To say that the our fields of perception alone give us phenomena i think is contrary to phenomenology, which Kant may have have been the first author of. Mentally we have, or for now have, a "frame" and we put all our sensations on this 2d frame in order to organize it. The phenomena of the window behind me is behind me, and the noumena could be anywhere. I even think sounds exist objectively. A reality outside of us — Gregory

I am not sure even Kant says you have a 2nd frame where your sense contents get transferred into for further organisation.   Anyway, Kant was not a Phenomenologist, and Phenomenology didn't exist when Kant was alive.

In Phenomenology, the content of perception appearing in your consciousness is all there is in perception.  You see your nose, and that is your nose.  There is no such thing as impression, ideas, or sense data of your nose.   But it doesn't end there.  Your perceived nose can trigger all other parts of your consciousness as experience. 

Your perception is also your experience with intentionality.  You know that your nose is part of your body, it can smell, it can have a bloody nose, it also supports your sunglasses if you wear one.  In that bracket of the nose in your consciousness, it has all the mental properties attached to it such as memory, imagination and belief in the nose.

So it is not that simple.  If you are interested more in Phenomenology you could read Husserl's book "Ideas", "Logical Investigation in 2 volumes", and even "Philosophy of Perception" by Merlou-Ponty, which are all meaty heavy going works by the main historical Phenomenologists.

Anyway, like you, some people seem to interpret Kant as a naive idealist who claims that you have objects in your mind, and that they are the real objects.  There are objects in the external world, which cause the senses to perceive the objects, but you don't know if they are the real, and there is the world of Thing-in-Themselves independent of your perception. 

That is the exact problem many people have been objecting to.  I think it is just an interpretation of Kant among many other different interpretations of him. But in reality, Kant never said that in his CPR or any other books he wrote.  He just said the existence of objects which look like they exist, but don't get caught by our senses are called Thing-in-Itself, and that is the way the world is, and how our perception works.  He doesn't push into the details of how they exist, why or what they really are.

How can a thought be named ? — RussellA

It isn’t, which was the point: thought of a cup is to name the thought, whereas the thought “cup” references that which is thought about.

The thought is just the system doing its job, in T.I., the synthesis of representations, and is an image. The name, then, in the form of a word, belongs to the image as its representation, and is its conception, and the different particular instances of that general conception are its schemata.

I would not be so presumptuous as to call W wrong. I have no problem whatsoever, on the other hand, in dismissing OLP, insofar as it is the case no word is ever presented that isn’t first thought. It is never the case we think with language, or by means of it. The only reason for language in the first place, is to objectively express, to communicate, the cognitive system’s functionality, but is not a necessary condition for it. Want proof? Read a book, to yourself of course, then reflect on what it was you were actually doing.
—————

Is it the case that we have the thought of a cup and then name it….. — RussellA

Close. We think, and name that which is thought about, the object of thought, cup. Or we could just be recalling a priori what was already resident in us as that represented named thing. Some call that residence consciousness, others call it memory, some call it intuition. Doesn’t matter; it’s just meant to represent that which has already been done, which just is, or given from, experience. The initial experience is not a priori, but the recalling of it by mere thought, is. How else to know a thing in a different time than its immediate perception?
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The limits of my language is the limit of my world……that I can tell you about. When I was bulletproof, many MANY years ago, by sheer accident I put a chainsaw into my left foot. Now there’s a part of my world I will never be able to tell you about. No matter what I say, your experience will never relate to it unless you’ve done the same thing, and then, our experiences will only match in content and not the least in effect, and proof positive there is that in my world beyond, and therefore not accountable by, my language.

Why OLP? So we relieve ourselves of the hard part of inquiring where words come from. It’s so much easier to examine the games we play with language, then to examine how the games we play are even possible. Funny, innit? That every single word ever, and by association every single combination of them into a whole other than the words themselves, being at the time of its instantiation a mere invention, is for that very reason entirely private? Gell-Mann’s language wasn’t private, but Joyce’s, from whence it came, certainly was.

People are funny. They think that because they are taught the name of a thing, the thing always came with the name they were taught to know it by, they’re comfortable believing the name belongs to the thing as its identity. And maybe that’s true for them, but it wasn’t always. And simply from that fact, speculative cognitive metaphysics is justified.

In order to write the sentence "Sorry, but I don't think there is such a thing as a "thought of a cup."" you must have had the thought of a cup. — RussellA

No. I knew instead what "a thought of a cup" would mean in the context of our discussion. When I think about a cup I'm doing something, but no "thought of a cup" exists.

No. I read certain philosophy, and found it was wrong. There's a tad too much presumption in your prognosis. And very little of any substance to your replies. — Banno

Remember I asked you: "What philosopher that seems muddled are you talking about? What is the source of the muddle? This is the question is begged here."

Come on Banno, speak!!

What has changed? To reply, "I've thought about a cup" doesn't help enough. We know that; what we want to know is, How are we to understand this thought event if it isn't a thing and it isn't an image? — J

If you're looking for an answer that would satisfy a neuroscientist, I can't give one.

We walk. Walking isn't a thing, nor is it an image. We eat. Eating isn't a thing or an image. We understand what it is to walk and eat even though they aren't things or images. Walking, eating and thinking are activities we engage in when interacting with the rest of the world; they're part of how we live.

It is never the case we think with language, or by means of it. — Mww

I agree. I have a pain in my left hand whose exact nature is inexpressible in language. The fact that I cannot express in language the exact pain does not mean that there is no pain. As Wittgenstein himself wrote in PI 293 of Philosophical Investigations: "The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all"

We think, and name that which is thought about, the object of thought, cup. — Mww

We look at the world and see an object that has been given a name by the Community within which we live.

Both the object and name are physical things that exist in the world, and we link the object and the name through Hume's principle of constant conjunction.

The name doesn't describe the object, but is linked with the object through Hume's principle of constant conjunction.

IE if every time I saw the Eiffel Tower and at the same time heard the name Eiffel Tower, I would begin associate the name Eiffel Tower with the object Eiffel Tower

As a name is only linked with a thought of an object by Hume's principle of constant conjunction, the one can exist independently of the other. IE, one can have the thought of an object independently of any name it may or may not have been given.

MANY years ago, by sheer accident I put a chainsaw into my left foot. — Mww

Many years ago, I had a garden fork go though my right foot, so I do have an idea of what you experienced.

That every single word ever, and by association every single combination of them into a whole other than the words themselves, being at the time of its instantiation a mere invention, is for that very reason entirely private? — Mww

Yes, for example what I understand by the word "tree" is unique to me, as no one else has had the same life experiences. IE, the meaning of "tree" for an Icelander can only be different to the meaning of "tree" for a Ghanaian.

No. I knew instead what "a thought of a cup" would mean in the context of our discussion. When I think about a cup I'm doing something, but no "thought of a cup" exists. — Ciceronianus

It is only possible for you to write that "but no "thought of a cup" exists" if you already know what the thought of a cup is.

IE, I can only say that that building over there is not the Eiffel Tower if I already know what the Eiffel Tower looks like.

Similarly, you can only say that the thought of a cup doesn't exist if you already know what the thought of a cup is.

Walking, eating and thinking are activities we engage in — Ciceronianus

You’re right, and I may have placed the emphasis misleadingly on the idea of an “activity” in general. Walking and eating are unproblematic examples of activities, because understanding them seems to begin and end with some description of how our bodies work, and why we perform the activities. But thinking or, more controversially, “having a thought” has a lot of room for questioning. Like you, I’d welcome some definitive input from a neuroscientist, but that’s probably decades away. Even without it, we can recognize that the activity of thinking has aspects – namely, the thoughts themselves – that don’t easily reduce to process-level description, and in fact invite the analogy with creating something or bringing something into being – namely, the intentional object of the thought. I agree that this is often misleading, but I think we have to acknowledge the difficulty of accounting for the “contentful” aspect of subjective experience.

We look at the world and see an object that has been given a name by the Community within which we live. — RussellA

Superficially true, but insufficient to explain empirical discovery by a solitary subject.

Hume's principle of constant conjunction….. — RussellA

….has more to do with the relation of cause and effect than to perception and cognition. It is the case that the relation of perception to cognition is under certain conditions entirely a priori, the validity of which Hume vehemently….and quite mistakenly…..denied.

…..one can have the thought of an object independently of any name it may or may not have been given. — RussellA

Yes, but because of constant conjunction alone? I rather think not, insofar as Hume’s carries the implication of necessary antecedent impression, whereas pure thought of things is exclusive of it. Constant conjunction refers this object to this impression as a matter of habit, but the mere impression of an object is not enough to name it.

for example what I understand by the word "tree" is unique to me, as no one else has had the same life experiences. — RussellA

But you just said the name is given by a relevant community, and if “tree” is that name for an object looked upon in the world by yours…..how can it be unique to you? If it is unique to you, it contradicts the proposition it is named by a community.

Life experiences are not identical but they can still be congruent, or similar enough to eliminate self-contradiction.
———-

HA!!! Like me and my foot, did the fork experience take your ego down a peg or two? One could say it was just a life experience, but the truth is, it perfectly exemplifies how to be a dumbass. Well….for me anyway.

I am not sure even Kant says you have a 2nd frame where your sense contents get transferred into for further organisation. — Corvus

My mental image of the Kantian frame-image is that it is not fully dimensional. That is, whatever dimension it has, the phenomena (not the noumena mind you) has more. Even other galaxies exist as phenomena when nobody is there to see it. Kant knew he lived in a real world, but he tried to reduce it to a philosophical formula. We don't want to be depersonalized (a classified disorder in the West) just because we like philosophy. As for phenomenology, it's father is Husserl but who is the great grandfather? "To the things themselves" they said but those things were "phenomena", hence the name of the movement. This dualism was enabled by the influence of Kant on latter philosophy. Phenomena is not understood by the immediate sensations anyway, hence the mere fact that I know the moon is there when everybody closes their eyes

Anyway, like you, some people seem to interpret Kant as a naive idealist who claims that you have objects in your mind, and that they are the real objects.  There are objects in the external world, which cause the senses to perceive the objects, but you don't know if they are the real, and there is the world of Thing-in-Themselves independent of your perception. — Corvus

This sounds like Plato. Kant has a different "feel" to his work but that may be from the historical distance between them. Is it possible Kant was just a Platonist?

Metaphysics sets out the background against which the world is ordered, and is as much fiat as observation. One can avoid the circularity by recognising this. — Banno

Interesting way to define the role of Metaphysics : to give us a general "background" understanding of how the world system functions. Aristotle described how the natural world works in his Physics, then, in the section known as Metaphysics, looked into how the Cultural (mental) realm imposes human will onto Nature.

I could be wrong, but I think was responding to your intimation about "ideology", with an ironic example of ideology-in-action. A man in need of affordable healthcare, scorns the idea of socialist medicine, where personal needs are more important than economic ends. Apparently, his adopted ideology is not in his own interest.

Your definition of Metaphysics in terms of military-style top-down order-by-fiat, seems to imply that Authoritarian rule is how things get done in the world. By contrast, a truly Democratic world would go around in circles. Maybe the perceived need for imposed order from above underlies both Religious and Political thus-saith-the-Lord Ideology. The sheep (masses) may need a strong-arm shepherd, but autocratic order may not be in the best interest of independent thinkers, such as philosophers.

Historically, Authoritarian leaders have had little patience with peer-to-peer philosophy and rule-by-the-unruly-masses Democracy. They see themselves as god-like figures imposing order on a rudderless world. Socratic philosophy, though, focuses on the self-imposition of order (self-discipline) for individuals. On the other hand, even Plato's justice seemed to settle for a pragmatic middle ground, by granting authority to counter-balancing tribunals in lieu of his transcendental ideal : Philosopher Kings. The American constitution also compromised with popular elections of a tripartite government, instead of a single hereditary sovereign King : an imperfect blend of top-down "fiat" and bottom-up freedom. :smile:

Superficially true, but insufficient to explain empirical discovery by a solitary subject. — Mww

As a solitary subject in a strange land, what would your intuition of the meaning of "ngoe" be ?

.Hume's principle of constant conjunction...............has more to do with the relation of cause and effect than to perception and cognition — Mww

From the IEP article on David Hume: Causation
Whenever we find A, we also find B, and we have a certainty that this conjunction will continue to happen.

If every time I see a particular object and hear someone say "Eiffel Tower", there is a good chance, though not absolute, that the name of this particular object is "The Eiffel Tower".

In a sense, the object does cause someone to say "The Eiffel Tower", in that there is a causal link between the object and the name.

But you just said the name is given by a relevant community, and if “tree” is that name for an object looked upon in the world by yours…..how can it be unique to you? — Mww

The Icelander and Ghanaian can agree with the Communal definition of tree as "a woody perennial plant, typically having a single stem or trunk growing to a considerable height and bearing lateral branches at some distance from the ground".

However, each will have their own unique understanding of what trees are based on their very different lifetime experiences.

Nice place to be. But how is it different to collecting antiques? — Tom Storm

For me, Philosophy is a retirement hobby. But personally, I prefer collecting new ideas instead of old furniture. The difference is ideal vs real archetypes. Which is more valuable depends on where you "store your treasures". :smile:

It's because of my conversations with others about metaphysics that I have arrived my position. And note, I didn't say 'no need for metaphysics', I said no need for certain speculative forms thereof. — Tom Storm

Can you give me an example of non-speculative, empirically proven, Metaphysics? Chemistry may be the least speculative form of Physics. But, some people denigrate Quantum Physics because its inherent uncertainty invites speculation.

Check-out 's description of Metaphysics above. He implies that you can avoid the circularity of conflicting opinions by having your opinions given to you by a higher authority. Is that the kind of non-speculative metaphysics you prefer? :cool:

Ok. Thanks.

Can you give me an example of non-speculative, empirically proven, Metaphysics? — Gnomon

You ought to know that nothing is certain. :razz: But lack of certainty is no reason adopt an untrammelled fantasy life. As I've said to you previously, I don't think humans arrive at capital T truth and notions of 'reality' are human constructions. There are experiences and concomitant understandings of the world we can't really avoid unless we want to die young or cause harm to others. I can presuppose I experience a physical world which I share with others. I don't need more than this. Idealism, for instance, makes no difference to how we live.

Sounds to me like you may be fighting a battle against old fashioned materialists and certain forms of science and that 'educating' others is part of your project. Ok then. I've also noticed that many people seem to be attracted to expressions of metaphysics and religion to appease the ghosts of their unhappy childhoods. Good luck to them too.

Wittgenstein in para 293 of Philosophical Investigations makes a strong case that we can speak about things-in-themselves. — RussellA

forfucksake. :roll:

Come on Banno, speak!! — Astrophel

Well, that's a first.

If you haven't been able to follow the thread so far, there's not much point in continuing.

Your definition of Metaphysics in terms of military-style top-down order-by-fiat... — Gnomon

Where did that come from?

The clowns have certainly taken over this thread.

Check-out ↪Banno's description of Metaphysics above. He implies that you can avoid the circularity of conflicting opinions by having your opinions given to you by a higher authority. — Gnomon

No, he doesn't.

Is it possible Kant was just a Platonist? — Gregory

There is continuity between Plato and Kant. Plato's Forms or Ideas are intelligible structures that make sense of the sensible world, while Kant's categories of the understanding are a priori concepts that structure our experience.

Kant's categories were adapted in slightly modified form from Aristotle who was of course a (critical) student of Plato.

Both Plato and Kant posit that what we perceive with our senses is not the totality of things - for Plato, the sensory world is a shadow of a higher reality. Kant likewise argues that things-in-themselves (noumena) exist beyond our sensory experiences (phenomena), even though they are not directly knowable. Plato and Kant both maintain a close connection between knowledge and ethics - for Plato, knowledge of the Good is crucial for ethical behavior. Kant also sees moral action as connected to rationality and autonomy, asserting that ethical conduct arises from practical reason.

Both emphasize the role of reason as a crucial faculty for understanding. Plato's rationalism is evident in his theory of recollection and the ascent to true knowledge, while Kant's critical philosophy is an investigation into the powers and limits of pure reason, but again with a strong emphasis on the a priori elements of knowledge, arguably inherited from Plato.

In both Plato's "Republic" and Kant there's the ideal of the philosopher as a mediator between the intelligible and sensible worlds, someone who, through reason, can guide others or even society toward a better state (for example Kant's famous essay What Is Enlightenment?) But it's also important not to downplay the way in which Kant differed from Plato, particularly in his rejection of the idea of the intuitive, direct knowledge of the Forms - it would overstate the case to call Kant 'a Platonist' but there is discernable continuity between them.

If you haven't been able to follow the thread so far, there's not much point in continuing. — Banno

Is there nothing I can do to make you explain something? By any standard, you're just too vacant and glib. Is this what analytic philosophy's positivism has done to you? An economy of expression of such efficiency that sparsity itself is its primary tenet?

How about this piece of yours: "Metaphysics sets out the background against which the world is ordered, and is as much fiat as observation. One can avoid the circularity by recognising this."

Of course, here, with this OP, the metaphysics starts with Kant. So, and we all know how this leads on to discussions about epistemic failings of naturalistic models, like Quine's. This doesn't sound muddled to me. The issue here is principally how one can establish what is the case in the world at the level of philosophy, the most basic level, without an analytic of the structure of the relation between the known and the knower. This relationship is foundational to any ontology, and this goes directly to what BOB ROSS opened with.

Let the analysis begin, Banno. What say you regarding this matter of the lack epistemic grounding that pervades any and all that can be the case?

I believe Kant and Hegel both were against this "intuitive, direct knowledge of the Forms". What -immediate awareness of oneness with God in the present moment- meant to mystics was different than philosophers. The latter desire to reach the ultimate by thought's guidance. Thoughts are fun

But lack of certainty is no reason adopt an untrammelled fantasy life. — Tom Storm

Are you certain that Transcendental Idealism is about free-floating fantasies? Or is that just a prejudice against philosophical Idealism (science of ideas)? The OP is looking into "preconditions of experience", one of which is Life and another is Sentience (Mind ; Consciousness). Are those topics fantastic, and off-limits, to you? Is it a waste of time to discuss the reality behind physical appearances, that Kant called ding an sich (essences)? And what cognitive psychologist Donald Hoffman called "core reality"?

Apparently, you free-associate Metaphysics with Religion & Spiritualism. But, for me Meta-physics is Philosophy, the science of minds & ideas : the non-physical non-fantasy aspects of Reality. For example, Psychology is about Metaphysics (res cogitans), while Neuroscience is about Biology (res vita). Have you seen anyone on this thread talking about gods & ghosts? Or is the association with Fantasy merely a figment of your imagination? That might be a topic for another thread. :smile:



A Case for Transcendental Idealism :
By ‘transcendental idealism’, I just mean the original view, plus my interpretation of it, made by Immanuel Kant; which starts with the core idea that we cannot know what is ‘transcendent’ to us (viz., what may exist completely independently of our representative faculties) but, rather, only what is ‘transcendental’ (viz., the necessary preconditions for the possibility of experience) . . . .
Quote from OP
Note --- Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle says that we "we cannot know both the position and speed of a particle, such as a photon or electron, with perfect accuracy". But we don't have to fantasize those properties, we can interpolate them ("what may exist") from observational evidence. Physics is about what we can know via the physical senses. Metaphysics is about that which transcends the capabilities of our senses. The fact that our senses have limitations is not a fantasy. For example, invisible Oxygen is an interpretation of relevant evidence, not a perception --- yet it's essential for life. Likewise, electrons have never been seen or photographed, but they are essential for material properties. The orbit "image" below is calculated from mathematical data, not from visible light.

. The issue here is principally how one can establish what is the case in the world at the level of philosophy, the most basic level, without an analytic of the structure of the relation between the known and the knower. — Astrophel

I think I can see this. As a non-philosopher, with a tendency towards postmodernism (often with reluctance - it's cultural) I generally hold an anti-foundationalist orientation. I think everything humans believe is constructed by us, a kind of performative interpretation of the world we think we know. Some of these ideas work better for certain purposes than others. Many of our preferences seem to be held for reason of aesthetic satisfaction - it pleases some of us to 'find' meaning, and others not to find meaning.

The issue here is principally how one can establish what is the case in the world at the level of philosophy, the most basic level, without an analytic of the structure of the relation between the known and the knower. — Astrophel

:100:

Put another way, a metaphysic is a statement of what must be the case, in order for the world to be as it is. Most analytical philosophy deprecates such endeavours, on the grounds that the world is all that is the case. Hence leading to relativism and subjectivism:

it pleases some of us to 'find' meaning, and others not to find meaning. — Tom Storm

The OP is looking into "preconditions of experience", one of which is Life and another is Sentience (Mind ; Consciousness). Are those topics fantastic, and off-limits, to you? — Gnomon

You often seem to present your ideas in the manner of a Christian or Muslim apologist, with the loaded rhetorical questions.

Answer: no.

Apparently, you free-associate Metaphysics with Religion & Spiritualism. — Gnomon

Really? Why do you say that? And why did you put capitals on these subjects? I already know they are important to you. But it would be true to say that the outcome of certain metaphysical beliefs are the building blocks of certain religious or spiritual views - just as Aristotle is foundational to Thomist beliefs.

Have you seen anyone on this thread talking about gods & ghosts? — Gnomon

Another loaded rhetorical question about a subject I don't recall raising.

Put another way, a metaphysic is a statement of what must be the case, in order for the world to be as it is. — Wayfarer

I don't think you can justify 'must be the case'. You can presuppose it. You can wish it. But can you say it must be true? Mostly metaphysics are tentative theories aiming to explain why the world seems to be how it is. But I don't think we even have a way of establishing precisely how the world is, let alone answering the why part.

I don't think you can justify 'must be the case'. You can presuppose it. You can wish it. But can you say it must be true? Mostly metaphysics are tentative theories aiming to explain why the world seems to be how it is. But I don't think we even have a way of establishing precisely how the world is, let alone answering the why part. — Tom Storm

:up:

Parallax can be used to determine the distance of an object, as nearby objects show a larger parallax than farther objects, but it doesn't allow us to see the back of a three-dimensional object.

What is parallax doing? Is it giving us information about the distance of an object from us or is it giving us information about the three-dimensional space that the object occupies? — RussellA

The world appears to us as three dimensional. As I see it there are no two-dimensional images; you have length and breadth and depth in any image. without depth the image cannot exist. Think of paintings; colour and tonal relations give the sense of depth. We might want to say the canvas is a two-dimensional surface, but it is not so.

As @Banno said even those with sight in only one eye still experience depth-perception. Of course, this experience is amplified by parallax, but it is a matter of degree not all or nothing.

My question earlier, which you have not attempted to answer was 'what two-dimensional surface do you think the purportedly two-dimensional image of our visual field is projected onto"?

I don't think you can justify 'must be the case'. You can presuppose it. You can wish it. But can you say it must be true? — Tom Storm

Isn't there a connection between metaphysics and the domain of necessary truth? I am thinking of the idea that 'there are things which are true in all possible worlds'. Logical principles and arithmetical proofs are often included under that heading. That idea is associated with Leibniz, and also with the principle of sufficient reason, which is precisely concerned with the reason why things are the way they are. (But then, of course, Leibniz' style of metaphysics was one of Kant's targets of criticism.)

In contemporary terms, all such ideas as principles of sufficient reason and the domain of necessary truths are regarded as outmoded ways of thought. But then, I ask, on what authority are such judgements made? This is why I've become interested in neo-thomism and contemporary Aristotelian philosophers who make the case for a revisionist form of metaphysics in full awareness of the scientific worldview and of Kant's criticism of metaphysics. 'Philosophy', as one of those neo-thomists said, 'always manages to bury its undertakers'.

Logical principles and arithmetical proofs are often included under that heading — Wayfarer

I understand that people may argue this. But since we only have our possible world to go by, how do we know that the logical absolutes, for instance, transcend our world or, for that matter, the human cognitive apparatus? I don't believe we do.