And that's what many have said. Yet installing that pro-Russian government, you have to do something about Kyiv. Try to take it, encircle it, perhaps hope that they follow the US proposal of flying to safety to the West. All that needs a military operation that isn't a feint.(Mearsheimer): I think he’s interested in taking at least the Donbass, and maybe some more territory and eastern Ukraine, and, number two, he wants to install in Kyiv a pro-Russian government, a government that is attuned to Moscow’s interests. — Jabberwock
I guess what has been confirmed is that the modern equipment is in use now.Not sure how funny this is in the scheme of things, but gave me a chuckle anyway. — jorndoe
Clearly he thought it was a possibility that the Russians only meant to threaten Kiev.
And no amount of copium is going to make those words go away. Sorry. — Tzeentch
I remember when the Yugoslav Civil war broke out, EU sent observers to observe "the cease-fire" dressed in white overalls. And then you had television footage of these white overalls running for their lives as they were fired upon.Goodie, let's have some external investigators (just don't get in the way of the defenders moving to kick the invaders out :smile:). — jorndoe
It [Dutch court] found that Russia had "overall control" over the separatist forces.
The most likely culprit is of course Russia as it's totally logical for them to a) make the end of the Dnipro unpassable and b) then withdraw forces from there to plug the Ukrainian counterattack. The only thing now is that after WW2 blowing up dams has been a war crime. But obviously Russia doesn't give a damn. Or a dam. — ssu
Although it is unclear who was responsible for the attack, last year, Ukrainian troops fired on the dam in an attempt to raise water levels downstream, and the military leadership had publicly contemplated destroying it altogether. — World Socialist Website
Seems that three of the six Leopard 2 mine-clearing tanks that Finland gave to Ukraine have met their end. But in a war of attrition, you spend materiel. The side that is attacking will face losses, if it doesn't have superiority on the battlefield. Yet likely the counterattack will go on for weeks or for months. — ssu
Russian propaganda is also trying to play the cui bono card. Their western proxies amplify that narrative: — SophistiCat
Although it is unclear who was responsible for the attack, last year, Ukrainian troops fired on the dam in an attempt to raise water levels downstream, and the military leadership had publicly contemplated destroying it altogether. — World Socialist Website
Those apologetics don't make much sense (to me anyway).
Socialists sort of promoting nationalist authoritatian oppressive degenerative capitalist Kremlin...? :brow:
Maybe they are just proxies. — jorndoe
the cui bono card — SophistiCat
As I pointed out months and months ago, Ukrainian offensives will face all the same problems of Russian offensives (mines and ATGM's make it very difficult to advance) ... just with far less capabilities. Additional capabilities (overwhelming artillery, glide bombs, missiles of various kinds) are why Russia can advance at all.
Even more worryingly for Ukraine, there seems to be plenty of footage of both Russian helicopters and planes engaging vehicles over the front, which indicates Ukraine anti-air capabilities are significantly degraded (basically exactly what the leaked papers described).
To make matters even worse for Ukraine, it continues to fight with significant artillery disadvantage.
There is basically not a single metric in which Ukraine has an advantage that can compensate all the disadvantages (numbers, vehicles, air power, electronic warfare, missiles and anything else). — boethius
Russia has long ceased to have any artillery advantage, with missiles it is clearly at a disadvantage - it has spent most of its stocks last year, now it is using mostly current production. — Jabberwock
Moreover, unlike the Western counterparts, they are too inaccurate to be used very effectively on the frontline. — Jabberwock
kraine still has enough HIMARS and now also Shadow Storms, which it uses quite well — Jabberwock
And the difference in the field is also rather important: all Ukrainians have to do to free Kherson and most of Zaporozhe is to cut the path to the sea - they do not even have to take Mariupol or Berdyansk. — Jabberwock
That is, they have 90 km to go (out of which they made 20). Sure, the main line will be tougher, there will be mines and defence lines, so losses are expected, but the situation still favors them. As the whole belt is within the range of Ukrainian missiles and some of its artillery, the Russian defence will lack significant depth. — Jabberwock
This is simply pure invention. We didn't know Russia's stock before before, during nor now.
What we do seem to know is Russia fires significantly more shells than Ukraine. I've not seen that disputed anywhere, except your comment here being the very first time. — boethius
If "all they have to do" is that ... why haven't they done it yet?
What you're talking about could easily cost tens of thousands of lives and still fail.
Worse, even if Ukrainians succeeded in such a manoeuvre it does not result in the situation of just needing to decide whether to invade Crimea or call it a day.
Russia will immediately counter attack to retake the land bridge, cutting North to isolate this exposed salient. It would continue to be fierce fighting and Ukrainians will need to keep this salient supplied to even stand a chance.
It's only if you leave your enemy alone for an entire year that they build up massive multi-layers fortified lines behind a fortified buffer zone and mine fields everywhere. The Russians are unlikely to do that, and would be attacking from both directions to retake the land in question.
... Which Ukrainians in the real world have not even gone through the buffer zone to reach the first fortified line, and you think reaching the sea is basically a done deal? — boethius
The militarily prudent thing for Ukraine to have done is do to the Russians strategy of digging in, inflict losses and just retreating whenever defences degrade, conserving forces and vehicles as much as possible. Simply because Russia has more numbers and capabilities obviously does not mean it can easily win, as we've seen in the war so far the defender has significant advantage.
If Ukraine spent lives and equipment more conservatively, it would be clear Russia could not possibly "win" and would be forced to negotiate. — boethius
The problem is, Ukraine and NATO has defined Russia "winning" as holding on to any Ukrainian territory whatsoever and Ukraine losing as giving up any territory whatsoever and the only acceptable outcome is removing Russia from the lands formerly known as Ukrainian, including Crimea.
What logically follows from this idea is "holding on" to every inch of territory at incredible cost, such as in Bakhmut, and also continuously promising an offensive that will push Russian forces all the way back to their previous border.
This political posture "plays well" for the Western media, building up the mythology needed to keep the arms flowing, but if it's impossible to deliver on, regardless of the arms that can be pumped in, you end up in this kind of situation of needing an offensive simply to fit the narrative.
This not only wastes significant men and material but will boost Russian morale while lowering Ukrainian morale, and ultimately a narrative that is nonsensical will eventually fall apart lowering Western morale generally speaking. We're already seeing the cracks. — boethius
As the Western countries aren't themselves in war, there isn't a huge "ramping up" of manufacturing. Basically only Poland is making huge investments in armament. Yet Western manufacturers know that if the war ends, then the market immediately shuts down. Hence the increase in production is only marginal.Unfortunately I don't have much time for the forum just right now ... but who's ramping up manufacturing to replace this material? — boethius
Ukraine isn't running out of able bodies. Do notice that counterattack has been quite local and limited. Ukrainians understand well that this war can go on for a long time. After all, it started in 2014.Likewise, where will people get replaced from when Ukraine starts to run out of able bodies? — boethius
I wouldn't say it makes zero sense. First of all, to have the initiative in war is extremely important. If you remain passive and don't engage in the enemy, you are handing the Russians the advantage: they can choose where and when to engage.The Ukrainian offensives makes zero sense and is only happening because it is part of the media narrative that promised there would be an offensive. — boethius
(The Guardian, 9th Feb 2023) Russia has launched a major offensive in eastern Ukraine and is trying to break through defences near the town of Kreminna, the governor for the Luhansk region said on Thursday.
Serhiy Haidai told Ukrainian TV that Russian troops had gone on the attack and were trying to advance westwards across a winter landscape of snow and forests. There had been “maximum escalation” and a big increase in shooting and shelling, he said.
Lol. Yeah, let's go that cui bono -thinking here. So Ukraine starts it's counteroffensive, but then limits it's possible area of operations by 87 kilometers by blowing the dam, from where then Russians can withdraw forces to fight were the actual counteroffensive now is going on. And what about the 17000 evacuated, the enormous harm done to agriculture and electricity production of 1,4 TW annually? To a country that has as it's objectives to liberate the territory from Russians. That was also preferable to what? That Russia would look bad?Russian propaganda is also trying to play the cui bono card. Their western proxies amplify that narrative: — SophistiCat
Do we know that it fires significantly more shells than Ukraine now? Can you provide any sources? — Jabberwock
Even amid a shortage, Ukraine is firing about 7,700 shells per day, or roughly one every six seconds, according to a Ukrainian military official who spoke on the condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to speak publicly. Russia, which may also be running low, is firing more — by some estimates triple that amount. — Facing critical ammunition shortage, Ukrainian troops ration shells
As long as Russia had artillery advantage, it pushed forward, because it is essentially the only tactics they have used. Then they stopped. — Jabberwock
And it will not be 'exposed salient' - if the land bridge falls, then most likely the Kherson oblast falls as well, Russians will not be able to supply the area just from Crimea. — Jabberwock
They have not done that because they were not ready. And yes, it will take tens of thousands of lives and yes, it could still fail. Still, it is the best manuever at this time. — Jabberwock
And I am not saying that Ukrainians will surely suceed - only that they have a reasonable chance. The claim that they have 'zero chance' is rather absurd. — Jabberwock
My theory is that Ukraine's offensive has essentially zero chance of succeeding and NATO and the Ukrainians know that. — boethius
As the Western countries aren't themselves in war, there isn't a huge "ramping up" of manufacturing. Basically only Poland is making huge investments in armament. Yet Western manufacturers know that if the war ends, then the market immediately shuts down. Hence the increase in production is only marginal. — ssu
Ukraine isn't running out of able bodies. Do notice that counterattack has been quite local and limited. Ukrainians understand well that this war can go on for a long time. After all, it started in 2014. — ssu
Actually the Russians were in the same situation as the Ukrainians just few months ago. And that Winter Counteroffensive was forgotten as it didn't go anywhere. Likely what will happen with the Ukrainian counteroffensive is that it will take time. Both sides have their limitations. — ssu
First of all, to have the initiative in war is extremely important. If you remain passive and don't engage in the enemy, you are handing the Russians the advantage: they can choose where and when to engage. — ssu
After all, it started in 2014. — ssu
If you follow pretty much any source about the war, West or Russia or Qatari or Indian or whatever, the Russians firing significantly more shells at every phase of the war I have never seen even remotely questioned. — boethius
Since Bakhmut (which the Russians captured by the way) there has been a "who launches their offensive first" game.
It's to the Russians advantage that Ukraine goes first, for a bunch of reasons that I can explain if you want, so Russia waited them out.
Ukraine definitely would have preferred Russia launch some major offensive and then be on the defensive, but Russia had no media pressure to do so. — boethius
Absolutely classic arm-chair general analysis. — boethius
Crimea is a massive island with a massive naval base and a whole bunch of military bases and can be supplied by both road and ferry and there are already hundred thousand or more troops that would be to the West of any land-bridge cut, troops with plenty of ammunition and supplies already stationed there.
It would take a significant amount of time for supplies to even start to be an issue, so this Ukrainian salient cutting the land bridge would need to hold out from intense well supplied attacks from both sides while itself having significant supply issues, which if you really can't see what they would be I can explain it to you. — boethius
For Ukraine to solve those issues would require an absolutely massive force to not only punch through Russian lines and make this salient in the first place but then dig in and hold the entire salient and get supplies in under constant attacks and so on ... in addition to needing to hold all the rest of the lines as well where Russia could counter offensive taking advantage of any weakness.
"Essentially zero chance" means very close to zero.
When this cutting the land bridge manoeuvre had I think some reasonable chance (but still pretty low and would be at extremely high cost) was last year before the Russian mobilisations and building up all these fortifications and mine fields as well as before retreating from Kherson and consolidating the lines (while sanctions were causing serious disruptions etc.).
Why that didn't happen is I think is likely for the exact same problem considering the idea now: what then? If you do cut the land bridge, you need to hold it, and well supplied Russians cutting the salient from both sides would result in a massive encirclement. So, instead Ukraine went with some largely propaganda wins of Kherson and Kharkiv (notice neither lead to cutting the land bridge, and if you wanted to cut the land bridge, even better if there's a bunch of Russians even more cut off in West-Kherson). — boethius
Which is the general problem of the Ukrainian idea of "winning" on the battlefield: the only way to actually end the war through solely military means is to invade and conquer Russia. Simply because this war has this strange framework of "Ukraine can't / won't attack Russia proper" doesn't somehow just get rid of the basic dynamic of every previous war that "winning" by military means requires conquering your enemy. — boethius
As I wrote, what you propose is basically Minsk 3.0. We know exactly how Minsk 1.0 and Minsk 2.0 have ended, so it is not a great surprise that Ukraine was not that willing to take another chance. There is absolutely no reason to think that Russia would uphold its part of the deal and plenty of reasons to think it would not. — Jabberwock
So I'm afraid you've got this one completely backwards. — Tzeentch
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