a separation (in space and time) of a self vs. other does not mean that the “object” which impacted you exists as something which excited your sensibility (as it could be fabricated by a different faculty of which you have) nor exists as something non-fabricated by a higher power.

Despite your insinuations and imputations about my intentions, I, upon further reflection, think that your "two worlds" argument is a good point; and I agree with you that it is an incoherence in Kantianism. If the things-in-themselves are completely unintelligible, then I honestly no reason to believe they exist in the first place (since I no longer think it is possible to prove that I have a representative faculty transcendentally and the empirical evidence for it presupposes various forms like logic and math, which I allegedly cannot assume of the things-in-themselves). Banno, the cup is, in fact, to your point, one cup: the cup-for-us is an indirect window into the cup-in-itself, and so the in-itself is not completely unintelligible.

Hello Javi,

What you argue is pretty interesting, but I don't know to what extent you accept or deny the existence of things-in-themselves.

I accept the existence of things-in-themselves.

On the other hand, I see your premises and arguments as a subject of Philosophy of Language.

I don’t think so: it would be more in the realm of metaphysics and ontology.

I was not, in the OP, making an argument about anything pertaining to how we speak or formulate languages.

So it is "mechanically" possible that there are exactly such unregistered events as Corvus is postulating. — Pantagruel

There are two aspects, being able to perceive something and then being able to make sense of it. Even if a human showed a cat a page from the book "The Old Man and the Sea", it could never make sense of it. Similarly, even if a super-intelligent alien showed us a page from "The True Nature of Reality", we could never make sense of it.

Similarly, even if a super-intelligent alien showed us a page from "The True Nature of Reality", we could never make sense of it. — RussellA

Yes, if man tried to explain the universe to an amoeba it wouldn't translate.

But essentially, the amoeba eventually becomes a man. So maybe it does happen?

But essentially, the amoeba eventually becomes a man. So maybe it does happen? — Pantagruel

It will happen. The more life evolves the more it will be able to understand. However, although life has been around for over 3.5 billion years, humans still have trouble using a MP3 player, so I don't hold out much hope.

But the “real objects” which excite your sensibility could be fabrication by a higher power, could they not? — Bob Ross

Sure. But why would we care? We work with what we’re given. In the case for natural real objects, say, what do we gain by asking if something we know absolutely nothing about created that of which we know very little? And for real objects humans make for themselves, it doesn’t even make sense to ask if a supersensible whatever created rakes and dump trucks.

just because there is a set of intuitions which contains a separation (in space and time)….does not mean that the “object” which impacted you exists as something which excited your sensibility — Bob Ross

That’s precisely what it means, insofar as intuitions are proven only and always sensuous. If denied, such that intuitions do not depend on the existence of real things that affect the senses, then you have falsified T.I., at least the original view of it, without sufficient reason.
————-

I forget if I’ve asked already, but assuming I haven’t……how does a ding as sich have a name?

Sure. But why would we care? We work with what we’re given. In the case for natural real objects, say, what do we gain by asking if something we know absolutely nothing about created that of which we know very little? And for real objects humans make for themselves, it doesn’t even make sense to ask if a supersensible whatever created rakes and dump trucks.

I agree. But this just demonstrates that there is no such transcendentally (valid) argument for there actually being real objects beyond our intuitions.

That’s precisely what it means, insofar as intuitions are proven only and always sensuous. If denied, such that intuitions do not depend on the existence of real things that affect the senses, then you have falsified T.I., at least the original view of it, without sufficient reason.

What is the argument for intuitions necessarily being sensuous (in the sense of real objects exciting a sensibility)? I don't see how one could transcendentally prove that.

I forget if I’ve asked already, but assuming I haven’t……how does a ding as sich have a name?

What do you mean? Like how is it called a "ding an sich"?

We could throw caution to the wind and call a "flat" three-dimensional image a two-dimensional image. :smile: — RussellA

Indeed we could. which indicates that much comes down to differences of parlance. I think, as I said, there is really no such thing as a two-dimensional image or existent of any kind, and that that realization ought to be reflected in how we speak about these things when we are giving them serious consideration.

In any case, talk of screens and other flat surfaces aside, the original point of contention was the idea that our visual field is a two-dimensional image, and I see nothing whatever to support that assertion.

If the things-in-themselves are completely unintelligible, then I honestly no reason to believe they exist in the first place (since I no longer think it is possible to prove that I have a representative faculty transcendentally and the empirical evidence for it presupposes various forms like logic and math, which I allegedly cannot assume of the things-in-themselves). — Bob Ross

The issue I see with that criticism, is that it reads too much into what Kant intends with the term 'thing in itself'. He's not positing a set of 'unknowable things', which we will forever fail to see. That reading imparts an apparent urgency to trying to 'peek behind the curtain' and see what the mysterious things in themselves really are.

I've quoted this from an online primer on Kant before, but I think it provides a better idea of his intention:

Kant's introduced the concept of the “thing in itself” to refer to reality as it is independent of our experience of it and unstructured by our cognitive constitution. The concept was harshly criticized in his own time and has been lambasted by generations of critics since. A standard objection to the notion is that Kant has no business positing it given his insistence that we can only know what lies within the limits of possible experience. But a more sympathetic reading is to see the concept of the “thing in itself” as a sort of placeholder in Kant's system; it both marks the limits of what we can know and expresses a sense of mystery that cannot be dissolved, the sense of mystery that underlies our unanswerable questions. Through both of these functions it serves to keep us humble. — Emrys Westacott

this just demonstrates that there is no such transcendentally (valid) argument for there actually being real objects beyond our intuitions. — Bob Ross

Transcendental arguments are not intended for empirical conditions, so, no, there wouldn’t be one. No need to argue for that which gives you a bloody nose, or a headache, or hurts your eyes if you look at it too long.

“…. The science of all the principles of sensibility à priori, I call transcendental aesthetic. There must, then, be such a science forming the first part of the transcendental doctrine of elements, in contradistinction to that part which contains the principles of pure thought, and which is called transcendental logic….”

What is the argument for intuitions necessarily being sensuous (in the sense of real objects exciting a sensibility)? I don't see how one could transcendentally prove that. — Bob Ross

There isn’t a proof. Remember….we’re not even conscious of this part of the system as a whole. The transcendental argument sets the technical groundwork, nonetheless, as the first part of the work.
—————

Like how is it called a "ding an sich"? — Bob Ross

No. Like….how is it called a cup-in-itself.

...to there... from where exactly? — creativesoul

Well, this is the question. One might say, with Derrida, that since there is no center from which springs the basis for all meanings, nothing inscribed in the world that gives the world to our understanding, we stand rudderless in a fathomless no where. But then, Derrida didn't exactly mean for this to be altogether a nihilation, for it does a kind of apophatic job of ridding us of thought and discovering actuality. It may be from a context or determinate form, and to the same, but then, there is also in this realization an opportunity to terminate the invocation of context entirely. LIke a Buddhist might do. This leads to a disclosure of a radically different kind.

Suppose I saw someone act in an unexpected way. For example, they had bought a winning lottery ticket and then proceeded to tear it up. As an outsider, how can I know their inner logical processes in order to say they are exhibiting either Determinism or Free will. — RussellA

The point was that people act in ways contrary to their own logical process. They know that it is illogical to buy lottery tickets, yet they still do. They know that the law enforces consequences for illegal actions yet they still proceed in those actions. They bypass safety precautions which they know the reasons for. There is an endless amount of examples.

The conclusion therefore is that we cannot characterize people in the way that the "logic gate" was characterized, because we know that the people are not bound to follow what the logical process dictates.

However, what if in fact my act had been determined, and what I thought was Free Will was in fact only the illusion of Free Will. — RussellA

Whether or not free will is an illusion is not the issue. The issue is whether people are bound (determined) to act according to what their own logical process dictates. And the answer is clear, they are not. I said that the concept of free will accounts for the reality of this fact, that people are not determined in this way. Whether or not this concept of free will is itself faulty, and free will is an illusion, is not the question right now. What is the question is whether or not the concept is sufficient to account for the fact that people are not determined to act according to their own logic.

Kant's response to Hume was that we ARE time and space. Both held the world to be phenomena but Kant held that world to be inside us in a sense. If we are time and space than the world would appear to us falsely because we usually experience time and especially space as outside us. Hence the noumena is the world minus time and space

Seems clear to me that that is precisely the wrong way around. We do not go from propositional and cognitive understanding to non-propositional and non-cognitive understanding. There is no such thing as non-cognitive understanding. There is such thing as non-propositional thought, belief, knowledge, and understanding. It's what precedes the propositional.

In any case, talk of screens and other flat surfaces aside, the original point of contention was the idea that our visual field is a two-dimensional image, and I see nothing whatever to support that assertion. — Janus

You agree that a screen in a flat surface. What is the difference between seeing a portrait of a person in an art gallery and seeing a portrait of a person on a screen. Don't both these appear the same in our visual field, ie, as two-dimensional images?

The point was that people act in ways contrary to their own logical process...The issue is whether people are bound (determined) to act according to what their own logical process dictates. — Metaphysician Undercover

How can we know that. I cannot look at someone and know their internal logical processes. Even I don't know my own internal logical processes.

I forget if I’ve asked already, but assuming I haven’t……how does a ding as sich have a name?...No. Like….how is it called a cup-in-itself. — Mww

Basically, because we name the unknown cause after the known effect.

As an Indirect Realist, if I see a red postbox, which is a representation in my mind, I name the cause of this representation "a red postbox". I don't need to know the true cause of my representation of a red postbox in order to give this unknown cause a name, ie, "a red postbox".

In ordinary language we say "Clouds of acrid smoke issued from the building". This is a figure of speech for saying that the smell is acrid, not that the smoke in itself is acrid.

In ordinary language we say "Eating sugary or sweet foods can cause a temporary sweet aftertaste in the mouth". This is a figure of speech for saying that the taste is sweet, not that the food in itself is sweet.

It is not the case that we believe that effects have causes, but rather that we know effects have causes. In today's terms, Innatism, and in Kant's terms, the a priori Category of cause.

We know the effect, whether the colour red, an acrid smell or a sweet taste because the effect exists in our minds. We know that effects have prior causes. Therefore we know that there has been a prior cause for our perceptions of the colour red, acrid smell and bitter taste.

It is then a straightforward matter, knowing that there has been a cause, even though we don't know what the cause was, to give this cause a name and name it after the effect.

For example, the unknown cause of our perception of the colour red is named "red", the unknown cause of our perception of an acrid smell is named "acrid" and the unknown cause of our perception of a bitter taste is named "bitter".

The unknown cause of our perceptions is in Kant's terms a thing-in-itself. Even though we don't know what this unknown thing-in-itself is, we can name it. We name it after the effect it has on our perceptions, which is known.

The names "red", "acrid" and "bitter" don't describe unknown things-in-themselves, but in Wittgenstein's terms as he describes in Philosophical Investigations, replace the unknown things-in-themselves.

As regards the cup-in-itself, "cup" names what we perceive in our minds, not something unknown that exists independently of our minds.

How can we know that. I cannot look at someone and know their internal logical processes. Even I don't know my own internal logical processes. — RussellA

One can know it by self examination, introspection. It looks like you haven't tried it, or gave up to soon without the required discipline.

One can know it by self examination, introspection. It looks like you haven't tried it, or gave up to soon without the required discipline. — Metaphysician Undercover

Is this possible?

Is it possible to have a thought about an internal logical process, when the internal logical process has caused the thought in the first place?

In other words, can an effect cause itself?

I see a red postbox, which is a representation in my mind, — RussellA

If you see a red postbox, then it is the case the thing comes to you already named, which makes you a direct realist. And to perceive alone, is not to represent.

If you don’t know the true cause of your representation, how did it get the name red postbox immediately upon you seeing it? And if you don’t know the true cause, how can you say that which you see is in fact a red postbox?

I submit, that when you say you’re seeing a red postbox, it is because you already know what the thing is that you’re perceiving. But there is nothing whatsoever in the perceiving from which knowledge of the perception follows.

If what you say here is the case, how do you explain those times where you don’t know what causes your perception? You feel a tickle on the back of your neck, what tells you it is a hair or a bug? The sound from around the corner…..backfire? Firecracker? Dump truck tailgate? Something dropped from a roof? According to your system, you should be able to name the sound without ever actually perceiving the cause of it. If you always know a red postbox is what you’re seeing, shouldn’t you always know the name of what you’re hearing? It is obvious this doesn’t always work, which casts doubts on a system operating in accordance with those conditions.

Kant was aware that the thing perceived is always at that time undetermined, but not that it was undeterminable, otherwise every single thing ever perceived would immediately be identified as a certain thing, which contradicts natural occurrence. The thing you perceive may indeed end up being named a red postbox, and that for each subsequent perception as well, but the name cannot arise from the mere physiology of your vision. And this is what makes you an indirect realist.

Realism: the attribution of properties such that an object is determinable;
Realist: one who attributes properties as that by which objects are determinable;
Direct realist: one who attributes properties as belonging to the object itself and which are given to him as such, and by which the object is determined;
Indirect realist: one who attributes properties according to himself, such that the relation between the perception and a series of representations determines the object.

I submit you don’t see a red postbox. You see a thing, to the representation of which you attribute the properties in the form of a series of conceptions, by which the thing becomes the experience of, becomes known to you as, a red postbox.
————

As regards the cup-in-itself, "cup" names what we perceive in our minds, not something unknown that exists independently of our minds. — RussellA

Right. “Cup” names. I asked about how the thing-in-itself gets a name, which is what happens when there is a “cup-in-itself”, in that the thing now has the name “cup”. How can a named thing exist independently of that which named it? And if it can’t, where did “cup” come from when attached to “-in-itself”?
—————

The unknown cause of our perceptions is in Kant's terms a thing-in-itself — RussellA

I don’t think so. The (immediately) unknown but (mediately) determinable cause of our perception, is the thing; the unknown and always undeterminable cause of the thing of our perception, is the thing-in-itself. And don’t make it an issue that a cause is unknown. A cause doesn’t have to be known, it just has to be such, for an effect that is itself determinable.

If you see a red postbox, then it is the case the thing comes to you already named, which makes you a direct realist. — Mww

Both the Indirect Realist and Direct Realist see a red postbox.
==============================================================================

If you don’t know the true cause of your representation, how did it get the name red postbox immediately upon you seeing it? — Mww

For the Indirect Realist, the name is of the representation in the mind. For the Direct Realist, the name is of a material object in the world .
===============================================================================

I submit, that when you say you’re seeing a red postbox, it is because you already know what the thing is that you’re perceiving. But there is nothing whatsoever in the perceiving from which knowledge of the perception follows. — Mww

This problem applies to both the Indirect and Direct Realist.
===============================================================================

According to your system, you should be able to name the sound without ever actually perceiving the cause of it. — Mww

True.
===============================================================================

The thing you perceive may indeed end up being named a red postbox, and that for each subsequent perception as well, but the name cannot arise from the mere physiology of your vision — Mww

Very true. Both the Indirect and Direct Realist need things they see to have been named in order to be able to use the name in language.
===============================================================================

Direct realist: one who attributes properties as belonging to the object itself and which are given to him as such, and by which the object is determined;
Indirect realist: one who attributes properties according to himself, such that the relation between the perception and a series of representations determines the object. — Mww

Very true. Even though an object emits a wavelength of 700nm, and we perceive the colour red, the Direct Realist believes that the object is red, whereas the Indirect Realist believes that only their perception of the object is red.
===============================================================================

I submit you don’t see a red postbox. — Mww

Depends on what you mean by the word "see".
===============================================================================

I asked about how the thing-in-itself gets a name — Mww

Suppose we see an affect. We know that if there has been an effect there must have been cause, even if we don't know what the cause was. Let us name the cause A

Suppose we see a broken window. We know that if there has been an effect there must have been cause, even if we don't know what the cause was. Let us name the cause of the broken window A.

IE, we have named something even if we don't know what it is.
===============================================================================

A cause doesn’t have to be known, it just has to be such, for an effect that is itself determinable. — Mww

I agree. If I see a broken window, I know that something has broken it.

We know there has been a cause when we perceive an effect.

Direct realist: one who attributes properties as belonging to the object itself and which are given to him as such, and by which the object is determined;
Indirect realist: one who attributes properties according to himself, such that the relation between the perception and a series of representations determines the object. — Mww

There are two significant differences between the Indirect and Direct Realist. The Indirect Realist approach is that of metaphysics, whereas the Direct Realist approach is that of Linguistic Idealism.

Both the Indirect and Direct Realist see a red post box.

For the Indirect Realist, as we know that the object emits a wavelength of 700nm when we perceive the colour red, the expression "I see a red post box" refers to a perception in the mind and not a material object in the world.

For the Direct Realist, the expression "I see a red post box" is in effect what Wittgenstein would call a hinge proposition, true regardless of what exists in the world. In fact, even if in the world was a pink elephant flying through the sky, the proposition " I see a red post" as a hinge proposition would still be true.

However, both approaches are valid, and each has its own place in our understanding.

I don't see a need to bring physical states into it. When we choose something, we either choose it for some reason, or we choose it for no reason at all (it is random action). If it is random action, then it is arbitrary, not free. If we have a reason for chosing something, then those reasons determine our actions.

And our reasons for choosing different things have to do with our beliefs and opinions, our knowledge and judgement. It seems to me like the development of all of these is uniquely tied up with states of affairs in the world, and thus our choices are tied up with (determined by) states of affairs as well. We might choose to love who we love and despise who we despise, but we do so because of who those people are. Thus, those choices are "determined by," who those people have revealed themselves to be.

Freedom can't be something like: being in state S1 at T1 and, based on nothing but free floating "freedom," we either go to S2 or S3. That's just randomness. The "choice," between S1 and S2 has to be based on something for us to do any "choosing." Further, we seem less free when we are forced into choices by coercion, instinct, uncontrollable drive, etc., so it seems like we can be free in gradations and we are more free when our choices are "more determined by what we want them to be determined by," not when they are "determined by nothing."

And we can't say our "choosing between," is "determined by our freedom," because this is circular. It leaves the choice free floating, determined by nothing, and so random.

Physical states, dualism, etc. don't really make a difference on this point IMO. Rather than speaking of "choosing between," it might be better to say that we are free: "when we do what we want and don't do what we don't want," when "we want to have the desires we have," and when we "understand why we have those desires and still prefer that we have them" — a sort of recursive self-aware self-determination, as opposed to a free floating non-determinism.

There is also the humoncular regress to consider. If we "see representations" by being "inside a mind" and seeing those representations "projected as in a theater," then it seems we should still need a second self inside the first to fathom the representations of said representations, and so on. Else, if self can directly access objects in such a theater, why not cut out the middle man and claim self can just experience the original objects?

It's a weird sort of inversion on the Allegory of the Cave. Instead of things being more real by virtue of being more necessary and self-determining, properties understood by the mind are downgraded into the shadows on the cave wall. In this way, the most contingent, least knowable becomes more veridical, the higher "thing in itself," while apparent necessity becomes a "creation of mind."

But if we reject the sort of ontological dualism that motivates such an explanation, I see no reason to assume that a red post can't have properties vis-á-vis how it relates to a person. The mistake is to go looking for an "in itselfness," of things like red. It's like asking "what does a thing look like without eyes?" Or "how is it conceived of without a mind?" Well, it isn't. Relations obtain between things and asking them to inher "in themselves" in the first place seems to be the category mistake.

Another way to think of it: assume objects are defined by their properties. "Looking red," is a relation an object can possess. Thus, it is a property of an object.

People reach the Kantian problem by other routes through supposing the objects must be more fundemental that properties, that properties "attach" to objects. And here you get the idea in contemporary metaphysics of "bare substratum," and pure haecceities," which start to look very similar to the noumenal on closer inspection. This just seems like a misstep to me, born out of attempts to define "identity," in terms of properties and relations.