But if you don't admit the existence of real definitions (or at least essences) then you cannot say that A is a better X than B — Leontiskos
Why not? — Banno
It is impossible to exaggerate the damage done to philosophy and cognitive science by the mistaken view that "believe" and other intentional verbs name relations between believers and propositions. — John Searle
Seems that "real definitions" are mere stipulations. Is it a better pair of scissors because it is sharp, or because it is harder to cut yourself with them? — Banno
A belief is a relation between an individual and a proposition. That there is much more to be said about belief is not in contention; this is just a place to start. This is set as a falsifiable proposition. — Banno
I am not looking for an ultimate, correct and complete interpretation of belief in some formal language.
And I don't think Searle is, either. — Banno
To "It is impossible to exaggerate the damage done to philosophy and cognitive science by the mistaken view that "believe" and other intentional verbs name relations between believers and propositions" I might append "...in that they find themselves searching for that relation as if it were a thing in the mind, or worse, in the brain". — Banno
You seem to be making use of some as yet unstated transcendental argument, along the lines of the only way one account is better than another is if it is closer to the essence... — Banno
...what he says about his claim — Leontiskos
This is very interesting. I find myself wondering why "The right thing to do is apologise" should not have a truth-value. And so I find myself here somewhat at odds with Wittgenstein, and leaning towards Davidson.“(I believe) The right thing to do is apologize.” Now the personal claim of belief makes more sense here. The proposition is not true or false, nor can we be “wrong” about this proposition; — Antony Nickles
"The right thing to do is apologize", claimed Antony
"That's true", replied Banno.
But we do judge one thing to be better than another without having in mind some ideal. — Banno
I've explained, a few times, I think, how it seems to me that you misinterpret this. — Banno
I might append "...in that they find themselves searching for that relation as if it were a thing in the mind, or worse, in the brain". — Banno
And all of this seems so obtuse, given the topic at hand.
So I must admit to being somewhat nonplussed. — Banno
Such as...? — Leontiskos
I dunno. It seems to me you simply misunderstood Searle, and double down when this is pointed out. Meh.What I am saying seems the most obvious thing in the world. — Leontiskos
Not a notion of which I have made use. I try not to deal in ideals......your ideal belief-relation... — Leontiskos
I find myself wondering why "The right thing to do is apologise" should not have a truth-value…
"The right thing to do is apologize", claimed Antony
"That's true", replied Banno. — Banno
I find myself here somewhat at odds with Wittgenstein, and leaning towards Davidson. — Banno
Well, I gave the example of scissors before, and you met it with some irrelevancies.
I made the point that what counts as "better" depends on what one is doing. Whether blunt scissors are better than sharp scissors depends on the task at hand, not on some ideal essence of scissor.
I suppose someone might reply that implicit in what one is doing is an ideal essence of the perfect tool for that task... seems a bit far fetched. I don't need a clear definition of the perfect screwdriver to choose between a Philips and a flat. — Banno
I suppose someone might reply that implicit in what one is doing is an ideal essence of the perfect tool for that task... seems a bit far fetched. — Banno
I don't need a clear definition of the perfect screwdriver to choose between a Philips and a flat. — Banno
When you look at a screw and decide to use a Phillips rather than a flathead screwdriver, you are inevitably appealing to "an ideal essence of the perfect tool for that task." — Leontiskos
If we look at saying, as Austin might, “That is false”, it is unclear what the implications would be (but something is amiss). — Antony Nickles
"The right thing to do is apologize", claimed Antony
"That's false", replied Banno.
No. You are not appealing to any such thing by choosing a Philips head. One does not need a clear definition of a Philips head screwdriver in order to use one to remove a screw. — Banno
The second objection, that definitions cannot express real essences, is mere trifling. The suggestion that the word "definition" be restricted to statements of meaning is purely stipulative: if the stipulation is accepted, as a convenient way of avoiding ambiguity, nothing need happen to Aristotle's theory beyond a change of name; and until one is proposed, we may either follow ordinary usage, which surely allows us to apply the word "definition" to statements of essence, or else avail ourselves of the scholastic distinction between 'real' and 'nominal' definition. The whole question is insignificant. — Introduction to Posterior Analytics, by Jonathan Barnes, p. xiii-xiv
And what could "know what it is..." mean, apart from being able to pick the driver from the chisel, the flat from the Phillips? Knowing what screwdriver is, is exactly being able to make use of it, and not understanding what it's essence is.In order to pick out a screwdriver you need to know what it is... — Leontiskos
In order to pick out a screwdriver you need to know what it is, and in order to know what it is you need to have an internalized definition of it. — Leontiskos
And what could "know what it is..." mean, apart from being able to pick the driver from the chisel, the flat from the Phillips? Knowing what screwdriver is, is exactly being able to make use of it, and not understanding what it's essence is.
And what's an "internalised definition"? One that is not explicit? One that cannot be made explicit? Could such a thing count as a definition? — Banno
In order to pick out a screwdriver you need to know what it is, and in order to know what it is you need to have an internalized definition of it. That's what a definition is. An understanding or concept of what something is. If you claim to know what something is then you have at least a nominal definition of it, and if you have a definition then you claim to know what it is. — Leontiskos
How broadly are you defining definition? — wonderer1
It would be nice if there were a thread where random tangents could be taken... — Leontiskos
Seems that "real definitions" are mere stipulations. Is it a better pair of scissors because it is sharp, or because it is harder to cut yourself with them?
— Banno
This is the elementary difference between a substance and an artifact. According to Aristotle, artifacts have no essence, although they can be usefully imagined to have quasi-essences in various ways. "Sharpness," for example, has a determinate and normative notion that is not merely stipulative, and we can assess artifacts according to this notion. — Leontiskos
It would be nice if there were a thread where random tangents could be taken... — Leontiskos
The scissors example, the understanding of which pair of scissors is the better, is determined by seeing which one cuts more quickly, straightly and cleanly; I think this is all empirically observable and has nothing to with essences, although we can think about it in those terms on reflection. — Janus
The missing premise is that belief names a substance, in the sense indicated here, which I suppose means something like "part of the natural world," and thus its essence can be sought by means of natural science, where we might expect theories ("only") to approximate that essence.
But that may be false. "Belief" is a category from folk psychology, which means it is just as likely to turn out to be defined only as well as "hammer" or "chair" or "government." You may disagree, and consider "belief" to name a natural kind, but you ought to recognize that in doing so you are relying on, if not advancing, very strong claims about psychology. Is that what you want to do? — Srap Tasmaner
Also: every thread turns into the same thread eventually, about the nature and status of concepts in general, as this one has. — Srap Tasmaner
I don't think I said that - anywhere.I began pressing Banno on his claim, found elsewhere, that definitions do not exist... — Leontiskos
No, he doesn't. He thinks that we would be better served considering use rather than essence. Hence sharp scissors are ill-advised in kindergarten. In that situation the better scissors are blunt.Banno... thinks the essence of a scissors is neither sharp nor dull. — Leontiskos
my claim has been that the final sentence of that quote commits Searle to the view that the notion of belief is both determinate and normative, and to the view that there exists a real definition of belief that the "mistaken view" has gotten wrong. — Leontiskos
He's saying hat the structure of beliefs is not well reflected in the predicate form B(a,p).The proposition is the content of the belief, not the object of the belief. In this case, the object of the belief is Washington. It is impossible to exaggerate the damage done to philosophy and cognitive science by the mistaken view that "believe" and other intentional verbs name relations between believers and propositions. — Searle, my bolding
A belief is simply information/data that has found a place in the mind where it is rarely, if ever, deliberately, consciously questioned, scrutinized, evaluated, etc. — WISDOMfromPO-MO
A modal definition - it's a slab if it has slabbyness in every possible world? Or is it enough for it to have slabbiness in this possible world? Or it's a slab IFF it's width is greater than it's height...
Or it's a slab if the builder places it horizontally, a block if he places it vertically... — Banno
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