I really don't like the labels either way and think they are not very useful, or were part of a historical context that perhaps doesn't pertain to every argument about philosophy of mind. — schopenhauer1

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I don't like labels much either. The real stuff is in the back and forth. Meaning is intensely cumulative and contextual.

Oh come now, get off the pedestal. I was just pointing out problems with the move to information processing which I know is a popular approach. — schopenhauer1

Come now, crawl out of the pit of scientific ignorance you are in.

I was t saying that for rhetoric. You were pretty haughty sounding there. Information processing is not necessarily scientific, though it is technical.

1. Subjectivity is the being of the world from/for a certain perspective. — plaque flag

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'In contrast to the outlook of naturalism, Husserl believed all knowledge, all science, all rationality depended on conscious acts, acts which cannot be properly understood from within the natural outlook at all. Consciousness should not be viewed naturalistically as part of the world at all, since consciousness is precisely the reason why there was a world there for us in the first place.' (Quoted the other day.)

2. The world is only given perspectively. — plaque flag

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existence itself implies and requires a perspective. Things don't exist from no point of view, they exist within a context, and the mind provides that context. But we don't notice that, because we're looking from it, not at it. — Quixodian

(from another thread)

3. All entities exist interdependently in the same semantic-inferential-causal nexus. — plaque flag

True, but what this nexus is, is very much the question at issue.

Notice that Husserl was critical of naturalism, something that often seems overlooked. Not from the perspective of 'belief in the supernatural' but from a realisation of the conditioned nature of cognition.

A related point. One of the challenges to dualism is, 'if you say "the mind" is separate from the things of the phenomenal domain, then what is it?', looking for some kind of objective definition. But "the mind" does not appear to us, it appears as us.

True, but what this nexus is, is very much the question at issue. — Quixodian

I suggest that it's just the world. The world itself is not an entity. There's a radical pluralism in this view in that we don't force being to be univocal. So deciding that the world itself is X [ mind, matter, etc. ] is probably inappropriate. Isn't reduction is the wrong way to go when describing Reality as a whole ? It just is what it is, including things of every category you like, too 'big' to fit in any of them.

The resolution to this "hidden dualism" is to recognize that the brain and its functions are also representations and, thusly, the brain-in-itself is not what one ever studies in a lab. E.g., neurons firing is an extrinsic representation (within our perceptions) of whatever the brain-in-itself is doing.

The next step is to realize that the brain-in-itself cannot be quantitative (for quantities never produce qualities and we know directly of qualities as our conscious experience). — Bob Ross

I agree with you that when we study the brain, just as when we study anything else, we are studying the brain as it appears to us. We have no idea what it, or anything else, is in itself apart from how it appears to us.

Quantities and qualities are merely different categories of appearances, we don't know what quantity in itself or quality in itself could be, so again, we cannot come to any warranted conclusions about the in itself.

The in itself is simply the dialectical counterpart of appearance, and that's all we can say. We know that we cannot be conscious of whatever gives rise to the network of interrelated appearances we call the world, but it seems obvious that it cannot give rise to itself, so we cannot but assume that there is something behind the veil.

We can imagine various possibilities, but what we cannot know is whether those possibilities are all merely associations derived from our experiences of the world of appearances or whether there is a kind of intellectual intuition that may allow us to glimpse behind or beyond it.

Whatever we might think about that must remain a matter of faith, we can live our lives believing one thing or another about what is behind the veil, and it is the imaginative diversity that situation and the role of faith affords, that makes the in itself an important, indeed central, part of human life.

I don't like labels much either. The real stuff is in the back and forth. Meaning is intensely cumulative and contextual. — plaque flag

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Husserl believed all knowledge, all science, all rationality depended on conscious acts, acts which cannot be properly understood from within the natural outlook at all. — Quixodian

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Along these lines, he would also only accept the potentially experienceable as meaningful. Reality is 'horizonal.' We haven't seen all of it. What we see suggests the possibility of seeing more. There's always a fuzzy background. The house has a back if we want to walk around and see it. The moment itself is not punctual but anticipatory and reminiscent, which is why music makes sense to us and we can read sentences over the course of seconds. We never see even familiar objects exhaustively.

existence itself implies and requires a perspective. Things don't exist from no point of view, they exist within a context, and the mind provides that context. But we don't notice that, because we're looking from it, not at it. — Quixodian

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To me this is a big piece of Husserl, the seeing of our seeing. The subject is usually 'transparent' unless it's practical to drag him or her (or it ?) out of the background. We mostly don't care about how the object is given but only what is given. We can learn to focus on the way that objects are given, including objects like melodies and memories. I think this is the real point of the bracketing, just to get us to stop obsessing over the what and its status and focus on the how.

But "the mind" does not appear tous, it appears as us. — Quixodian

It's a rich concept. As consciousness, we can say it's a view on the world. As a discursive subject, it has views and responsibilities. We keep score on it. But 'matter' is pretty rich too.

I agree with you that when we study the brain, just as when we study anything else, we are studying the brain as it appears to us. We have no idea what it, or anything else, is in itself apart form how it appears to us. — Janus

My issue is: why do we insist that the familiar world is appearance behind which lurks some Reality ? As far as I can tell, it's only by taking brains and eyes in the familiar world seriously that we can find indirect realism plausible, but indirect realism says those same brains and eyes are mere appearance.

I sincerely don't think this objection has been addressed sufficiently by indirect realists.

We never see even familiar objects exhaustively. — plaque flag

This reminds me of Harman's "vicarious causation" and the "hiddeness/withdrawal" of objects. See here:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Object-oriented_ontology#:~:text=Object%2Doriented%20ontology%20is%20often,of%20this%20correlation%20is%20unknowable.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Object-oriented_ontology#Metaphysics_of_Graham_Harman

I've looked into Harman. Can't say that I was won over, though I like his style. I embrace anthropocentrism as inescapable myself. I'm a correlationalist too, it seems. So I'm one of his bad guys. But I think you are correct about the relationship. Husserl => Heidegger => Harman.

My issue is: why do we insist that the familiar world is appearance behind which lurks some Reality ? As far as I can tell, it's only by taking brains and eyes in the familiar world seriously that we can find indirect realism plausible, but indirect realism says those same brains and eyes are mere appearance.

I sincerely don't think this objection has been addressed sufficiently by indirect realists. — plaque flag

I think the assumption is based on the known fact that we cannot be conscious of the processes of self and world arising. We inhabit our cognitions, and we know they cannot be explained in in terms of themselves: thus, we cannot but assume that something more that we cannot be aware of is going on.

The alternative is phenomenalism, which seems to be incapable of explaining anything.

We inhabit our cognitions, and we know they cannot be explained in in terms of themselves: thus, we cannot but assume that something more that we cannot be aware of is going on. — Janus

I think we both agree very much that there's always more to find out and clarify.

The alternative is phenomenalism, which seems to be incapable of explaining anything. — Janus

I have to disagree there. I think maybe this is an indirect realist's misunderstanding of what I call direct realism in terms of indirect realist assumptions.

My thinking is that the ego that philosophy ought to prioritize is the participant in the ontological discussion --the ontologist among other ontologists. You and I right now are discursive subjects, responsible for the coherence of our claims. We make our case in terms of worldly objects and public concepts. Given that we are rational and not giving up on critical thinking, the conditions of the possibility for this critical thinking are [onto- ] logically necessary. [ We can't deny a shared world and language, etc. ]

So the stuff our language intends --- the stuff of experience we can talk about meaningfully, -- ought to be embraced as real rather than as mere appearance. But this does not mean we pretend that we do or can ever know it exhaustively. The lifeworld has depth, horizon, a kind of infinity.

Small difference in practice and epistemological humility. I admit. So I'm making a case for a thesis I think is a bit more solid in terms of impractical criteria. I am being unworldly and foolish, trying to offer what I find, by my grasp of ideally universal criteria, the most coherent and complete articulation of the structure of our shared situation.

So the stuff our language intends --- the stuff of experience we can talk about meaningfully, -- ought to be embraced as real rather than as mere appearance. But this does not mean we pretend that we do or can ever know it exhaustively. — plaque flag

I don't intend to imply that appearances are not real. I think they are real on account of real pre-cognitive effects on our senses. In principle we can know exhaustively whatever is accessible to our senses, both what is available naturally and what is available to our senses however augmented technologically. We have no way of knowing what is not, even in principle, accessible to our senses, but I see that as no reason to claim that there is nothing more than what can be known, in principle, via the senses. In other words, I think that from the fact that there can be nothing else knowable to us than what is accessible in fact and in principle to the senses, it does not follow that there can be nothing more tout court, nothing more that exists.

I also want to say that although that position is what seems reasonable to me. I don't think there is any imperative that it must seem reasonable to you, because in matters that cannot be determined either empirically or logically, I think what is acceptable or rejectable comes down to personal assessments of what seems plausible or coherent.

In principle we can know exhaustively whatever is accessible to our senses, both what is available naturally and what is available to our senses however augmented technologically. — Janus

FWIW, I think Husserl makes a good case that even familiar objects have a kind of transcendent infinity. I can't see this lamp on my desk from every possible angle in every possible lighting and so on.

I am familiar with the idea of the phenomenon as appearance or representation (indirect realism) which is given completely and certainly. This is the idea that I can't be wrong about how things seem to me. It's a classic and respectable thesis, though I've pointed out my objections.

More positively, I think we can put seemings and toothaches with doves and quasars on the same plane of rational discourse. Instead of dualism, we have a radical pluralism, you might say. A melody exists differently than the memory of ice cream exists differently than the integer. But it's also a monism, because all of these entities are caught up in the same rational discussion, getting their significance from relationships with one another.

I see that as no reason to claim that there is nothing more than what can be known, in principle via the senses. — Janus

FWIW, I don't think like a classical empiricist. I think concepts are directly given in experience. We see apples and not blobs of red. Numbers have a reality that transcends me as individual human being (but maybe not the species, and I wouldn't try to talk beyond the species.)

For me the point in this context is semantic. I suspect that experience informs what we can mean by words. So I, anyway, don't know what I'm saying if I talk beyond my experience. I have experience being surprised, so I understand epistemic humility. I also don't think others are compelled to be so 'ascetic' as someone who happened to adopt the project of critical-rational ontology. I sincerely respect that a mystic or even the bookfleeing athlete may live a better and wiser life than me. I flatter myself that I am 'existentially' humble. I don't buttonhole people and preach my way of life. I even confess its foolishness in worldly terms. But on the 'chessboard' or at the 'poker table' of ontology, where we're all on the path together, I go at it passionately, which might misleadingly suggest that I take it as the only game in town.

I also want to say that although that position is what seems reasonable to me. I don't think there is any imperative that it must seem reasonable to you, because in matters that cannot be determined either empirically or logically, I think what is acceptable or rejectable comes down to personal assessments of what seems plausible or coherent. — Janus

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Yes. I totally embrace our freedom. Counterfactual hypothetical conversational community. To me it's crucial that we have our personal creativity, and not just for the tribe but for ourselves.

Ontology is like creative nonfiction. You know how Popper regards creativity as central. I think he's right. But weirdly it's aimed at truth --creatively guessing what might be true and making a case for it.

My issue is: why do we insist that the familiar world is appearance behind which lurks some Reality ? As far as I can tell, it's only by taking brains and eyes in the familiar world seriously that we can find indirect realism plausible, but indirect realism says those same brains and eyes are mere appearance.

I sincerely don't think this objection has been addressed sufficiently by indirect realists. — plaque flag

Sounds to me like that makes the familiar worried doubly removed. Because we're only getting appearances from organs that are, themselves, appearances.

As I pointed out, the relationship between chemistry and life is analogous to the relationship between neurology and mind. Are you saying there is a hard problem of biology too? If that's true, then there must be a hard problem of chemistry also. Otherwise how to explain all those atomic processes all mixed up with chemical processes. — T Clark

Many of us do not share the belief that "the relationship between chemistry and life is analogous to the relationship between neurology and mind." We do not see a hard problem of biology, because chemistry and biology are both physical processes. We see a hard problem of consciousness because, while neurology is a (bunch of) physical process(s), we believe consciousness is not. Physical processes, like movement or flight, are reducible to the physical properties of the involved entities, which are ultimately reducible to the properties of the particles that make everything up. Even processes of the brain, like vision and behavior, fall into this category.

But what physical properties, at any level, explain the various aspects of consciousness - such as my experience of blueness, or my awareness at different levels - that exist on top of the physical properties that explain vision and behavior?

Because we're only getting appearances from organs that are, themselves, appearances. — Patterner

Right. They take the sense organs as real in order to argue they are not real. But they don't notice the dependence on the thing they cancel --- because the move was inherited, traditional. And because it captures the way the world is given perspectively but misunderstands that it's the world that's given and not some mediating image.

People felt compelled to interpret our fallibility in terms of us being wrapped up like a humunculus in a bubblescreen about which we could not be wrong, though the screen could fail to match up with a reality that was now utterly inaccessible.

But what physical properties, at any level, explain the various aspects of consciousness - such as my experience of blueness, or my awareness at different levels - that exist on top of the physical properties that explain vision and behavior? — Patterner

I think there's a nondualist way to do justice to subjectivity. If we think of consciousness as the being of the world 'for' a subject and from a perspective, then of course the world is blue in some places and sounds like a trumpet in other places. We can even explain my seeing blue in terms of wavelengths and explain wavelengths in terms of mathematical intuitions and witnessings of successful experiments.

All of these entities are already in the same causal-inferential nexus. Flat ontology. Equal dignity for promises and quarks.

But what physical properties, at any level, explain the various aspects of consciousness - such as my experience of blueness, or my awareness at different levels - that exist on top of the physical properties that explain vision and behavior? — Patterner

First off, I appreciate the clear, direct response. I've been in a lot of discussions about consciousness and it always comes down to this. I keep telling myself not to get involved, but the subject is right at the heart of the kinds of issues I like best. Even when it never gets resolved, I get to reexamine my understanding of how the world and my own self-awareness work.

I think what bothered me most about this particular iteration of the conflict is it's blatant circularity. The evidence that there is a hard problem of consciousness is that it consists of mental processes which can't be studied by science because of... the hard problem of consciousness. Of course, as I noted, all these arguments come down to this same contradiction.

The evidence that there is a hard problem of consciousness is that it consists of mental processes which can't be studied by science because of... the hard problem of consciousness. — T Clark

You seem to be misconstruing something. Issues of correlation between mental processes and physical processes can be studied empirically and are studied, for example.

The hard problem is well, harder, because it’s explaining the nature of mental events as opposed to physical events. This makes it a more complex issue.

But in your case, the first step is recognizing the distinction, even if for semantic or historical reason, if not substantial ones of ontology.

But in your case, the first step is recognizing the distinction, even if for semantic or historical reason, if not substantial ones of ontology. — schopenhauer1

I recognize the distinction between mental and physical events and processes in the same sense that I recognize the distinction between chemical and biological events and processes. The fact that you don't is an indicator of how unlikely we are to come to agreement.

But what physical properties, at any level, explain the various aspects of consciousness - such as my experience of blueness, or my awareness at different levels - that exist on top of the physical properties that explain vision and behavior?
— Patterner

First off, I appreciate the clear, direct response. I've been in a lot of discussions about consciousness and it always comes down to this. I keep telling myself not to get involved, but the subject is right at the heart of the kinds of issues I like best. Even when it never gets resolved, I get to reexamine my understanding of how the world and my own self-awareness work. — T Clark

Exactly. Reexamining ourselves is not necessarily a bad thing. And keeping the communication going can't be bad, either.

I think what bothered me most about this particular iteration of the conflict is it's blatant circularity. The evidence that there is a hard problem of consciousness is that it consists of mental processes which can't be studied by science because of... the hard problem of consciousness. Of course, as I noted, all these arguments come down to this same contradiction. — T Clark

I look at it this way... If we saw a skyscraper made entirely of liquid water, we would be stunned. To put it mildly. The properties of water and/or H2O molecules do not allow for such a thing. But here it is! A skyscraper made of water! We'd think there was something going on that we are, for some reason, unable to see. And we'd put quite a bit of effort into figuring out what was going on.

The case of consciousness seems even more unfathomable. Even if the properties of water cannot account for a skyscraper, at least both things are physical. There seems some hope off figuring out what the trick is. And properties of particles and groups of particles give us other physical properties, such as lift, friction, and aerodynamics, so flight is entirely explainable in the physical.

But, while everything about the brain and body are physical, consciousness does not seem to be. What properties of particles, or bio-chemical energy running along neurons, or brain structures, suggest that the system can be aware of itself? Or have subjective experience, even without awareness? If beings from elsewhere studied our brains in all possible detail, what would they point to and say, "Ah! They are conscious! You can tell, because of X, Y, and Z."

And on top of that, the physical things and processes in the brain are already doiny something. They are making more complicated physical processes, such as vision and behavior. How is it that those same physical things and processes are making something very different at the same time? That seems to be asking quite a lot.

Very well said. Materialists seem to have abandoned the idea of denying consciousness is a thing or waving it away by claiming mental states are identical to brain states. Panpsychism and Integrated Information Theory are all the rage now. I don't think eliminative materialism will ever make a comeback. It's hard to understand how it became popular in the first place, it's so intuitively wrong.

Hello Mww,

Odd innit? In the attempt for empirical knowledge, the irreducible origin of it is impossible to know.

Then wouldn’t it be impossible to know that one has a representative faculty, let alone that one is?

Humans don’t think/cognize/comprehend in its rational method, in the same terms as the source of their knowledge requires in its physical method.

This is fair to an extent; however, we are still able to understand that world, which certainly is not of the same rational construction as our own faculties, better.

Hello Plaque Flag,

It's the familiar experience of the brain in causal relationships with other familiar objects that motivates [ a paradoxical ] indirect realism in the first place.
…
It's because indirect realism makes the brain it depends on an 'illusion' that it fails.

As an indirect realist myself (of an idealist flavor), I agree; but this exactly my point!

The brain-in-itself (if you continue bravely along the path as you seem to be doing) starts to sound 'mystical as fuck.' I don't think it can be given meaning that it doesn't steal from 'mere appearance.'

The brain-in-itself is represented as the brain-for-us. It is ‘mystical’ only insofar as we will never come to know it absolutely with our currently evolved minds (i.e., brains-in-themselves).

I can follow your thinking to some degree. Your point is justified and fascinating within the framework of indirect realism -- but the framework don't work, seems to me.

Why doesn’t it hold?

I claim that methodological solipsism only works properly at the level of the entire species. But this gives us an anthropocentric direct realism.

I didn’t understand this part. What do you mean by methodological solipsism? And how does that lead to direct realism? By my lights, direct realism is only possible if we were not representing the world—and we clearly are (by my lights).

Hello Janus,

we cannot come to any warranted conclusions about the in itself.

Since we have already discussed this, I will be brief here: I disagree that we cannot come to know things at all in-themselves. It does not follow that because “We have no idea what it, or anything else, is in itself apart from how it appears to us” that we are likewise not acquiring indirect knowledge of the in-themselves (which, in turn, negate the idea that we cannot know anything about the in-themselves).

Quantities and qualities are merely different categories of appearances

Quantities are not a category of appearances. You, nor I, have ever experienced a quantity.

Whatever we might think about that must remain a matter of faith

Just as a side note, in the same manner, I take it up on faith that gravity will still operate on me the next time I try to jump into the air: there is no field of study which is exempt from this so-called “faith” you speak of.