However the more important matter is that consciousness is a process that occurs in a specific brain, — wonderer1

So is my idea of ‘7’ different to yours? (Better not be, else it might be hard to do business.)

So is my idea of ‘7’ different to yours? (Better not be, else it might be hard to do business.) — Wayfarer

It is unlikely that for practical purposes of doing business, my idea of '7' is substantially different than yours. However in terms of more subtle associations we each make with '7', certainly. Perhaps you consider '7' to. be a lucky number. One of us might even have not so subtle differences in our associations with '7', as are seen in synesthesia.

:up:

Asking that question seems to suggest that a computer is conscious, does it not?

So is my idea of ‘7’ different to yours? — Wayfarer

Often is the case….like, almost always…..that the origin of an idea, and the use of that conception subsumed under it, are treated without regard for the necessary distinctions between them.

Use of the object representing an idea, presupposes it. If more than one understanding represents the idea with the same conception, and they understand each other in the mutual use of it, the idea presupposed in the one must be identical with the presupposed idea in the other.

So, no, your idea of seven, or any singular idea susceptible to representation, and mine, are not different, all else being given. But you already knew that.

Asking that question seems to suggest that a computer is conscious, does it not? — NotAristotle

Only if information processing is considered not only necessary, but sufficient for the advent of consciousness; in other words, I don't think so. I think concern and significance are necessary elements of consciousness. We are conscious of what matters to us. Nothing matters to the computer.

So is my idea of ‘7’ different to yours? (Better not be, else it might be hard to do business.) — Wayfarer

It would be hard to do business if your idea of 'tree', 'car' 'road', 'building' and countless other examples were significantly different enough from one another to make communication impossible. '7' is just a name for a certain number of anything. Because number is manifold and addition, subtraction, multiplication and division are possible, then the whole system of complex mathematics can be evolved form a few simple rules. All those basic functions can be physically instantiated though, for example on an abacus. And modern calculators and computers are physical instantiations of the ability to complex mathematics, more complex than we can.

So'7' in a way is just like any other rule, except that mathematics is the most complex coherent system of logical rules that we know of.

Hello Janus,

Taking the visual as paradigmatic for the sake of simplicity, the environment is presented, or given, to us, meaning that our eyes, optic nerves and brains are affected by and respond to reflected light and our brains produce representations of environments consisting of objects that stand out as such from, but are of course never separate from, the environments. It is acknowledged that ideas condition to some degree what stands out for us, what is noticed. Would anything be seen if there was nothing to be seen?

All of this is dependent on us granting that the phenomena are a valid method of inferring what metaphysically is there—e.g., you observe phenomenally that you are affected by what seems to you to be an environment which you are in, you find that it makes sense to explain other peoples’ difference observations as due to their faculties of representation (such as blind people), etc. However, under Kant’s view, I would argue, if we take him very seriously, then our own minds (or brains) are things-in-themselves (in order for him to claim we have representative faculties)--but, wait, he also says we can’t know anything about the things-in-themselves...so we shouldn’t even know we have minds or brains (in the sense of a mind-independent one).

If one concedes that we can engage in metaphysical inquiries to determine that we have a brain or a mind, then they are equally conceding that Kant’s original formulation of there being an epistemic barrier between us and the phenomena is wrong. That is my point. Then it can no longer be argued that we have no idea about ontology. The gates fly open, so to speak.

If you had never encountered any sense data at all, there would be nothing to reason with and hence no a priori knowledge. Even Kant acknowledged this as far as I remember.

I agree, but this concedes that we can get at what the things-in-themselves are; and Kant will not accept that.

He acknowledges it, yes, but it is an internal incoherency with his view (I would say).

He just argues we must have it ‘because how could it be otherwise’--while also barring us from investigating the things-in-themselves (but, again, wouldn’t our minds be things-in-themselves?).

So, 'every change has a cause' is an inductive inference from experience which has eviolved into our consistent and coherent web of understanding of the empirical via science.

I partially agree. ‘every change has a cause’ is a priori true but we have to use a posteriori knowledge to get there. It is a necessitated by the preconditions of our experience: the pure forms of intuition—i.e., space and time. We don’t, like hume thought, just experience things occur in happenstance with each other so many times that we label it ‘causal’.

For a simple example, if I throw a brick at an ordinary 2.4 mm pane of glass the glass will almost certainly break. If I push something which is top heavy, and precariously balanced, it will fall. If I punch you hard in the face you will likely cry out in pain, and your face will probably bruise. If I hit a nail into soft wood with a hammer it will go in more easily that into hard wood (it may even bend when I try to hammer it into hard enough wood and I may have to pre-drill a hole). These are a few examples of countless other kinds of experiences that lead to the conclusion that all effects have causes, and yet apparently in the quantum realm, not all effects do have causes.

Again, I would hold that causality is necessitated by our pure forms of intuition. There is no ‘realm’ in terms of quantum mechanics. Every effect does have a cause.

One plus one always equals two. I can prove this by placing two objects together, and I can see two objects there or I can focus on each object and see them individually as two examples of one object. The very fact that you say that you don't know "1+1=2" without counting your fingers supports the idea that the formulation is a generalized abstraction from sense experience. It is not reason, but imagination, that tells you that reason without sense data produces no knowledge, because you cannot imagine any knowledge, or anything at all, which is completely separate from the senses.

Not quite. Yes you can count small numbers with objects, but not larger ones. You can’t empirically prove that 8888888888888888 + 2 = 8888888888888890. Likewise, you cannot imagine that calculation either. The only way for you to prove it is with your faculty of reason: which is not imagination.

Bob

Hello Wayfarer,

I appreciate you sharing that information! I have also heard that eastern philosophy coincides with schopenhauerian and Kantian metaphysics, but I am not well enough versed on the Vedas (and such) to comment much further (unfortunately).

Bob

Hello Mww,

Isn’t relation the manifestation of a difference? The very conception of a synthetic a priori cognition, the backbone of transcendental philosophy, specifies a difference in the relation between the conceptions contained in the subject and the conceptions contained in the predicate of a syllogistic proposition. VOILA!!! Using difference to make the gathering of knowledge possible.

I meant ‘difference’ in the post-modern sense: the acquisition of knowledge purely from the phenomena, of which says nothing of the things-in-themselves.

Arguably post-modernism owes a lot to Kantianism: without the idea that we can never know the world beyond what is capable to conform to ourselves entails that reality becomes hyperreality. The map and territory, for practical purposes, blend together.

I think Piece was a closet Kantian anyway, wasn’t he? Early on he called himself a “pure Kantist ”, The Monist, 1905. Also in The Monist, he states pretty much the Kantian doctrine regarding the ding as sich, and the importance of the categories. He abdicated the Kantian pedestal only later, becoming a Hegelian absolute idealist…..for some reason or another. But I get your point.

I am unfamiliar if he was a hegelian, but I do know he was a Kantian in many respects and his views owe a lot to Kant.

Agreed, iff “home” is the human thinking subject.

Correct.

If you’d said we could no longer cognize the object, but that doesn’t mean there isn’t one, I’d have just said….yep.

Yeah that’s what I meant.

Things are things in themselves until they are met with human sensibility

But isn’t all evidence of “human sensibility” phenomenal? Isn’t it a metaphysical claim?

I don’t need to think it; I can represent to myself differences in arrangements of matter. Horse are not comprised of wood and fences don’t have hooves. Different phenomena, different things, different things-in-themselves from which the things appear.

Again, according to Kant our phenomena tell us nothing about things-in-themselves; but your description here is an attempt at reverse engineering what is outside of your representative faculty by means of what is presented to you by your representative faculty. That’s my point.

Makes me wonder why you would ask why I maintain a thing-in-itself for each thing that appears.

Because that would require that phenomena do tell you about the things which reside outside of your representative faculty; and then Kant’s original view falls apart if this is conceded.

Bob

I would have hoped that brief excerpt would be of use by itself, in respect of the question of the ‘knowledge of things in themselves’. (Knowledge of The Vedas not required!)

Another point is that Kant’s assertion that we can’t know things ‘as they are in themselves’ is simply an admission of the limits of human knowledge. It is a modest claim, not a sweeping assertion. As Emrys Westcott says in an excellent Kant primer, 'A more sympathetic reading is to see the concept of the “thing in itself” as a sort of placeholder in Kant's system; it both marks the limits of what we can know and expresses a sense of mystery that cannot be dissolved, the sense of mystery that underlies our unanswerable questions. Through both of these functions it serves to keep us humble.' Whereas the idea that the way things appear to humans, is the way they truly are, amounts to a kind of tacit assertion of omniscience.

Whereas the idea that the way things appear to humans, is the way they truly are, amounts to a kind of tacit assertion of omniscience. — Wayfarer

Or exceptional luck. :razz:

All of this is dependent on us granting that the phenomena are a valid method of inferring what metaphysically is there—e.g., you observe phenomenally that you are affected by what seems to you to be an environment which you are in, you find that it makes sense to explain other peoples’ difference observations as due to their faculties of representation (such as blind people), etc. However, under Kant’s view, I would argue, if we take him very seriously, then our own minds (or brains) are things-in-themselves (in order for him to claim we have representative faculties)--but, wait, he also says we can’t know anything about the things-in-themselves...so we shouldn’t even know we have minds or brains (in the sense of a mind-independent one). — Bob Ross

All of that was just an outline of what appears to be the case empirically speaking. I make no human-independent metaphysical claims based on that. But I will say that, when speculating about what might be real in itself, it seems to me more likely that what gives rise to a differentiated world would be differentiated in itself, than not.

In any case, the fact remains that we cannot know. All we know is a human-shaped world, not a tiger-shaped world or an elephant-shaped world or a world without any particular shape; I don't see how that can be reasonably disputed.

So, if we are going to take a position on the question of what might be real independently of the human, then we are going to go with what seems most plausible, which is and must remain, a subjective matter. It really isn't a topic worth arguing about, because when people disagree based on their personal presuppositions or preferences, then they will inevitably merely end up talking past one another. The other reason i think it doesn't really matter is that it is of no real significance to how we live our lives in this world of appearances, the only world we know.

I won't respond to the rest of your post, because it all seems to me based on the same misunderstanding that Kant and I are making purportedly human-independent metaphysical claims.

your description here is an attempt at reverse engineering what is outside of your representative faculty by means of what is presented to you by your representative faculty — Bob Ross

That would be the case if the reversal went further than authorized by the normal Kantian method.

……the post-modern sense: the acquisition of knowledge purely from the phenomena, of which says nothing of the things-in-themselves. — Bob Ross

Same as transcendental philosophy, except the latter says that things-in-themselves exist while saying nothing about such existence.

…..that would require that phenomena do tell you about the things which reside outside of your representative faculty…. — Bob Ross

All things which phenomena tell me about, are already outside my representational faculties.
—————-

Things are things in themselves until they are met with human sensibility.
-Mww

But isn’t all evidence of “human sensibility” phenomenal? Isn’t it a metaphysical claim? — Bob Ross

Mine references a time before, yours references a time after. They don’t connect to each other, and each is true on its own.

the idea that we can never know the world beyond what is capable to conform to ourselves entails that reality becomes hyperreality. The map and territory, for practical purposes, blend together. — Bob Ross

For all practical purposes, yes. Reality conforms to us each time a high-rise goes up, or some
numbnuts burns down a forest. Metaphysically, on the other hand, the map/territory divide rests assured.
————-

You can’t empirically prove that 8888888888888888 + 2 = 8888888888888890. — Bob Ross

An individual may not have enough time to prove it, but it certainly can be proven. The measure is degree of difficulty, not its possibility.

Hello Wayfarer,

I would have hoped that brief excerpt would be of use by itself, in respect of the question of the ‘knowledge of things in themselves’. (Knowledge of The Vedas not required!)

I must have misunderstood your post, because it seemed like you were advocating for ideas from eastern philosophy (e.g., that the things-in-themselves are really empty). Although I am not well versed therein, I don’t find it a feasible solution to say that the objective world is really empty—that is no different, in terms of parsimony, as saying it is all produced by my mind only (to me).

Another point is that Kant’s assertion that we can’t know things ‘as they are in themselves’ is simply an admission of the limits of human knowledge. It is a modest claim, not a sweeping assertion.

I agree: that is fair. But I think his project ends up undermining itself. If we can get at that there are things-in-themselves, and arguably that our minds are things-in-themselves, then we can get at ontology.

Bob

Hello Janus,

In any case, the fact remains that we cannot know. All we know is a human-shaped world, not a tiger-shaped world or an elephant-shaped world or a world without any particular shape; I don't see how that can be reasonably disputed.

Just because we see the world from our human perspective does not mean we cannot formulate accurate metaphysical claims. If that were the case, then you couldn’t infer, for example, object permanence because it is beyond the possibility of all experience.

I think, for your argument to work, you would have to prove that our human representation of the world is completely inaccurate—otherwise, then we have no reason to believe that we cannot get validly at metaphysics.

So, if we are going to take a position on the question of what might be real independently of the human, then we are going to go with what seems most plausible, which is and must remain, a subjective matter.

Metaphysics is not subjective (in that sense) at all: we use objective criteria just like science does.

I won't respond to the rest of your post, because it all seems to me based on the same misunderstanding that Kant and I are making purportedly human-independent metaphysical claims.

My point was that Kant’s transcendental claims undermine his claims about us not being capable of knowing the things-in-themselves.

Bob

Hello Mww,

your description here is an attempt at reverse engineering what is outside of your representative faculty by means of what is presented to you by your representative faculty — Bob Ross

That would be the case if the reversal went further than authorized by the normal Kantian method.

I didn’t follow this part: could you elaborate?

Same as transcendental philosophy, except the latter says that things-in-themselves exist while saying nothing about such existence.

Agreed.

All things which phenomena tell me about, are already outside my representational faculties.

As of yet, I think this is an assumption you are making if you aren’t extrapolating it from the phenomena.

An individual may not have enough time to prove it, but it certainly can be proven. The measure is degree of difficulty, not its possibility.

I think it can be proven, just not empirically. Are you disagreeing? We prove it with reason, not empirical tests (e.g., not with counting our fingers). It is a priori.

Bob

Although I am not well versed therein, I don’t find it a feasible solution to say that the objective world is really empty—that is no different, in terms of parsimony, as saying it is all produced by my mind only (to me). — Bob Ross

There is indeed a school of Buddhism called Mind-Only, which is near in many respects to Kastrup’s Analytical Idealism. The reason that it doesn’t end in solipsism, is that Buddhism rejects the sovereignty of the self. In other words, the world is created by the mind of beings. Compatible with enactivism and constructivism.

In other words, the world is created by the mind of beings. — Wayfarer

Intriguing. Can you say some more on this? In broad brush strokes, how is the world created by the mind of beings? And how is that contrasted with a sovereignty of self?

I think it can plausibly related to enactivism. According to enactivism, subjective and objective aspects arise in the context of the organism's ongoing interactions with its environment. The subject's lived experience is understood as inherently embedded in and shaped by its environment. The environment provides the affordances, or possibilities for action, which influence the subject's perception and behavior.

In this view, subjectivity is not considered as a purely private, inner realm divorced from the objective world. Instead, it emerges through the subject's engagement with the world. The subject's embodied interactions and sensory-motor skills shape its perceptual capacities, leading to the construction of its subjective experience.

That in turn can be traced back to The Embodied Mind. Published in 1991, it explores the idea that cognition is not solely a product of the brain but is grounded in the dynamic interaction between the body, the mind, and the environment. The book draws on insights from various disciplines, including cognitive science, phenomenology, and Buddhist philosophy, to propose a new understanding of the mind that emphasizes embodiment and action.

Hence the tie with Buddhism. It’s a deep subject because it draws on abhidharma, Buddhist philosophical psychology which is a complicated topic. But one striking thing I noticed in studying the early Buddhist texts, is the frequent recurrence of the compound term, ‘self and world’, in dialogues on the nature of the self. Buddhism would put it that self and world ‘co-arise’ - which is the perspective that enactivism draws on. Whereas, you will know if you read many topics on this forum, that the assumed attitude is generally that objective and subjective are clearly differentiated or distinct domains of being.

Thich Naht Hanh used the term ‘inter-being’ to convey the meaning of śūnyatā - because all things exist on account of causes and conditions, and in relationship to others. Whereas the default view of liberal individualism is that the individual ego, the separated self, is the axis around which the world turns, so to speak.

Thank you for that. Nice and clear.

That in turn can be traced back to The Embodied Mind. Published in 1991, it explores the idea that cognition is not solely a product of the brain but is grounded in the dynamic interaction between the body, the mind, and the environment. The book draws on insights from various disciplines, including cognitive science, phenomenology, and Buddhist philosophy, to propose a new understanding of the mind that emphasizes embodiment and action. — Wayfarer

I think this makes sense and accords with my sense of things. I've watched a number of interviews and lectures with Evan Thompson and read some papers.

You did use the term 'created by the mind of beings' before - I'm assuming you intended this as analogous with enactivism - the 'dynamic interaction' you referred to above? I was a little thrown by 'created'.

But one striking thing I noticed in studying the early Buddhist texts, is the frequent recurrence of the compound term, ‘self and world’, in dialogues on the nature of the self. Buddhism would put it that self and world ‘co-arise’ - which is the perspective that enactivism draws on. — Wayfarer

That is interesting and kind of hard to ignore as, dare I say it, common sense.

All our roads seem to lead towards phenomenology... :wink:

All things which phenomena tell me about, are already outside my representational faculties.
-Mww

As of yet, I think this is an assumption you are making if you aren’t extrapolating it from the phenomena. — Bob Ross

But I am necessarily extrapolating it from phenomena. It would be impossible to be informed of whatever phenomena does tell me, if there weren’t any. All I have to do to say what phenomena tell me about, is extrapolate within the method by which phenomena arise, to the source of them. If the phenomena is necessarily given according to methodological procedure, the source cannot be contingently assumed. The cause must be as necessary as the effect it produces, for otherwise the theory is without sufficient ground.

Caveat: there is as yet no knowledge of what the phenomena represents, but only that it represents something. Sensibility is a representational faculty, not a cognitive one.
————-

On large numbers:

I think it can be proven, just not empirically. Are you disagreeing? We prove it with reason, not empirical tests (e.g., not with counting our fingers). It is a priori. — Bob Ross

I disagree large quantity summations cannot be empirically proven, and I disagree reason a priori is itself the proof. The latter is the source of synthetic principles a priori, which make the form of mathematical operations possible, the content be what it may. All empirical proofs require content, which reason alone does not provide, in accordance with the principles, which it does.

Furthermore, reason can only prove within its own constructs, which we call logic. So it is true it is logically provable that some quantity adjoined to another in serial accumulation produces a quantity greater than either of two adjoined, but such is not a proof for particular numbers added together, insofar as to prove that, and thereby sustain the logic, the content for which the principle is the condition, would have to actually manifest, which just IS the empirical proof. In the case at hand, it follows that the great magnitude of the quantities to be adjoined, and the adjoining of them in a mathematical operation, do nothing to violate the principle.

Hello Mww,

But I am necessarily extrapolating it from phenomena.

I could equally claim that it is ‘necessary’ that your mind is a thing-in-itself.

In both cases, it isn’t logically nor actually necessary but rather (debatably) metaphysically necessary.

But none of this holds necessary transcendental absolute certainty that Kant thought it does. It is possible (albeit not plausible) that they aren’t representations of anything.

I disagree large quantity summations cannot be empirically proven, and I disagree reason a priori is itself the proof. The latter is the source of synthetic principles a priori, which make the form of mathematical operations possible, the content be what it may. All empirical proofs require content, which reason alone does not provide, in accordance with the principles, which it does.

Furthermore, reason can only prove within its own constructs, which we call logic. So it is true it is logically provable that some quantity adjoined to another in serial accumulation produces a quantity greater than either of two adjoined, but such is not a proof for particular numbers added together, insofar as to prove that, and thereby sustain the logic, the content for which the principle is the condition, would have to actually manifest, which just IS the empirical proof. In the case at hand, it follows that the great magnitude of the quantities to be adjoined, and the adjoining of them in a mathematical operation, do nothing to violate the principle

Seeing one block and another block and determining there are two blocks is empirically verifiable; but to then use that as a baseline to extrapolate huge numbers being summed together is the application of cognition only. I don’t mean ‘cognition’ in the transcendental idealist sense pertaining to the construction of the phenomenal world but, rather, the higher-order ability to self-reflectively cognize.

You seem to be claiming that simply because we start out with an empirical proof that the rest that is abstractly reasoned about them is thereby empirical: is that correct?

Bob

You seem to be claiming that simply because we start out with an empirical proof that the rest that is abstractly reasoned about them is thereby empirical: is that correct? — Bob Ross

Kindasorta, I guess. The whole possibility of mathematical processes is predicated on the principle reason provides a priori, which itself is derived from a category, regardless of the quantities involved. It is so much easier to empirically prove the small number operations, but the large number operations follow the same principle, so, they are just as possible to empirically prove, but rather much more time consuming. As long as there are people willing to do it, or any sufficiently correlating method, all the sands on one beach could be added to all the sands on another beach….no problem. Not much point in it, except to prove it can be done.
————-

But I am necessarily extrapolating it from phenomena.
-Mww

I could equally claim that it is ‘necessary’ that your mind is a thing-in-itself. In both cases, it isn’t logically nor actually necessary but rather (debatably) metaphysically necessary. — Bob Ross

Hmmmm. I’ll go with…it isn’t actually necessary, in that there may not even be any such thing as a phenomenon (mind). Still, if phenomena/mind are valid metaphysical conceptions, and if they arise logically in a methodology which requires them, then they are logically necessary. And because logic is a metaphysical practice, and the conception is already a methodological requirement, then it could be said that they are metaphysically necessary.

I could equally claim that it is ‘necessary’ that your mind is a thing-in-itself. — Bob Ross

Indeed. And that the mind does not appear among, or as, a phenomenon.

Just because we see the world from our human perspective does not mean we cannot formulate accurate metaphysical claims. If that were the case, then you couldn’t infer, for example, object permanence because it is beyond the possibility of all experience. — Bob Ross

Object permanence is inferred on account of the experienced invariance of objects. It is an inductive, that is fallible, inference, not a deductive, infallible inference.

I think, for your argument to work, you would have to prove that our human representation of the world is completely inaccurate—otherwise, then we have no reason to believe that we cannot get validly at metaphysics. — Bob Ross

If you are going to continue to distort what I've said like this, then I see little point in continuing. I have nowhere argued that our representations are inaccurate in a metaphysical context, and nothing I've said depends on such a claim. What could they possibly be inaccurate in relation to if the in-itself is unknowable? They are only accurate or inaccurate within their own context, i.e. within the empirical context; it is only there that we can get things right or wrong.

My point was that Kant’s transcendental claims undermine his claims about us not being capable of knowing the things-in-themselves. — Bob Ross

This is a rubbish claim, Bob, and it has already been explained to you a few times as to why it is erroneous. Kant's a priori claims are only about the nature of intuitions, i.e. that they are spatiotemporal, and regarding the categories of judgements about phenomenally experienced objects. The transcendental ego is the closest he gets to looking like making a metaphysical, in the traditional sense, claim, but it not; it is just formulating the idea we all have of being a subject which is not empirically observable, i.e. that is transcendental. Kant does not reify this idea to claim the existence of a substantial self, as Descartes does, as far as I know. So, I see the transcendental ego as a phenomenological, not a metaphysical, posit. @Mww ?

Hello Mww,

As long as there are people willing to do it, or any sufficiently correlating method, all the sands on one beach could be added to all the sands on another beach….no problem

That’s fair, but arguably there is a limit to what can be empirically proven in this manner—all I have to do is sufficiently raise the numbers; but I get your point.

I think you are saying that math is a priori in the sense that it is actually a part of the logical construction of our phenomena experience (i.e., it is transcendental), and I was more talking about a priori to our cognitive faculty of the mind (in the sense of just thinking—not the construction of our phenomenal world).

My point is that, regardless, the true origin of our proofs in pure math is a priori in the sense of our faculty of reason (in the colloquial sense) and our proofs (arguably from a transcendental idealist’s perspective) of the useful application of math is a priori in the sense of our faculty of reason’s ability to construct the phenomenal world according to principles.

Still, if phenomena/mind are valid metaphysical conceptions, and if they arise logically in a methodology which requires them, then they are logically necessary

Logical necessity pertains to the form of the argument: the proposition (or term) cannot be false. For example, a = a will be true all the way down in a truth table.

What do you mean by “if they arise logically in a methodology”?

And because logic is a metaphysical practice, and the conception is already a methodological requirement, then it could be said that they are metaphysically necessary.

Metaphysical necessity is essentially that it is true in all possible worlds—or that the thing in question exists and there exists nothing with the potency to stop it existing. I am not sure that I followed what you meant here: could you elaborate?

Bob

Hello Janus,

Object permanence is inferred on account of the experienced invariance of objects. It is an inductive, that is fallible, inference, not a deductive, infallible inference.

But it is a metaphysical claim that you cannot make if you are claiming that we are barred from understanding the world in-itself beyond our human nature. You can’t claim even inductively that object have permanence in the real world, because the real world is human-nature independent.

If you are going to continue to distort what I've said like this, then I see little point in continuing. I have nowhere argued that our representations are inaccurate in a metaphysical context

I said:

I think, for your argument to work, you would have to prove that our human representation of the world is completely inaccurate—otherwise, then we have no reason to believe that we cannot get validly at metaphysics.

I didn’t say you argued it. I said that is the only foreseeable argument to me for you view.

I think that if we don’t have good reasons to believe that we are ‘stuck in our human-nature box’ (so to speak), then the most parsimonious solution is to assume we aren’t (until its proven otherwise). So, to me, you would thusly have to prove that we can’t. So, let me refurbish my statement: I think you would have to argue that our representation of the world gives us no insight into the things-in-themselves (instead of being inaccurate), and I that’s where Transcendental Idealism starts self-undermining (e.g., but all this transcendental investigation is actually transcendent investigation of the mind as a thing-in-itself--but then we can get at the things-in-themselves).

What could they possibly be inaccurate in relation to if the in-itself is unknowable?

To clarify, I apologize, I should have said that you need to prove that we cannot get at the things-in-themselves—not that they are completely inaccurate. But, again, I wasn’t distorting your view: I was saying what I thought you would need to prove: not what I thought you were claiming.

They are only accurate or inaccurate within their own context, i.e. within the empirical context; it is only there that we can get things right or wrong.

This didn’t make sense to me: if you are claiming that we cannot know about the things-in-themselves, then you can’t know whether they are accurate or inaccurate at all. All you can do is compare phenomena to each other, and that, according to Kant, tells you nothing about the things-in-themselves.

This is a rubbish claim, Bob, and it has already been explained to you a few times as to why it is erroneous.

I don’t see how it is rubbish. For example, even we are describing that we have a priori, transcendental aspects of our minds, then aren’t those minds a part of the things-in-themselves and we are describing that mind-in-itself? For example, his twelve categories are aspects of a thing-in-itself called a mind. But he also claims we can’t know anything about things-in-themselves. Please explain to me what about my line of reasoning here is rubbish.

Kant's a priori claims are only about the nature of intuitions, i.e. that they are spatiotemporal, and regarding the categories of judgements about phenomenally experienced objects

Sort of. Firstly, Kant’s claims about the nature of intuitions is that we have receptibility and sensibility which, by my lights, entails that it is a part of a mind or something in-itself. Now, as Mww pointed out, Kant doesn’t actually say it is in a mind-in-itself; but then one has to hold that these receptive and sensible faculties that one has is just a part of nothing (if it isn’t a part of the things-in-itself, then there is nothing else it could be a part of).

Secondly, the categories of judgments are also either (1) ontologically nothing or (2) ontologically a part of a thing-in-itself (which contradicts Kant’s claims).

The transcendental ego is the closest he gets to looking like making a metaphysical, in the traditional sense, claim, but it not;

All of his claims are metaphysical. Transcendental philosophy is metaphysics.

So, I see the transcendental ego as a phenomenological, not a metaphysical, posit

My read of it was that he was arguing for soul.

Bob

If I may interject a question as someone with only a superficial understanding of Kant...

Isn't it a bit of an overstatement to say we know *nothing* of the thing-in-itself? Why not a more nuanced view, in which we know a limited amount about things-in-themselves, but some of us know more than others, depending on the thing under consideration.

You can’t claim even inductively that object have permanence in the real world, because the real world is human-nature independent. — Bob Ross

Fer fuck's sake, Bob, how many times do I have to tell you I'm not claiming that object permanence or independence is a feature of, or inference about, anything more than the phenomenal world of human experience.

I said:

I think, for your argument to work, you would have to prove that our human representation of the world is completely inaccurate—otherwise, then we have no reason to believe that we cannot get validly at metaphysics.

I didn’t say you argued it. I said that is the only foreseeable argument to me for you view. — Bob Ross

But I would have to argue that, if my argument depended on it, which it doesn't. You don't pay attention to anything I write, apparently, or else you distort it in the reading. I've already explained numerous times that everything I have been saying relates only to the phenomenal world. When is that going to sink in?

Our representations of the phenomenal world are neither completely accurate nor completely inaccurate; a fact which has no bearing whatsoever on the question of whether we know the world as it is in itself (which simply as a matter of definition we don't, because anything we know is by definition the world as it is for us).

For example, even we are describing that we have a priori, transcendental aspects of our minds, then aren’t those minds a part of the things-in-themselves and we are describing that mind-in-itself? For example, his twelve categories are aspects of a thing-in-itself called a mind. — Bob Ross

No Bob, those minds may be a part of the world in itself, but the mind as we know it is the mind as it appears to us. Kant's twelve categories are analytically determined by reflecting on the ways in which we understand phenomenal objects.

All of his claims are metaphysical. Transcendental philosophy is metaphysics.

So, I see the transcendental ego as a phenomenological, not a metaphysical, posit

My read of it was that he was arguing for soul. — Bob Ross

More unargued assertion; it's not interesting, Bob. Kant does not argue for a soul, at least not in the CPR. He does argue in the CPJ that we have practical reasons for believing in freedom, immortality and God, but that is a whole other kettle of fish, and is not relevant to the question of whether we know the in-itself * which, for the last time, by definition, we do not).