If I may interject a question as someone with only a superficial understanding of Kant...
Isn't it a bit of an overstatement to say we know *nothing* of the thing-in-itself? Why not a more nuanced view, in which we know a limited amount about things-in-themselves, but some of us know more than others, depending on the thing under consideration. — wonderer1
the true origin of our proofs in pure math is a priori in the sense of our faculty of reason — Bob Ross
our proofs (…) of the useful application of math is a priori in the sense of our faculty of reason’s ability to construct the phenomenal world according to principles. — Bob Ross
And because logic is a metaphysical practice, and the conception is already a methodological requirement, then it could be said that they are metaphysically necessary.
-Mww
Metaphysical necessity is essentially that it is true in all possible worlds — Bob Ross
Fer fuck's sake, Bob, how many times do I have to tell you I'm not claiming that object permanence or independence is a feature of, or inference about, anything more than the phenomenal world of human experience.
Object permanence is inferred on account of the experienced invariance of objects. It is an inductive, that is fallible, inference, not a deductive, infallible inference.
You don't pay attention to anything I write, apparently, or else you distort it in the reading. I've already explained numerous times that everything I have been saying relates only to the phenomenal world. When is that going to sink in?
Our representations of the phenomenal world are neither completely accurate nor completely inaccurate; a fact which has no bearing whatsoever on the question of whether we know the world as it is in itself (which simply as a matter of definition we don't, because anything we know is by definition the world as it is for us).
No Bob, those minds may be a part of the world in itself, but the mind as we know it is the mind as it appears to us. Kant's twelve categories are analytically determined by reflecting on the ways in which we understand phenomenal objects.
More unargued assertion; it's not interesting, Bob
Kant does not argue for a soul, at least not in the CPR.
The “I think” must accompany all my representations, for otherwise something would be represented in me, which could not be thought; in other words, the representation would either be impossible, or at least be, in relation to me, nothing...All the diversity or manifold content of intuition has, therefore, a necessary relation to the “I think,” in the subject in which this diversity is found.
The true origin of the possibility of our proofs, is in reason and is a priori.
The origin of the proofs themselves, is in understanding, and is a posteriori.
Useful application…..is empirical, for which the phenomenal is constructed, but by understanding, according to conceptions. Understanding is incompetent to construct synthetic principles a priori, but only to construct the conceptions and the synthesis of them to each other, representing the content of those principles. Transcendental application, is neither useful nor empirical, the form of which is merely syllogistic and thus having no empirical content.
Jeeezz, I hate that expression. Like…..what other world is there? That other worlds are not impossible says not a gawddamn thing about the one we’re in. And we’re not in a possible world; we’re in a necessary world.
Metaphysically necessary merely indicates a condition in a thinking subject. End of story.
This just says, while mathematics is that which exhibits absolute certainty, and we are ourselves the author of mathematical procedures, then it is true absolute certainty is possible for us.
The cautions lay in thinking that insofar as absolute certainty is possible, we are thus authorized to pursue the experience of some object representing it. But that just won’t work, because the objects being pursued are not those we construct of ourselves, but are thought to exist in their own right. And they might, but there are no mathematically derived principles given from pure reason, and by association there can be no absolute certainty contained therein, that can support the reality of that object.
The certainty of mathematics can not be imitated in philosophy.
Is a universal mind an absolute certainty deduced from mathematical principles?
If not, the object, represented as a universal mind in our understanding, is a mere philosophical possibility
If all our representations are derived from ideas contained in that which is not itself a certainty, why should we trust that our representations arise from it?
If I can grasp that all my representations belong to me
and never doubt or question that they do
why would I shadow that certainty with that which has decidedly less so, by thinking to myself that my representations are merely offshoots of something else?
While you are correct in saying it is possible, what’s missing is why I should even consider the possibility that analytic idealism holds more persuasions than the transcendental idealism I currently endorse?
So…..what do I gain by granting my representations have their irreducible origin somewhere other than in me?
Firstly, Janus, I don’t know why you are getting so hostile. — Bob Ross
As you said the above and ‘object permanence’ typically refers to the claim that the objects persist in the context beyond human representations of the world (which would be beyond the phenomenal one). — Bob Ross
In truth, we never perceive whole objects, but only views of them from different perspectives, so we construct the notion of whole objects from the various views (and feels) we have of them — Janus
But -- to start with, wholes and views aren't opposites; they're different sorts of things altogether, and it's exactly this ambiguity that's troublesome. — Srap Tasmaner
So would you rather say we perceive partial objects, out of which we construct a whole in our minds, conceptually, or that we have views of (presumably whole and complete) objects? I've substituted "have" there, but you can stick to "perceive views" if you intended to treat a view as a sort of object. — Srap Tasmaner
If the model is that there's something out there, and then our sensorium, and then finally, at the greatest remove from what's out there, our intellect, are phenomena the input to the sensorium, or the output of the sensorium? I'm thinking it's output, which is to say, the input for the intellect. — Srap Tasmaner
But that too is ambiguous, and if we expect this account to align with the findings of neuroscience, we have to decide whether to count the processing of perceptual data as part of the intellect or part of the sensorium. If you say intellect, then phenomena are almost nothing, the firing of neurons without considering where those impulses go (must go). But if you say sensorium, then an awful lot has already been done, without your awareness, before it reaches the intellect. — Srap Tasmaner
And that's fine, still seems like this is the way to go because that signals processing isn't incidentally unconscious but necessarily so, and we get to call phenomena whatever the first things are that we even can become aware of, whether we happen to be or not. — Srap Tasmaner
But at what point do we get objects? That's the question. Does perception make available to awareness uninterpreted views? That looks unlikely. Color constancy suggests that whether something is an object determines how its color is presented to your awareness, and you have no control over this. It seems your perceptual apparatus is already making decisions about which parts of your so-called field of vision are objects, or anyway something has. — Srap Tasmaner
And if objects are only offered to your awareness pre-assembled, we might say, then objects are constitutive of phenomena, not the other way around. The alternative is to take intellect to include this unconscious processing, but then I'm really not clear what phenomena are supposed to be. Not views certainly. Not color patches. I really don't know what. — Srap Tasmaner
Since we are not conscious of the process of input to the sensorium, I would agree that phenomena (defined as recognizable sense objects) are the output, so it seems we agree on that. — Janus
Are we still agreed? — Srap Tasmaner
I thought the origin of the proofs themselves, being in the understanding, would be a priori….. — Bob Ross
….we cannot know a priori the mathematical relations of objects a priori — Bob Ross
……math is not a priori in the sense of being a part of our construction, via the understanding, of the world around us. — Bob Ross
It isn’t that the possible worlds exist but, rather, that under one’s metaphysical commitments there is an existence with the potency to actualize the thing, and as such the thing is considered metaphysically possible. — Bob Ross
For example, under transcendental idealism I don’t think you can claim: there are other minds; that you have a mind; that you have representative faculties; that objects persist in their existences even when you are not perceiving them, etc…… — Bob Ross
I think a more plausible explanation and account of reality. — Bob Ross
I'm not becoming hostile, just impatient. I just don't believe that you are grasping what is meant by things in themselves. So, I am not going to deal with or respond to anything other than that one point at this juncture.
The idea of things-in-themselves is not meant to be interpreted as claiming that there are things just like those that are perceived that exist independently of human perception; the "thing" in there is a kind of placeholder for some unknowable X
So, object permanence cannot reasonably be thought to apply to things in themselves
except in the sense that whatever it is that appears to us as invariant objects does so reliably, which suggests, but doesn't prove, that the in itself is invariant
In truth, we never perceive whole objects, but only views of them from different perspectives, so we construct the notion of whole objects from the various views (and feels) we have of them, and the fact that we can act on them, and the whole picture of a world of objects of more or less invariance is woven together with remarkable consistency by the brain/ mind.
We have intended, then, to say that all our intuition is nothing but the representation of phenomena; that the things we intuite, are not in themselves the same as our representations of them in intuition, nor are their relations in themselves so constituted as they appear to us; and that if we take away the subject, or even only the subjective constitution of our senses in general, then not only the nature and relations of objects in space and time, but even space and time themselves disappear; and that these, as phenomena, cannot exist in themselves, but only in us – CPR
Part of this picture consists in the idea of object invariance; this idea is inevitable, even animal behavior shows that they expect objects not to simply disappear when they can't be seen. I observe this when I throw the ball for my dog and it inadvertently goes into the long grass; he never stops searching for it until he finds it showing that he expects it to be there somewhere and not to have simply disappeared.
So, if anyone says that they think this or that metaphysical explanation is the most plausible, that really only speaks to their own personal preferences. That, in short, is all I've been arguing for.
So, I haven't been arguing that it is provable that the in itself is invariant or that phenomenal objects are "permanent", but that object permanence is the inference to the best explanation in the empirical context, and that regarding noumenal invariance we really have no idea how to assess which explanation would be the more plausible because we have nothing to compare any explanation with
You can think all day long it takes three lines to enclose a space, but you’re not going to prove it with apodeitic mathematical certainty, unless you physically draw three real lines in a relation to each other corresponding to the image representing your thinking.
Agreed, not part of our construction of the world, which begins with phenomena, whereas mathematics ends with them
For me, a thing I have yet to experience is already metaphysically possible, simply because it is conceivable as a thing, or a manifold of things, such as a world of things
You’re saying a thing is metaphysically possible insofar as some existence with the potency to actualization some possible thing hasn’t done it yet, which is tantamount to a non-natural causality.
Now, I accept the transcendental conception of a non-natural causality, but not with respect to the actualization of metaphysically possible things.
For example, under transcendental idealism I don’t think you can claim: there are other minds; that you have a mind; that you have representative faculties; that objects persist in their existences even when you are not perceiving them, etc…… — Bob Ross
Transcendental philosophy is a speculative methodology. It doesn’t work by claims, which imply possible truths, but by internal logical consistency in the unity of abstract conceptions, same as yours.
Perhaps, but not more knowledge. So we have between us, one philosophy which demonstrates that some knowledge is impossible given this set of conditions, and another philosophy which demonstrates that the former impossible knowledge really isn’t, given a different set of conditions, which in effect, only demonstrates another form of impossible knowledge.
Idealism, in whichever denomination, is always predicated on a subject that cognizes in accordance with a system contained in the form of his intellect
I rather think your idealism has to do with the cognitions, whereas my idealism has to do with the system proper;
yours concerns what is thought about, mine with thought itself.
Yours is limitless, mine self-limiting.
When considering the pros and cons of each, parsimony should be the rule.
And here’s the problem: you can’t say that things-in-themselves cannot be thought of as knowably having object permanence and then turn around and say that the phenomena suggests that the things-in-themselves have object permanence. The phenomena do not suggest anything about the things-in-themselves under Kantianism. Period. — Bob Ross
except in the sense that whatever it is that appears to us as invariant objects does so reliably, which suggests, but doesn't prove, that the in itself is invariant
And here’s the problem: you can’t say that things-in-themselves cannot be thought of as knowably having object permanence and then turn around and say that the phenomena suggests that the things-in-themselves have object permanence. The phenomena do not suggest anything about the things-in-themselves under Kantianism. Period. — Bob Ross
Would you say that we, then, get indirect knowledge of the things-in-themselves? I think that none of the above (that you said) is compatible with Kantianism, but I personally agree with you. Kant argues adamantly that we have absolutely no clue what the things-in-themselves are—not even a reverse engineering of the phenomena. See:
We have intended, then, to say that all our intuition is nothing but the representation of phenomena; that the things we intuite, are not in themselves the same as our representations of them in intuition, nor are their relations in themselves so constituted as they appear to us; and that if we take away the subject, or even only the subjective constitution of our senses in general, then not only the nature and relations of objects in space and time, but even space and time themselves disappear; and that these, as phenomena, cannot exist in themselves, but only in us – CPR
Perhaps you can be a neo-Kantian, but you are clearly contradicting Kant here. — Bob Ross
Janus, you are conceding here that you can, at the very least, get at what is suggested of the things-in-themselves via the phenomena, which is clearly not compatible with Kantianism (in its original formulation). I personally agree with you, but then you can’t turn around and claim, like a Kantian would (which was my whole point originally with Mww), that we can’t do metaphysics beyond transcendental philosophy. Your argument for object invariance here is exactly that: a metaphysical claim pertaining to the things-in-themselves. — Bob Ross
“noumenal invariance” and “object invariance” are the same thing: they are both a metaphysical claim about the same things-in-themselves. By definition (of “object invariance”), we are talking about whatever persists beyond your phenomenal experience and is thusly non-phenomenal (i.e., noumenal). — Bob Ross
”yours concerns what is thought about, mine with thought itself.”
-Mww
I can agree with this to a certain extent; but I also hold that our minds are representative faculties—however, I don’t think it is cogent to claim that we can only go that far. — Bob Ross
What do you mean by “it doesn’t work by claims”? — Bob Ross
”…..only demonstrates another form of impossible knowledge.”
-Mww
What is the other form of impossible knowledge that my theory conceives? — Bob Ross
…..under my view, it is actually and metaphysically possible for the ball at the top of the hill to fall to the ground because I belief the world has to offer such things that could actualize it. — Bob Ross
But not all conceivable things are metaphysically possible. — Bob Ross
….you can’t turn around and claim, like a Kantian would (which was my whole point originally with Mww), that we can’t do metaphysics beyond transcendental philosophy. — Bob Ross
If things-in-themselves are responsible for producing the phenomenal things, and the phenomenal things are reliably invariant (to varying degrees according to the phenomena under consideration, of course) then we can say that things in themselves reliably give rise to invariant phenomena. That doesn't say anything about the things in themselves being invariant in themselves, though.
What I meant there is the same as what I said above; we have no warrant for saying that things-in-themselves are invariant in themselves, but we do know that they are invariant in the sense that they reliably produce invariant phenomena
In positing things-in-themselves as being the things that give rise to the appearance of phenomenal things I'd say Kant must be committed to that much.
Now I admit that there is a tension here in the Kantian idea that we know absolutely nothing about things-in-themselves, but I don't think it amounts to an outright inconsistency.
If "the nature and relations of objects in space and time" and space and time themselves are human representations, human perceptions, then it would seem to follow that these cannot exist apart from human experience.
All he is saying is that the phenomena of perception cannot exist absent perception, and that seems right, doesn't it?
I'm only talking about the natural expectations of the dog that objects don't simply disappear when not being perceived
It might seem inconceivable to us that something could produce a world of differentiated and diversely invariant objects without being differentiated and invariant in itself, but it doesn't follow that we therefore know that the in itself must be differentiated and invariant
We might think that to be the most plausible explanation, but quantum physics might make us think twice about that
One of the subtleties of metaphysics in general, is the recognition that only through reason can reason be examined, from which follows that all that is reasoned about is predicated on what is reason is. This is, of course, the epitome of circularity, and because it is inevitable, it best be kept to a minimum. No one has admitted to having sufficient explanation for how we arrive at representations, even while many philosophize concerning what they do in a speculative theory, justifying their inclusions in it. So saying, to posit an additional representational faculty, doing what it does and we not being able to say how it does what it does, stretches circularity beyond what couldn’t be explained beforehand.
I mean you are correct, in that there are things, such as those you listed, that I have no warrant to claim, either as fact objectively, or as irreducible truth subjectivity, which is exactly the conditions under which transcendental philosophy is to be understood.
yet you hold with the mind as a representational faculty, which is something impossible to know without the antecedent knowledge there is a mind, and, the nature of it is such that it has representational capabilities.
If conception is itself a metaphysical function, and if possibility is a metaphysical condition, then whatever is conceivable must be metaphysically possible.
No matter what was turned around from, or by whom, I never said nor hinted there is no metaphysics beyond transcendental philosophy, or that all metaphysics is necessarily predicated on transcendental philosophy’s critical method.
One can attempt to solves pure reason’s problems, including the one of singular importance, any way he wishes, depending on the preliminaries he uses.
Perhaps you might be so kind as to reiterate what your whole point originally was, with respect to what you said there.
except in the sense that whatever it is that appears to us as invariant objects does so reliably, which suggests, but doesn't prove, that the in itself is invariant – Janus
And here’s the problem: you can’t say that things-in-themselves cannot be thought of as knowably having object permanence and then turn around and say that the phenomena suggests that the things-in-themselves have object permanence. The phenomena do not suggest anything about the things-in-themselves under Kantianism. Period.
Janus, you are conceding here that you can, at the very least, get at what is suggested of the things-in-themselves via the phenomena, which is clearly not compatible with Kantianism (in its original formulation). I personally agree with you, but then you can’t turn around and claim, like a Kantian would (which was my whole point originally with Mww), that we can’t do metaphysics beyond transcendental philosophy. Your argument for object invariance here is exactly that: a metaphysical claim pertaining to the things-in-themselves.
Do you have an idea as to why your system is called analytic idealism, insofar as it is a metaphysical doctrine?
I think it does, because the only way a thing a representation can be invariant is if either (1) the mind of which it is produced simply fabricates it as such, or (2) the object of which it is representing (which is a thing-in-itself) is invariant. There’s no other options by my lights. — Bob Ross
I think, given what I said above, it is an inconsistency. Either the mind’s representative faculty cause the invariance, or the things-in-themselves which are being represented do: there’s no third option. So to make a claim like “we can know phenomenal invariance but nothing about the things-in-themselves”, to me, is claiming a third option that can’t exist. — Bob Ross
For example, under transcendental idealism I don’t think you can claim: there are other minds; that you have a mind; that you have representative faculties; that objects persist in their existences even when you are not perceiving them, etc[/quote][/quote]Are you agreeing with me then that:
— Bob Ross
Yes, I think we can know that there are minds that represent the world around to themselves: what is impossible (in terms of knowledge) about that? — Bob Ross
I thought you were claiming that we cannot perform valid metaphysics beyond transcendental philosophy—as we cannot know the things-in-themselves. Is that incorrect? — Bob Ross
It is originally called ‘analytic’ idealism because it is formulated under the Analytic school of philosophy — Bob Ross
I don’t think there’s sufficient warrant to claim there are other minds in any case, but it is nonetheless reasonable to suppose there are.
I recognize the ubiquity of the conventional use of the word, but I personally don’t hold with minds as something a human being has. I consider it justified to substitute reason for mind anywhere in a dialectic without detriment to it, given the fact it is impossible to deny, all else being equal, that every human is a thinking subject. On the other hand, I am perfectly aware I am a thinking subject, which authorizes me to claim reason for myself, and that beyond all doubt.
The absurdity resides in the notion that if non-perception implies non-existence, then my perception is necessary existential causality itself. But it is absolutely impossible for me to cause the existence of whatever I wish to perceive, as well as to not perceive that of which I have no wish whatsoever, which makes explicit the only existences I could possibly be the causality of, is that which was already caused otherwise, which is all my perceptions could ever tell me anyway.
Then there is time. If I am the cause of an object’s existence merely from my perception of it, then the time of my perception is identical to the time of the object’s existence, which is the same as my having attributed to that object the property of time. But time, as well as space, can never be assigned as a property, therefore the time or space of the object’s existence cannot be an attribution of mine
In order to know a thing in the strictest sense, it must manifest as an experience. What is impossible (in terms of knowledge) about that, is that minds of any form are never going to manifest as an experience.
how would such knowledge be possible? How is it that you think that which the judgement represents, can be known?
That we cannot know the thing-in-itself has nothing to do with metaphysics. Metaphysics proper concerns itself with solutions to the problems pure reason brings upon itself, of which the thing-in-itself is not one.
Good vs bad logic in conjunction with experience or possible experience, for whatever metaphysics, has better service.
Ahhhh…that’s it? Transcendental idealism shifted the entire idealistic paradigm, so I figured that which attempts to shift it again, would shift from that.
There is a short missive in CPR which sets the ground for its doctrine, which says metaphysics is predicated necessarily on the possibility of synthetic a priori cognitions, then goes about proving there are such things which validates the ground initially set as a premise. That to which synthetic cognitions are juxtaposed, are analytic, so….I just figured the new style of idealism wanted to be grounded in pure analytic cognitions, which are mere tautologies necessarily true in themselves, which, of course, a universal mind would have to be, re: self-evident
”I don’t think there’s sufficient warrant to claim there are other minds in any case, but it is nonetheless reasonable to suppose there are.”
-Mww
Why would it be reasonable if you cannot know anything about the things-in-themselves, which would include other minds? — Bob Ross
But there are things about you as a mind you cannot prove of others without venturing into metaphysical claims about the things-in-themselves. — Bob Ross
It just seems like an evasion (inadvertently) of the real issue I am trying to address here to say that ‘mind’ is merely ‘reasoning’. — Bob Ross
Likewise, you can’t prove, even if that is the case that we all reason, that ‘we’ are the ‘ones reasoning’. Do you agree with me on that? — Bob Ross
Time and space aren’t properties of objects per se, but you are, under transcendental idealism, producing them under space and time. — Bob Ross
Saying that the objects only exist in your perception is just to say that there no corresponding object beyond those forms of space and time — Bob Ross
”In order to know a thing in the strictest sense, it must manifest as an experience.”
-Mww
It can agree with this, as a matter of semantics, if you are saying that possible knowledge is that which one experiences…… — Bob Ross
……but then this just pushes the question back: why can’t we say that possible knowledge goes beyond our experiences? — Bob Ross
Also, as a side note, wouldn’t it be impossible to know that, for example, your mind uses pure conceptions of the understanding to produce the world if we are defining possible knowledge as only that which we experience? Because we definitely don’t experience that. — Bob Ross
Because we can tell that our perception of the world is dictated by our representative faculties. — Bob Ross
Metaphysics is about understanding that which is beyond all possibility of experience, and that includes transcendental philosophy. — Bob Ross
Things-in-themselves are beyond the possibility of all experience. — Bob Ross
Analytic Idealism, I would say, is just pure ontolotical idealism; whereas transcendental idealism is really only epistemic idealism — Bob Ross
Things-in-themselves concerns things. Minds are not things. Things-in-themselves do not include minds.
I am not a mind; I am a conscious intelligence, a thinking subject
Notice the conspicuous lack of mention for the thing-in-itself. My body is never absent from my representational faculties, insofar as they are contained in it, thus is always a thing and never a thing-in-itself.
I didn’t say mind was merely reasoning.
It is not impossible what I consider as thinking really isn’t, but is in fact merely the material complexity of my brain manifesting as the seeming of thought. So, what…..you’re trying to say that because it is not impossible for thinking to be other than it seems, the door is thereby left open for my thinking to be a manifestation of something even outside my own brain? Perhaps that’s no more than the exchange of not impossible regarding brains, for vanishingly improbable for external universal entity.
Time and space aren’t properties of objects per se, but you are, under transcendental idealism, producing them under space and time. — Bob Ross
No. I am not producing objects. I am producing representations of them, and those under, or conditioned by, space and time.
Saying that the objects only exist in your perception is just to say that there no corresponding object beyond those forms of space and time — Bob Ross
Sure, but no one has sufficient justification for saying objects only exist in perception, which makes the rest irrelevant.
Semantics, huh? Why don’t we just agree that if you know a thing, you’ve experienced it.
It can agree with this, as a matter of semantics, if you are saying that possible knowledge is that which one experiences; but then this just pushes the question back: why can’t we say that possible knowledge goes beyond our experiences?
Why wouldn’t that be true? The truth of that doesn’t affect the premise that if a thing is known it must have been an experience, and doesn’t affect possible experience.
Of course. The categories are nothing but theoretical constructs. It is merely a logically consistent speculation that understanding relates pure conceptions to cognition of things. Pretty hard to experience a theory, right?
Now, for me, this is exactly backwards. I mean…what comes first, the appearance of a thing, or the representation of it? Our understanding of the world is dictated by our representational faculties.
Ehhhhh…..we just have different ideas of what entails metaphysics.
While it may be fine to say it is understood for something to be beyond the possibility of all experience, it remains the case that understanding is not authorized to say what that something is
Understanding cannot inform what things are not conditioned by the categories,
Yours wants the content of a conception as metaphysical, which is an exposition of it; mine wants that there are conceptions, including their content, not thought spontaneously as in understanding in conjunction with a synthesis of relations, but given complete in themselves from a pure a priori source.
It sounds like you are saying there are minds which are of a mental substance — Bob Ross
But, traditionally, a mind is a conscious intelligence—a thinking subject which has qualia. — Bob Ross
I agree that the body is not a thing-in-itself, but the mind (or something else) must be. — Bob Ross
Even if the mind is not a ‘thing’ in the sense of being of a physical substance, it is a ‘thing-in-itself’ of a mental substance. — Bob Ross
It just seems to me like an incredibly unparsimonious account of reality. — Bob Ross
”…..if you know a thing, you’ve experienced it.”
-Mww
I said: (…) if you are saying that possible knowledge is that which one experiences….
If by “if you know a thing, you’ve experienced it”, you just mean that you’ve experienced something…..
The question up for debate here is whether you have justification for claiming there are things-in-themselves that are being represented in that experience—not that having an experience is having an experience. — Bob Ross
Our understanding of the world is dictated by our representational faculties, but that doesn’t mean we can’t give cogent accounts of beyond that…. — Bob Ross
I only said what my mind is not. I’ve said before I don’t hold that minds are anything beyond an object of reason, which negates that I may be what’s referred to as a substance dualist.
Ok. Why must it be? For a mind, or something else which serves the same purpose, to be a thing-in-itself makes necessary it is first and foremost, a thing. Says so right there in the name.
This looks like a way to force acknowledgement for the existence of a mind.
The thing-in-itself is a physical reality
Which still requires an exposition for mental substance such that mind can emerge from it.
Are you using Descartes for that exposition? It’s in Principia Philosophiae 1, 51-53, 1644, if you want to see how yours and his compare.
I am not accounting for reality; I’m accounting, by means of a logical methodology, reality’s relation to me.
But I know with apodeictic certainty the conditions under which the relations logic obtains, and from which my experiences follow, do not contradict Nature, which is all I need to know.
Do you see that neither of your follow-up’s relate to what I said?
Possible knowledge, knowledge not in residence, cannot be from experience that is.
To experience is not necessarily to know, but to know is necessarily to experience.
Agreed.
Justification for claiming things-in-themselves are being represented in experience, should never be a question up for debate, and if it does arise as such, it can only be from a different conception of it.
To represent a thing-in-itself in its original iteration, is self-contradictory, insofar as the thing-in-itself is exactly what is NOT developed in the human intuitive faculty for representing sensible things.
Then why isn’t such cogent account given by the understanding that’s already dictated our understanding of the world?
So it turns out, not only does reason ask understanding to bend its own rules, but justifies the request because it has already bent its own principles
If that happens, there are no checks and balances left at all, and there manifests an intellectual free-for-all where anything goes, an “…embarrassment to the dignity of proper philosophy….”, so those old-time actual professional philosophers would have us know.
I have no problem with that BUT I can do the same exact thing about things-in-themselves. — Bob Ross
Why can possible knowledge not be from experience? — Bob Ross
We use parsimony, coherence, intuitions, reliability, consistency, empirical adequacy, etc. and this doesn’t require us to limit ourselves to transcendental investigations. — Bob Ross
If I am understanding you correctly, then you are using the “understanding” vs. “reason” semantics from Kant (which is fine). If so, then I would say that (1) your ability to acquire the knowledge of the ‘understanding’ is just metaphysics (and is no different than what I am doing) and (2) I reject Kant’s formulation of it as merely an exposition of ‘reason’ as opposed to the ‘understanding’ — Bob Ross
Maybe expound whatever proof you found convincing for Kant’s twelve categories: that might help me understand better. — Bob Ross
My interest here is waning , sorry to say.
Convinced of a proof grounded in an idea? Nahhhh….no more than persuaded, and that in conjunction with his claim that he’s thought of everything relevant, and needs nothing from me to complete the thesis. For me to think he could have done better, or that he trips all over himself, implies I’m smarter than he, which I readily admit as hardly being the case.
Funny, though, innit? To help you understand? You realize, don’t you, that is beyond my abilities? No matter what anybody says in attempting to help you, you’re still on your own after they’ve said whatever it is they going to say. And because you’ve rejected some parts, it isn’t likely you’re going to understand the remainder as a systemic whole, which necessarily relates to the parts rejected.
If you are convinced that there are twelve categories, then you should be able to articulate the proof that convinced you. — Bob Ross
I didn’t see a proof in that quote…. — Bob Ross
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