Most contemporary philosophers of mind employ a Cartesian conceptual space in which reality is (at least potentially) divided into res extensa and res cogitans. — Dfpolis

Really? How contemporary is contemporary? Most people are monists these days, no?

Well, not most people (they're more sensible), but most philosophers of mind are monists. I was not saying they are dualists, but that they use Cartesian categories to frame their arguments. Dennett's "Cartesian Theater" is an obvious example. Very few think there are unified beings than can act both physically and intentionally. Instead they ask themselves whether thinking stuff is a possibility, and if so, how it interacts with extended stuff. It is the imposition of disjoint concepts, not the reality of psychophysical humans, that is the source of the problem. There is no intrinsic problem with one being acting in different ways.

I have been exploring this question from the perspective of Aristotelian-Thomist (A-T) philosophy. I have been introduced to that by readings of Edward Feser and Jacques Maritain among others. I agree with your criticism of Cartesian dualism, which posits two fundamentally different kinds of substances. This dualistic framework, while addressing certain epistemological concerns of Descartes' time, inadvertently raised further metaphysical issues. Specifically, if the mind and body are so fundamentally different, how do they interact, especially in a mechanistic universe? The conflation of the Latin 'subtantia' as a translation of Aristotle's 'ouisia' with the everyday meaning of 'substance' has also been calamitous, giving rise to the oxymoron 'spiritual substance'.

This leads directly to criticisms like Ryle's "ghost in the machine" argument. By positing the mind (or soul) as a distinct substance, Cartesian dualism opens itself up to the critique of introducing an inexplicable, ethereal entity within the machine-like workings of the physical world.

So far, so good. But I'm not entirely on board with your description of physics and maths as being solely grounded in abstraction. Of course, abstraction is involved, but there is more to both than only that.

I've learned that hylomorphic dualism offers a different perspective. The soul is not a separate "thing" or "substance" in the way Cartesian dualism conceives it. Instead, it is the form of the body—a principle of organization, a blueprint. The rational element of this soul (nous) is dynamic, intimately involved in the act of knowing. When the intellect grasps the form of a particular, it is united with it (in the sense of knowing its essence). So in hylomorphic dualism, there's no need for an ethereal, ghostly substance to interact with the physical world because the soul, especially its rational component, is already intimately intermingled with the world through the processes of cognition and understanding. The soul's entwinement with the body doesn't necessitate a metaphysically problematic "interaction" because they aren't two completely separate realms to begin with.This makes the hylomorphic conception of the soul much more integrative and less prone to the pitfalls of Cartesian dualism.

It also depicts the intellect (nous) as that which is capable of grasping meaning. It is not a kind of 'substance' but a type of ability - unique, as far as we know, to h. sapiens (if present in rudimentary form in some other species). And it is an aspect of that intellectual faculty which enables mathematical abstraction in the first place, which is what has made mathematical physics so powerful and predictive. (On these grounds, I'm not persuaded by the various relativist or fictionalist accounts of mathematics.)

In the picture I'm drawing, abstractions (such as number) are indeed real - but they're not phenomenally existent. Rational sentient beings are able to grasp these ideas due to their power of insight and intelligence. But through that faculty, they are able to gain insight into a realm above and beyond that defined by the laws of physics alone. (This is reason why naturalist philosophers will generally deprecate platonic realism concerning number.)

So I'm in agreement in some respects, but not in others. I basically agree with your diagnosis of the shortcomings of Cartesian dualism, and its consequences, but I think there is an alternative philosophy of mind that also does justice to the power of mathematics and science, without succumbing to materialism.

I've learned that hylomorphic dualism offers a different perspective. The soul is not a separate "thing" or "substance" in the way Cartesian dualism conceives it. Instead, it is the form of the body—a principle of organization, a blueprint. — Wayfarer

If the soul, as the form of the body, is the blueprint, or principle of organization, and the living body comes into existence as an organized body, then the soul must be prior to the living body, as cause of it, and therefore a separate thing.

a separate thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

Or ‘principle’. Beware reifications in this matter.

If the "principle" has a separate existence can't we call it a "thing"?

But to the point of the op, @Dfpolis, doesn't this separate existence, whether its called a principle or a thing, necessitate dualism? I mean we are saying that the soul is prior to, and therefore separate from the body, how we categorize it, as "substance", "principle", or "thing", doesn't seem very relevant to the point that this separation seems to necessitate a dualism. And how this separate "principle" or whatever we call it, the soul, manages to produce an organized body would be the interaction problem in a nutshell.

If the "principle" has a separate existence can't we call it a "thing"? — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm dubious about that but I won't divert DFpolis' thread until he's responded further.

Thank you for commenting. In the paper I published in January, I take the position you suggest, offering hylomorphism as providing a better conceptual space than Cartesian dualism. I just finished a draft of "How the Agent Intellect Works," which proposes a different model than that of Aquinas. (If you would like a chance to comment, message me.)

My ideas on abstraction as the basis of science come from Aquinas's Commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius, Maritain's Philosophy of Nature, and Whitehead's Science and the Modern World. Please expand on why you disagree.

Perhaps I don't! This is new territory to me - having been studying philosophy under my own steam for a good while, the fact that I find A-T philosophy persuasive has come as something of a surprise. Anyway, carry on, I hope there are others here who will provide further comment, I will continue to read.

If the soul, as the form of the body, is the blueprint, or principle of organization, and the living body comes into existence as an organized body, then the soul must be prior to the living body, as cause of it, and therefore a separate thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

Aristotle defines the soul is the first actuality of a potentially living body (De Anima ii, 1, 412b28). ("First actuality" is being operational. "Second actuality" is operating.) Aquinas accepts this definition. What is ontologically prior is God's intention to create whatever He creates. No actuality can be prior to the existent of which it is the actuality.

doesn't this separate existence, whether its called a principle or a thing, necessitate dualism? — Metaphysician Undercover

If it were a separate entity, we would have dualism. It is not. A "principle" is the source (arche) of a concept. Consider the actuality and potential of an acorn. Its actuality (eidos = form) is being a kind of nut. Its potential (hyle = timber, poorly as translated "matter") is to be an oak tree. These are not two substances joined in some way, but one thing considered in two ways. So, human souls are actual human beings, while human "matter" is our potential to be planting soil for daisies.

No actuality can be prior to the existent of which it is the actuality. — Dfpolis

This is inconsistent with Aristotle's Metaphysics. A thing is necessarily the thing which it is and cannot not be the thing it is, by the law of identity. And "a thing" is not a random disorderly existence. So when a thing comes into existence it necessarily has a cause of being the thing it is, and not something else. This cause is the form of the thing, which pre-exists in time, the material existence of the thing. Therefore the form of a thing (its actuality, as what it actually will be) must be prior in time to the material existence of the thing, as cause of it being the very thing that it is, and not something else.

If it were a separate entity, we would have dualism. It is not. A "principle" is the source (arche) of a concept. Consider the actuality and potential of an acorn. Its actuality (eidos = form) is being a kind of nut. Its potential (hyle = timber, poorly as translated "matter") is to be an oak tree. These are not two substances joined in some way, but one thing considered in two ways. So, human souls are actual human beings, while human "matter" is our potential to be planting soil for daisies. — Dfpolis

I think you misrepresent "potential" here. The potential of an acorn is not "to be an oak tree", because "an oak tree" is a form. Potential is better represented as the capacity to be or not be. And since potential encompasses many possibilities, it cannot be restricted by one specific thing, such as your statement, "an oak tree". What restricts the potential (matter) of the acorn in this way, such that we might say it may either become or not become an oak tree, rather than a maple or something else, is the form of the acorn. So your statement "to be an oak tree" does not represent the matter of the acorn, it represents the form of the acorn, as that which restricts the matter to specific possibilities.

Furthermore, this form which is put into the acorn, which restricts its potential in that way, is prior to the material existence of the acorn, as Wayfairer indicated with, "a principle of organization, or blueprint". So it is very clear that the form of the acorn "a kind of nut", which restricts the potential (matter) of the acorn so that the possibilities for what it may become are limited, pre-exists the material existence of the acorn. This form is derived from the parent oak tree which produces the nut.

Therefore the form of the acorn pre-exists the material existence of the acorn, and acts (as an actuality) to direct the coming into being of the material acorn such that the potential (matter) of the acorn is limited in the particular way that it is. This pre-existence of the form of the acorn, as prior in time to the acorn, therefore separate from the acorn, is what we need to deal with as implying the requirement for dualism.

Consider the actuality and potential of an acorn. Its actuality (eidos = form) is being a kind of nut. Its potential (hyle = timber, poorly as translated "matter") is to be an oak tree. — Dfpolis

I guess you refer to planting an acorn in order to grow an oak tree. (What else?) Like planting sperm in an uterus, an action that will (hopefully) result in the growing of human body.
Well, the sperm is not a potential human body. It needs to be united, combined with other organic stuff for an embryo to be created. Same thing with seeds and plants.

But even if sperm is potentially a human body, i.e. the same thing in different development stages, they are both matter. Their relation could not be considered as soul and body or mind and body, a relation from which the subject of dualism arises. Am I right?

BTW, nice handling of the ancient Greek language ... :smile:

when a thing comes into existence it necessarily has a cause of being the thing it is, and not something else. — Metaphysician Undercover

Indeed it does, but a being's own form/actuality cannot be a prior cause because nothing is actual until it exists. What is prior is a being's matter, its efficient cause, and its telos or end. Thus, the efficient cause, working on specific matter for a specific end produces a specific form or actuality.

To defend your position, you need to explain how a thing can be actual before it is. I think you are confusing two meanings of "form." An artisan has a "form" in mind before she produces her work, but that "form" is not the "form" (actuality) of the finished product, but her intention, i.e. an end (final cause). In the same way, the laws of nature, which are intentional realities, act on prior states produce final states.

since potential encompasses many possibilities, it cannot be restricted by one specific thing, such as your statement, "an oak tree". — Metaphysician Undercover

You are confusing the hyle of artificial processes, where the clay or wood can become many things, with that of natural processes, which is determinate. (See my hyle paper.) An acorn has a determinate potential. It will never sprout into a pine or a stalk of wheat.

So your statement "to be an oak tree" does not represent the matter of the acorn, it represents the form of the acorn, as that which restricts the matter to specific possibilities. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, an acorn is not an actual (operational) oak tree, but a potential one. If you never saw one spout and did not know where it came from, you would not know that its end is to become an oak tree.

So it is very clear that the form of the acorn "a kind of nut", which restricts the potential (matter) of the acorn so that the possibilities for what it may become are limited, pre-exists the material existence of the acorn. — Metaphysician Undercover

Every creature has a prior creative intention in the mind of God. But, that is a metaphysical, not a physical, explanation. Physically, the form of an acorn is the foundation for the form of the oak into which it may sprout, but, being the foundation for a form is not being the form. It is being a potential.

This pre-existence of the form of the acorn, as prior in time to the acorn, therefore separate from the acorn, is what we need to deal with as implying the requirement for dualism. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is confused. What is ontologically, not temporally, prior is God's creative intent. But, God is simple, having no intrinsic diversity. What allows us to speak of distinct "exemplar" ideas in God is the fact that ideas are relational -- relating God, Who is simple, to creation, which is not. So, the Divine exemplars are diversified by terminating in diverse creatures, not by any diversity in the mind of God. Thus, without actual, existing creatures, there are no distinct exemplars. Since exemplars are inseparable from the actuality of the exemplified creatures, there is no dualism.

Well, the sperm is not a potential human body. It needs to be united, combined with other organic stuff for an embryo to be created. Same thing with seeds and plants. — Alkis Piskas

Of course, more is required. Still acorns grow into mature oaks, not pines or oats.

But even if sperm is potentially a human body, i.e. the same thing in different development stages, they are both matter. Their relation could not be considered as soul and body or mind and body, a relation from which the subject of dualism arises. Am I right? — Alkis Piskas

The problem is that there are two traditions about souls. One is dualistic, and followed by Plato, Augustine and Descartes. The other is non-dualistic, and followed by Aristotle and Aquinas. In De Anima II, Aristotle argues against the idea of a separate soul, and concludes, essentially, that "to have a soul" and "to be alive" mean the same thing. He formulates this by defining the psyche (soul) as "the first actuality of a potentially living body." "First actuality" is being operational, which, for organisms, is being alive. Under this definition, every living thing has a soul, but not in the dualistic sense. Aristotle's psyche carries no mental implications, except in humans because human life involves thinking.

Since to have a soul is to be a living being, there is no separate addition to visible a human being (which is a tode ti = "this something" -- Aristotle's definition of a substance). In other words, one substance performs both physical and mental acts. Aristotle held that our ability to think (nous = intellect), was uniquely human, but not separate.

Still, not separate in life does not exclude separability at death, and Aristotle seemed to believe that the active or agent intellect was separable. Aquinas certainly did.

BTW, nice handling of the ancient Greek language ... — Alkis Piskas

Thank you.

What does your theory have to say about machine consciousness?

he problem is that there are two traditions about souls. One is dualistic, and followed by Plato, Augustine and Descartes. The other is non-dualistic, and followed by Aristotle and Aquinas. — Dfpolis

Right. (And I guess there are others too in both camps.)
All this is quite interesting.
(BTW, I'm leaning towards Platon. And I'm a pro-Socrates. Although I have never alalyzed or examined them from a "dualistic" point of view.)

Well, chatGPT can almost pass the Turing test, but as Turing said, his test is just a game. It does not prove that machines have consciousness, just that they can fool people.

The problem is that natural science is based on a third person perspective and the resulting data, while being conscious is only experienced from a first person perspective. Because of this, there is no way to use natural science deduce consciousness as the effect of some physical process. At best, we would have a correlation, as we do between certain types of brain states and types of qualia.

Anything a computer does, including outputting "I am conscious," can be explained physically, i.e. in terms the third person perspective. If a device were to behave in way that we could not so explain, it would not be a computer, because we know what they do and how they do it.

You could not design such a device using physics or math because physics does not predict mental effects and computations produce quantities, not ideas. It is only when we look at the results that ideas are formed.

If some device were conscious, we could never it know for sure. We only know other people are conscious by analogy -- they are structured and act like we do, so they must be like us. A device would not be structured like us, and so we could not understanding it from a first person perspective. So, how we could we know it is conscious?

(BTW, I'm leaning towards Platon. And I'm a pro-Socrates. Although I have never alalyzed or examined them from a "dualistic" point of view.) — Alkis Piskas

Why take one human and divide her into two separate parts?

Most contemporary philosophers of mind employ a Cartesian conceptual space in which reality is (at least potentially) divided into res extensa and res cogitans. Then, they ask: how res cogitans could possibly interact with res extensa? — Dfpolis

Spinoza already solved this Cartesian puzzle. There are not two substances, extensa and cogitans, but one substance seen under two attributes. This renders the interaction problem moot.

:up:

Spinoza already solved this Cartesian puzzle. There are not two substances, extensa and cogitans, but one substance seen under two attributes. This renders the interaction problem moot. — Janus

He was anticipated by Aristotle, Aquinas and others in the Aristotelian tradition.

I'll phrase this differently to what I usually say:

The interaction of res cogitans and res extensa was a problem during the 17th century and before, obviously most explicitly formulated by Descartes, whom had good reasons to do so at the time.

But then Newton came along and showed, much to his dismay, that the concept of matter, not thought, but matter, was not the matter that exists in the world.

What vanished, contrary to popular history, was the machine, the ghost remained intact, and still is around for us to deal with.

So whatever remains of the world, thought is a part of that. We could call what remains ghostly matter or naturalism, it's terminological.

So, we are a creature made of world stuff, thought being one of the properties world stuff has. Gravity, electromagnetism, nervous systems, metabolism, in short everything is a different manifestation of this world stuff.

But we have this strange, maybe innate, tendency to treat mind and matter as if these were fundamentally opposite things, but they're not.

Indeed it does, but a being's own form/actuality cannot be a prior cause because nothing is actual until it exists. What is prior is a being's matter, its efficient cause, and its telos or end. Thus, the efficient cause, working on specific matter for a specific end produces a specific form or actuality. — Dfpolis

The telos or end as the intent of the designer, is actual, and prior to the material existence of the thing. This is Wayfarer's principle, or blueprint. The blueprint, or design of the thing, as a form, is actual and prior to the individual material thing. Further, there must be continuity between the form as design, and the form in the individual thing, to avoid the interaction problem. These must be one and the same form, or else we have the so-called interaction problem.

The artist who is "working on specific matter for a specific end" with the means of efficient causation, must actually put the form into the matter. Otherwise there is a separation, a gap, between the form as design and the form within the individual object. This gap denies the possibility of the telos or end being causal. If there is a gap between the form as desired end, and the form as individual object (outcome), there is no causation between the two, and the telos or end is not causal.

So the gap is filled with "efficient cause". The efficient causes are the means. But still there appears to be a difference between the form as design, and the form within the individual, the material object as outcome. The difference is attributed to accidents, and the accidents are the influence of the matter which is chosen by the artist.

Now the question is whether the influence of matter, and the resulting accidents, renders the form of the individual as a distinct form, or is it just a change of form, allowing the form to maintain its identity as the same form, in the way that a changing object maintains its identity as the same object, by the law of identity. I believe that we must allow for the temporal continuity of "the same form", or else there is an interaction problem, a gap between the form as intent, and the form as outcome. But when we allow for this continuity which I am describing, we also admit to independent forms, as the form is then prior to its material existence, therefore independent.

To defend your position, you need to explain how a thing can be actual before it is. I think you are confusing two meanings of "form." An artisan has a "form" in mind before she produces her work, but that "form" is not the "form" (actuality) of the finished product, but her intention, i.e. an end (final cause). In the same way, the laws of nature, which are intentional realities, act on prior states produce final states. — Dfpolis

As I said above, if we do not allow that the form in the artist's mind, and the form of the artist's finished work, are one and the same form, there is a gap between the two which produces an interaction problem. So, in common understanding, we say that the form is brought from the artist's mind, and put into the medium, through the means of efficient causes. Therefore, the intermediary, efficient causation, solves any interaction problem. However, if we deny the continuity between the form in the artist's mind, and the form in the work of art, then we cannot say that the artist takes the form from one's mind and puts it into the medium, through the means of efficient causation. And then we have an implied interaction problem between the form in the mind, and the form in the work of art.

Every creature has a prior creative intention in the mind of God. But, that is a metaphysical, not a physical, explanation. Physically, the form of an acorn is the foundation for the form of the oak into which it may sprout, but, being the foundation for a form is not being the form. It is being a potential. — Dfpolis

The problem here is that physics does not deal with telos, ends, and intention, but metaphysics does. So if the reality of the situation is that telos and intention are causal, and you reject the explanation as metaphysical rather than physical, you are going in the wrong direction. Physics cannot give an explanation for this, but metaphysics can. Therefore you ought to consider the metaphysical explanation , and forget about your desire for a physical explanation.

This is confused. What is ontologically, not temporally, prior is God's creative intent. — Dfpolis

What I am saying is that the oak tree has creative intent when it produces the acorn. It must, because the purpose of the acorn is to produce another oak tree, and intent is defined as purpose. So there is no need to refer to "God's creative intent" at this point, we need only look at the oak tree's creative intent. However, there will be a problem of infinite regress, or a first living being, and at this point we might be inclined to turn to God.

The blueprint, or design of the thing, as a form, is actual and prior to the individual material thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

I believe this is the point already addressed:

If it were a separate entity, we would have dualism. It is not. A "principle" is the source (arche) of a concept. — Dfpolis

The form, idea or principle is not something that exists - at least, in the sense that a particular exists. The intelligible form of particulars is a universal.

Which leads me to this:

A thing is necessarily the thing which it is and cannot not be the thing it is, by the law of identity. — Metaphysician Undercover

In Aristotelian and classical philosophy, the law of identity is a logical law that is general and not tied specifically to particulars.

We've argued about that many times, I'd be interested in @Dfpolis' interpretation.

Please expand on why you disagree. — Dfpolis

OK, here is the question that has occupied my philosophical quest for decades. It concerns the reality of universals. With your background and interests, I presume you hold to realism concerning universals. Am I right in that? What interests me is what it means to say that universals are real - because they don't exist as do phenomenal objects (the proverbial rocks, apples and trees.) Do you see what I'm getting at? Is this a topic for discussion in the sources you're aware of?

:up:

He was anticipated by Aristotle, Aquinas and others in the Aristotelian tradition. — Dfpolis

Spinoza's idea of substance was very different than Aristotle's. Not sure about Aquinas' since I am little familiar with his writings.

Why take one human and divide her into two separate parts? — Dfpolis

(I think you have just disclosed your gender! :smile:)

We don't divide a human into two parts. A human has two parts.

(Everyone with one's own view on the subject, of course. But mine is stronger! :grin:)

These must be one and the same form, or else we have the so-called interaction problem. — Metaphysician Undercover

No. You cannot have an interaction between a prior intention and its instantiation anymore than a line can interact with its terminal point. First, the intention to create terminates once the object is created, and second, a form as plan is not a form as actuality. If they were, we would have an actuality whenever we had a plan.

f there is a gap between the form as desired end, and the form as individual object (outcome), there is no causation between the two, and the telos or end is not causal. — Metaphysician Undercover

True, but that continuity does not make a plan the same as an actuality.

The difference is attributed to accidents, and the accidents are the influence of the matter which is chosen by the artist. — Metaphysician Undercover

We must not confuse accidents as unplanned outcomes with metaphysical accidents, which are notes of intelligibility that inhere in, and can be predicated of, the the whole. It is not unplanned accidents that make a thing actual, but the efficient cause implementing the plan. Accidents inhering in a being cannot be prior to that being. Matter as potential is prior, but once we have an actuality, all accidents belong to that actuality or form. For a human artisan, the actuality may depart from the plan because of the stuff used, but that is not the reason a plan is not an actuality.

Now the question is whether the influence of matter, and the resulting accidents, renders the form of the individual as a distinct form, or is it just a change of form, allowing the form to maintain its identity as the same form, in the way that a changing object maintains its identity as the same object, by the law of identity. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, if plans were identically actual beings, every time we made a plan, we would automatically make a reality. That would make cars and houses much cheaper.

if we do not allow that the form in the artist's mind, and the form of the artist's finished work, are one and the same form, there is a gap between the two which produces an interaction problem. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, no. The mental form part of the process of execution. There is no gap because that process terminates in the executed reality. If there were a gap, it would mean that were were finished making the thing before it became actual, a contradiction.

The problem here is that physics does not deal with telos, ends, and intention, but metaphysics does. — Metaphysician Undercover

It does deal with ends, it just calls them "final states"; however, it does not deal with them as intentional.

Physics cannot give an explanation for this, but metaphysics can. — Metaphysician Undercover

They both explain, but at different levels. Each level involves a different degree of abstraction, and so the explanations are complementary, not contradictory or even competitive.

What I am saying is that the oak tree has creative intent when it produces the acorn. — Metaphysician Undercover

But, it cannot, because it has no mind. God has a creative intent. It is manifest in the laws of nature which guide the transformation of the acorn's potential into an oak.[quote="Metaphysician

Undercover;844673"]at this point we might be inclined to turn to God.[/quote]
We have to turn to God immediately because oaks do not have minds, and we need a mind as a source of intentionality.

With your background and interests, I presume you hold to realism concerning universals. Am I right in that? — Wayfarer

I am a moderate realist. That means I think universals do not have a separate existence, but do have a foundation in reality.

Do you see what I'm getting at? Is this a topic for discussion in the sources you're aware of? — Wayfarer

Yes. There are volumes on this. I discussed my position on universals (with references) in light of the fact that species are not static but but evolve, in "Metaphysics and Evolution: Response to Critics," pp 849-857. The basic idea is that each instance of a universal has the objective potential to elicit the same idea. It is this objective potential or intelligibility that is the basis in reality for our universal concepts. As populations evolve, the kinds of ideas their members can elicit shift and, so new species concepts are called for.

You can Google "the problem of universals".