I think it gets to the crucial reflexive element re "freedom." A "full" freedom requires that we have control over our desires. This is where Frankfurt's distinction between first order desires "I want to x" and second order desires "I desire that I should want to x," is key. We can also have negative second order desires, i.e., "I want to not desire x," e.g., when a drug addict wants to be free from the desire of their addiction.

Then you point to the way in which desire leads to injustice. I think there is a connection, and it is one Nietzsche profoundly misses (or rather refuses to address). If we have people with reflexive and negative freedom, people who have self control, means, and freedom from constraint, they might still desire to do things that deprive others of their freedom. What is missing in Nietzsche but present in Hegel, Honneth, etc. is a conception of "social freedom," as the ways in which desires are harmonized such that they don't conflict. This requires that we want to promote others freedom, and one reason we should want this is that it shall make us more free (see Hegel's Lord-Bondsman dialectic in the Phenomenology of Spirit or Saint Augustine's critique of Rome as a "commonwealth" in the City of God)

So, to bring in a very influential quote on the subject:

I do not understand my own actions. For I do not do what I want, but I do the very thing I hate. Now if I do what I do not want, I agree that the law is good. So then it is no longer I that do it, but sin which dwells within me. For I know that nothing good dwells within me, that is, in my flesh. I can will what is right, but I cannot do it. For I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I do. Now if I do what I do not want, it is no longer I that do it, but sin which dwells within me.

So I find it to be a law that when I want to do right, evil lies close at hand. For I delight in the law of God, in my inmost self, but I see in my members another law at war with the law of my mind and making me captive to the law of sin which dwells in my members. Wretched man that I am! Who will deliver me from this body of death? Thanks be to God through Jesus Christ our Lord! So then, I of myself serve the law of God with my mind, but with my flesh I serve the law of sin...

For those who live according to the flesh set their minds on the things of the flesh, but those who live according to the Spirit set their minds on the things of the Spirit. To set the mind on the flesh is death, but to set the mind on the Spirit is life and peace.

Saint Paul of Tarsus - Epistle to the Romans

And I think Paul's larger theory of freedom is actually very close to the versions of Plato and Hegel we find in Robert Wallace's quite secular Philosophical Mysticism in Plato, Hegel, and the Present. Because the idea is that we are not free when we are determined by that which is outside of ourselves. We end up being mere cause, determined by "that which comes before." To borrow from Saint Bonaventure, "effects are [mere] signs of their causes."

In the Elements of Philosophy of Right Hegel rejects the idea of freedom simply being the proper prioritization of the passions and ranking of actions, which I think you see in Aristotle and Epicurus to some extent. This is at best a partial freedom because it is still always going to be determined from without to a great extent.

Now above, Paul talks of being "dead in sin," but this is not a biological death. It's a death of personhood that is restored by Christ, the Logos. In a more symbolic reading of how the Logos quells sin and "casts out the Legion within," we approach the more rationalist formulation in Hegel, although we lose something as well.

I've read a lot of Hegel and I think Wallace is spot on in many respects. The idea is that we become free by going "inwards and upwards" ala Saint Augustine is stronger in Plato though. There is a reaching beyond proximate causes that make us their effects, towards self-determination. And to the extent that we transcend our boundaries, reaching out in rationality and dissolving love, we are free.

But then descriptions of Hegel or Plato as pantheists are completely wrong, as are descriptions of them as "anthrotheists." The point is that we are only deified to the extent we are self-determining, free, and we are only free to the extent we transcend, and we only transcend to the extent that we are intellectually determined by rationality and emotionally determined by an open love.

And this seems actually closer to more orthodox religion, Rumi, Saint Paul, etc. than many forms of "philosophical religion." It's the same sort of transcendent attitude you see in "God is love," "God is in us," "living through the will of God," "Christ living in us/us living in Christ," which is smattered across Saint John, Saint Paul, and even to a degree Saint Peter's writing.

Absolute transcendence is crucial for the fullest sort of freedom because to have something that is outside one's self is crucially to be defined by that thing. But if one transcends all boundaries then there can be full self-determination. And I think you see a bit of this intuition in Shankara too.

I find pleasure/pain as a primary nexus for desire, some sort of norm, quite a difficulty. Kant's attempt at defining aesthetic judgment is built, like Epicurus' system, on the pleasure/pain axis, and it's terribly inadequate. There are two examples that for me don't fit this picture:

1. A woman's desire to bear and raise a child. I don't know of a male philosopher who looks at this seriously: yet it's how the species continues, the heart of the matter. Pleasure/pain cannot account for these desires, or so it seems to me. There is something marvellous involved: the embrace of pain and confinement to enable something else; the desire to create another, to recognise and love that other and to find fulfilment in both the caring for that other, and the eventual letting go of control.

2. Sado-masochism. In s/m behaviour a high degree of pain may be the greatest pleasure. And the ethical approaches to such behaviour involve, as the Count outlines in another context, the second order desire: How shall we enact our desires, that will involve being hurt or hurting, in a way that acknowledges and indeed privileges the other? After all, the enactment of such desires on a first order basis would be no more than narcissism, and cruelty.

I don't have a systematic reply to offer, just ask about these things. I start off taking an analytic approach to these questions, but it seems to me Levinas' explorations of our encounters with the other offer great insights into how we can resolve the analytic problems that arise.

Perverse desire belongs to the final category -- not groundless, and not necessary. Epicurus doesn't speak in terms of perversion, but I think this set of categories helps to clarify perversion and that his explanation thereafter -- where he speaks of people habituating themselves to luxury or treating evil as a good -- helps to describe perverted desire. It's technically perverted because there's nothing wrong with, say, sexual desire (I choose sexuality because it's something that should communicate. I believe this holds for other desires of the same category though). It is a natural desire. But it is possible to treat sexual desire as if it's necessary to satisfy, and to become anxious about satisfying sexual desire. To add something to the theory I'd say that sexual desire is such that it can either be satisfied in a simple manner -- which is what Epicurus advocates for in pursuing the tranquil life -- but it can also "run away" with itself. One can become attached not to the satisfaction of sexual desire but rather to its excitement and seek to deepen that excitement and become attached to a luxurious sexuality which is never satisfied (and, hence, would lead to a non-tranquil life, which is evil in Epicurean ethics). — Moliere

For Lacan, desire is never fully satisfied. Any material or ‘natural’ need requires articulation and recognition demanded from another. After transferrence onto the general form, desire bears on something other than the satisfaction it can bring. The particularity of a need assumes an irresolvable lack that transcends the given situation and generates a ceaseless sense of incompleteness. Lacan entirely transforms the perspective on transgression and perversion.

I can’t speak to perversion and desire. But I am confident that most people don’t know what they want and their active pursuits and ostensible meaning are derived through goals provided by enculturation and marketing. The person who has reflected and worked to transcend these has a better shot at happiness. I suspect this is close to Epicurus.

:up:

Life is perverse. It consumes itself in renewing itself. Mind would like to rise above life, but does so only in self-denial - aka love.

A "full" freedom requires that we have control over our desires. This is where Frankfurt's distinction between first order desires "I want to x" and second order desires "I desire that I should want to x," is key. We can also have negative second order desires, i.e., "I want to not desire x," e.g., when a drug addict wants to be free from the desire of their addiction. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Is this control over desire or just being at the mercy of one desire over another? Since you mentioned Nietzsche, I thought I’d quote him on the issue of will and desire:

The fact] that one desires to combat the vehemence of a drive at all, however, does not stand within our own power; nor does the choice of any particular method; nor does the success or failure of this method. What is clearly the case is that in this entire procedure our intellect is only the blind instrument of another drive which is a rival of the drive whose vehemence is tormenting us . . . While “we” believe we are complaining about the vehemence of a drive, at bottom it is one drive which is complaining about the other; that is to say: for us to become aware that we are suffering from the vehemence [or violence] of a drive presupposes the existence of another equally vehement or even more vehement drive, and that a struggle is in prospect in which our intellect is going to have to take sides.

There is no struggle of reason against the drives; what we call “reason” is nothing more than a certain “system of relations between various passions,” a certain ordering of the drives.

Then you point to the way in which desire leads to injustice. I think there is a connection, and it is one Nietzsche profoundly misses (or rather refuses to address). If we have people with reflexive and negative freedom, people who have self control, means, and freedom from constraint, they might still desire to do things that deprive others of their freedom. What is missing in Nietzsche but present in Hegel, Honneth, etc. is a conception of "social freedom," as the ways in which desires are harmonized such that they don't conflict. — Count Timothy von Icarus

What writers like Deleuze and Focault get from Nietzsche is the fundamentally social nature of drives. Because our drives are inextricably bound up within a larger community, the essential question for them is not how to harmonize individual drives to achieve social ethical norms, but how we ever manage to resist those normative chains that bind us.

The impulse toward the community is itself a drive, in competition with the other drives: we never leave the domain of the drives. The drives never exist in a free and unbound state, nor are they ever merely individual; they are always arranged and assembled, not only by moral systems, but more generally by every social formation.

…the fundamental problem of political philosophy is one that was formulated most clearly by Spinoza: “Why do people fight for their servitude as stubbornly as though it were their salvation?” The answer: because your desire is never your own. Desire is not a psychic reality, nor is it strictly individual; rather, your drives and affects are from the start part of the social infrastructure.”( Dan Smith)

Is this control over desire or just being at the mercy of one desire over another? Since you mentioned Nietzsche, I thought I’d quote him on the issue of will and desire:

It's control over desire (as a whole) to the extent that a person is deciding as a harmonized unity. Nietzsche isn't wrong to point out the problem of one desire simply acting as a tyrant over others, although he fails to extend the nature of this problem to social relations between people far enough IMO. He sees clearly how a person, as a whole, isn't free if one desire simply lords over the others like a tyrant, but then fails to see how the human tyrant becomes unfree through his tyranny in the interpersonal sphere, how power and the role of Lord becomes a trap.

Even if we accept Nietzsche's description of the will as a "congress of souls," we can still suppose that some congresses are more harmonious than others. This is the difference between the person who does a chore they don't like because they have been forced to, because they do not want to be punished, or because they do not want to hurt the feelings of another, versus the person who does a chore they don't like because they have decided that it must be done and is "better," in a holistic sense. This second person is acting out of a positive duty thay they desire as part of their identity. This is the fire fighter who fears a burning building as much as anyone, but who wants to rush in on another level, because he wants his identity to include his duty.

Nietzsche famously described the ascetic saint as simply a person who has turned their will to dominate inwards, becoming a tyrant against the other elements of their own will. But I never got the sense that Nietzsche had put much effort into understanding the tradition he is critiquing here. Rather he attacks a sort of folk understanding of asceticism. But there is a difference between conquering and harmonizing, between a Washington and a Stalin.

The difference between mere control and harmonization is well expressed at the interpersonal level in Hegel's Elements of the Philosophy of Right, where Hegel shows how institutions objectify morality by causing people's preferences to "synch up." We come to see our own benefit in others' benefit as we develop and go outside ourselves. Likewise we can see how much personal development also requires that we come to see the satisfaction of desires within in a similar way, holistically.

There is no struggle of reason against the drives; what we call “reason” is nothing more than a certain “system of relations between various passions,” a certain ordering of the drives.

I think Nietzsche is just wrong here. His analysis has value in that it looks at the ways in which the "will" is not unified. But it fails to look at the ways in which it is unified, the ways in n which desires feed into one another, emerge from others, combine, are shaped by experience, etc. while simultaneously taking the intellect to be more unified. This is a sort of atomistic view that I don't think it warranted by experience or the insights of cognitive science. Thought is process not a collection of objects. In it we have strong emergence, circular influence, and complexity in play. Thinking in terms of atomistic "desires to x," that are either prioritized or not is simply failing to recognize the ways in which there is unity and the extent to which there can be more or less unity.

Hegel makes a similar critique against such a definition freedom as "the proper ranking of drives and desires and application of the intellect to them." However, when he does this in PR there is more acknowledgement of the organic nature of the will and the inseparability of intellect.

What writers like Deleuze and Focault get from Nietzsche is the fundamentally social nature of drives. Because our drives are inextricably bound up within a larger community, the essential question for them is not how to harmonize individual drives to achieve social ethical norms, but how we ever manage to resist those normative chains that bind us

Exactly. But it's a mistake to have this insight and then think of freedom primarily in terms of overcoming social pressure. To do this is to ignore that man is a social animal and has social desires, to make social desires a slave to a conception of freedom that is focusing too much on "freedom from constraint," and not enough on "being able to do what one wills."

The takeaway I see here is that freedom necessarily must include a social dimension (Hegel, Honneth, etc.)

And it must include a transcendent element ala Plato, Hegel, Wallace, etc., because freedom means, in part, not to be determined by the external. But if we view society as external to ourselves, defining ourselves in terms of "what is not us," we will invariably see ourselves as unfree due to how we must be limited by "those who are outside ourselves."

Yet, clearly people can come to identify with others as an extension of themselves, the most obvious example being the family, our first example in life of "going beyond ourselves." The point is not that society is already an organic whole —as Paul says of the Church, "one body" — but that it must become so for freedom to be fully realized.

So freedom includes a sort of "being at home in the world," and being "at one with it," whereas Nietzsche ultimately seems constrained by his atomism. There can be a "communion of the Saints," who become one in being part of something higher, more self-determining, but we cannot have a "communion of overmen," because they are kept bound apart by the atomism they assume, and because one's self-determination undermines the others'.

It's control over desire (as a whole) to the extent that a person is deciding as a harmonized unity. Nietzsche isn't wrong to point out the problem of one desire simply acting as a tyrant over others, although he fails to extend the nature of this problem to social relations between people far enough IMO. He sees clearly how a person, as a whole, isn't free if one desire simply lords over the others like a tyrant, but then fails to see how the human tyrant becomes unfree through his tyranny in the interpersonal sphere, how power and the role of Lord becomes a trap — Count Timothy von Icarus

Deleuze’s Nietzschean-inspired model posits assemblages of desiring elements which produce what he calls a plane of consistency. This plane creates relational connections within the person , and a point of view or perspective, without any overarching synthesis. There is no one self, no one overarching desire, but a society of selves and a society of desires that manifest a relative ongoing thematic unity throughout its changes. Tyranny and power are not properties of individuals, they are manifestations of affects circulating though a culture , from the bottom up rather than from the top down. Subjects are produced by the way power circulates though a community.

Even if we accept Nietzsche's description of the will as a "congress of souls," we can still suppose that some congresses are more harmonious than others. This is the difference between the person who does a chore they don't like because they have been forced to, because they do not want to be punished, or because they do not want to hurt the feelings of another, versus the person who does a chore they don't like because they have decided that it must be done and is "better," in a holistic sense. This second person is acting out of a positive duty thay they desire as part of their identity. This is the fire fighter who fears a burning building as much as anyone, but who wants to rush in on another level, because he wants his identity to include his duty. — Count Timothy von Icarus

You seem to making a leap here from harmonization of desires to normative ethics as altruism. For Deleuze, the consistency of personality is produced as a relation between heterogeneous differences( desires, affects). This society of the person is constantly changing in small ways, exposed to an outside that is not only outside the person, but beyond the cultural norms. And yet we have a tendency to. get ourselves stuck in repressive, conformist social structures that each of us participate in and perpetuate. Altruism for the sake of the repressive goals of a social structure is a kind of selfishness. That is, a being caught up in a stagnant idea of the social self.On the other hand , recognizing that the ‘self’ is always naturally reinvented in the direction of new values, which are neither simply the result of cultural inculcation nor a solipsistic ‘selfishness’ points one in the direction of a robust ethic of altruism.

Tyranny and power are not properties of individuals, they are manifestations of affects circulating though a culture , from the bottom up rather than from the top down. Subjects are produced by the way power circulates though a community

Interesting. I've been meaning to read more Deleuze. I'm not super familiar with him.

But that makes sense to me. The "lord" isn't constrained by their individual lordship over their bondsmen, but by the fact that, in their society, one is either a lord or a bondsman. If one fails to be a lord, then one ends up as a bondsman.

I see this in modern status anxiety. People might have very liberal attitudes, but they are constrained by the system.

"Yes, kids should go to economically integrated schools. Yes, we need to build housing on a massive scale. But not here. If you only do it here, we fall down the ladder into the abyss."

That's the problem of having a ladder with a few rungs in the clouds and the rest in the abyss. Those in the clouds have to cling to their rung for dear life, even if they'd prefer not to have to do so and would be willing to make sacrifices to change things.

That said, tyranny over the self can't ONLY be about culture. Some people are tyrannical in their self-discipline in service of ideas their culture rejects, e.g. the strongly and individually religious.

You seem to making a leap here from harmonization of desires to normative ethics as altruism.

It's simply the first idea I thought of. People can be disciplined in being morally dubious stock traders because they want "master of the universe, insider," to be part of their identity too.

I use the altruistic example because that's how you get to social freedom. People do take on identities and embrace positive duties that aren't in any way altruistic, but the only way society as a whole gets free is when people embrace a duty to each other's freedom.

This doesn't cut against efforts to reform society. That's where I disagree with Hegel. Hegel gets so obsessed with unity that he ignores the role that activists have in improving society. I agree with him that activists sometimes go too far and have a net corrosive effect, but that doesn't mean they aren't needed at all.

The point isn't that we become free in supporting the society we already have, or even the society we want to have, but that we become free in supporting the evolution of the society that produces the most freedom. And since individuals' freedom is deeply interrelated, this means freedom for all. This, IMO, has sort of been lost in modern philosophy. There is way too much focus on fighting conformity, cutting against the grain, etc. Sure, that's important, but it cannot be an ends in itself. In Nietzsche, it is an ends in itself and in this it becomes a self defeating ideology if applied at the social level.

But how do we progress towards more truly altruistic institutions and social norms. Well that's a whole different story about social and organizational "evolution," and the ways in which organizations become "self-aware."

Deleuze’s Nietzschean-inspired model posits assemblages of desiring elements which produce what he calls a plane of consistency. This plane creates relational connections within the person , and a point of view or perspective, without any overarching synthesis. There is no one self, no one overarching desire, but a society of selves and a society of desires that manifest a relative ongoing thematic unity throughout its changes. — Joshs

As far as I know, Deleuze never applies the term society regarding his theory of desire. For him, the concept of ‘a society of selves and a society of desires that manifest a relative ongoing thematic unity' would display a return to a totalizing process of identification, the revival of outmoded naturalized notions of collective subjectivity. 'This plane creates relational connections within the person, and a point of view or perspective.' This account of Deleuze's perspective on desire misses desire's actual productive capacity and assumes the person's existence before and aside from syntheses of desire. Assemblages of desiring elements produce not a plane of consistency but an unstable and autopoietic unity of processes of heterogeneous drives, flows and partial objects that populate the unconscious. The three primary passive syntheses of desire give rise to a form of the subject that emerges as an I that recognizes itself and its desires retrospectively. The encounter of the molecular realm of the unconscious with the sphere of social production results in organizing distinct and exclusive objects and persons according to the principles of identity, negation, and contradiction. Further, Deleuze's concept of abstract machine expresses the complex, recurrent, and metastable relations that maintain assemblages of molar and molecular domains. It opens up a conception of subjectivity
beyond the naturalizing representations of desire and culture. That is why Foucault calls 'Anti-Oedipus' ‘a book of ethics that ferrets out the fascism that is ingrained in our behaviour.'

As far as I know, Deleuze never applies the term community regarding his theory of desire. For him, the concept of ‘a society of selves and a society of desires that manifest a relative ongoing thematic unity' would display a return to a process of identification, — Number2018

No, he uses words like collectivity, collection, mass, population, multiplicity, a band, a peopling, a group.
I’m aware that the plane of immanence is a virtual dimension on which conceptual personae and concepts are created via connective synthesis, inclusive disjunction and conjunctions of intensities. Concepts subsist of relations between heterogenous series rather than unification by identity or representation. I’m sure we can agree on the distinction between the smooth and the striated, the molecular and the molar, the rhizomatic and the arborescent, the body without organs and the clothed body, the virtual and the actual, the subject group and the subjected group.

Nevertheless , the reason I use the expression ‘thematic unity’ is that concepts on a plane of immanence resonate, “and the philosophy that creates them always introduces a powerful Whole that, while remaining open, is not fragmented: an unlimited One-Al, an "Onnitudo" that includes all the concepts on one and the same plane.” The plane of immanence is diagrammatic and fractal, making possible a point of view and problematic field that produces , via linkages between heterogeneities, a sort of non-totalizing thematic distinguishing the concepts of one philosopher from another.
“In the end, does not every great philosopher lay out a new plane of immanence, introduce a new substance of being and draw up a new image of thought, so that there could not be two great philosophers on the same plane?”

The point isn't that we become free in supporting the society we already have, or even the society we want to have, but that we become free in supporting the evolution of the society that produces the most freedom. And since individuals' freedom is deeply interrelated, this means freedom for all. This, IMO, has sort of been lost in modern philosophy. There is way too much focus on fighting conformity, cutting against the grain, etc. Sure, that's important, but it cannot be an ends in itself. In Nietzsche, it is an ends in itself and in this it becomes a self defeating ideology if applied at the social level. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Shaun Gallagher, in his latest book Action and Interaction, has a chapter on justice which incorporates ideas from Hegel, Frankfurt and Honneth, while giving more emphasis to its basis in intersubjectivity.

Gallagher writes:

“Justice, like autonomy, is relational. I cannot be just or unjust on my own. So an action is just or unjust only in the way it fits into the arrangements of intersubjective and social interactions.” “Justice consists in those arrangements that maximize compound, relational autonomy in our practices.” The autonomy of the interaction itself depends on maintaining the autonomy of both individuals. Justice (like friendship) involves fostering this plurality of autonomies (this compound autonomy); it is a positive arrangement that instantiates or maintains some degree of compound relational autonomy.”“Accordingly, although one can still talk of individuals who engage in the interaction, a full account of such interaction is not reducible to mechanisms at work in the individuals qua individuals.”

A key aspect of justice is the recognition of the other:

“As reflected in the definition of interaction, in interactional dynamics recognition depends on autonomy and is undermined by reification; that is, treating the other as an object observed from a third-person perspective. At the same time, individual autonomy diminishes without social interaction; and interaction doesn't exist if the autonomy of any of the participants is denied. Interaction, autonomy, and recognition dissipate in cases of slavery, torture, or terrorism.”
“ As the enactivist approach makes clear, a participant in interaction with another person is called to respond if the interaction is to continue. My response to the other, in the primary instance, just is my engaging in interaction with her—by responding positively or negatively with action to her action. Although research on primary intersubjectivity provides a detailed model of elementary responsivity, it may also be useful to consider Levinas's analysis of the face-to-face relation in order to explicate what this research tells us.” “…according to Levinas, the face-to-face relation primarily registers in an ethical order: the other, in her alterity, is such that she makes an ethical demand on me, to which I am obligated to respond…In contrast to Heidegger who might speak about a system of involvements that constitute the pragmatic world (characteristic of secondary intersubjectivity), Levinas describes a direct embodied encounter with the other.…the failure to enact that transcendence [recognizing the alterity of the other], as when we simply objectify or reify the other person, is also a possibility of relational contingency.”

I believe instead that the ethical dilemma we face is not that of recognition vs reification, self-transcendence vs self-interest, the arbitrary conservative thrust of the lure of the familiar vs the compassionate embrace of otherness. When we seem to fail to recognize and maintain the other‘s autonomy this is not a retreat into self but, on the contrary, an experiencing of otherness which is too other to be intelligible. For Gallagher justice is maintaining the autonomy of the other, as if one first glimpses this autonomy and then decides not to honor it. But the other's autonomy can only exist for me to the extent that I can integrate it intelligibly within my way of life, which is itself the ongoing production of a collaborative community. The failure to coordinate harmoniously among competing realtional intelligibilites results in the appearance of injustice, as though there were an intention on the part of one of the parties not to recognize an aspect of the other.

However, it is not autonomous content that we strive to maximize, but intelligible process, and intelligibility is ontologically prior to the actions of an autonomous subject who recognizes or fails to recognize others. When there is disagreement between the victim and the alleged perpetrator about whether an injustice has indeed been committed, who determines, and how is it determined, that someone is closing off another's affordance space and eliminating their autonomy? If it is intelligible ways of going on that are being protected, then from the vantage of the ‘perpetrator', what is being excluded, closed off and eliminated is not a particular content (the other's affordances) , in the service of reifying one's own autonomy. On the contrary, the aim is to exclude from a system of practices that which would render it nonsensical and deprive it of coherent meaning. In other words, from the vantage of the so-called perpetrator, the practices of exclusion and elimination are in the service of rendering justice by preventing the degradation of meaningful autonomy in general.

As Ken Gergen(1995) states:

“... groups whose actions are coordinated around given constructions of reality risk their traditions by exposing them to the ravages of the outliers. That is, from their perspective, efforts must be made to protect the boundaries of understanding, to prevent the signifiers from escaping into the free-standing environment where meaning is decried or dissipated. In this sense, unfair or exclusionary practices are not frequently so from the standpoint of the actors. Rather, they may seem altogether fair, just and essential to sustain valued ideals against the infidels at the gates.”

There is no one self, no one overarching desire, but a society of selves and a society of desires that manifest a relative ongoing thematic unity throughout its changes. Tyranny and power are not properties of individuals, they are manifestations of affects circulating though a culture , from the bottom up rather than from the top down. Subjects are produced by the way power circulates though a community. — Joshs

This perspective asserts the primacy of power and the way it circulates through a community.
But in what way? The circulation ‘from the bottom up rather than from the top down’ and back to the bottom affirms ‘thematic unity’ of smooth continuous movement through culture and of a non-coercive intersubjectivity of communal consensus. It follows the spirit of Habermas’s appeal to reason as a healing power of unification and reconciliation. Yet, it is far from the Nietzschean Deleuze’s approach to power and desire. The will to power ‘makes the difference’ and dominates over the domain of diverse and incommensurable tendencies. It generates and in-forms forces into actual, representable types from a virtual level of intensive and differential relations of mutual imbrication and tension. 'The ongoing thematic unity' of the plain of consistency resonates with ‘the informal outside, a battle, a turbulent zone where particular points and the relations of forces between these points are tossed about.’

In the Elements of Philosophy of Right Hegel rejects the idea of freedom simply being the proper prioritization of the passions and ranking of actions, which I think you see in Aristotle and Epicurus to some extent. This is at best a partial freedom because it is still always going to be determined from without to a great extent. — Count Timothy von Icarus

So there's interesting points of consonance and dissonance that I perceive here between Hegel and ancient ethics, at least as we're talking about those two things here. Autarky, in particular, is a goal of Epicurean philosophy -- which gets along with notions of freedom. Further the notion of the invulnerable man gets along with the notion of absolute freedom you present.

What's funny, though, is that both Aristotle and Epicurus rely upon notions of human nature in order to make their case. In a way you could say that this is not determined from without, but from within -- but this is where I see a strong difference in the approaches. The enlightenment-era philosophers will speak in terms of will -- and so first and second order desires make sense -- but the ancient philosophers will speak in terms of nature.

These could be read in harmony if we chose to find some way to speak of the social freedom you speak of in terms of human nature, but obviously they don't need to be read in harmony. And what you say here points out a good point of tension: living in accord with your nature is seen as the highest freedom in Epicurus. You obviously can't will yourself to not be what you are, or at least if you do so you'll cause yourself unnecessary anxiety. But then the Enlightenment-inspired notions of desire speak of a willing subject rather than a species-being which you can live in accord with. (though if we're to be technically correct it's worth noting here that both are a kind of fib that isn't really true or false, but rather is the meaningful background upon which ethical justification is built)

Now above, Paul talks of being "dead in sin," but this is not a biological death. It's a death of personhood that is restored by Christ, the Logos. In a more symbolic reading of how the Logos quells sin and "casts out the Legion within," we approach the more rationalist formulation in Hegel, although we lose something as well.

I've read a lot of Hegel and I think Wallace is spot on in many respects. The idea is that we become free by going "inwards and upwards" ala Saint Augustine is stronger in Plato though. There is a reaching beyond proximate causes that make us their effects, towards self-determination. And to the extent that we transcend our boundaries, reaching out in rationality and dissolving love, we are free.

But then descriptions of Hegel or Plato as pantheists are completely wrong, as are descriptions of them as "anthrotheists." The point is that we are only deified to the extent we are self-determining, free, and we are only free to the extent we transcend, and we only transcend to the extent that we are intellectually determined by rationality and emotionally determined by an open love.

And this seems actually closer to more orthodox religion, Rumi, Saint Paul, etc. than many forms of "philosophical religion." It's the same sort of transcendent attitude you see in "God is love," "God is in us," "living through the will of God," "Christ living in us/us living in Christ," which is smattered across Saint John, Saint Paul, and even to a degree Saint Peter's writing.

Absolute transcendence is crucial for the fullest sort of freedom because to have something that is outside one's self is crucially to be defined by that thing. But if one transcends all boundaries then there can be full self-determination. And I think you see a bit of this intuition in Shankara too. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I quote here because I believe you're demonstrating the difference here strongly. Autarky is the ability to be self-sufficient as the human being that you are, but absolute freedom, absolute transcendence is this ethical goal to be beyond what one is. It's an ethics of self-transformation rather than an ethics of being-at-home, or something like that. (obviously these are terms of art here)

A woman's desire to bear and raise a child. I don't know of a male philosopher who looks at this seriously: yet it's how the species continues, the heart of the matter. Pleasure/pain cannot account for these desires, or so it seems to me. There is something marvellous involved: the embrace of pain and confinement to enable something else; the desire to create another, to recognise and love that other and to find fulfilment in both the caring for that other, and the eventual letting go of control. — mcdoodle

In terms of the division here I'd put that in the natural and unnecessary desires -- it's natural to want children, but one doesn't need children in order to live a tranquil life (or, it's a groundless desire to want to bare a child if you're unable -- you can still raise children, but the desire to bare a child will never be satisfied). Though I'll go half-way here and agree that Epicurean desire doesn't make sense of the desire for children, which do not bring about a tranquil life, but do bring about fulfillment for some people. I think this point can be generalized, even -- often times people find dangerous, painful, irrational, etc. desires satisfactory, and that satisfaction is not the satisfaction of tranquility. The Epicurean ethic would simply say these desires are allowable insofar that you don't pursue them to the point that they cannot be satisfied (or, perhaps, this is an interpretation of the ethic with respect to this desire)

Sado-masochism. In s/m behaviour a high degree of pain may be the greatest pleasure. And the ethical approaches to such behaviour involve, as the Count outlines in another context, the second order desire: How shall we enact our desires, that will involve being hurt or hurting, in a way that acknowledges and indeed privileges the other? After all, the enactment of such desires on a first order basis would be no more than narcissism, and cruelty. — mcdoodle

Here's where I think Epicurus' theory of desire shines -- it's not a theory of desire which is built along pain/pleasure alone; it has a tri-partite structure to help sort out which pleasures one ought to pursue. Sadomasochism is a desire some people find fulfilling, but do they find it tranquil? I'd say that depends on the individual. It could bring about tranquility, but it could also be a perverse desire in the technical sense where you can achieve tranquility through modifying desire rather than pursuing s/m -- but if you don't have that choice, if you're "anchored" lets say to sadomasochism, then surely pushing against yourself would also cause anxiety -- and the desire to not be s/m could be the real cause of anxiety, when a person may be able to satisfy that desire without an anxious circle of desiring-to-not building up into a release that itself becomes the object of desire.

So to classify the example: I think sadomasochism would fit within the category of natural and unnecessary desires, and could be either a perverted desire in the sense that it becomes groundless, or it could just be a quirky desire that's natural in the sense that it belongs to the person as they are, and unnecessary in that it's not needed to continue life and ought be foregone if it brings about anxiety.

What I believe myself to be adding is a kind of sub-category to the natural and unnecessary desires: there are the ones which are not perverted (can be satisfied) and there are the ones that are perveted (cannot be satisfied). While I think the always groundless desires (like the desire for immortality) probably do hold for all people, it's this middle category in-between the necessary/natural and the always groundless desires where most of our psychological wonderings sit. This is the place where we cause our own problems and pains through the very things we believe will relieve those pains, but excising the desire is a more certain way, at least, of attaining the general ataraxic temperament.

I start off taking an analytic approach to these questions, but it seems to me Levinas' explorations of our encounters with the other offer great insights into how we can resolve the analytic problems that arise. — mcdoodle

Here we agree. It's so good. Unfortunately I find it hard to express because of its phenomenological form of expression. It's like it gets at a truth that I find hard to express in any other way.

For Lacan, desire is never fully satisfied. Any material or ‘natural’ need requires articulation and recognition demanded from another. After transferrence onto the general form, desire bears on something other than the satisfaction it can bring. The particularity of a need assumes an irresolvable lack that transcends the given situation and generates a ceaseless sense of incompleteness. Lacan entirely transforms the perspective on transgression and perversion. — Number2018

First I'm pretty much taking your word on Lacan here. I've read people influenced by him but never took that plunge. With that being said I'd say the natural and necessary desires would stand out in Lacan's theory of desire, which are re-occurring due to the nature of life but satisfiable. But I suspect that Lacan would take these facts of hunger and thirst and say that due to their reoccurrence they are never fully satisfied. Or, perhaps, just that we have reoccurring desires is enough to generate a ceaseless sense of incompleteness.

In which case I think it'd be safe to say that Lacan's desire runs orthogonally to Epicurean desire. If desire is never satisfiable, if there's is always a lack and a sense of incompleteness, then the Epicurean cure is a fraud. You'd be making the desire for desire itself a groundless desire which cannot be satisfied.

But this is where I think the appeal to nature -- even though it's fallacious! -- is actually a strength. Running along with the philosophy as I did with Sadomaoschistic desire: Surely if the goal is tranquility then building up desires about desire would result in anxiety if our desires about desire lead us to desire things which cannot be satisfied. But if you, instead, come to live with your own nature -- in this case a ceaseless sense of incompleteness due to the nature of desire as a lack -- you can come to see that it's just a little bit of pain, and that pain isn't all that bad to deal with after all. The pain will come again, and so will go away, and the pleasure will fade away, but will come about again.

I can’t speak to perversion and desire. But I am confident that most people don’t know what they want and their active pursuits and ostensible meaning are derived through goals provided by enculturation and marketing. The person who has reflected and worked to transcend these has a better shot at happiness. I suspect this is close to Epicurus. — Tom Storm

For Epicurus there's a definitive cure, and so he takes it upon himself to do the enculturation and marketing so that people will have the right wants. It's probably the thing that makes his philosophy the most obscure and strange from our way of thinking today -- we'd say a person has to come to that conclusion on their own, Epicurus would say that this is like giving a person with a broken bone the opportunity to learn how to set a bone; it might happen, and those who figure it out probably do feel good about figuring it out, but it's a cruelty if you see things as he does. (I've never been able to take that extra step, so I don't quite see things like that. But I can articulate the viewpoint)

Basically if we're confident that most people don't know what they want, and we know a set of wants which produce happiness, then why bother giving people the freedom to hurt themselves when it's ignorance which is the culprit of their misery?
 

Life is perverse. It consumes itself in renewing itself. Mind would like to rise above life, but does so only in self-denial - aka love. — unenlightened

Is the consumption of life to preserve life a perversion, or can you see it as a natural flow which can become perverted? At least, I'd like to suggest that love isn't the only way out of the conundrum of desire (but still one of the ways); Epicurus doesn't point to a path of love which transcends life, but rather a mode of desire where we live with the flow of contraries which are interdependent upon one another. It's more like a pruned nature for the purpose of living happily -- and the perversion is the recognition of human desires tendency to want more than what makes a person happy, by their own nature.

I believe instead that the ethical dilemma we face is not that of recognition vs reification, self-transcendence vs self-interest, the arbitrary conservative thrust of the lure of the familiar vs the compassionate embrace of otherness. When we seem to fail to recognize and maintain the other‘s autonomy this is not a retreat into self but, on the contrary, an experiencing of otherness which is too other to be intelligible. For Gallagher justice is maintaining the autonomy of the other, as if one first glimpses this autonomy and then decides not to honor it. But the other's autonomy can only exist for me to the extent that I can integrate it intelligibly within my way of life, which is itself the ongoing production of a collaborative community. The failure to coordinate harmoniously among competing realtional intelligibilites results in the appearance of injustice, as though there were an intention on the part of one of the parties not to recognize an aspect of the other.

However, it is not autonomous content that we strive to maximize, but intelligible process, and intelligibility is ontologically prior to the actions of an autonomous subject who recognizes or fails to recognize others. When there is disagreement between the victim and the alleged perpetrator about whether an injustice has indeed been committed, who determines, and how is it determined, that someone is closing off another's affordance space and eliminating their autonomy? If it is intelligible ways of going on that are being protected, then from the vantage of the ‘perpetrator', what is being excluded, closed off and eliminated is not a particular content (the other's affordances) , in the service of reifying one's own autonomy. On the contrary, the aim is to exclude from a system of practices that which would render it nonsensical and deprive it of coherent meaning. In other words, from the vantage of the so-called perpetrator, the practices of exclusion and elimination are in the service of rendering justice by preventing the degradation of meaningful autonomy in general.

As Ken Gergen(1995) states:

“... groups whose actions are coordinated around given constructions of reality risk their traditions by exposing them to the ravages of the outliers. That is, from their perspective, efforts must be made to protect the boundaries of understanding, to prevent the signifiers from escaping into the free-standing environment where meaning is decried or dissipated. In this sense, unfair or exclusionary practices are not frequently so from the standpoint of the actors. Rather, they may seem altogether fair, just and essential to sustain valued ideals against the infidels at the gates.” — Joshs

Good and interesting stuff. There's a sense of Levinas where I can see it as being as unrealistic as the Epicurean mode of life, and then there's a sense in which I think its phenomenology expresses the beginnings of ethical desire very well. So a reading up against this is just what I need for thinking through what I've often found to be a kind of terminus without answer. To put it in plainer terms I think what Levinas gets at is the conceptual limit of ethics -- that it cannot be defined in terms of an intelligible order built by ones' self alone. I'm not sure I'd say that Otherness is a warm embrace in that, but rather that this recognition of alterity is the beginnings of ethical thought. After all, if we were really all the same inside then couldn't the philosopher, at least theoretically, build an ethical system from afar while observing human nature through history, psychology, anthropology, and so forth? But if we're not, then we actually need to listen to one another to get there.

Is the consumption of life to preserve life a perversion, or can you see it as a natural flow which can become perverted? — Moliere

That question suggests, (rightly I think) that perversion is in the seer more than the seen. That is, the first perversion is the cleaving of the individual such that they can stand in judgement of their own desires. And from that judgement comes the repression and then the projection onto the world of whatever is seen to be perverse. Perversion is the buck that is always passed and never stops. It is the human condition. The epicurean is naturally a connoisseur of perversion. Too much would be gross, but a little spice in your girls (or boys) ...

That question suggests, (rightly I think) that perversion is in the seer more than the seen. That is, the first perversion is the cleaving of the individual such that they can stand in judgement of their own desires. And from that judgement comes the repression and then the projection onto the world of whatever is seen to be perverse. Perversion is the buck that is always passed and never stops. It is the human condition. The epicurean is naturally a connoisseur of perversion. Too much would be gross, but a little spice in your girls (or boys) ... — unenlightened

I think you're right to point out the Epicurean is a natural connoisseur of perversion. How else would Epicurus be able to identify perverted desire without being a connoisseur of desire and its possibilities? And I think you're right that it's the seer which identifies rather than it being an intrinsic property of desire (except in the extreme cases, like hunger or the desire to be immortal, which I'd say require a particularly motivated seer to see as anything but what they are).

Could this be read as another point that differentiates it from the moralities of self-transformation? The ethical sage is wise in the ways of perversion and so is able to not just live their own life, but even provide the cure to others such that they can live that life too. But that knowledge is not one of purity, or of changing oneself from a fallen to a blessed state. Rather it's accepting oneself as what one is and modifying desires to attain the desired desire of tranquility. So to continue with the desire of sexuality masturbation would actually be what a person needs to satisfy sexuality, and because it's easier to attain that than having a sexual partner there's no need to pine after something more exciting and pursue it to the point that you cannot have it. Rather it's better to masturbate and be satisfied with that if you cannot attain a sexual partner without causing anxiety for your life. If you can, of course, then that's a natural and unnecessary desire because masturbation is always right there -- but insofar that you don't build your life around satisfying your sexuality with a particular kind of person in a particular kind of way such that you make your desires subject to fortune then there's nothing wrong there. It's not the particular action which is right or wrong, but rather all the desires around action and the state of mind we obtain by living a certain way. (and also this should go some way to demonstrating how this ethic really is an ethic against love as a central motivation -- it's not a universal love of others, or the love of an individual, which brings about a good life. Those are things which are nice, but not necessary, for a good life)

I'm not sure it's right to put this as a 2nd order desire because I don't think it's that rationalist. There's something deeply irrational to the appeal to human nature, at least in relation to our notions of the autonomous self making choices. The perversion of the individual standing in relation to their own judgments like they can judge them as separate from the self -- I don't think that Epicurean philosophy makes this mistake. It speaks of ordering desires for a particular kind of life, but it's always bringing it back to the kind of creatures we are. And the kinds of desires we have, before the cure, naturally lead to anxiety.

Now if there is truly no human nature then the philosophy is a bit of a fib. If one believes that the Christian way of life will transform people to be better than they are born to be -- or any variation on that theme, which is common enough (It's the warped wood theory of human nature combined with a notion of a cure for the soul) -- then the Epicurean philosophy is anathema as well. In fact I think this could go some way to explaining how it became so unpopular. Stoicism, with its emphasis on the life of the mind, could be married to Christianity, but Epicureanism -- with its emphasis on the human life here and now -- brings about more conceptual tensions.

Well... anyways, those are the thoughts that come to mind. This is very much an area where I'm exploring without answer.

Rather it's accepting oneself as what one is and modifying desires — Moliere

Is this not a direct contradiction? As the therapist proverbially says, "the lightbulb has to want to change."

But honestly, I don't understand much of what you are saying. I'd better be quiet.

Basically if we're confident that most people don't know what they want, and we know a set of wants which produce happiness, then why bother giving people the freedom to hurt themselves when it's ignorance which is the culprit of their misery? — Moliere

I don't see how this follows. We can't make people take up 'better' or choices. I also don't see who is 'giving' anyone else freedom. People make their choices, the end. If they arrive at a personal understanding that they can do better and be more authentic, then great. But authenticity can't be mandated.

We can't make people take up 'better' or choices. I also don't see who is 'giving' anyone else freedom. People make their choices, the end. If they arrive at a personal understanding that they can do better and be more authentic, then great. But authenticity can't be mandated. — Tom Storm

On authenticity I agree. That obviously, almost by definition, cannot be mandated or forced. But to make sense of the perspective:

The Epicurean community is somewhat like a monastic community. It has its own set of rules and a social hierarchy. The relationship between master and student is very much a relationship between a doctor and a patient, so authority is presumed from the outset. It's a dogmatic philosophy: it's not the expression of the self or the finding of your authentic individuality which brings about happiness, but rather living in accord with your human nature. And the master of a community would be the one who intercedes, or doesn't, on the day-to-day life. Unlike a therapist-patient who goes on to live their own individual lives with sessions to figure out just what's what, the monastic community is always living together and that provides more than enough opportunity for the master to intercede.

That is, Epicurus kind of did have the power to make people make better choices, but just like a lot of the philosophical communities from back then it has a cult-like feeling to it in today's world. While I agree that you and I cannot make people take up better choices -- for one it makes me uncomfortable to even think in those terms, so I'd be pretty bad at it to begin with (but a drill sergeant, now... they'd be good at it, just towards different ends than a tranquil life) -- we can at least see that the conceptual value to the philosophy is not in authenticity, as we tend to believe is best. I'm giving leeway because I sincerely don't believe in as fixed a human nature as the Epicurean philosophy seems to, and so I believe people have to find these things for themselves. But it's not authenticity that brings about happiness (after all, we could authentically desire to be immortal, and pursue that, and it would cause anxiety because it's a groundless desire), but the pruning of desire such that one can be happy. (though authenticity does seem to be a thing we hold onto, so it relates.)


How does that sit with you?

Is this not a direct contradiction? As the therapist proverbially says, "the lightbulb has to want to change."

But honestly, I don't understand much of what you are saying. I'd better be quiet. — unenlightened

I'm appreciating your contributions, and I thank you for having patience with my babblings. Bringing up Christian virtues in relation to Enlightenment virtues as did, and bringing that in relation to a reading of Nietzschean ethics has given me a good set of points to differentiate this from other ethical approaches.

It's perfect because Nietzsche, of all value systems, pretty squarely sits against Christian virtues -- at least in the regular, as-read way (there are Christian Nietzscheans, but they're like me: an odd bunch thinking through ethical problems).

So I'll gladly take the blame for a lack of understanding. I'm definitely groping in the dark here, and could use any feedback.

How does that sit with you? — Moliere

The only interest I have in Epicurus is how I might adapt some of his ideas for myself. I am naturally inclined to many similar approaches - I am a minimalist. I have no interest in luxury. I have never chased ambition or status. I am mostly indifferent to food. This is I believe my authentic orientation. I can't speak for anyone else and, since I am not a very social person, the idea of any kind of an Epicurean community fills me with horror.

I'm giving leeway because I sincerely don't believe in as fixed a human nature as the Epicurean philosophy seems to, and so I believe people have to find these things for themselves. — Moliere

Agree. Of course people only tend to find things if they are aware such options are available or supported to pursue them. It seems to me most people are not aware there may be better alternatives to how they are living.

But it's not authenticity that brings about happiness (after all, we could authentically desire to be immortal, and pursue that, and it would cause anxiety because it's a groundless desire), but the pruning of desire such that one can be happy. (though authenticity does seem to be a thing we hold onto, so it relates.) — Moliere

I hear you, but I think authenticity, being who you are, is a better path towards happiness than trying to live up to impossible standards, or following some else's plans for your life. There are of course limits to how far authenticity can take you. But anything can be made to look bad if taken to an extreme example. There big problem with authenticity is how do you determine who you really are? Therein lies the challenge.

The only interest I have in Epicurus is how I might adapt some of his ideas for myself. I am naturally inclined to many similar approaches - I am a minimalist. I have no interest in luxury. I have never chased ambition or status. I am mostly indifferent to food. This is I believe my authentic orientation. I can't speak for anyone else and, since I am not a very social person, the idea of any kind of an Epicurean community fills me with horror. — Tom Storm

Yeah I'm sure I'd not get along very well with the program either. Though I've lived in some intentional communities I did get along with, but they weren't dogmatic like the Epicurean community is (at least as I understand it and render it here).

I emphasize the dogmatic nature because I think it's the best way of seeing how the ideas are different, and thereby making them valuable as a distinct set of values. Our modern sensibilities would question tranquility from the outset, asking after another justification (or, what amounts to the same thing, demanding that we end our justification in freedom and authenticity of the individual), and it's this listless journey towards the already assumed ultimate foundation that I'm guarding against, while also wanting to maintain fidelity to the philosophy (since that's what makes understanding a philosophy valuable; it's that it's different and off the path we'd think of that gives it its value, at least to me).

On the whole I'd say that your interest is the right kind of interest to have. I don't think it makes sense to re-create these communities, for instance. But the ideas had a different life due to the communities, and it's that which I wish to preserve in thinking from them.

I hear you, but I think authenticity, being who you are, is a better path towards happiness than trying to live up to impossible standards, or following some else's plans for your life. There are of course limits to how far authenticity can take you. But anything can be made to look bad if taken to an extreme example. There big problem with authenticity is how do you determine who you really are? Therein lies the challenge. — Tom Storm

Here's where the dogmatic ideas can help, I think. There's a sense in which asking yourself who you really authentically are never produces an answer. I could really be either this or that. We come to embody conflicting desires. And if desire is how we normally decide, then the only choice between desires is through another desire -- conceptually what the dogmatic belief towards tranquility does is give a person who is floundering something to hold steady. After all it's not really the authentically healthy enlightened self-knowers which are asking things like "Who am I really?" (not that there are such beings), but people who are asking for some kind of answer. People like everyone, just to be clear on how many people I believe are authentically healthy enlightened self-knowers ;), but you hopefully see the point. Sometimes we are confident in who we are and have no problem. And sometimes we flounder, and so go back to the familiar answers.

Without community I think that this conceptual dogma is where we can start to get some cross-over between the ancient, dogmatic, monastic lifestyle where a master corrects a pupil, and the self-directed ethics of the modern world. In truth we'd always be free to let go of the dogma of tranquility. Why not? But, then, part of me says: I don't want to.

This might go some way to answering your objection here un:

Is this not a direct contradiction? As the therapist proverbially says, "the lightbulb has to want to change." — unenlightened

The lightbulb has to want to change, yes, but frequently the lightbulb wants to change and not to change, or to live a tranquil and simple life as well as an exciting and luxurious life. We frequently find ourselves in contradiction. If we simply don't want to change then, in a sense, we're already a step ahead because we are in unity with our desires. That's surely less anxiety-inducing than having desires which conflict, and so I think it'd follow that from an Epicurean perspective it's better to be in unity with luxurious desires which are satisfied than to be in conflict between luxurious and simple desires. There are people who want both danger and safety, and it's to them that the cure can speak to. I think what would eventually tip the scales in favor of the Epicurean ethic is fortune and fortune alone -- eventually the life of satisfying luxurious desires will come to anxiety if the person who pursues them was actually attached to them such that they were actually groundless, and their groundlessness becomes apparent in light of the inability to satisfy those desires.

But then this points out how different this way of thinking is. It's not even the luxurious desires which are evil but anxiety that springs from treating them as if they are needs when they are natural but unnecessary desires. A theoretical life which satisfied a set of luxurious desires as easily as a set of simple desires wouldn't really be an evil. It's because human life is subject to fortune, where we will have periods where we won't be able to satisfy our natural but necessary unnecessary desires, that the Epicurean advise to building a soul that's fine with the simple things in life gains its worth.

But, anyways, I thought this would go some way to addressing your charge of contradiction: we have contradictory desires, and so accepting oneself as a process for choosing which desire isn't contradictory on the part of the Epicurean, but on the part of the person who seeks a cure.

Attempting a relevant generalization here: The difference between this and Christian ethics might be that the Epicurean acknowledges a pupil's desires as a creature and then modify them such that they are more tranquil, whereas the Christian which emphasizes love acknowledges that human beings are fallen creatures, and its our capacity to love one another which overcomes this creatureliness.

(It seems a bit of a simplification, because there are other ways I could put it which emphasizes sameness, such as that right living leads to a tranquil life. It's interesting to me how different and the same these philosophies frequently are)

I'm pretty much taking your word on Lacan here. I've read people influenced by him but never took that plunge. With that being said I'd say the natural and necessary desires would stand out in Lacan's theory of desire, which are re-occurring due to the nature of life but satisfiable. But I suspect that Lacan would take these facts of hunger and thirst and say that due to their reoccurrence they are never fully satisfied. Or, perhaps, just that we have reoccurring desires is enough to generate a ceaseless sense of incompleteness.

In which case I think it'd be safe to say that Lacan's desire runs orthogonally to Epicurean desire. If desire is never satisfiable, if there's is always a lack and a sense of incompleteness, then the Epicurean cure is a fraud. You'd be making the desire for desire itself a groundless desire which cannot be satisfied.

But this is where I think the appeal to nature -- even though it's fallacious! -- is actually a strength. Running along with the philosophy as I did with Sadomaoschistic desire: Surely if the goal is tranquility then building up desires about desire would result in anxiety if our desires about desire lead us to desire things which cannot be satisfied. But if you, instead, come to live with your own nature -- in this case a ceaseless sense of incompleteness due to the nature of desire as a lack -- you can come to see that it's just a little bit of pain, and that pain isn't all that bad to deal with after all. The pain will come again, and so will go away, and the pleasure will fade away, but will come about again. — Moliere

Thank you for your response. You are correct that Lacan’s desire is incompatible with the Epicurean’s. There is no simple dichotomy for me, with a groundless desire as a lack from one side and a possibility of tranquillity and fulfillment from another. Both perspectives assume
an ahistorical, universalist nature of desire. Yet, for Lacan, any concrete desire co-exists and co-relates with the symbolic order and the primordial pre-conscious and unconscious settings (the mirror stage, etc.). He offers an elaborated modification of Freud’s theory of psychics so that an ultimate lack and ceaseless desire becomes one of the primary human conditions. I will not take sides here; I see this discussion as an opportunity to enhance my understanding. Certainly, we cannot clearly define human nature that stands independently from a concrete social situation. Even hunger and pain in certain circumstances can be experienced as satisfactory and positive. Our emotional sphere is penetrated with social forces in such a manner that even the most intimate feelings cannot be separated from collective affective impacts. To state the opposite, one should assert the exceptionality of the chosen ethical and theoretical perspective. Paradigmatic examples of the Sadomasochistic desire as an exemplary perversion and the achievement of the state of tranquillity in an ashram or Enlightenment in a Buddhist monastery show the decisive role of a particular social constellation. On the other hand, Baudrillard, Deleuze, and Guattari contend that the lack becomes the desire’s ultimate feature exclusively under the historical conditions of a capitalist society.

Thank you for your response. You are correct that Lacan’s desire is incompatible with the Epicurean’s... I will not take sides here; I see this discussion as an opportunity to enhance my understanding — Number2018

Then we're in agreement on the opportunities this discussion has. :) Comparing and contrasting would help me in my understanding too.

There is no simple dichotomy for me, with a groundless desire as a lack from one side and a possibility of tranquillity and fulfillment from another. Both perspectives assume
an ahistorical, universalist nature of desire. Yet, for Lacan, any concrete desire co-exists and co-relates with the symbolic order and the primordial pre-conscious and unconscious settings (the mirror stage, etc.). He offers an elaborated modification of Freud’s theory of psychics so that an ultimate lack and ceaseless desire becomes one of the primary human conditions.

Hrrm... groundless desire isn't just a lack, though. It's the basis of this building up of desire. For example what begins as the fear of death becomes the desire for security becomes satisfied only by obtaining enough things to fulfill your security such that you are immortal -- this is a groundless desire. Groundless desire is impossible to fulfill for the kind of creature you are, and when we continue to pursue groundless desires they can have this sort of anxiety spiral due to them being unfulfillable in principle.

There are some desires that are fairly universal like this, like the fear of death, which I think gives the Epicurean account some measure of relevance in spite of historical change. I certainly don't think that one has faded, even if we are time-bound.

It's because there are desires people have which are not universal, though, that it's important -- in the Epicurean tradition -- to attend to your desires as they can also form these anxiety spirals. So I wouldn't read Epicurus as being entirely ahistorical, either. His belief in human nature strikes me as ahistorical, but there's also a practice that people attend to whereby they assess their desires which are not universal, but still arise, in order to pursue the ones which lead to a more tranquil life.

Certainly, we cannot clearly define human nature that stands independently from a concrete social situation. Even hunger and pain in certain circumstances can be experienced as satisfactory and positive. — Number2018

This is why I emphasize the dogmatic element in the philosophy: that which is satisfactory or positive and yet increases anxiety is an evil. Yet the fourth line in the four-part cure states "Pain is easy to endure", so pain is not an evil either. Hunger and pain are simple desires which can be easily satisfied, the one from eating, the other from waiting. And while you feel pain now it will go, and you'll even feel it again, and it will go away again. It's the anxiety about hunger and pain which is the evil, not the hunger and pain. And if you pursue hunger and pain to experience satisfaction, then as long as you are not anxious in that pursuit this is merely a natural but unnecessary desire.

Our emotional sphere is penetrated with social forces in such a manner that even the most intimate feelings cannot be separated from collective affective impacts. To state the opposite, one should assert the exceptionality of the chosen ethical and theoretical perspective. Paradigmatic examples of the Sadomasochistic desire as an exemplary perversion and the achievement of the state of tranquillity in an ashram or Enlightenment in a Buddhist monastery show the decisive role of a particular social constellation.

I think the Epicurean theory gets along here, as well. Epicurus formed communities so that he could intentionally work on the most intimate feelings of others so that they could live what he believed to be better lives. His theory of human nature is ahistorical, but it includes human sociality. A person had to be removed from the social milieu in order to cure them.

On the other hand, Baudrillard, Deleuze, and Guattari contend that the lack becomes the desire’s ultimate feature exclusively under the historical conditions of a capitalist society.

Care to say more on this?

One of the advantages of moral anti-realism is that you can say to yourself from the outset that none of these are true, and so the comparison must consist in something other than establishing which of them is true. As a meta-theory it forces the ethicist to evaluate ethics on something other than the usual.

So, four moral viewpoints to think through in contradistinction to one another: Epicurean, Nietzschean, Hegelian, and Christian. Interestingly they all value freedom, the difference there is in what freedom consists of. Before I meant to simply extend Epicurus' theory of desire, but now I'm thinking a good place for comparison to begin with is what each philosophy -- at least as we might render it here (I certainly don't think I have the one and only true reading) -- is what is perversion for each.

I believe I've covered Epicurean perversion.

Nietzschean perversion is nihilism. The last man -- nihilistic, socialistic, fulfilling simple desires and obtaining good sleep -- is the ultimate perversion of value; it's the attachment to value without struggle, without the pain that makes one stronger and more able. It's using value to satisfy the human being rather than treating value as an end unto itself which must be created.

What's funny about Nietzsche in our culture now is that I think we sort of live in a world of Nietzscheans who strive to create new things for others -- on the daily there's another table breaker proving that up is down and down is up and this novel approach is better than the bad old ways. The only thing that takes away from it being truly Nietzschean is that it's ultimately just for money, and so Nietzsche would of course hate it -- the ubermensch creates values for the sake of the values in the light of nihilism, to overcome nihilism, to overcome himself (and it is a himself in Nietzsche -- the feminine, throughout his philosophy, is also a kind of perversion that needs a whip). A modern Nietzschean would say to this:
“The most perfidious way of harming a cause consists of defending it deliberately with faulty arguments.” -- and I think they'd be right. Nietzsche's moral order is on the whole unachievable by us humans. It requires the over-humans, the more-than-creatures to create values. Something like a Christ.

Christian perversion -- what isn't perverted in Christianity? The entire world is a perversion; some interpret that in a more literal sense, and some don't, but either way the world as it is -- before it has attained the Kingdom of God -- is the most perverted thing. Everything from the beginning of humanity is fallen, and it's only through the death of a God willingly taking on the sins of the world, offering a path of grace that a human being can rise above this perversion.

Hegelian perversion -- so I'd like to think -- is anarchy. Hegel's a funny ethical philosopher because he encompasses all values into a teleological order. So what could possibly be perverted, when everything has a time and a place? I put forward anarchy because I believe Hegel's vision of absolute freedom is the nation-state across the world. This would explain why there are Marxists, Liberals, and Fascists who all claim homage to Hegel: they all are politically dedicated to the nation-state. And the past, within Hegel, can be understood as slowly building towards the international order of states -- the maximum freedom -- but the modern anarchist is a perversion because they are against the telic order. On the whole I think perversion can be understood in each of the political traditions along this way: Marxists, Liberals, and Fascists each see one another as a perversion of their tradition, of the way a state ought to be structured. But for Hegel this is exactly what you'd predict and you'd be looking for the next sublation in the order of thought. But the anarchist sees no sublation, no telic order, no end. The anarchist simply doesn't want teleology or a state or a party. The anarchist demands freedom from teleology.

In listing these perversions what I'm noticing is that even the subject of perversion changes between them. For Epicurus it's desires which become perverted, at least as I'm arguing and rendering the philosophy here. For Nietzsche it's values which become perverted such that nihilism holds. For Christianity the subject of perversion is all of existence, which includes the human soul. And for Hegelian perversion it's the order and expression of the ideas in the social form which becomes perverted -- everything has a time and place, but all roads lead to Absolute Freedom.

This, in turn, has me asking the general: What is perversion?

Of course it will be relative to the examples we're considering, so it's worth noting that answering the question isn't the same as answering "What is fire?" -- there is no object, perversion, which we are defining, but rather this is an aspect of the seer, the judger, the value-er. The comparison of values above should demonstrate this as even the object which becomes perverted changes depending upon the ethics.

But I see something common: perversion is when something becomes what it ought not be, but that it can be (I want to not say: "due to its nature", but that phrase gets at what I mean). Perversion requires a duality of the un-perverted to define it. It has to be either avoidable, or overcome-able, or at least defined by another value that marks the perversion. But it also has to be tied, in some sense, to the object of perversion. A human being in a dream turning into the Eiffel Tower is absurd, but not perverted. A human being becomes perverted because they are able to be perverted due to being a human being, having a duality which is at least contrary (here meaning that it's contradictory to both want and not want the same thing, but contrary if you go back and forth between them -- you both want and not want, but can only act on one or the other want at one time). In a similar way we might say the hammer becomes perverted when it's used as a weapon; that's certainly a possibility within its capacities, but the intent of the hammer is to hammer nails or pull nails out.

I want to drop "nature" in the account, but I'm thinking that what is natural -- what the seer sees as the natural place of the object of perversion -- is what helps understand perversion in this very general sense. (upon getting closer to an actual perversion, such as the examples I've worked through, we could probably drop "nature" in some cases, but in general that seems to be the only idea that works)


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The certainty of Goodness, that we are The Good Ones, is the target of my thinking. It's not just disagreement that brings me to believe in our ignorance of the ethical -- that would be preferable to the total silence on the ethical, the absolute lack of interest in ethical thinking due to our moral certitude. But this is just a way of thinking, and not a truth. I want to emphasize that again because I think it's the most natural philosophical plank in a dialogical ethic, and a dialogic ethic should be easy to see as preferable if we take Levinas' philosophy as a good.

But for me, and this is where I think I differ most significantly from Levinas (who reads to me as a moral realist): There is no truth to be proven, no fact to justify our actions, no tablet which gives us an excuse to forego thinking ethically. But I'd like to point out that this is actually better for a dialogical perspective because that means speaking with one another on what is right and wrong, and not simply arguing for the convictions we already hold and pursue.

I want to drop "nature" in the account, but I'm thinking that what is natural -- what the seer sees as the natural place of the object of perversion -- is what helps understand perversion in this very general sense. — Moliere

I think a perversion is a kind of privation, and a privation is an absence of that which is due. What is due depends on a thing's nature. So for example, a shark with a missing fin has a privation, but a man with a missing fin has only an absence. Without some notion of what should be, we cannot distinguish privation from absence, and "nature" supplies this notion.

But that a perversion is a kind of privation does not tell us overly much. There is still something unique about the special variety of privation that is a perversion.

In a similar way we might say the hammer becomes perverted when it's used as a weapon — Moliere

Yes, it is perverse to use a hammer as a weapon. But perhaps it would be even more perverse to strangle someone with a stethoscope, for then that which was fashioned to cause health is being used to cause death. I think perversion is something like that.

Hegelian perversion -- so I'd like to think -- is anarchy. Hegel's a funny ethical philosopher because he encompasses all values into a teleological order. So what could possibly be perverted, when everything has a time and a place? I put forward anarchy because I believe Hegel's vision of absolute freedom is the nation-state across the world. This would explain why there are Marxists, Liberals, and Fascists who all claim homage to Hegel: they all are politically dedicated to the nation-state. And the past, within Hegel, can be understood as slowly building towards the international order of states -- the maximum freedom -- but the modern anarchist is a perversion because they are against the telic order. On the whole I think perversion can be understood in each of the political traditions along this way: Marxists, Liberals, and Fascists each see one another as a perversion of their tradition, of the way a state ought to be structured. But for Hegel this is exactly what you'd predict and you'd be looking for the next sublation in the order of thought. But the anarchist sees no sublation, no telic order, no end. The anarchist simply doesn't want teleology or a state or a party. The anarchist demands freedom from teleology.

I always figured Hegel's commitment to the state had to do with the lack of any extra state powers during his era. He is still living in the shadow of Westphalia and the apocalyptic conflagration that killed a significantly larger share of the German population than both World Wars combined. The state was elevated out of fear of the return to religious wars.

But if Hegel had seen the failures of the state system in the World Wars, and moreover on climate change, global inequality, ocean acidification, recalcitrant multinational mega corps, and mass migration, I think he'd come around on the idea of things like the UN, EU, AU, etc. There is a tension in his philosophy. He wants to allow particularism, but then doesn't wholeheartedly embrace federalism because he wants the state to be an organic unity. I think this is a dynamic that plays out on many levels, individual vs society, region vs whole state, state vs union of states. Most philosophers focus on the individual vs society, I think Hegel is correct to also put emphasis on this higher level, even if he fails to totally resolve the issues.

I always took his point to be: "we are only fully free to explore our particularity in the organic, stable, harmonized whole," so in the end the two do support each other more than they contradict one another.