Ehm, no.

This was in reply to your claim that 190,000 troops would translate into 283 BTGs.

The confusion lies primarily with you. — Tzeentch

So what is the source of the 21 thousand troops in the northern campaign OTHER than multiplying 31 BTGs by about 700? Because that one does not work, as we now know thanks to your illumination that all Russian troops might not have been directly organized in the BTGs. And you have not answered the question: if using 100 BTGs involves use of the indisputable 190 000 troops, then how much troops are involved when 31 BTGs are involved? With your apparent difficulties, let me do the math for you again:

100 BTGs involves 190000 troops: 190000/100 = 1900, therefore 1 BTG involves about 1900 troops
31 BTGs: 31 * 1900 = 58900 = that many troops were involved in the northern campaign

Taking the land bridge would obviously still be of vital importance, because the negotiations failing was a clear possibility from the start. — Tzeentch

'If I lose, my primary goal is...'. Nope, it still does not work that way.

Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the Kyiv attack had not been part of the Feb 24 invasion.

In terms of strategy, what might reasonably have been expected for north-Ukrainian/Kyiv forces? Moved to defend the east? Half go east, half stay to defend if also to be attacked there (north/Kyiv)? Stay put? What difference (if any), would it have made to the south/eastern parts of the invasion?

Each could be tediously analyzed and some implications drawn, while supposing that the Russian generals/strategists were informed/competent or not.

Animated gifs (somewhat large image files, so not going to attach):

• Phase 1, Feb 24 — Apr 7
• Phase 2, Apr 7 — Sep 5
• Phase 3, Sep 5 — Nov 11

Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the Kyiv attack had not been part of the Feb 24 invasion.

In terms of strategy, what might reasonably have been expected for north-Ukrainian/Kyiv forces? Moved to defend the east? Half go east, half stay to defend if also to be attacked there (north/Kyiv)? Stay put? What difference (if any), would it have made to the south/eastern parts of the invasion? — jorndoe

That depends on where the Russians would be. With todays means of intelligence you cannot have a large grouping of forces without the enemy being aware of it. If there were no Russians in the north, most of the defending forces around Kiev could be moved south. Especially that Ukrainians do not need to move far - for Russians to go from north to south and the other way round requires going 'around' Ukraine.

There are some indications that the initial invasion was planned as Tzeentch claims: only in the south, in order to get the corridor to Crimea and (possibly) Transnistria, maybe up to Zaporozhnia. The operation in the south was certainly much better prepared and planned. Possibly due to inadequate intelligence at a later stage Putin became convinced that they will be able to take Kiev and depose the authorities, so they tried, with catastrophic results. If they stuck to the plan, the campaign might go much better for Russians, even with the Ukrainian forces relieved from the north. Possibly the international reaction might have been different as well - slicing off the pieces of Ukraine might be viewed differently than an 'all-out' war.

More strawmanning.

The amount of BTGs involved in Ukraine is entirely part of your argument.

My argument is that we have information showing 21,000 (numbers ranging between 15,000 - 30,000 depending on different reports) troops moved on Kiev. (and 190,000 troops maximum operating in Ukraine at the onset of the invasion).

That's from where I draw my conclusions.

All this math and mental gymnastics you're doing is you not being able to accept that 21,000 troops is all you have to work with and it's woefully insufficient for what you're claiming the Russians intended.

Stop pretending any of what you're spinning here is part of my argument.

Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the Kyiv attack had not been part of the Feb 24 invasion.

In terms of strategy, what might reasonably have been expected for north-Ukrainian/Kyiv forces? — jorndoe

This is quite hard to say (too many moving parts to make even an educated guess, in my view), but in a general sense if there had been no significant threat to Kiev, the Ukrainian defense would have been a lot denser, because there would have been less frontline to cover. This is generally seen as being in favor of the defender.

I'm hypothesizing. — Tzeentch

So now its hypotheticals. At least that is promising. :smirk:

Anyway, the 190,000 figure is provided by Mearsheimer as the upper limit of troops the Russians deployed at the start of the invasion. I don't think that number is actually being seriously disputed — Tzeentch

How about the fact that troops committed to a war aren't just made up, even in Russia, from battalion tactical groups, the maneuver units? Maneuver units are the spearhead of the fighting force, but behind there is all other supporting elements and supply.

Hence you have Armies attacking into Ukraine, which are created from several divisions which in turn form the needed BTCs. Hence it's rather naive talk of how much manpower and then look at size of the BTC. And anyway, as usual, this is totally besides the point.

The fact is that Russian Army and other parts of the armed forces concentrated nearly everything they could to the "special military operation" is totally obvious. The most obvious and irrefutable fact is that they had to perform a mobilization of reserves afterwards, when things didn't go as planned. And so is that two of main axis went after Kyiv and anybody with the slightest understanding of how militaries work can see that this wasn't a feint.

Understanding that Ukraine put up a fight, understanding the pre-attack intel was horrifically wrong, and above all the attack being got stuck with lots of losses, Russia withdrew it's forces from the Kyiv operations area to reinforce other fronts as a) Ukraine won't follow them to Belarus. This was no feint, what happened was a withdrawal.

Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the Kyiv attack had not been part of the Feb 24 invasion.

In terms of strategy, what might reasonably have been expected for north-Ukrainian/Kyiv forces? — jorndoe

This is quite hard to say (too many moving parts to make even an educated guess, in my view), but in a general sense if there had been no significant threat to Kiev, the Ukrainian defense would have been a lot denser, because there would have been less frontline to cover. This is generally seen as being in favor of the defender. — Tzeentch

One hypothetical (as we are talking about hypotheticals now) would have been that Russia would only have attacked in Donbas and the war wouldn't have been about the de-nazification of Ukraine (regime change).

This clearly would have had an affect of the attack being on a lower escalatory ladder and likely would have produced a far weaker response from the West. If the Russian attack would have confided to the Donbas with the objective to gain all of the area and that landbridge to Ukraine, many could argue that this wouldn't be a major escalation. No attack towards Kyiv and Kharkiv. Above all, no regime change either. Ukraine, as it had done in 2014, would still have had to have reserves to defend it's Capitol from a possible attack. But now as it was an all-out attack on Ukraine with the objective of regime change, this obviously didn't happen.

Putin did have this possibility, but he went Kyiv.

My argument is that we have information showing 21,000 (numbers ranging between 15,000 - 30,000 depending on different reports) troops moved on Kiev. (and 190,000 troops maximum operating in Ukraine at the onset of the invasion). — Tzeentch

No, we do not have that information. Your flawed argument is that 31 BTGs equal 21000 involved troops, because of your faulty assumptions. If you have information that only 20000-30000 troops were on the Kiev axis, please provide it. Repeating '31 BTGs' is NOT that information, because, as you have finally figured out, BTG basic composition does not comprise the totality of troops involved. So please, provide information that so many troops moved on to Kiev which is NOT '31 BTGs'.

If you have information that only 20000-30000 troops were on the Kiev axis, please provide it. — Jabberwock

I already have. Direct communications by the Ukrainian General Staff.

If you had anything better you would have provided it by now, so all of this is just posturing.

Come with sources, or spare yourself the effort of replying.

So now its hypotheticals. — ssu

Essentially everything we talk about here is hypothetical, because hard facts are not available.

I hope this is nothing new for you.

[...] and anybody with the slightest understanding of how militaries work can see that this wasn't a feint. — ssu

Simply untrue.

Mearsheimer considers the possibility in one of his lectures which I have already linked here. Seymour Hersh states it outright in an interview which I have also linked.

But I suppose these are people without "the slightest understanding of how militaries work." Oddly they are also some of the few that go against the western propaganda narrative.

That's not a coincidence.

Understanding that Ukraine put up a fight, understanding the pre-attack intel was horrifically wrong, and above all the attack being got stuck with lots of losses, Russia withdrew it's forces from the Kyiv operations area to reinforce other fronts as a) Ukraine won't follow them to Belarus. [...] , what happened was a withdrawal. — ssu

Even if we would assume everything you write here is true, it does nothing to discredit the feint theory.

I already have. Direct communications by the Ukrainian General Staff.

If you had anything better you would have provided it by now, so all of this is just posturing. — Tzeentch

No, you have not. The communications by the Ukrainian General Staff DOES NOT give the number of troops, only the number of BTGs. So you DO NOT have a source for your number. You conclude that it was 21000 troops based on your faulty assumptions.

And I have already provided sources: e.g. the Kiev Convoy itself had 15000 troops - and that is just reserve on one salient.

So, again: provide the information that only 20000-30000 troops moved on Kiev.

Possibly the international reaction might have been different as well - slicing off the pieces of Ukraine might be viewed differently than an 'all-out' war. — Jabberwock

That, after all, worked to some degree in the original taking of Crimea and the 'independent' Republics.

Putin became convinced that they will be able to take Kiev and depose the authorities, so they tried, with catastrophic results. If they stuck to the plan, the campaign might go much better for Russians, even with the Ukrainian forces relieved from the north. — Jabberwock

Things would have been very different if the Russians had been able to establish an air bridge to Hostumel/Antonov airport. The Russian paratroopers who survived were sent to trenches in eastern Ukraine. Proof of intention will have to wait until after the war is over and Russians talk about it. But the lack of airborne infantry attempts and their use as ditch diggers since that battle suggests a deep opportunity cost.

As has been demonstrated ad infinitum during these thousands of comments comprising the OP, the idea of a military feint is always linked to a particular theory that Russia was provoked into attacking Ukraine. This runs counter to the idea Russia planned to take the whole of the country under their control through proxies. If one removes that debate from the question, the movement toward Kyiv still was a terrible mistake. If they had advanced into Ukraine from Belarus to establish defensive lines as they did in the east, that would have pinned the forces to the northern front more effectively than joy-riding tanks with no infantry support.

So, the debate is stuck in which way the Russians were stupid in their planning. That is not a very compelling ground upon which to support theories. Hopefully, the war will end soon, and we can get the words from the horse's mouth. Presuming, of course, that the horse has not been shot.

No, you have not. The communications by the Ukrainian General Staff DOES NOT give the number of troops, only the number of BTGs. So you DO NOT have a source for your number. You conclude that it was 21000 troops based on your faulty assumptions. — Jabberwock

* * *

[...] and anybody with the slightest understanding of how militaries work can see that this wasn't a feint. — ssu

Simply untrue.

Mearsheimer considers the possibility in one of his lectures which I have already linked here. — Tzeentch

Wrong again.

The given link here Mearsheimer SAYS ABSOLUTELY NOTHING LIKE THAT. Nothing. Nowhere in the 1h 33min lecture did he even touch the subject.

@Tzeentch, you have to understand that when you give as reference or say that someone has the same thing in mind, you simply have to have the ability to produce a direct quote or a copy-paste quote that people can see that they really think so. Here, just in case of @Jabberwock's and other counters, the references you point out don't say what you state them saying.

That Mearsheimer says that Russia doesn't want all the territory of Ukraine (which I do agree and have emphasized the Novorossiya part of Ukraine) is simply not the same as saying the two axis of Russian advance into Kyiv were a faint.

Learn how to use references or sources.

Tzeentch, you have to understand that when you give as reference or say that someone has the same thing in mind, you simply have to have the ability to produce a direct quote or a copy-paste quote that people can see that they really think so — ssu

That's not the video I meant. By now I have dug up and shared these links so many times I can't be bothered to do so again, since none of you seem to take any of the contents to heart anyway.

If you want the information, it's all there in my posts. You use the forum search function to look them up.

I'm past putting any effort into educating you.

If they had advanced into Ukraine from Belarus to establish defensive lines as they did in the east, that would have pinned the forces to the northern front more effectively than joy-riding tanks with no infantry support. — Paine

I think that's untrue.

The Russians went into Ukraine being outnumbered, even though military logic would dictate going on the offensive would require a sizable numerical advantage.

This is why the Russians ended up overextended, and retreated from the north in April 2022.

Forming a defensive line in the north and attempting to hold onto both the north and the east was probably unfeasible from the start. Forming a defensive line in the north would have also given away the fact that the Russians had no intention of taking Kiev, which would have severely decreased the strategic impact it might have had.

The feint theory assumes the Russians had a plan going into this, and thus it does not rely on the argument that the Russians were incompetent. That's why I think it is a lot more compelling.

If it was a feint, it was definitely planned. The same is true if it was not.

I don't see the logic of

Forming a defensive line in the north would have also given away the fact that the Russians had no intention of taking Kiev, which would have severely decreased the strategic impact it might have had. — Tzeentch

If Russia had started moving towards Kiev in the conservative fashion it advanced upon Kherson, for example, that would have pinned the forces needed for defending the city. I take the point that perhaps there were not enough resources for that to be sustained but Ukraine was not in a position to assume it was a bluff. Instead, the Russians attempted an incredibly risky airborne infantry move.

Leaving the reading of strategic intentions aside, stupid or not, the issue not touched upon in your analysis is that the airborne operation could have worked. A lot of marginal situations broke the Ukrainians way. Your thesis does not make sense of what success might have led to.

If Russia had started moving towards Kiev in the conservative fashion it advanced upon Kherson, — Paine

I don't see what's conservative about the way the Russians advanced into Kherson. They penetrated quite deeply, and seemed to have encountered very little resistance until they were counter-attacked.

The difference is that Kiev was heavily defended, which should have been entirely expected.

Instead, the Russians attempted an incredibly risky airborne infantry move. — Paine

Leaving the reading of strategic intentions aside, stupid or not, the issue not touched upon in your analysis is that the airborne operation could have worked. — Paine

Your thesis does not make sense of what success might have led to. — Paine

Even if everything went the Russians' way, Kiev was way too heavily defended to be taken given the amount of troops the Russians deployed. Unless you have different information than me, I don't see any way the numbers could be interpreted to fit this idea.

The Russian force movements don't seem to imply they were preparing for a months-long battle either. In the north, huge swathes of land were bypassed and never cleared - something which would have been absolutely crucial in preperation for such a thing.

Even if everything went the Russians' way, Kiev was way too heavily defended to be taken given the amount of troops the Russians deployed. Unless you have different information than me, I don't see any way the numbers could be interpreted to fit this idea. — Tzeentch

So you have the numbers? Great, can we see them?

I don't see what's conservative about the way the Russians advanced into Kherson. They penetrated quite deeply, and seemed to have encountered very little resistance until they were counter-attacked. — Tzeentch

That is how they roll. And they made the Ukrainian recapture of that ground very expensive.

Even if everything went the Russians' way, Kiev was way too heavily defended to be taken given the amount of troops the Russians deployed. Unless you have different information than me, I don't see any way the numbers could be interpreted to fit this idea. — Tzeentch

If they had advanced with solid logistical support instead of rolling the dice, retreat would not have meant a panicked withdrawal from the field. If the airborne operation had been successful, there would have been a Russian presence north of Kiev much longer than the ass grab of their retreat. To this degree, you are pinning a theory upon the goal of the operation to whether it failed or not, leaving no room for its possible success.

I am pretty sure that Russia would now give its left nut to have not gambled so recklessly. As in our argument about this last year, the lack of importance you assign to the airborne infantry is what keeps getting left out of your analysis of numbers of boots on the ground.

Not sure how funny this is in the scheme of things, but gave me a chuckle anyway.

"Take that, damn tractor!" :fire: :rage: :death:

Video shows Russia blew up a tractor instead of tank
^{— Marshall Ritzel · Associated Press · Jun 8, 2023 · 1m:8s}

That's not the video I meant. By now I have dug up and shared these links so many times I can't be bothered to do so again, since none of you seem to take any of the contents to heart anyway. — Tzeentch

Lame excuse. You simply use the quote key and it's easy...

Besides, in the other videos you have referred to like this video Mearsheimer says himself that the limited objectives that Russia had was to take or threaten Kyiv. Mearsheimers only point has been that the force cannot occupy all Ukraine.

So your wrong.

Caught :)

Radio New Zealand investigates Russia-friendly editing of Ukraine articles
^{— Tess McClure, Luke Harding · The Guardian · Jun 9, 2023}

... Mearsheimer says himself that the limited objectives that Russia had was to take or threaten Kyiv. — ssu

Ta-daa.

Ta-daa. — Tzeentch

Chotiner: You don’t think he has designs on Kyiv?

Mearsheimer: No, I don’t think he has designs on Kyiv. I think he’s interested in taking at least the Donbass, and maybe some more territory and eastern Ukraine, and, number two, he wants to install in Kyiv a pro-Russian government, a government that is attuned to Moscow’s interests.

Chotiner: I thought you said that he was not interested in taking Kyiv.

Mearsheimer: No, he’s interested in taking Kyiv for the purpose of regime change. O.K.?

Chotiner: As opposed to what?

Mearsheimer: As opposed to permanently conquering Kyiv.

https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/why-john-mearsheimer-blames-the-us-for-the-crisis-in-ukraine

Ta-daa.

You understand that nothing he says in that March 2022 interview takes anything away from the contents of the lecture he gave in May 2022.

If anything, the lecture represents a more up-to-date representation of his views.

So I'm not sure what you think you have proven.

So I'm not sure what you think you have proven. — Tzeentch

Mearsheimer himself tells you that one of the Russian goals was toppling the Ukrainian authorities and installing a puppet goverment, as I told you three days ago:

The plan was to take Kiev, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson and Odessa, possibly Dnipro. If it suceeded, there would be little to no resistance, as the entire government structure would collapse (with Lviv being the only remaining bigger center). Ukrainians would have no choice but to accept peace on very unfavorable terms, most likely with puppet Russian government installed. — Jabberwock

So Mearsheimer expressly disagrees with you that the northern offensive was just meant to distract Ukrainians while Russians take the south. On the contrary, he agrees with me that it was essential for the the plan to install Russian-friendly authorities. Just taking land did not require Ukrainian surrender, toppling the government would.

So Mearsheimer expressly disagrees with you that the northern offensive was just meant to distract Ukrainians while Russians take the south. — Jabberwock

Untrue.

As I have stated before, he expressly considers it a possibility that the Russians meant to threaten Kiev:

The Russian military did not attempt to conquer all of Ukraine. That would have required a classic blitzkrieg strategy that aimed at quickly overrunning all of Ukraine with armored forces supported by tactical airpower.

That strategy was not feasible however, because there were only a 190,000 soldiers in Russia's invading army, which is far too small a force to vanquish and occupy Ukraine, which is not only the largest country between the Atlantic Ocean and Russia, but also has a population of over 40 million people.

You're not gonna conquer, occupy and absorb a country of that size with a 190,000 people. And you're not even gonna have enough troops to launch a classic blitzkrieg, which is essential to conquer the entire country.

Unsurprisingly the Russians pursued a limited aim strategy, which focused at either capturing or threatening Kiev, and conquering a large swathe of territory in eastern and southern Ukraine.

In short, Russia did not have the capability to subdue all of Ukraine, much less conquer other countries in Europe. — John J. Mearsheimer

Untrue. — Tzeentch

What is untrue? I gave you a specific quote that Mearsheimer believed one of the Russian goals was to install Russian-friendly government, contrary to your claims. In the very quote you now give Mearsheimer says that Russian strategy was to capture or threaten Kiev, so apparently he believes capturing Kiev was viable. You claim that Russians never meant to capture Kiev and never had the means, Mearsheimer obviously disagrees with you.

also "threatening to capture Kiev" can still be compatible with the idea of forcing a regime change. It doesn't obviously mean that Russia was making a diversion.

Nope.

He used the terms either / or.

Clearly he thought it was a possibility that the Russians only meant to threaten Kiev.

And no amount of copium is going to make those words go away. Sorry.

↪Jabberwock
also "threatening to capture Kiev" can still be compatible with the idea of forcing a regime change. It doesn't obviously mean that Russia was making a diversion. — neomac

Yes, that was another point I wanted to make. A 'threat' is not necessarily a feint. When a bully says 'Give me your money or I will beat you up' it is a threat, but it is not necessarily a FAKE threat. When Americans nuked two Japanese cities, they have threatened Tokyo, but it was not a feint. On the contrary, Japanese surrendered, because the threat was very real.

If Russians have surrounded Kiev and said 'Give up or we will pound the city with artillery until nothing remains', it would be a threat, but it would not be a feint. They did not have to literally capture the whole city for Ukrainians to surrender.

Mearsheimer said that Russians wanted to topple the Ukrainian government. Explain how does that 'dismiss the entire western narrative of the Ukraine war'.