I still can't tell. Desire as described in Anti-Oedipus is one of the theories of desire that I have in mind, though. That intersection between Marx and Freud is perfect for the question of the relationship between desire and justice.

I think that it'd be possible to accept desire as productive and still articulate a difference, though I'm not sure how it'd work out. Like I already admitted I find myself going back to thinking about desire whenever I try to articulate a relationship between desire and justice, so in practice I'm basically in the same boat at the moment.

I feel doubt at the proposition that injustice would solve itself. — Moliere

I tend to agree. In my opinion injustice creates a residual disorder in the individual and society, and this residual injustice is very hard to rectify after the fact. As an analogy, an alcoholic might get sober, but if they don't change all sorts of things about their life and their circumstances they will easily fall back into alcoholism.

I think this would depend upon how we'd read the history, honestly. Which facts are we going to emphasize in telling the story of ancient philosophy? In thinking through desire I have reasons to want to find differences -- I'm not really settled on a theory of desire so the differences stand out as important to me as a basis for judgement.

I mean, this is why I emphasize that there's more than one way to read these texts -- my rendition of Epicurus and my rendition of Aristotle definitely disagree :D . Though that does make sense of some things like that they had different schools, rather than Epicurus attending the Lyceum. I had to look up dates on the Lyceum because I wasn't sure, so I thank you for the prodding. Another thing I completely missed is that Cicero's On the Ends features a peripatetic as distinct from both Epicureanism and Stoicism!

So there are some reasons aside from my emphasis to at least think they must be different in some ways. — Moliere

That's fair. To simplify it, as an Aristotelian I tend to think in terms of virtue, and it seems to me that Epicurus would accept some of Aristotle's virtues but reject others. Specifically, they seem to more or less agree on the goodness of temperance (moderation in food, drink, sex, and externally acquired pleasures in general). But I don't think Epicurus will necessarily follow Aristotle when it comes to other virtues, such as courage, or truthfulness, or generosity. So my first impression is that Epicurus is like something of a subset of Aristotle; a simplified scheme.

Cool. So a point of agreement would be that the temperate man does not need a strong will. — Moliere

Right.

But a strong will is not necessary to overcome a disordered soul in the Epicurean philosophy. — Moliere

Well, how is akrasia overcome? I would be surprised if the depraved Epicurean becomes upright without a significant expenditure of effort and will. For example, just because his master tells him to do something, it does not follow that that something will be easy to do.

Aristotle thinks in terms of 'habits', and anyone can see that changing deeply embedded habits takes effort and will.

In part this is probably due to my emphasizing the concepts and how they fit together from the perspective of Epicurus himself; almost always the way ethical concepts fit together and the practices they inspire are not the same. I know there are more cosmopolitan Epicureans who lived after: Diogenes of Oenoanda was rich enough to have land and build an inscription which details the Epicurean philosophy because, so it claims, it lays the path to salvation. So the concepts would lead one to practice a certain way -- a way in which Epicurus did -- but later practitioners found benefit in the philosophy in spite of not following the ascetic way of life that the ideas clearly outline too. My thought on this is that there was a distinction between The Doctors -- like what Epicurus was -- and the people who learn and live the Epicurean philosophy, in a similar way that many religious communities have at least two social layers with different social rules depending upon how much influence you wield within the social organism. — Moliere

Okay, that makes sense. I think I associate Epicureanism with asceticism because Epicureans give up a great many things that most people take for granted. It is a minimalism, albeit not practiced for the sake of a religious end.

Well, how is akrasia overcome? I would be surprised if the depraved Epicurean becomes upright without a significant expenditure of effort and will. For example, just because his master tells him to do something, it does not follow that that something will be easy to do. — Leontiskos

The cure!

The way I understand it -- if the Epicurean master had a brain surgery he could perform on people that would be effective that'd be acceptable. In a way this is, for the Epicurean, a question for medical science. It's not just telling people what to do, but more or less manipulating them for their own good. It's not just a spiritual practice, it's a cure that must be performed on the human soul for their benefit.

This is what I'd say is the most uncomfortable aspect of the philosophy from my perspective -- but we do practice like this in some circumstances in our society, we just limit it to whether a person can be rightly judged to have agency. The way I'd hodge-podge these two concepts would be to say from the perspective of the Epicurean doctor you don't have agency until you've been cured because people resist the cure. It's just not their will which is being taken into consideration, but rather their happiness. (at least, in accord with the Epicurean notion of happiness)

Okay, that makes sense. I think I associate Epicureanism with asceticism because Epicureans give up a great many things that most people take for granted. It is a minimalism, albeit not practiced for the sake of a religious end. — Leontiskos

That's true!

The cure!

The way I understand it -- if the Epicurean master had a brain surgery he could perform on people that would be effective that'd be acceptable. In a way this is, for the Epicurean, a question for medical science. It's not just telling people what to do, but more or less manipulating them for their own good. It's not just a spiritual practice, it's a cure that must be performed on the human soul for their benefit.

This is what I'd say is the most uncomfortable aspect of the philosophy from my perspective -- but we do practice like this in some circumstances in our society, we just limit it to whether a person can be rightly judged to have agency. The way I'd hodge-podge these two concepts would be to say from the perspective of the Epicurean doctor you don't have agency until you've been cured because people resist the cure. It's just not their will which is being taken into consideration, but rather their happiness. (at least, in accord with the Epicurean notion of happiness) — Moliere

Okay, so in our culture we would think a lot about consent. So if you are an Epicurean doctor and I submit myself to your care then you can work your magic on me, but as soon as I withdraw my consent then it is no longer permissible for you to operate on me. If the "medicine" is onerous then I will be liable to withdraw consent, and thus continence will be necessary, no? And this isn't such a new idea; folks have been running away from doctors and asylums long before the dawn of the age of consent. :wink:

As to the passive/active question, could a brain surgery really rectify my behavior and make me happy? (Perhaps this is just the pharmaceutical question in a different guise.)

Finally, Epicureanism has been around for millennia, and has not had access to brain surgeries or potent, ongoing medication. What have the Epicurean doctors been doing for these millennia? Have they found ways to operate on and transform souls without any effort or difficulty on the part of the soul? This is where my skepticism swells.

Okay, so in our culture we would think a lot about consent. So if you are an Epicurean doctor and I submit myself to your care then you can work your magic on me, but as soon as I withdraw my consent then it is no longer permissible for you to operate on me. If the "medicine" is onerous then I will be liable to withdraw consent, and thus continence will be necessary, no? — Leontiskos

Hrmm, not if the cure is making you happier, I'd imagine.

Or here we are -- if you withdraw consent then this is just a failure on the part of the doctor to administer the cure. "Fault" here not in an ethical sense, but rather in an exploratory sense -- if we find a person who is resistant to the cure then we have more to overcome.

What have the Epicurean doctors been doing for these millennia? Have they found ways to operate on and transform souls without any effort or difficulty on the part of the soul? This is where my skepticism swells. — Leontiskos

Well, first I'd say that there no longer exist Epicureans in this manner where there were schools and such. This way of life is a dead way of life, and so asking after their practices is something of an academic exercise already. At most today we have people who are inspired by the writings, but nothing so organized as it was.

It seems to me that they operated on similar principles that other churches do: forming communities which reinforce and teaches norms and sets the people who are within that community outside of the social milieu to which they originally belonged such that the social organism comes to influence the person to adopt the way of life. It's a church, more or less, and they were like priests.

But then we're left with an ancient record to piece these things together, and I'm certain that just like any church there were people who did not get along with the cure. That is I share your skepticism that they had such a cure. But the philosophy around how to treat a sick soul is still quite different: it's not their lack of willpower, but a lack of knowledge on the part of the administrator of the cure. In a way the person who is not cured is morally ignorant -- you cannot expect them to behave in accord with right living because they're still attached to wrong living.

Hrmm, not if the cure is making you happier, I'd imagine.

Or here we are -- if you withdraw consent then this is just a failure on the part of the doctor to administer the cure. "Fault" here not in an ethical sense, but rather in an exploratory sense -- if we find a person who is resistant to the cure then we have more to overcome. — Moliere

But aren't cures almost always painful? And won't patients need to accept and tolerate pain if they want to be cured? I don't track your idea that the cure will be painless, or that a doctor treats a patient without any cooperation on the part of the patient. I mostly think that Epicurus will require Aristotle's continence, unless perhaps he has a cure the likes of which the world has never seen!

(Churches require continence as well, e.g. Romans 7:21-25)

But aren't cures almost always painful? And won't patients need to accept and tolerate pain if they want to be cured? I don't track your idea that the cure will be painless, or that a doctor treats a patient without any cooperation on the part of the patient. I mostly think that Epicurus will require Aristotle's continence, unless perhaps he has a cure the likes of which the world has never seen! — Leontiskos

Hrmm, not painless, I agree with that -- Lucretius' poem talks about how the cure is painful, and the reason to put it into poetry was to sweeten it in the same way that you sweeten medicine for children when they don't want to take it; so the literature supports that the cure is painful, but is more pleasurable in the long term given that the anxious mind is what is being cured. And I think one has to want a cure in order for it to work its magic -- you have to agree that the pain you feel now is worth getting rid of, and it's this point that I think most would pass over an Epicurean ethic: "you mean that this exciting life is painful? Sign me up for more pain!" would be a common refrain.

But such a person isn't expected to just act on themselves, for instance -- Alcoholics Anonymous is similar in this regard. The community is what provides support for people to change their behavior for the better, after having acknowledged that there is a problem. And here this is important because it's not an individual's willpower which is at fault for alcoholism, as if they could only conjure more willpower then they'd be able to resist the urge; if anything that image is exactly what's in the way of finding a realistic path to changing one's behavior, by all accounts!

Rather there must be some way that a community can help an individual who is lacking in this capacity, and the failure of the individual is a failure on the part of the community to provide enough support. The question becomes: How do we help this person become happy, given that they are unable?

This gets along with the notion that ought implies can, but while acknowledging psychological or behavioral limits of individuals; it's not a lack of willpower, though a presence of willpower would surely make the doctor's task easier, it's that this person requires something more than willpower (given their total inability in that regard).

it's not a lack of willpower, though a presence of willpower would surely make the doctor's task easier, it's that this person requires something more than willpower (given their total inability in that regard). — Moliere

I think you are describing Aristotelian continence. The value of continence does not reside in the idea that willpower suffices for happiness.

Again, for Aristotle the route for the depraved person is <depravity $\to$ incontinence $\to$ continence $\to$ temperance>. I have been presenting it as the idea that willpower is necessary (but not sufficient) to move from depravity to temperance.

The only thing I disagree with is "total inability." They must be able and willing to undergo the painful cure, and this requires willpower. More than willpower is needed, but without willpower they cannot be cured. Those with a total inability would not commit to the cure, attend the AA meetings, etc. Again, temperance is the goal, not continence, and temperance is not a matter of willpower. For Aristotle continence is not even a virtue, because it is not good in itself.

The overemphasis on willpower is presumably a descendant of Puritanism.

I think you are describing Aristotelian continence. The value of continence does not reside in the idea that willpower suffices for happiness. — Leontiskos

Fair enough -- if what I'm describing is, in fact, Aristotelian then the distinction between the thinkers isn't as important to me as the line of thought itself.

Let's say that this emphasis on willpower is a common belief, that I have heard it attributed it Aristotle's psychology (in the sense of having authority due to Aristotelian roots), and that I believe this is a bad way of thinking about how human beings change their behaviors. It seems what you're saying is that this is an incorrect way of understanding Aristotle, so fair enough -- then I misunderstand Aristotle.

The overemphasis on willpower is presumably a descendant of Puritanism. — Leontiskos

Now that's very plausible to me. A misreading of Aristotle through a popular ethic is probably what I'm contending with in my little mental games in thinking the difference between them. But here I still think there's a point to be made, in spite of all this.

The only thing I disagree with is "total inability." They must be able and willing to undergo the painful cure, and this requires willpower. More than willpower is needed, but without willpower they cannot be cured. Those with a total inability would not commit to the cure, attend the AA meetings, etc. Again, temperance is the goal, not continence, and temperance is not a matter of willpower. For Aristotle continence is not even a virtue, because it is not good in itself. — Leontiskos

Why would you disagree with "total inability"? Isn't that the actual problem case that I'm talking about? From the perspective of the doctor, at least, the one who gets themselves to the AA meetings and undergoes change because they realize they have a problem and they need help -- that's the case that's already solved itself. From the perspective of the Epicurean doctor the person who doesn't attend the meetings, that cannot stop themselves from pursuing anxious desire -- those are the cases that need the most help.

Fair enough -- if what I'm describing is, in fact, Aristotelian then the distinction between the thinkers isn't as important to me as the line of thought itself.

Let's say that this emphasis on willpower is a common belief, that I have heard it attributed it Aristotle's psychology (in the sense of having authority due to Aristotelian roots), and that I believe this is a bad way of thinking about how human beings change their behaviors. It seems what you're saying is that this is an incorrect way of understanding Aristotle, so fair enough -- then I misunderstand Aristotle. — Moliere

Sure. There may be some differences, but I tend to think you are overstating them. The Aristotelian tradition is not at all will-centered in my opinion. Of course that doesn't mean that it might not involve a greater emphasis on the will than Epicureanism.

Why would you disagree with "total inability"? Isn't that the actual problem case that I'm talking about? From the perspective of the doctor, at least, the one who gets themselves to the AA meetings and undergoes change because they realize they have a problem and they need help -- that's the case that's already solved itself. From the perspective of the Epicurean doctor the person who doesn't attend the meetings, that cannot stop themselves from pursuing anxious desire -- those are the cases that need the most help. — Moliere

I am saying that the person who doesn't go to the doctor will never be cured, and no one who sees a doctor has a total inability. In the general case I think there needs to be some baseline of willpower in order to seek the cure in the first place. I want to say that the doctor-patient relation is synergistic.

The Aristotelian tradition is not at all will-centered in my opinion. Of course that doesn't mean that it might not involve a greater emphasis on the will than Epicureanism. — Leontiskos

Well, which is it, do you think? Are they the same or are they different?

I am saying that the person who doesn't go to the doctor will never be cured, and no one who sees a doctor has a total inability. In the general case I think there needs to be some baseline of willpower in order to seek the cure in the first place. I want to say that the doctor-patient relation is synergistic. — Leontiskos

And I am saying I don't believe there must be willpower in place for someone to desire change. I'd go so far as to say a person has to want change, but that there are those without willpower and those are the cases in the most need of help.

Willpower is an odd concept -- what is it to act against an inclination other than to be inclined this way? And I'd say some people are so abled, so inclined, and some are not. But the doctor doesn't just say "Well, that guy was born to be sick", but acknowledges difference and gets to work. If they don't go see the doctor, for instance, the doctor can go see them.

Well, which is it, do you think? Are they the same or are they different? — Moliere

I wouldn't doubt that they are different, but it is not right to say they are so different that for Aristotle willpower suffices for happiness. He certainly does not think that. I don't know enough about Epicurus to say where the exact differences lie.

And I am saying I don't believe there must be willpower in place for someone to desire change. I'd go so far as to say a person has to want change, but that there are those without willpower and those are the cases in the most need of help. — Moliere

I'd say that to want change is to exercise willpower.

Willpower is an odd concept -- what is it to act against an inclination other than to be inclined this way? And I'd say some people are so abled, so inclined, and some are not. — Moliere

I think that if willpower is anything it is an expression of agency, and to confuse agency with an inclination is not right. The agent and their will is what stands over inclinations.

If they don't go see the doctor, for instance, the doctor can go see them. — Moliere

Perhaps, but in this case we are talking about a fundamentally different reality.

Let me put it this way. For Aristotle happiness is an activity. It is bound up with a person's agency. To say that a doctor could perform a brain surgery and make someone happy is to make happiness a passivity, a kind of imposable state. A contemporary objection to this idea comes in the form of the "experience machine," which would make one utterly "happy" and is nevertheless rejected.

I wouldn't doubt that they are different, but it is not right to say they are so different that for Aristotle willpower suffices for happiness. He certainly does not think that. I don't know enough about Epicurus to say where the exact differences lie. — Leontiskos

Fair. I clearly don't either.

Thanks for pointing it out: now rather than just some random thought I have some questions and readings for figuring out the questions!

I'd say that to want change is to exercise willpower. — Leontiskos

I think that if willpower is anything it is an expression of agency, and to confuse agency with an inclination is not right. The agent and their will is what stands over inclinations. — Leontiskos

Interesting!

So clearly there are some differences in thought on willpower, at least if we take your reading of Aristotle and my reading of Epicurus as a starting point of comparison. At least this seems to me to be a clear point of disagreement in how we're thinking right now.

Perhaps, but in this case we are talking about a fundamentally different reality.

Let me put it this way. For Aristotle happiness is an activity. It is bound up with a person's agency. To say that a doctor could perform a brain surgery and make someone happy is to make happiness a passivity, a kind of imposable state. A contemporary objection to this idea comes in the form of the "experience machine," which would make one utterly "happy" and is nevertheless rejected. — Leontiskos

Hrrrm... I'm wondering to what extent that their theories of happiness are also at odds, or if it makes sense to say that Epicurus' theory of happiness is an activity -- but a different activity. Your assertions have caused doubt in my understanding of Aristotle, though, so I acknowledge that I'd have to do more homework to make an assertion either way here.

I'm wondering to what extent we could make the claim that ataraxia is a state of mind or an activity -- I know that the passive/active distinction was shared among philosophers at the time, but I'd have to go do homework to feel confident in making an assertion either way.

Thanks for pointing it out: now rather than just some random thought I have some questions and readings for figuring out the questions! — Moliere

Sure. :up:

Interesting!

So clearly there are some differences in thought on willpower, at least if we take your reading of Aristotle and my reading of Epicurus as a starting point of comparison. At least this seems to me to be a clear point of disagreement in how we're thinking right now. — Moliere

Yes, well those comments about willpower were not really Aristotelian, haha. I was just applying my own notion from common sense. I suppose I would want ask, if willpower is just an inclination, then why do we give it a special name? What is distinctive about it?

Speaking specifically about Aristotle, this question of the will gets tricky. In some ways it would be safe to say that for Aristotle a dog pursues its desires through its mobility, its five senses, etc. The human being, in addition to these, pursues its desires through reason. So Aristotelians sometimes speak of the will as the "rational appetite," or the "appetitive reason," or something like that. In any case, it is the aspect of the human being which is bound up with desire and "movement."

Hrrrm... I'm wondering to what extent that their theories of happiness are also at odds, or if it makes sense to say that Epicurus' theory of happiness is an activity -- but a different activity. Your assertions have caused doubt in my understanding of Aristotle, though, so I acknowledge that I'd have to do more homework to make an assertion either way here. — Moliere

For Aristotle virtue is a disposition towards acting well, and to act well—to exercise one's powers and faculties in an optimal manner and towards the proper goals—is to be happy. Someone who possesses the dispositions (virtues) but never exercises them is not happy.

I'm wondering to what extent we could make the claim that ataraxia is a state of mind or an activity -- I know that the passive/active distinction was shared among philosophers at the time, but I'd have to go do homework to feel confident in making an assertion either way. — Moliere

Yes, that would be interesting to know.