Next time...

Cheers!

Ok, so the Jupiter example was at least rhetorically a poor choice, since it led us off on a side line.

Here's what I would defend:

• Not all our beliefs are explicit
• Beliefs are propositional attitudes, and as such can be put in the form: M believes that p for some proposition p and some believer M.

As for the Jupiter example, I erred. It's at least missing one premise - that creativesoul is rational, and so has consistent beliefs. I didn't think that worth doubting.

So we have
Creativesoul believes
{

• Banno is in Australia
• Australia is not in orbit around Jupiter
• therefore, Banno is not in orbit around Jupiter.

}

And it may have indeed been true that

Creativesoul believes
{

• Banno is in Australia
• Australia is not in orbit around Jupiter
• Banno is in orbit around Jupiter.

}
provided that Creativesoul is allowed inconsistent beliefs.

Thanks for urging the correction.

Beliefs are propositional attitudes, and as such can be put in the form: M believes that p for some proposition p and some believer M. — Banno

At time t1, S believes that a particular broken clock is working.

Show me.

Show me. — creativesoul

Show what?

There's an ambiguity here that can be expounded by getting the scope clear. It might be

There is a broken clock X and (S believes that X is not broken)

Do you see a problem with that?

Or it might be that

There is a broken clock X and S believes that (X is broken and not broken)

S is irrational or some such.

:brow:

Next time...

Cheers!

Do you see a problem with that? — Banno

You complained about ambiguity, then added some.

Are you claiming that at time t1, S had an attitude towards your words now?

Time does not seem relevant, but if you must include it:

There is a broken clock X and (S believes that X is not broken) — Banno

becomes

At time t, there is a broken clock X and (S believes that X is not broken)

S has an attitude towards the broken clock.

S has an attitude towards the broken clock. — Banno

That's what I arrive at.

So where's the proposition/statement that S has an attitude towards?

Ah.

That: X is accurate.

X rigidly designates the clock, broken or unbroken. That's what allows the ambiguity to be shown.

Perhaps we can jump ahead and re-parse this as

There is a clock, that clock is broken, but S believes (that clock is accurate).

Are you claiming that at time t1, S had an attitude towards your words now?

No.

Okay. So, at time t1, where's the proposition that S has an attitude towards. Earlier we agreed that S's attitude was towards the broken clock. Broken clocks are not propositions.

I'm saying that this and other examples show the inherent inadequacy in the conventional understanding of belief as propositional attitude as well as the belief that approach.

I've a bit of time tonight, so...

I appreciate the kind words earlier, and I can only hope that you already know that I have quite a bit of respect and admiration for your participation in the forums throughout time. In addition, as you've said concerning my role in helping you, you've helped me in more ways than I can think of. Davidson, Searle, Kripke, and other respected academics have helped me via you.

I appreciate ya!

:wink:

Earlier we agreed that S's attitude was towards the broken clock. Broken clocks are not propositions. — creativesoul

Sure, the clock is not a proposition, nor an attitude. . But "The clock is broken" is a proposition, and to believe that the clock is broken is to adopt an attitude towards that proposition.

I'm saying that this and other examples show the inherent inadequacy in the conventional understanding of belief as propositional attitude as well as the belief that approach. — creativesoul

I still don't see how.

I've a bit of time tonight, so... — creativesoul

I don't. Trip to Bunnings, then a couple of meetings and seedlings to plant out. Maybe in between.

I'm still thinking that the way forward is to do with Moyal-Sharok's book, which seems to take your side of the discussion.

Earlier we agreed that S's attitude was towards the broken clock. Broken clocks are not propositions.
— creativesoul

Sure, the clock is not a proposition, nor an attitude. . But "The clock is broken" is a proposition, and to believe that the clock is broken is to adopt an attitude towards that proposition. — Banno

At time t1, S did not believe the clock was broken.

At time t1, S believed the clock was working. It was not. S believed a broken clock was working. What I'm asking you to do is show me how the accounting practice you're defending handles such a situation. We can - and do sometimes - believe that a broken clock is working. However, what I'm pointing towards is the fact that no one would say so at the time. After having been shown, they would readily admit that they had indeed once believed that a broken clock was working, despite never having an attitude towards the proposition "a broken clock is working" such that they believe it to be true.

I'm saying that this and other examples show the inherent inadequacy in the conventional understanding of belief as propositional attitude as well as the belief that approach.
— creativesoul
I still don't see how. — Banno

Hopefully the above helps?

:yikes:

There are other issues as well. Following the practice you've defended, five different people can believe that you are currently in five different places, but the practice in question will render them all as having the exact same belief about your spatiotemporal location. The earlier example you set out about my being rational could be used by me to show you.

what I'm pointing towards is the fact that no one would say so at the time. — creativesoul

But someone who believed the clock was working would say that it was working. Not following you at all.

Russell's example is usually used as an early version of the stuff Gettier latter built a name around.

There is the man who looks at a clock which is not going, though he thinks it is, and who happens to look at it at the moment when it is right; this man acquires a true belief as to the time of day, but cannot be said to have knowledge. — Russell, Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits

There's nothing here to indicate an argument against beliefs as propositional attitudes.

Following the practice you've defended, five different people can believe that you are currently in five different places, but the practice in question will render them all as having the exact same belief about your spatiotemporal location. — creativesoul

I don't see how. A believes that Banno is at x; B believes that Banno is at y; C believes that Banno is at z; and so on. Each has a different belief.

Not following your point at all.

Not following your point at all. — Banno

May I suggest attending to what I've written?

If you go back a couple of pages, to the beginning of this discussion, you'll see that instead of addressing what I've written, you've addressed other things... consistently. I want to continue, but I need you to address the words I've written.

A believes that Banno is at x; B believes that Banno is at y; C believes that Banno is at z; and so on. Each has a different belief.

Not following your point at all. — Banno

According to the practice you're defending, all of them believe that you're not at w.

According to the practice you're defending, all of them believe that you're not at w. — creativesoul

Yep.

What's the problem?

May I suggest attending to what I've written? — creativesoul

I am. Maybe your position is not as clear as you suppose.

So... they both share the exact same belief about your spatiotemporal location and do not?

:worry:

I ask you to reread our exchange here.

Ok, did that. You take belief to be some sort of mental furnishing, while I take it to be some sort of stopgap imputation used in explanations of intentional acts. So you are unhappy to say these folk do not believe I am at w, because you can't find that piece of furniture in their minds. While I'm happy to say they do not believe I am at w, because it explains why they did not look for me there.

Where does that get us?

Maybe your position is not as clear as you suppose. — Banno

For what it's worth, Banno's position is much more clear to me than creativesoul's. Creativesoul's posts aren't providing me with a great deal of insight into the position or the arguments. In fact I really don't understand what creativesoul is saying or getting at.

But someone who believed the clock was working would say that it was working. Not following you at all. — Banno

Right. I wonder if it would be easier to sort out past beliefs about working clocks before bringing in broken clocks, or at least to place the differences side by side. I mostly don't think false beliefs are a great starting point for these discussions (nor a great re-starting point).

Glad that I'm not missing something obvious, then. I was wondering.

I'm not seeing how time makes a difference here - a bit of a prejudice of mine, as an emphasis on temporal issues seems to often accompany phenomenological accounts.

So I'd start with the time at the widest scope:

At three o'clock, (there is a clock, that clock is broken, but S believes (that clock is accurate)).
And again I don't see how it changes the story. Compare

At two o'clock, (there is a clock, that clock is broken, but S believes (that clock is accurate)).


What's the point of specifying a time?

What's the point of specifying a time? — Banno

I haven't worked that out either.

Call me old-fashioned, but I think it would be helpful if @creativesoul provided a compass like, "Banno believes X. I believe Y. X contradicts Y."

I'm guessing creative thinks I think dogs have unspoken propositions in their minds.

The poisoning the well fallacy looms large here, my friend. I'm perfectly capable of making and defending my own position. I'm not going to spend the limited time I've available fending off strawmen.

You've been consistently misattributing belief to me throughout. I once saw you exclaim that the easiest way to win a disagreement with someone else(yourself at the time you said it) was to begin by misunderstanding it. Trust me when I tell you that you've misunderstood a few things - evidently.

I've asked you several times to explain the proposition that S had an attitude towards at time t1 such that they believed it to be true. We agreed that S's attitude - at time t1 - was towards a broken clock. Broken clocks are not propositions. So, either S's attitude towards the broken clock - at time t1`- was not a belief about the broken clock or not all belief is equivalent to a propositional attitude, because broken clocks are neither propositions nor attitudes.

Are you claiming that S's attitude towards the broken clock - at time t1 - was not that that particular clock was working?

So, either S's attitude towards the broken clock - at time t`- was not a belief about the broken clock or not all belief is equivalent to a propositional attitude, because broken clocks are neither propositions nor attitudes. — creativesoul

Why can't it be said that S had a propositional attitude towards the clock; namely the belief that it was functioning. I must admit I'm struggling to see what issue you are trying to highlight here.

Call me old-fashioned, but I think it would be helpful if creativesoul provided a compass like, "Banno believes X. I believe Y. X contradicts Y." — Leontiskos

You take belief to be some sort of mental furnishing, while I take it to be some sort of stopgap imputation used in explanations of intentional acts. — Banno

The above is what Banno believes about the notion of belief I'm working from. I do not take belief to be some form of mental furnishing. All furnishings have a fairly precise spatiotemporal location. On my view, belief is not the sort of thing that has a spatiotemporal location. Banno's account of my position on belief contradicts my own position on belief.

It's been around a decade ago that Banno and I participated in a debate about whether or not truth was/is prior to language. He argued in the negative. I argued in the affirmative. We have since had another debate about whether or not all belief have propositional form.

Banno holds that belief is imputed/attributed to another creature as a means for explaining its behaviour. I do not disagree completely with that idea. We do just that and we do it quite often. It's just not an explanation for how belief emerges onto the world stage nor what belief consists of.

I am of the carefully considered opinion that some belief is prior to language. Hence, it only follows that language less belief cannot possibly be equivalent to a propositional attitude unless propositions can exist - somehow - prior to language in such a way that a language less creature could have an attitude towards one. Most defenders of the position he's arguing from deny the very idea that language less creatures have belief. He does not.

That just scratches the surface of the disagreement between Banno and myself. The differences between his position and my own are often tied to the respective notions of belief that we're working from.

Why can't it be said that S had a propositional attitude towards the clock — Janus

Well, that's not the sort of thing we say when discussing propositional attitudes. Those are attitudes towards propositions. We don't talk about having 'propositional attitudes' towards other things... clocks notwithstanding. Propositional attitudes are towards propositions... by definition nonetheless.

So, to directly answer your question, it could be said, but it would amount to nonsense or misuse.