And I got you.

Nothing about the two major axis being feints as you declared to Mearsheimer to say.

If you quote somebody saying something, then this person has to say that thing. Nothing something that you can intrepret of being somewhat close or whatever to what you intend.

In fact the limited objectives Mearsheimer said, to take Kyiv or threaten it aren't feints. A feint is a is a maneuver designed to distract or mislead. That is different. You don't engage your best troops, do the most the largest airborne operation of the war, engage in a month long battle, suffer substantial losses, all to make a feint. There's absolutely no logic to it.

The only one calling it a feint is you. Not Mearsheimer and likely not anybody else.

And furthermore, you showed even better how confused you are:

(Mearsheimer): I think he’s interested in taking at least the Donbass, and maybe some more territory and eastern Ukraine, and, number two, he wants to install in Kyiv a pro-Russian government, a government that is attuned to Moscow’s interests. — Jabberwock

And that's what many have said. Yet installing that pro-Russian government, you have to do something about Kyiv. Try to take it, encircle it, perhaps hope that they follow the US proposal of flying to safety to the West. All that needs a military operation that isn't a feint.

So your confusion here is that you totally mix up what are the territorial objectives of Putin (and that's the territories of Novorossiya) and then military operation for installing that pro-Russian government (or the destruction of the rump state of Ukraine).

Surely you have something better than a pedestrian attempt at semantics?

It's not semantics. If you argue that the attack toward Kyiv was a feint and argue that other people are saying this or have said so when they have not, that isn't semantics.

Not sure how funny this is in the scheme of things, but gave me a chuckle anyway. — jorndoe

I guess what has been confirmed is that the modern equipment is in use now.

Yet not sure just how large this counteroffensive will be. The fact is that even if the assistance from the West is significant and is enough for Ukraine to defend from Russian assaults, but to take on Russia's entrenched defenses is another issue. Then you have to have that numerical advantage and superiority at least in the local level, which still is difficult for Ukraine.

It is a war of attrition now.

Clearly he thought it was a possibility that the Russians only meant to threaten Kiev.

And no amount of copium is going to make those words go away. Sorry. — Tzeentch

The same goes with "he’s interested in taking Kyiv for the purpose of regime change. O.K.?"
The point is that "threaten" doesn't mean "feint" or "diversion". You are putting into Mearsheimer's mouth something he didn't say to obfuscate what he explicitly said. If you want hard numbers for the Russian troops, I want hard quotes of Mearsheimer's explicitly claiming that Kyiv battle was likely or possibly a diversion or a feint.

I want hard quotes — neomac

Me too.

This is a Philosophy Forum, so we do treat quoting somebody seriously.

I just cannot say "Well, Kant said the same thing too as I" if I really haven't got that exact quote from Kant. People won't take it as not important or as semantics.

Besides talking about a military diversion in this case is itself a form of diversion. Indeed, the military perspective can't trump the political perspective, if war is ultimately politics by other means. The declared reason of this "special operation" was "to demilitarise and denazify Ukraine" [1], not taking land bridges. Did Russia succeed in doing this so far? Is Russia any closer to achieve this now more than ever? Hell no, as Prigozhin must acknowledge:
https://www.businessinsider.com/wagner-group-prigozhin-russia-putin-failed-demilitarize-ukraine-strongest-army-2023-5?r=US&IR=T
https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1661130760978325505


[1]
"The purpose of this operation is to protect people who, for eight years now, have been facing humiliation and genocide perpetrated by the Kiev regime. To this end, we will seek to demilitarise and denazify Ukraine, as well as bring to trial those who perpetrated numerous bloody crimes against civilians, including against citizens of the Russian Federation".
https://www.businessinsider.com/wagner-group-prigozhin-russia-putin-failed-demilitarize-ukraine-strongest-army-2023-5?r=US&IR=T

Destruction of the Kakhovka Dam ...

Moscow and Kyiv blame each other for disastrous dam collapse in southern Ukraine
^{— Susie Blann, Danica Kirka, Edith M Lederer · AP via PBS · Jun 6, 2023}
Russia opens investigation after Ukraine shells evacuation point, kills pregnant woman
^{— TASS · Jun 8, 2023}
Russia shells Ukrainian city inundated by dam collapse after Zelenskyy visit
^{— Vasilisa Stepanenko, Jamey Keaten, Illia Novikov, Joanna Kozlowska, Elise Morton, Yuras Karmanau, Hanna Arhirova, Edith M Lederer · AP · Jun 8, 2023}
Who blew up the Kakhovka dam? Here are the three theories
^{— Brad Dress · The Hill · Jun 11, 2023}
Ukraine's Zelenskiy: Work has started on international investigation of dam breach
^{— Ron Popeski, Marguerita Choy · Reuters · Jun 11, 2023}
Kherson flooding: Ukraine evacuation boat attacked by Russia, killing three
^{— Alys Davies, Paul Adams · BBC · Jun 11, 2023}

Goodie, let's have some external investigators (just don't get in the way of the defenders moving to kick the invaders out :smile:).
If the ICC finds either to blame, then they'll likely deny.
If Kyiv is found to blame, then they have to answer to those from which they're getting aid (civil, arms).
If the Kremlin is found to blame, then they won't care much.

Dmitry Medvedev, a former president and prime minister of Russia and the current vice-chairman of the Russian Security Council decided to celebrate the Russia's Day by posting a picture of Kiev's Maidan Nezalezhnosti with the caption 'Future square of Russia'... for those who still think the war was about Donbas or NATO.

Goodie, let's have some external investigators (just don't get in the way of the defenders moving to kick the invaders out :smile:). — jorndoe

I remember when the Yugoslav Civil war broke out, EU sent observers to observe "the cease-fire" dressed in white overalls. And then you had television footage of these white overalls running for their lives as they were fired upon.

The most likely culprit is of course Russia as it's totally logical for them to a) make the end of the Dnipro unpassable and b) then withdraw forces from there to plug the Ukrainian counterattack. The only thing now is that after WW2 blowing up dams has been a war crime. But obviously Russia doesn't give a damn. Or a dam.

* * *

Seems that three of the six Leopard 2 mine-clearing tanks that Finland gave to Ukraine have met their end. But in a war of attrition, you spend materiel. The side that is attacking will face losses, if it doesn't have superiority on the battlefield. Yet likely the counterattack will go on for weeks or for months.

Ukraine denounces Russian MH17 'rambling conspiracy theory' at World Court
^{— William Maclean · Reuters · Jun 12, 2023}

It [Dutch court] found that Russia had "overall control" over the separatist forces.

... has been implicitly confirmed by Russians anyway, no secret.
Definite answers about the MH17 tragedy may not be found, just a plausible consensus.


Chechen forces sign contract with Russia after Wagner’s refusal
^{— Al Jazeera · Jun 12, 2023}

Kadyrov's aspirations sort of coming to fruition?
Putin seems to stay silent on the Prigozhin-versus-Shoigu/defence-ministry thing.

The most likely culprit is of course Russia as it's totally logical for them to a) make the end of the Dnipro unpassable and b) then withdraw forces from there to plug the Ukrainian counterattack. The only thing now is that after WW2 blowing up dams has been a war crime. But obviously Russia doesn't give a damn. Or a dam. — ssu

Russian propaganda is also trying to play the cui bono card. Their western proxies amplify that narrative:

Although it is unclear who was responsible for the attack, last year, Ukrainian troops fired on the dam in an attempt to raise water levels downstream, and the military leadership had publicly contemplated destroying it altogether. — World Socialist Website

Militarily, it's not actually clear which side this benefits or hurts more. Ukrainian army wasn't likely to attempt crossing the Dnipro river there, except for amphibious incursions, which the flooding does not affect. For that reason, the Russians didn't have many forces defending the left bank. The flooding destroyed their first lines of defense, which, in theory, would make the crossing easier for the Ukrainians after the waters recede. But the Russians still hold positions on higher ground, which would make a full-scale assault across a half-kilometer wide river very problematic.

Naturally, the Ukrainians had even less cause to fear Russian attacks in this area. Ever since their retreat from the right bank, all that the Russians could do - and continue doing - is conduct chaotic shelling of Kherson and other settlements in the area to terrorize and punish the remaining civilian population. They have no force left to conduct a large-scale assault anywhere, let alone in such a difficult place. Hell, it took them nine months, tons of ammunition and suicidal human wave assaults just to grind down one town of little strategic significance - and that was their only "success story" in half a year of war.

More pro-Western pro-Nato pro-Ukraine pro-US pro-Neoliberal capitalism and imperialism propaganda by Prigozhin:
https://hungary.postsen.com/world/194486/Prigozhin-envisions-executions-and-revolution-and-according-to-him-victory-is-not-on-the-side-of-the-Russians.html

Seems that three of the six Leopard 2 mine-clearing tanks that Finland gave to Ukraine have met their end. But in a war of attrition, you spend materiel. The side that is attacking will face losses, if it doesn't have superiority on the battlefield. Yet likely the counterattack will go on for weeks or for months. — ssu

Unfortunately I don't have much time for the forum just right now ... but who's ramping up manufacturing to replace this material? Likewise, where will people get replaced from when Ukraine starts to run out of able bodies?

The premise that the war is attritional is almost exactly the same as the premise Ukraine cannot possibly win.

As I pointed out months and months ago, Ukrainian offensives will face all the same problems of Russian offensives (mines and ATGM's make it very difficult to advance) ... just with far less capabilities. Additional capabilities (overwhelming artillery, glide bombs, missiles of various kinds) are why Russia can advance at all.

Even more worryingly for Ukraine, there seems to be plenty of footage of both Russian helicopters and planes engaging vehicles over the front, which indicates Ukraine anti-air capabilities are significantly degraded (basically exactly what the leaked papers described).

To make matters even worse for Ukraine, it continues to fight with significant artillery disadvantage.

There is basically not a single metric in which Ukraine has an advantage that can compensate all the disadvantages (numbers, vehicles, air power, electronic warfare, missiles and anything else).

The Ukrainian offensives makes zero sense and is only happening because it is part of the media narrative that promised there would be an offensive. Lives are being spent basically to just prop up a delusional propaganda version of the world a little while longer.

Russian propaganda is also trying to play the cui bono card. Their western proxies amplify that narrative: — SophistiCat

Although it is unclear who was responsible for the attack, last year, Ukrainian troops fired on the dam in an attempt to raise water levels downstream, and the military leadership had publicly contemplated destroying it altogether. — World Socialist Website

Those apologetics don't make much sense (to me anyway).
Socialists sort of promoting nationalist authoritatian oppressive degenerative capitalist Kremlin...? :brow:
Maybe they are just proxies.

Those apologetics don't make much sense (to me anyway).
Socialists sort of promoting nationalist authoritatian oppressive degenerative capitalist Kremlin...? :brow:
Maybe they are just proxies. — jorndoe

Even the mainstream Western media has thrown plenty of doubt on what caused the dam to collapse, mainly due to there being literally zero evidence and, more importantly, the Western media has got the memo to stop just repeating everything Ukraine says and start being critical (setting up the, if not resolution, then Western aid pullback).

As for the:

the cui bono card — SophistiCat

Cui bono is literally the first thing any investigator asks themselves when confronted with literally any crime.

Doesn't mean who benefits is who did it, but it's clearly at least worth checking out.

You think a defence attorney has ever said in response to the evidence their client pocketed the insurance money ... "OMG, here we go, prosecutor playing the 'cui bono card', I rest my case."

As I pointed out months and months ago, Ukrainian offensives will face all the same problems of Russian offensives (mines and ATGM's make it very difficult to advance) ... just with far less capabilities. Additional capabilities (overwhelming artillery, glide bombs, missiles of various kinds) are why Russia can advance at all.

Even more worryingly for Ukraine, there seems to be plenty of footage of both Russian helicopters and planes engaging vehicles over the front, which indicates Ukraine anti-air capabilities are significantly degraded (basically exactly what the leaked papers described).

To make matters even worse for Ukraine, it continues to fight with significant artillery disadvantage.

There is basically not a single metric in which Ukraine has an advantage that can compensate all the disadvantages (numbers, vehicles, air power, electronic warfare, missiles and anything else). — boethius

Russia has long ceased to have any artillery advantage, with missiles it is clearly at a disadvantage - it has spent most of its stocks last year, now it is using mostly current production. Moreover, unlike the Western counterparts, they are too inaccurate to be used very effectively on the frontline. Ukraine still has enough HIMARS and now also Shadow Storms, which it uses quite well (just yesterday they killed Major General Goryachev, chief of staff of the 35th Field Army, at his headquarters, with an unknown number of his staff).

And the difference in the field is also rather important: all Ukrainians have to do to free Kherson and most of Zaporozhe is to cut the path to the sea - they do not even have to take Mariupol or Berdyansk. That is, they have 90 km to go (out of which they made 20). Sure, the main line will be tougher, there will be mines and defence lines, so losses are expected, but the situation still favors them. As the whole belt is within the range of Ukrainian missiles and some of its artillery, the Russian defence will lack significant depth.

Whether they will have enough momentum to go further into Crimea remains to be seen. Still, it will be their choice, as they will have the initiative. Not to mention that with the land bridge gone and Dzhankoi within missile range Russians will have a rather hard time with keeping Crimea supplied. If Ukraine somehow manage to repeat the attack on the Kerch Bridge, they will have a hard time – it will the reprise of the Kherson blockade, only on a much bigger scale.

EDIT: It seems that Goryachev was killed with a HIMARS strike, which is even worse for Russians, as Ukrainians have more of them and apparently they can strike whatever they want within the land bridge.

Russia has long ceased to have any artillery advantage, with missiles it is clearly at a disadvantage - it has spent most of its stocks last year, now it is using mostly current production. — Jabberwock

This is simply pure invention. We didn't know Russia's stock before before, during nor now.

What we do seem to know is Russia fires significantly more shells than Ukraine. I've not seen that disputed anywhere, except your comment here being the very first time.

Moreover, unlike the Western counterparts, they are too inaccurate to be used very effectively on the frontline. — Jabberwock

First, dumb shells can be very accurate even in adverse conditions and pencil and paper calculations. I've seen this done first hand. It's just math and skill (of everyone involved). Self propelled artillery with everything done by computer can be quite reliable and keep in mind that every observed hit is data for recalibrating things.

Second, a large part of the tactical use of artillery is to suppress enemy movement. You have no idea where incoming shells are going to hit, where the next will hit and for how long, and the incapacitating range of these shells can be hundred meters, so infantry take cover and hence don't go anywhere in the meanwhile. Even outside lethal range, small shrapnel pieces can still penetrate the skin causing wounds that slow people down, can get infected and aren't a good thing.

Third, Russia too has guided munitions, but more importantly even Western media admits Russia is dominating the electronic warfare front, downing Ukrainian drones while flying its own. Even if you have guided munitions of whatever sort you need to be able to see what you're firing at.

kraine still has enough HIMARS and now also Shadow Storms, which it uses quite well — Jabberwock

These systems do not cover infantry and breach fortified front lines, they can blowup high value targets, such as the general (one use of US spy satellites and these sorts of expensive missiles).

Of note about this particular general, at least according to Reuters, the source of this news is from a Russian blogger and not confirmed by the Russian military. So who knows, but obviously long range guided missiles can attack such high value targets, but that doesn't actually win any battles.

And the difference in the field is also rather important: all Ukrainians have to do to free Kherson and most of Zaporozhe is to cut the path to the sea - they do not even have to take Mariupol or Berdyansk. — Jabberwock

If "all they have to do" is that ... why haven't they done it yet?

What you're talking about could easily cost tens of thousands of lives and still fail.

Worse, even if Ukrainians succeeded in such a manoeuvre it does not result in the situation of just needing to decide whether to invade Crimea or call it a day.

Russia will immediately counter attack to retake the land bridge, cutting North to isolate this exposed salient. It would continue to be fierce fighting and Ukrainians will need to keep this salient supplied to even stand a chance.

It's only if you leave your enemy alone for an entire year that they build up massive multi-layers fortified lines behind a fortified buffer zone and mine fields everywhere. The Russians are unlikely to do that, and would be attacking from both directions to retake the land in question.

... Which Ukrainians in the real world have not even gone through the buffer zone to reach the first fortified line, and you think reaching the sea is basically a done deal?

That is, they have 90 km to go (out of which they made 20). Sure, the main line will be tougher, there will be mines and defence lines, so losses are expected, but the situation still favors them. As the whole belt is within the range of Ukrainian missiles and some of its artillery, the Russian defence will lack significant depth. — Jabberwock

As pointed out above, if Ukraine manages to create a salient it will be under attack from the West and East.

What you're talking about is not some easy task and even if done you'd then need to hold onto this salient that cuts the land bridge requiring significant and continuous supplies.

But we'll obviously see in the coming weeks who's right and who's wrong.

My theory is that Ukraine's offensive has essentially zero chance of succeeding and NATO and the Ukrainians know that.

So why do it anyways?

The militarily prudent thing for Ukraine to have done is do to the Russians strategy of digging in, inflict losses and just retreating whenever defences degrade, conserving forces and vehicles as much as possible. Simply because Russia has more numbers and capabilities obviously does not mean it can easily win, as we've seen in the war so far the defender has significant advantage.

If Ukraine spent lives and equipment more conservatively, it would be clear Russia could not possibly "win" and would be forced to negotiate.

The problem is, Ukraine and NATO has defined Russia "winning" as holding on to any Ukrainian territory whatsoever and Ukraine losing as giving up any territory whatsoever and the only acceptable outcome is removing Russia from the lands formerly known as Ukrainian, including Crimea.

What logically follows from this idea is "holding on" to every inch of territory at incredible cost, such as in Bakhmut, and also continuously promising an offensive that will push Russian forces all the way back to their previous border.

This political posture "plays well" for the Western media, building up the mythology needed to keep the arms flowing, but if it's impossible to deliver on, regardless of the arms that can be pumped in, you end up in this kind of situation of needing an offensive simply to fit the narrative.

This not only wastes significant men and material but will boost Russian morale while lowering Ukrainian morale, and ultimately a narrative that is nonsensical will eventually fall apart lowering Western morale generally speaking. We're already seeing the cracks.

This is simply pure invention. We didn't know Russia's stock before before, during nor now.

What we do seem to know is Russia fires significantly more shells than Ukraine. I've not seen that disputed anywhere, except your comment here being the very first time. — boethius

Do we know that it fires significantly more shells than Ukraine now? Can you provide any sources?

As long as Russia had artillery advantage, it pushed forward, because it is essentially the only tactics they have used. Then they stopped. For the last half of the year Russia has attacked a single place: Bakhmut, where Prigozhin, responsible for the attack, complained about the lack of ammo. Some of it was political posturing, of course, but it would not be very credible if it was indisputably false. Not to mention that you do not move 100 m per week if you have indisputable artillery advantage. And you do not run away the moment you capture the city you have been conquering for the last six months.

And HIMARS do not attack artillery units, of course. They attack artillery ammo dumps, which they have been doing since Ukrainians got them. Russians have reacted by dispersing them, but this is of limited efficiency: you still have to gather them to transport them, especially if most of your transport is by train.

If "all they have to do" is that ... why haven't they done it yet?

What you're talking about could easily cost tens of thousands of lives and still fail.

Worse, even if Ukrainians succeeded in such a manoeuvre it does not result in the situation of just needing to decide whether to invade Crimea or call it a day.

Russia will immediately counter attack to retake the land bridge, cutting North to isolate this exposed salient. It would continue to be fierce fighting and Ukrainians will need to keep this salient supplied to even stand a chance.

It's only if you leave your enemy alone for an entire year that they build up massive multi-layers fortified lines behind a fortified buffer zone and mine fields everywhere. The Russians are unlikely to do that, and would be attacking from both directions to retake the land in question.

... Which Ukrainians in the real world have not even gone through the buffer zone to reach the first fortified line, and you think reaching the sea is basically a done deal? — boethius

They have not done that because they were not ready. And yes, it will take tens of thousands of lives and yes, it could still fail. Still, it is the best manuever at this time.

And it will not be 'exposed salient' - if the land bridge falls, then most likely the Kherson oblast falls as well, Russians will not be able to supply the area just from Crimea. Ukrainians would be exposed only on the 80 km section from Vuhledar to Mariupol - the rest would be protected by the very same defence lines which Russians cannot breach for a year. 'Cutting from North' would be essentially repeating attacks around Vuhledar - we know how well those went. And supplies would be no problem - they would still have Zaporozhe behind them, as they do now. It is Russians who are in vulnerable position there - they have 150 km to defend with their backs to the sea and only 80 km of depth.

And I am not saying that Ukrainians will surely suceed - only that they have a reasonable chance. The claim that they have 'zero chance' is rather absurd.

The militarily prudent thing for Ukraine to have done is do to the Russians strategy of digging in, inflict losses and just retreating whenever defences degrade, conserving forces and vehicles as much as possible. Simply because Russia has more numbers and capabilities obviously does not mean it can easily win, as we've seen in the war so far the defender has significant advantage.

If Ukraine spent lives and equipment more conservatively, it would be clear Russia could not possibly "win" and would be forced to negotiate. — boethius

Russia would not win in the sense that it would not vasalize Ukraine, but it would still make significant gains - new territories which it would arm and use as a staging ground for another round. Any peace accord for Ukraine would be just Minsk 3.0, i.e. a temporary peace until Russia decides to take another slice. Unfortunately, the war will actually end when the Russian society/authorities decide it is not worth waging.

The problem is, Ukraine and NATO has defined Russia "winning" as holding on to any Ukrainian territory whatsoever and Ukraine losing as giving up any territory whatsoever and the only acceptable outcome is removing Russia from the lands formerly known as Ukrainian, including Crimea.

What logically follows from this idea is "holding on" to every inch of territory at incredible cost, such as in Bakhmut, and also continuously promising an offensive that will push Russian forces all the way back to their previous border.

This political posture "plays well" for the Western media, building up the mythology needed to keep the arms flowing, but if it's impossible to deliver on, regardless of the arms that can be pumped in, you end up in this kind of situation of needing an offensive simply to fit the narrative.

This not only wastes significant men and material but will boost Russian morale while lowering Ukrainian morale, and ultimately a narrative that is nonsensical will eventually fall apart lowering Western morale generally speaking. We're already seeing the cracks. — boethius

That theory seems to be based mostly on conjecture and not very much on facts. The West has supported Ukraine when it has been retreating for a long time - it certainly did not 'hold on to every inch'. And it is much easier to gather support for a country that is still relentlessly attacked. It is not about what one thinks as winning or losing - Russia must be stopped and the time for it is now - when it is bled and weakened from the year on the offensive and before it has adjusted economically and militarily. It makes no sense to wait until it gets stronger again.

Some news on the street about the present situation ...

NATO leader says Ukrainians are making progress and advancing against Russian forces
^{— Chris Megerian · AP · Jun 12, 2023}

Former Kremlin Official Says Putin Is Too Afraid to Punish the Wagner Group’s Prigozhin, Even After Public Name Calling
^{— Veuer via Dailymotion · Jun 13, 2023 · 1m:12s}

Blue and yellow flag, Russian dead attest to Ukrainian advance in south
^{— Vitalii Hnidyi, Max Hunder, Guy Faulconbridge, Vladimir Soldatkin, Peter Graff, Alex Richardson, Grant McCool, Angus MacSwan, Mark Heinrich · Reuters · Jun 13, 2023}


↑ Source

(, just FYI, the tankies thing wasn't specifically about the dam)

Unfortunately I don't have much time for the forum just right now ... but who's ramping up manufacturing to replace this material? — boethius

As the Western countries aren't themselves in war, there isn't a huge "ramping up" of manufacturing. Basically only Poland is making huge investments in armament. Yet Western manufacturers know that if the war ends, then the market immediately shuts down. Hence the increase in production is only marginal.

Likewise, where will people get replaced from when Ukraine starts to run out of able bodies? — boethius

Ukraine isn't running out of able bodies. Do notice that counterattack has been quite local and limited. Ukrainians understand well that this war can go on for a long time. After all, it started in 2014.

The Ukrainian offensives makes zero sense and is only happening because it is part of the media narrative that promised there would be an offensive. — boethius

I wouldn't say it makes zero sense. First of all, to have the initiative in war is extremely important. If you remain passive and don't engage in the enemy, you are handing the Russians the advantage: they can choose where and when to engage.

Furthermore, if you didn't notice, what happened to the Russian "Winter Offensive"?

(The Guardian, 9th Feb 2023) Russia has launched a major offensive in eastern Ukraine and is trying to break through defences near the town of Kreminna, the governor for the Luhansk region said on Thursday.

Serhiy Haidai told Ukrainian TV that Russian troops had gone on the attack and were trying to advance westwards across a winter landscape of snow and forests. There had been “maximum escalation” and a big increase in shooting and shelling, he said.

Actually the Russians were in the same situation as the Ukrainians just few months ago. And that Winter Counteroffensive was forgotten as it didn't go anywhere. Likely what will happen with the Ukrainian counteroffensive is that it will take time. Both sides have their limitations. The simple fact is that the Russian armed forces have suffered severe losses of equipment and trained manpower in the war since February 2022. Such losses will take many years to replace and hence the Russians have to keep a reserve too.

The Dnipro is a natural defensive line.

In the age of pin-point accuracy weapons going over it is a difficult issue. Not impossible, but just difficult. For example in WW2, the Germans tried desperately to destroy the bridge over the Rhein at Remagen, but a bridgehead was established over the river. Germans made several attempts to bomb the bridge, if I remember correctly.

Russian propaganda is also trying to play the cui bono card. Their western proxies amplify that narrative: — SophistiCat

Lol. Yeah, let's go that cui bono -thinking here. So Ukraine starts it's counteroffensive, but then limits it's possible area of operations by 87 kilometers by blowing the dam, from where then Russians can withdraw forces to fight were the actual counteroffensive now is going on. And what about the 17000 evacuated, the enormous harm done to agriculture and electricity production of 1,4 TW annually? To a country that has as it's objectives to liberate the territory from Russians. That was also preferable to what? That Russia would look bad?

At least the good thing is that now Tucker is giving his bullshit just on Twitter.

Yesterday Putin has stated that Ukrainians blew up the dam. But in the next sentence he said that it is a major obstruction of the Ukrainian counteroffensive. He admitted that the apparent inconsistency is 'strange'.

Do we know that it fires significantly more shells than Ukraine now? Can you provide any sources? — Jabberwock

If you follow pretty much any source about the war, West or Russia or Qatari or Indian or whatever, the Russians firing significantly more shells at every phase of the war I have never seen even remotely questioned.

Here's a source from the Washington post

Even amid a shortage, Ukraine is firing about 7,700 shells per day, or roughly one every six seconds, according to a Ukrainian military official who spoke on the condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to speak publicly. Russia, which may also be running low, is firing more — by some estimates triple that amount. — Facing critical ammunition shortage, Ukrainian troops ration shells

As long as Russia had artillery advantage, it pushed forward, because it is essentially the only tactics they have used. Then they stopped. — Jabberwock

You need more than an artillery advantage.

Since Bakhmut (which the Russians captured by the way) there has been a "who launches their offensive first" game.

It's to the Russians advantage that Ukraine goes first, for a bunch of reasons that I can explain if you want, so Russia waited them out.

Ukraine definitely would have preferred Russia launch some major offensive and then be on the defensive, but Russia had no media pressure to do so.

And it will not be 'exposed salient' - if the land bridge falls, then most likely the Kherson oblast falls as well, Russians will not be able to supply the area just from Crimea. — Jabberwock

Absolutely classic arm-chair general analysis.

Crimea is a massive island with a massive naval base and a whole bunch of military bases and can be supplied by both road and ferry and there are already hundred thousand or more troops that would be to the West of any land-bridge cut, troops with plenty of ammunition and supplies already stationed there.

It would take a significant amount of time for supplies to even start to be an issue, so this Ukrainian salient cutting the land bridge would need to hold out from intense well supplied attacks from both sides while itself having significant supply issues, which if you really can't see what they would be I can explain it to you.

For Ukraine to solve those issues would require an absolutely massive force to not only punch through Russian lines and make this salient in the first place but then dig in and hold the entire salient and get supplies in under constant attacks and so on ... in addition to needing to hold all the rest of the lines as well where Russia could counter offensive taking advantage of any weakness.

What you describe is not remotely close to being some easy thing Ukrainians can casually do.

Now, if NATO trained up a 200 000 well equipped army that's ready to enter the fight and do this thing on top of everyone who is already there and have been holding lines more-or-less, then, ok, I would say it's definitely doable with such a force, even without the air cover, and the war is about to get super messy, as it's unclear what the Russians would do.

And, as I've mentioned before, maybe there is some secret island where NATO has built up a 200 000 man force. We can't know for sure, but the only reports I've seen is that NATO trained 35 000 for this offensive operation, which is really just not enough to do what you're talking about.

Of course, we'll soon find out who's right and who's wrong, that's for sure.

They have not done that because they were not ready. And yes, it will take tens of thousands of lives and yes, it could still fail. Still, it is the best manuever at this time. — Jabberwock

Spending tens of thousands of lives and still failing would definitely be a complete military catastrophe, and considering that risk you'd need pretty powerful arguments about why it is worth the risk you're talking about, not just stating "it is the best manuever at this time".

And I am not saying that Ukrainians will surely suceed - only that they have a reasonable chance. The claim that they have 'zero chance' is rather absurd. — Jabberwock

Leaving out the word qualifying "zero chance" that appears immediately before it is simply dishonest.

What I state is:

My theory is that Ukraine's offensive has essentially zero chance of succeeding and NATO and the Ukrainians know that. — boethius

"Essentially zero chance" means very close to zero.

When this cutting the land bridge manoeuvre had I think some reasonable chance (but still pretty low and would be at extremely high cost) was last year before the Russian mobilisations and building up all these fortifications and mine fields as well as before retreating from Kherson and consolidating the lines (while sanctions were causing serious disruptions etc.).

Why that didn't happen is I think is likely for the exact same problem considering the idea now: what then? If you do cut the land bridge, you need to hold it, and well supplied Russians cutting the salient from both sides would result in a massive encirclement. So, instead Ukraine went with some largely propaganda wins of Kherson and Kharkiv (notice neither lead to cutting the land bridge, and if you wanted to cut the land bridge, even better if there's a bunch of Russians even more cut off in West-Kherson).

Which is the general problem of the Ukrainian idea of "winning" on the battlefield: the only way to actually end the war through solely military means is to invade and conquer Russia. Simply because this war has this strange framework of "Ukraine can't / won't attack Russia proper" doesn't somehow just get rid of the basic dynamic of every previous war that "winning" by military means requires conquering your enemy.

The alternative to conquering your enemy is a negotiated settlement, a forever war ... or ... getting conquered.

Now, people argue a forever war, or as close as can be managed, is good for the West. I'm not convinced this is even true, but what is clearly true is that a forever war that does not result in victory for Ukraine cannot possibly be good for the average Ukrainian. In such circumstances, the longer the war goes on the worse it is for the weaker side, never better, mainly because the stronger side will feel they need more and more compensation for the war going forward. Now, you may say those feelings are unjustified, that's certainly a valid debate on philosophyforum, but the reality is that's what will inform negotiating positions: the more the war goes on, the more Ukrainians need will need to give up in a peace settlement, not less.

This of course creates a classic cycle of a long war where the losing side can't accept the costs since "day x" (where they had the most leverage) has not gained anything and the stronger side feels they need to have more and more to "show for it" to justify the fighting and losses, making it even harder for the weaker side to compromise.

The whole reason for a conventional deterrent against a stronger force is basically "mutually assured pain": it maybe not rational for the weaker side to fight a long war as they'll lose, but it may not be rational either for the stronger side to fight a long war either as it's not cost-beneficial.

Which is a big part of the tragedy here, that Ukraine had a good negotiating position early on in the war, by not capitulating and clearly demonstrating their will to fight. Unfortunately for everyone and their relatives who have died since, a good negotiating position doesn't mean you get what you want. Because Zelensky understands basically nothing about politics, Ukraine not only had a good negotiating position against Russia but also against the EU. Zelensky could have leveraged the EU's desire to keep getting Russian gas to get more from either Russia or the EU in compensation for ending the war and business as usual continuing. For example, Russia has stated multiple times it doesn't have a problem with Ukraine joining the EU, so Zelensky could have leveraged the early good negotiating position to get that EU membership one way or another, investment, all sorts of stuff etc.

Fast forward to today and all that leverage playing the EU and Russia against each other (in the sense they both want things from each other at the time; mainly maintain the oil and gas trade) to get the best possible deal for Ukraine is mostly gone.

Instead, Zelensky listens to the UK and US who are both not part of the EU, surprise, surprise not only have the least interest in the war stopping but plenty of arms-dealing reasons for the war to continue, not to mention different currencies that could use, maybe even need, a weak Euro (what I believe this war is ultimately about). But what did Zelensky get for stopping negotiations and continuing the war? Just more war.

As the Western countries aren't themselves in war, there isn't a huge "ramping up" of manufacturing. Basically only Poland is making huge investments in armament. Yet Western manufacturers know that if the war ends, then the market immediately shuts down. Hence the increase in production is only marginal. — ssu

The West keeps saying they'll "do whatever it takes" blah, blah, blah ... but we agree that the goal here is not "Ukraine winning" in any military sense.

Also,

A. it's not "Western manufacturers" who have decided not to ramp up manufacturing and NATO just has to accept that. If NATO wanted it could just order the rounds needed to fight a long war, or provide "cost +" contracts to build the capacity for it ... and if they aren't needed because there was a settlement ... well maybe there's a settlement precisely because the West has demonstrated commitment to a long war!!

B. governments could literally pass a law ordering these companies to produce whatever the government wants.

Ukraine isn't running out of able bodies. Do notice that counterattack has been quite local and limited. Ukrainians understand well that this war can go on for a long time. After all, it started in 2014. — ssu

First, my point was that is a risk on the Ukrainian side of attritional warfare. They have less people so they will run out of people first.

Second, we don't see Ukraine's "million man army" in the field or anything close to that and I would put good money on that being because they ran out of able bodies, explaining expanding to 60 as well as require women to register for the draft too.

I can speak from experience, and I think you as well, it's not easy being a soldier. It's really very tough and a lot of people simply can't handle it mentally or physically and that includes people who "looked good on paper". A lot of people are not only ineffective soldiers but instead a liability on the battlefield: unreliable, unpredictable and down right dangerous (and this includes professional soldiers ... just a lot less compared to drafting large swaths of the population with basically not filter).

There's a reason young and fit men have been the "go to" source of front line soldiers throughout history, and if you look at this pool of men it's not all that much in a population such as Ukraine when you factor in modern sensibilities and we don't have societies anymore 100% dedicated to warfare that throw babies of cliffs to prove their toughness or similar hazing rituals.

Warfare is also a lot more complicated nowadays than standing in a phalanx and I would also say a lot more terrifying.

Furthermore, as we've discussed plenty, armour and air defence really is essential for any offensive manoeuvres and these systems require training which requires time, the extent people can "learn on the job" in the front lines I think is extremely limited in considering assault capabilities. People can learn how to dig and stand in a trench and fire in the general direction of the enemy as well as fire shoulder launched missiles; which is why when that was the most successful phase of the war when such tactics were relevant (and therefore Ukraine had the highest leverage).

As I mentioned when it was happening in the first weeks of the invasion, ATGM's and stingers and the like are really great for arresting Russian advances and inflicting serious damage, but cannot possibly be the basis of any offensive manoeuvres (so Ukraine cannot "win" on that basis and should negotiate; the West decided instead to pretend that was feasible but eventually accept the obvious military reality and supply tanks, but too little too late in my opinion, but had they been early worm on that ... maybe Russia blows up massive Western tank columns with tactical nukes, so we'll just pretend people can just run around with ATGM's and win a conventional war).

Actually the Russians were in the same situation as the Ukrainians just few months ago. And that Winter Counteroffensive was forgotten as it didn't go anywhere. Likely what will happen with the Ukrainian counteroffensive is that it will take time. Both sides have their limitations. — ssu

This is exactly my thesis: that Ukraine offensives have the same problems as Russian offensives ... just worse as they have less capabilities (less planes, less helicopters, less air defence, less tanks and so on).

Going on failed offensives is not "initiative":

First of all, to have the initiative in war is extremely important. If you remain passive and don't engage in the enemy, you are handing the Russians the advantage: they can choose where and when to engage. — ssu

This is a false dichotomy. The choice is not between being passive and undertaking a major offensive that suffers significant losses. While defending you can do plenty of things such as launch small counter offensives and so on that have a positive cost-benefit. By not wasting your forces you constantly threaten to engage them anywhere along the front line as well as have them available (because they are not dead or destroyed) to reinforce lines where it is suitable to defend (i.e. not a few building left in Bakhmut but somewhere else that's more suitable or defence).

With such a strategy Ukraine can single (or explicitly say) that they can't defeat the Russians, but the Russians can't defeat them either, so it's better to accept our perfectly reasonable offer (which is the problem, Zelensky does not want to offer anything Russia might accept, seek concessions from either Russia or the EU or even the United States to compensate what he gives Russia to end the conflict).

How you give the Russians the option to simply defeat you is by wasting your forces in undertaking fools errands and no longer having the reserves necessary to maintain a defence on a 1000 km front or prevent the Russians from encircling the capital successfully this time and so on.

It's reported Ukraine has lost 4 MiGs in this offensive so far and also could be easily 6-18 months to actually have any F16s in Ukraine ... so that's a pretty significant loss of air capabilities that could have been used to keep things together until said F16s arise. Now, fog of war, who knows anything, but the point is if you want your offensive to have a good chance of success then you committing your planes you may need to do.

After all, it started in 2014. — ssu

The war has not been so intense since 2014.

That there was 8 years of a low intensity civil war "supported" by Russia is not any basis to say the current intensity of warfare can last 8 years.

At some point things will start to fall apart, and it's difficult to bet against the far larger and stronger side with far more kinds of capabilities.

Probably why talk of a "frozen conflict" has ramped up in the West, the alternative to one side winning or a negotiated settlement is just each side being unable to carry out large offensives and things just stay like that.

However, I'm unsure if this would even be stable in this case, mainly due to the drones allowing attritional warfare to continue at great distances. This is very much a new thing in the history of warfare and may prevent a large no-mans land forming which each side hesitates to cross and firing artillery randomly back and forth is basically guess work and mainly just a reminder of what would happen if large infantry formations did enter no mans land.

If you follow pretty much any source about the war, West or Russia or Qatari or Indian or whatever, the Russians firing significantly more shells at every phase of the war I have never seen even remotely questioned. — boethius

Here is what one of Wagner commanders had to say about that yesterday (start with 'They have a lot of ammo!'). You do have to read between the lines a bit (it is, after all, the state propaganda program), but his words cannot be in any way interpreted 'We have plenty of ammo and they do not'.

Since Bakhmut (which the Russians captured by the way) there has been a "who launches their offensive first" game.

It's to the Russians advantage that Ukraine goes first, for a bunch of reasons that I can explain if you want, so Russia waited them out.

Ukraine definitely would have preferred Russia launch some major offensive and then be on the defensive, but Russia had no media pressure to do so. — boethius

I am just an armchair analyst, but it goes against any manual of strategy I have read in my armchair. When your enemy's offensive culminates, you take over the initiative. You do not wait for him to regroup, get stronger and gain the initiative again.

Absolutely classic arm-chair general analysis. — boethius

Of course it is, what did you expect on a philosophy forum? Am I to understand yours is not? Which military academy have you graduated from?

Crimea is a massive island with a massive naval base and a whole bunch of military bases and can be supplied by both road and ferry and there are already hundred thousand or more troops that would be to the West of any land-bridge cut, troops with plenty of ammunition and supplies already stationed there.

It would take a significant amount of time for supplies to even start to be an issue, so this Ukrainian salient cutting the land bridge would need to hold out from intense well supplied attacks from both sides while itself having significant supply issues, which if you really can't see what they would be I can explain it to you. — boethius

Crimea is supplied from the north (the main route) and by the Kerch bridge. For the military supplies trains constitute an ovewhelming majority, I am surprised you did not know that. Road is by far secondary. Ferries...? Mmm... no.

If the land bridge is cut off, majority of its supplies will be provided by two very long, rather vulnerable tracks. Sure, maybe they have enough supplies to hold off, I cannot know that. But that is of secondary importance, as I do not think that this offensive even covers Crimea. I suppose the most realistic plan is to make Russians withdraw to the Perekop Isthmus. And that seems quite doable.

And yes, I admit, I do not see where exactly Ukrainians would have supply issues. Let us suppose they take the slice from Vuhledar to Vasilyvka - where exactly and how would Russians cut their supply lines from the north of Zaporozhe?

For Ukraine to solve those issues would require an absolutely massive force to not only punch through Russian lines and make this salient in the first place but then dig in and hold the entire salient and get supplies in under constant attacks and so on ... in addition to needing to hold all the rest of the lines as well where Russia could counter offensive taking advantage of any weakness.

The obvious difference is that the only actually exposed section would be 80 km south of Vuhledar. Russians have proven completely unable to cross Ukrainian lines south of Donetsk, even though they have tried very hard. They cannot take Marinka for a year, why should we assume they suddenly could?

"Essentially zero chance" means very close to zero.

When this cutting the land bridge manoeuvre had I think some reasonable chance (but still pretty low and would be at extremely high cost) was last year before the Russian mobilisations and building up all these fortifications and mine fields as well as before retreating from Kherson and consolidating the lines (while sanctions were causing serious disruptions etc.).

Why that didn't happen is I think is likely for the exact same problem considering the idea now: what then? If you do cut the land bridge, you need to hold it, and well supplied Russians cutting the salient from both sides would result in a massive encirclement. So, instead Ukraine went with some largely propaganda wins of Kherson and Kharkiv (notice neither lead to cutting the land bridge, and if you wanted to cut the land bridge, even better if there's a bunch of Russians even more cut off in West-Kherson). — boethius

Even with the qualification it is still quite absurd. And I have serious doubts that we are even looking at the same map... If they take the land bridge, they are exposed from 80 km on the East; even if we assume the 80 km on the West, they still would have unobstructed support from the heartland on the line of at least 120 km. How is that 'encirclement'?

And they did not take the land bridge because the West did not supply enough weapons earlier, that is all.

Which is the general problem of the Ukrainian idea of "winning" on the battlefield: the only way to actually end the war through solely military means is to invade and conquer Russia. Simply because this war has this strange framework of "Ukraine can't / won't attack Russia proper" doesn't somehow just get rid of the basic dynamic of every previous war that "winning" by military means requires conquering your enemy. — boethius

As I wrote, what you propose is basically Minsk 3.0. We know exactly how Minsk 1.0 and Minsk 2.0 have ended, so it is not a great surprise that Ukraine was not that willing to take another chance. There is absolutely no reason to think that Russia would uphold its part of the deal and plenty of reasons to think it would not. But maybe you can explain it – what exactly would stop Russia from taking another shot in 5, 10 years?

The only way to actually end the war is to remove Russia's potential and will to fight. Ukraine understands this and so does the West. Note that US and UK might be the largest donors in absolute terms, but in relative terms they are far behind: relatively the most was given by the Baltics and the Eastern Europe. They are very willing to help Ukraine to neutralize Russia, because they understand very well what happens if it does not.

As I wrote, what you propose is basically Minsk 3.0. We know exactly how Minsk 1.0 and Minsk 2.0 have ended, so it is not a great surprise that Ukraine was not that willing to take another chance. There is absolutely no reason to think that Russia would uphold its part of the deal and plenty of reasons to think it would not. — Jabberwock

Actually, Mearsheimer argues that Putin was deeply committed to making Minsk work. (51:27)

And we know from recent revelations by former French President François Hollande and former German Chancellor Angela Merkel that it was NATO who chose to treat the Minsk Accords as a temporary armistice during which Ukraine could be armed and prepared for further war.

I would add that high-profile former officials leaking sensitive information like this is neither an accident nor is it a coincidence. They see what the United States has done in Ukraine, and they disagree with it.

So I'm afraid you've got this one completely backwards.

So I'm afraid you've got this one completely backwards. — Tzeentch

We know from Girkin exactly how committed Russians were to peace. Why should we not believe him?