I follow the argument and thanks but it is somehow unsatisfying. :wink:

Is there any specific problem or issue you are able to identify, or is it that you find it emotionally unsatisfying; you want more?

I'm not sure. I guess I am unclear about how empiricism can be said to have a firm traction on reality if that reality is provisional or, shall we say, derivative? I guess Kant must be saying this is what we have access to. Our reality is derivative but consistent and subject to predictable regularities.

I guess I am unclear about how empiricism can be said to have a firm traction on reality if that reality is provisional or, shall we say, derivative? — Tom Storm

Right, I see what you mean. However, I wouldn't say that empirical reality is derivative, more like it is one aspect of the real. I mean, sure, it is, to some degree, constructed by us, but we are real beings. Likewise, the realities or "unwelts" of other creatures are fully real, being as they, different aspects of the real.

That, for what it is worth, is how I look at it anyway,

Fair enough. By derivative I simply meant derived directly from noumena and 'constructed' through our cognitive limitations.

:up:

how is it inferred therefrom that there are multiple things-in-themselves and not a thing-in-itself? — Bob Ross

Working backwards: our representations are not all alike, therefore our sensations are not all alike, therefore the effects things have on sensibility are not all alike, therefore not all things are alike, therefore not all things-in-themselves are alike, insofar as for any thing there is that thing-in-itself.

how can you infer that it is impossible that appearances aren’t of nothing? Is that simply absurd to you? — Bob Ross

Because appearances are necessarily of something? I’m kinda struggling with the triple negative. At any rate, appearances aren’t inferred, they’re given. Perception is, after all, a function of physics, not logic implied by inference.

I infer that the appearances are representations by comparison of other appearances (e.g., they inject me with a hallucinogen drug and my representations becomes significantly different than when I am sober, etc.). — Bob Ross

First off, appearances are not representations, they are affects on the senses. Not yet mentioned, is the speculative condition that appearance denotes only the matter of the thing as a whole, which leaves out the form in which the matter is arranged, the purview of productive imagination, from which arises the first representation as such of the thing, called phenomenon, residing in intuition.

We are not conscious of the instantiation of representations as phenomena, so the alteration of the cognitive process has no effect on that of which we had no awareness in the first place. The changes in representations that occur due to disregard of the rules by unnatural external influence, is in understanding, the representations of which are not intuitions from appearances, but conceptions. The appearance is the same, insofar as it is the same thing being sensed; what the cognitive process subsequently does with such appearance differs, which we commonly refers to as a misunderstanding, but is properly reflected in judgement.

But if representations tell us nothing about things-in-themselves then it is odd to me that it can even be inferred that there is a dynamic of representations vs. things-in-themselves in the first place. — Bob Ross

Odd to me as well; there is no dynamic of representations vs. thing-in-themselves, they have nothing to do with each other. Empirically, the dynamic resides in the relation between things and the intuition of them. Logically, and empirically, the dynamic resides in the relation between things and the conceptions of them. There is another dynamic, residing in pure reason a priori, in which resides the relation between conceptions to each other, where experience of the conceived thing is impossible, re: eternal/universal Mind and the like.

I am a substance monist….. — Bob Ross

You’d pretty much have to be, holding with a Universal Mind, right?

……so I am unsure by what you mean by “substance is never singular”: could you elaborate? — Bob Ross

It’s the reduction from there is no such thing as an object comprised of a single property, which reduces to nothing can be cognized by a single conception. Human thought, being a logical system, always requires a relation.

But in all fairness, -ism’s are a dime a dozen, which makes this idea easily refutable.

So would it be fair to say that you think we are barred from metaphysics (other than transcendental inquiries)? — Bob Ross

Nahhhh……metaphysics is an unavoidable pursuit, when reason seeks resolution to questions experience cannot provide. Transcendental philosophy merely points out the conditions under which such resolutions are even possible on the one hand, and the circumstances by which the resolutions may actually conflict with experience on the other. The mind is, as my ol’ buddy Golum likes to say, tricksie.
—————

The universal mind is not an idea, it is mind that has ideas and those ideas are the Platonic, eternal forms which are expressed within space and time, which are conditions of our minds. — Bob Ross

Ok, not an idea. If not an idea, and not a thing, for a human then, what is it? What does it mean to say it is mind, rather than it is a mind? This is what is meant by the impossibility of cognizing from a single conception. One can say it is mind, but that effectively says nothing. To say it is mind that has ideas makes it no different than my own mind. To call it eternal mind adds a conception, but by which is invoked that which is itself inconceivable, re: mind that has all ideas, or, is infinitely timeless.

Still, as long as universal mind theory doesn’t contradict itself, it stands. If it contradicts other theories, then it’s a matter of the relative degree of explanatory power philosophically, or merely personal preference conventionally. There is the notion that reason always seeks the unconditioned, that abut which nothing more needs be said, which certainly fits here. It used to be a theocratic symbol having no relation to us, but it’s since graduated to an extension of us. Not sure one is any better than the other.

I made a mistake. The line should have said…. Things-in-themselves can be inferred AS the possibility of sensations in general a priori.

Kant had the idea that we can treat the objects of perception and knowledge as conforming to us, rather than us conforming our minds to them….. — Srap Tasmaner

Yep. The so-called “Copernican Revolution”, which of course, he didn’t call it.

…..but it also means that those objects must cooperate, must be capable of cooperating, of appearing to us, of revealing themselves to us or being revealed to us. — Srap Tasmaner

Perhaps, but parsimony suggests objects are either there or they are not there. You’re hinting at a limitation regarding the object (it doesn’t cooperate hence doesn’t appear) but I would rather think the limitation is in us, in that our physiology limits what can appear to us, re: only a specific range of wavelengths of light for visual appearances, etc., and also limits the effect that which can appear, has.

Look at what is posited. It is not the empty place-holder it was supposed to be, but is rich with its own structure of revealing and concealing — Srap Tasmaner

If this is the case, the notion that objects conform to our intellect falls apart. Things are rich with the structure we understand it to have that doesn’t contradict the sensation the object provides, for otherwise we couldn’t know it as that thing and not another. We must grant a thing has a composition, but without its being subjected to an intellectual system, the composition cannot relate to a structure in which the composition is arranged. A most dramatic instance being….a sound may indeed affect the nose, but thereby no phenomenon is at all possible.

So the thing that appears isn’t so much an empty placeholder ontologically, but moreso an undetermined constituent of reality. But either way….

without which the formal description of knowledge hangs in the air. — Srap Tasmaner

…..is nonetheless the case.

You’re hinting at a limitation regarding the object (it doesn’t cooperate hence doesn’t appear) but I would rather think the limitation is in us, in that our physiology limits what can appear to us, re: only a specific range of wavelengths of light for visual appearances, etc., and also limits the effect that which can appear, has. — Mww

Let's stick with that example for a moment. What difference would our physiology make if objects didn't absorb and reflect and radiate certain wavelengths of light? If there weren't light for objects to do this with? Are you suggesting that color perception in us is an entirely "internal" matter, having nothing to do with the objects we perceive as colored? Nothing to do with light?

Sorry, I’m not up on the science, and I’m not going to pretend otherwise by reading wiki for 2 or 3 minutes.

But, yeah, I see what appears to be colored things, but I don’t know if they are colored or I color them. And I really don’t care, insofar as it wouldn’t make the slightest difference to me if I should be informed with apodeictic certainty one or the other is the case.

Still, I will maintain that humans are very limited creatures, and leave it at that.

That's fine. It's not what I wanted to talk about anyway. But leaving the example aside, which was meant to function almost as an analogy, the point remains: in saying that there are somethings that appear to us, or that give rise to impressions on our sensorium, whatever, we are saying something about those things, that they have this character of revealing or being revealed, and showing themselves to us is a potential or capacity of such things.

To imagine something is to imagine it revealed to you, or as it would be if it were, or to imagine it somewhat revealed and still somewhat concealed.

You can say that an object's concealment from us can be recast as a limitation of ours, that we cannot see through walls, say, and leave it that. But what of the object that is revealed to us, at least partially? Is it illuminated only by the light of our minds? Or does it participate in our perception of it, by showing itself in such a way that we can perceive it?

….in saying that there are somethings that appear to us (…) we are saying something about those things….. — Srap Tasmaner

Agreed, in principle; we say they exist, and that necessarily.

….that they have this character of revealing or being revealed, and showing themselves to us is a potential or capacity of such things. — Srap Tasmaner

But if we can say they exist necessarily, there’s nothing added by saying they have a character of this kind or that, which could only be attributed to that which exists anyway.
————-

But what of the object that is revealed to us, at least partially? — Srap Tasmaner

Then we cognize the part we perceive. How would we know the thing is only partially revealed? Reason might guess is there more than meets the eye, but perception does not.

there’s nothing added by saying they have a character of this kind or that, which could only be attributed to that which exists anyway. — Mww

Do you want to take another swing at this? It sounds like you said predicating F of x says nothing about x because you can only predicate F of x if x exists. That's nonsensical. Of course x has to exist, but predicating is still predicating. --- I wasn't really thinking about predication, but now I just don't know what you mean.

How would we know the thing is only partially revealed? — Mww

Now that's a funny thing. You may choose to phrase it more carefully than I will, but the overall shape of that Kantian position is that something is revealed to us but something at the same time is concealed, namely how the thing is in itself rather than for us.

(Loads more, but I don't want to take on all of Kant all at once!)

You may choose to phrase it more carefully than I will,…. — Srap Tasmaner

That’s why I said I agreed, in principle. You said we say something about x, and we do, but not at the time of x. We say determinate things about x after the system has already subjected x to process, in which neither the system as a whole nor the processing of x, say anything. And the processing of appearances has no other purpose than to give to the system some x, whatever x is. There is no predication here, no logic, only transition from the external natural state of being of x to an altogether very different internal state which represents it. We couldn’t predicate in this time frame because we’re not conscious of it, which makes explicit there’s no way to philosophize on the one hand metaphysically, or empirically theorize scientifically on the other, about how that transition occurs. But….it does, we know the ends, but not the means. Given all that, it remains that all that can be said about x, at the time of its appearance, is that x exists.
————-

…..the overall shape of that Kantian position is that something is revealed to us but something at the same time is concealed, namely how the thing is in itself rather than for us. — Srap Tasmaner

True enough, but not at the same time, which just distinguishes the thing from the thing-in-itself. At one point in time it is a thing-in-itself, and some other point in time the thing-in-itself is a thing for us, the changeover being if and when there is an appearance.

Again with the finer points, a euphemism for one man’s reductionism is another man’s quibble….

……nothing is revealed to us, it is given to us.
……if a thing is sufficiently concealed it is not necessarily an existence, but a thing-in-itself is a necessary existence, insofar as without it, the thing which appears is impossible, a contradiction.

Hello Tom Storm,

I hope it's the latter and not just business as usual. Which I guess is a Christian view - love your neighbour as you do yourself. The reason being we are all the same being... :wink:

It is basically the golden rule but without Christian metaphysics per se. I don’t think most Christians agree with Kastrup, because his view is more of a pantheism/theist hybrid.

I personally can't identify reasons to change how I interact with the world, regardless of the metaphysics or ontology posited. So I am wondering how useful it is to even have views on ontology, other than a common sense account, which may not be true, but has the virtue of working well enough as a frame.

I think for most people it drastically changes their behaviors because they depend heavily on their metaphysical views to guide them; but, for me, like you, I see many rational views and all of which can contain people with fruitful, moral, and thoughtful lives.

I like to say that I worry more about the average man that agrees with me than the sophisticated man that completely disagrees with me. Not to mention I’de rather live with the latter than the former.

Bob

Hello Janus,

No, Kant is merely saying that if there are appearances, then logically speaking, there must be things which appear, whatever the in itself existence of what appears might be.
…
We know there are things which appear as phenomena, but we also know that these appearances are not the things, and that we cannot know what the things are apart from how they appear to us.

This is where the obscurity sets in with Kant (for me): what do you mean “logically speaking”? If you can’t point to your experience of things being representations of other things, then why do you think they are representations at all? You can’t point to scientific inquiry into the brain: those are studies of phenomena which Kant thinks tells us nothing about what is being represented—but then why think there is something being represented in the first place?

No, I won't have to concede that, because I don't think reason without sense data produces knowledge. It is not a valid inference from the fact that sense data combined with reason produces knowledge to a claim that reason on its own can produce knowledge.

I see. This doesn’t work though. For example, if reason without sense data produces no knowledge, then you do not know that “every change has a cause”. You don’t know that “a = a”. You don’t know that “1+1=2” without counting your fingers (so to speak). You don’t even know that “reason without sense data produces no knowledge” without appealing to pure reason. Some things are a priori true, and that means they do not require sense data.

Bob

Hello Mww,

Working backwards: our representations are not all alike, therefore our sensations are not all alike, therefore the effects things have on sensibility are not all alike, therefore not all things are alike, therefore not all things-in-themselves are alike, insofar as for any thing there is that thing-in-itself.

I agree and think this is true if we were speaking about what you can empirically know (but that’s just studying phenomena which tell us nothing of things-in-themselves); but how do you know metaphysically there are things-in-themselves and not a thing-in-itself?

By your own concession, we aren’t supposed to know reality fundamentally is, so how can you say that a part of that fundamental reality is things-in-themselves as opposed to one thing-in-itself?

To me it doesn’t make sense to say we can gain just enough metaphysical access to know that there are things-in-themselves, but then claim we can’t go further when it is the same exact abductive reasoning we use for all of it.

By my lights, you cannot be certain that there are things-in-themselves just as much as I can’t be certain that there is a Universal Mind.

Because appearances are necessarily of something? I’m kinda struggling with the triple negative. At any rate, appearances aren’t inferred, they’re given. Perception is, after all, a function of physics, not logic implied by inference.

What I am trying to do is show you that if you want to go the truly skeptical route that we are barred from metaphysics (or at least ontology) then to be consistent I think you would have to also rebuke transcendental philosophy: you are using abductive reasoning to infer “appearences are necessarily something?”--there’s no certainty in that. This is no different than inferring that the best explanation of what reality fundamentally is is a Universal Mind—there’s no certainty in that either.

First off, appearances are not representations, they are affects on the senses.

Appearances are perceptions, which are representations that your mind generated of the sensations.

Not yet mentioned, is the speculative condition that appearance denotes only the matter of the thing as a whole, which leaves out the form in which the matter is arranged, the purview of productive imagination, from which arises the first representation as such of the thing, called phenomenon, residing in intuition.

Oh are you saying that the “appearance” is just the impression of the thing-in-itself on you and the representation is the formulation of it according to your mind’s abilities? If so, I can get on board with that.

Odd to me as well; there is no dynamic of representations vs. thing-in-themselves, they have nothing to do with each other. Empirically, the dynamic resides in the relation between things and the intuition of them. Logically, and empirically, the dynamic resides in the relation between things and the conceptions of them. There is another dynamic, residing in pure reason a priori, in which resides the relation between conceptions to each other, where experience of the conceived thing is impossible, re: eternal/universal Mind and the like.

I think you are just fleshing out more deeply what I was trying to get at with the “representations” vs. “things-in-themselves”. You are noting that there is an impression, an intuition, and then an understanding of the thing-in-itself—and that last step is the phenomena. I don’t have a problem with this, but my point is that you can’t come to understand these functions of the mind without abductive reasoning about the phenomena--the end result of that chain of interpretation. So Kant can’t say stuff like:

We have intended, then, to say that all our intuition is nothing but the representation of phenomena; that the things we intuite, are not in themselves the same as our representations of them in intuition, nor are their relations in themselves so constituted as they appear to us; and that if we take away the subject, or even only the subjective constitution of our senses in general, then not only the nature and relations of objects in space and time, but even space and time themselves disappear; and that these, as phenomena, cannot exist in themselves, but only in us

If the relations between the phenomena tell us nothing about the things-in-themselves, since they are just the “subjective constitution” of our senses, then you cannot claim:

Working backwards: our representations are not all alike, therefore our sensations are not all alike, therefore the effects things have on sensibility are not all alike, therefore not all things are alike, therefore not all things-in-themselves are alike, insofar as for any thing there is that thing-in-itself.

Because this is an extroplation of the relations of phenomena: you are saying that this phenomena relates to another in a manner that suggests they are representations of different things. Kant is barring this (as seen in the above quote).

You’d pretty much have to be, holding with a Universal Mind, right?

Correct. But I don’t hold substance monism to fit the view, I think substance monism is the best explanation of the universe in general.

Nahhhh……metaphysics is an unavoidable pursuit, when reason seeks resolution to questions experience cannot provide. Transcendental philosophy merely points out the conditions under which such resolutions are even possible on the one hand, and the circumstances by which the resolutions may actually conflict with experience on the other. The mind is, as my ol’ buddy Golum likes to say, tricksie.

That’s fair, but then I would like to know the symmetry breaker between abducing there are things-in-themselves and, let’s say, everything being a part of one substance. Or that it is a part of a mental substance. Or that there is a Universal Mind. All of these are abductive, metaphysical attempts to explain the world, and some explain more of the data more parsimoniously than others.

For example, I don’t think, under your view, you can hold object permanence because you can’t know anything being your representative faculty, of which the very forms are supposed to be in your head. So how do you know the red block actually persists existing as you viewed it once you turn around? How do you know it exists at all other than a phenomena?

Ok, not an idea. If not an idea, and not a thing, for a human then, what is it? What does it mean to say it is mind, rather than it is a mind?

It was a typo: it is a mind. But it ends up arguably being the only mind and we are just off-shoots of the same mind.

To say it is mind that has ideas makes it no different than my own mind.

Because solipsism isn’t a parsimonious view. You can’t explain other people, object permanence, etc. without positing an objective world around you. Sure, you could say that it is just your mind, but it doesn’t account for the data very well.

To call it eternal mind adds a conception, but by which is invoked that which is itself inconceivable, re: mind that has all ideas, or, is infinitely timeless.

It is outside of space and time. Yes, that it a tricky conception to wrap one’s head around, but that doesn’t mean it isn’t true.

Still, as long as universal mind theory doesn’t contradict itself, it stands. If it contradicts other theories, then it’s a matter of the relative degree of explanatory power philosophically, or merely personal preference conventionally. There is the notion that reason always seeks the unconditioned, that abut which nothing more needs be said, which certainly fits here. It used to be a theocratic symbol having no relation to us, but it’s since graduated to an extension of us. Not sure one is any better than the other.

That is fair: I think that is what metaphysics is about—giving the best general account of reality.

Bob

”….not all things are alike, therefore not all things-in-themselves are alike, insofar as for any thing there is that thing-in-itself.”
-Mww

I agree and think this is true if we were speaking about what you can empirically know…. — Bob Ross

Yes, exactly. Knowledge or possible knowledge a posteriori.

…..but how do you know metaphysically there are things-in-themselves and not a thing-in-itself? — Bob Ross

To know metaphysically is knowledge a priori, as opposed to empirical knowledge. Knowledge a priori as it applies to external reality, in Kant, is impure a priori, insofar as it has empirical conditions contained in the syllogism, and is thereby an inductive inference, a logical function, hence, at least for convenience, is metaphysical knowledge. Which is all the thing-in-itself was ever meant to indicate.

So we don’t know all things are appearances given from one thing-in-itself, or as many things-in-themselves as there are things that appear. Nevertheless, humans are capable of more than one sensation at a time, either from a single object or from a multiplicity of them. For single objects there’s no conflict, but for more than one sensation from more than one object, and knowledge of things-in-themselves is impossible anyway, we gain nothing by the one-for-all over the each-in-itself, which makes the all-for-one superfluous.

By your own concession, we aren’t supposed to know reality fundamentally is…. — Bob Ross

Not that we’re not supposed to, but that we are not equipped.

By my lights, you cannot be certain that there are things-in-themselves just as much as I can’t be certain that there is a Universal Mind. — Bob Ross

Maybe not, but the alternative is that I am necessary causality for the entire manifold of all that I perceive. Let the contradictions rampant in that scenario simmer awhile.

….if you want to go the truly skeptical route that we are barred from metaphysics (or at least ontology) then to be consistent I think you would have to also rebuke transcendental philosophy — Bob Ross

Absolutely**, but then, I don’t hold with being barred from metaphysical expositions. I just find ontology unnecessary as a discipline in transcendental philosophy, because the existence of things is never in question as is the manifestation of them in experience.

**”…. Thus, the critique of reason leads at last, naturally and necessarily, to science; and, on the other hand, the dogmatical use of reason without criticism leads to groundless assertions, against which others equally specious can always be set, thus ending unavoidably in scepticism….”

This is no different than inferring that the best explanation of what reality fundamentally is is a Universal Mind—there’s no certainty in that either. — Bob Ross

Such is the bane of all speculative metaphysics: there’s no empirical proofs, but only internal logical consistency and strict adherence to the LNC, the only form of certainty we have to guide our contemplations.
————

First off, appearances are not representations, they are affects on the senses.
-Mww

Appearances are perceptions, which are representations that your mind generated of the sensations. — Bob Ross

Break it down: Appearance = the input to the sensory device; perception = the activity of the sensory device; sensation = the output of the sensory device. The sensory device generates the sensation, which is the matter of the object that appears. Not yet a representation, for the mere matter of sensation has not been arranged into a determinable form. There are representations generated by the mind from sensation, but these are phenomena, in which the matter is arranged into a form by the reproductive imagination.
(Easier to comprehend if it be granted a perception is the reception of the whole object, all at once, which makes descriptive analysis of it impossible, and if the system can’t describe it, can’t analyze it, it won’t be able to cognize it, making knowledge of it impossible)
————

are you saying that the “appearance” is just the impression of the thing-in-itself on you and the representation is the formulation of it according to your mind’s abilities? — Bob Ross

Nope. Impression of the thing.

You are noting that there is an impression, an intuition, and then an understanding of the thing-in-itself…. — Bob Ross

Nope. Impression, intuition, understanding of the thing.

So Kant can’t say stuff like:

“….We have intended, then, to say that all our intuition is nothing but the representation of phenomena; that the things we intuite, are not in themselves the same as our representations of them in intuition….” — Bob Ross

Hey, give him a break. He’s a seriously-genius Enlightenment Prussian. He’s just reminding the readers, maybe half a dozen of whom are his intellectual peers, that the things of intuition are not things-in-themselves. And things-in-themselves, if they contain or are constituted by relations, such must be relations-in-themselves. Continuing with the passage…..

“…..if we take away the subject, or even only the subjective constitution of our senses in general, then not only the nature and relations of objects in space and time, but even space and time themselves disappear….”

The subjective constitution of our senses in general, which is to say regardless of whatever appears to us, is imagination and the two pure intuitions. Take away imagination the synthesis of matter to form and therefore the phenomenon is impossible; take away the pure intuitions and objects that should have appeared won’t, insofar as there is nothing for object to extend into, therefore they have no shape, and if they have no shape the can contain no matter, and if they contain no matter, they are not objects at all, and if they are not objects at all, there wouldn’t be anything to appear, a blatantly inexcusable contradiction.

If the relations between the phenomena tell us nothing about the things-in-themselves, since they are just the “subjective constitution” of our senses…. — Bob Ross

Phenomena are not what is meant by subjective constitution of our senses in general. Subjective constitution is that within us which makes the transition from sensation, determined by the physiological constitution of the sensory apparatus, to phenomena, possible

The follow-up says it all:

“….. What may be the nature of objects considered as things in themselves and without reference to the receptivity of our sensibility is quite unknown to us…..”

Sensibility is that part of the human cognitive system that has to do with perception, covering the range from appearance to phenomena, technically, “….. The capacity for receiving representations through the mode in which we are affected by objects, is called sensibility….”. The mode in which we are affected means just which one or more of the five sense organs creates its sensation.

Notice, too, that the nature of objects considered as thing-in-themselves, presupposes their existence. I mean….how could the nature of a thing be considered, even if the thing is considered as having the nature of a thing-in-itself, if it didn’t exist? But I think you’ve acceded that point, if I remember right.
—————-

Because this is an extroplation of the relations of phenomena: you are saying that this phenomena relates to another in a manner that suggests they are representations of different things. Kant is barring this (as seen in the above quote). — Bob Ross

I don’t see where in the above quote anything is being barred. If you perceive a horse jumping over a fence as a whole appearance, the phenomenon of the horse is separate from but nonetheless related to the phenomenon of the fence. And this, by the way, is a good example of the intricacies of the system, insofar as motion, having neither matter not form, and therefore not a phenomenon, is provided a priori as rules by the understanding, re: succession of times in conjunction with a plurality of spaces in a singular intuition.

If you think about it, you can see the validity in it. You may have experience with horses, and with fences, and with things that move, but you’ve never seen a horse jump a fence. But you an still connect a horse to jumping a fence even though you’ve never seen it happen, thus have no experience of it. In short, you can easily conceptually image the motion, a certain indication it must be possible without contradicting the natural order, which is a purely logical deduction, which only understanding can provide, exemplifying the prime dualism in human cognition:

“….. Understanding cannot intuite, and the sensuous faculty cannot think…..”
————-

I think that is what metaphysics is about—giving the best general account of reality. — Bob Ross

Yep, no dispute there at all.

Some things are a priori true, and that means they do not require sense data. — Bob Ross

Man, after reading that, it appears you’re more familiar with this stuff than you let on when talking to me. Which makes much of what I say pretty much superfluous.

We are NOT amused!!!! (Grin)

Hello Mww,

Man, after reading that, it appears you’re more familiar with this stuff than you let on when talking to me. Which makes much of what I say pretty much superfluous.

We are NOT amused!!!! (Grin)

I am familiar with Transcendental Philosophy and do deploy the a priori vs. a posteriori distinction; however, I don’t agree 100% with Kant, and it appears you do. So that is why I am having trying to understand your interpretation of him (as I can tell it is different already from mine).

I assure you that nothing you are saying is superfluous!

Yes, exactly. Knowledge or possible knowledge a posteriori.

I am saying that Kant is using a posterior knowledge to determine that beyond the phenomena there are things-in-themselves which transcend ourselves--but then he equally claims that we can’t gain transcendent access. This is the point where I think this notion of “we can’t know ontology because it is transcendent” is refuted by the very argument meant to be in its favor.

If one takes Kant very seriously, by my lights, then there is no knowledge of things-in-themselves, and, consequently, they have to develop a post-modern pragmatist approach (such as using difference to gather knowledge)--like the American Pragmatist Pierce.

I am just curious how you get around this issue? Or is it even an issue to you?

To know metaphysically is knowledge a priori, as opposed to empirical knowledge. Knowledge a priori as it applies to external reality, in Kant, is impure a priori, insofar as it has empirical conditions contained in the syllogism, and is thereby an inductive inference, a logical function, hence, at least for convenience, is metaphysical knowledge. Which is all the thing-in-itself was ever meant to indicate.

I agree. He intended things-in-themselves as purely ‘negative conceptions’: correct? But, again, if we can reverse engineer from experience that our best guess is that there are things-in-themselves, then I don’t see what is stopping us from hedging our best guess of whether there are Universals or particulars (for example).

The problem is that:

Such is the bane of all speculative metaphysics: there’s no empirical proofs, but only internal logical consistency and strict adherence to the LNC, the only form of certainty we have to guide our contemplations.

Transcendental Philosophy is a form of speculative metaphysics but Kant doesn’t seem to think so. Literally all of good metaphysics tries to extrapolate based off of the real world their best explanations of it and only bad metaphysics ventures so far beyond reality with merely LNC. Kant isn’t doing anything differently here other than trying to keep his metaphysical research as close to ‘home’ as possible.

So we don’t know all things are appearances given from one thing-in-itself, or as many things-in-themselves as there are things that appear. Nevertheless, humans are capable of more than one sensation at a time, either from a single object or from a multiplicity of them. For single objects there’s no conflict, but for more than one sensation from more than one object, and knowledge of things-in-themselves is impossible anyway, we gain nothing by the one-for-all over the each-in-itself, which makes the all-for-one superfluous.

But here’s where I get confused, because I only consider myself a representative being because of empirical observations; and so I have no problem saying the objects conform to my representative faculties; however, this is the same fundamental process I am using to develop all of my metaphysics—there’s nothing special about this that makes it more legit than so-called ‘speculative metaphysics’ when done properly.

Likewise, I view myself as a representative faculty of an objective world, which is a transcendent conception I have—it isn’t acquirable transcendentally.

Maybe not, but the alternative is that I am necessary causality for the entire manifold of all that I perceive. Let the contradictions rampant in that scenario simmer awhile.

How can you be certain that that is the only other alternative? Do you see how these are the same questions you ask of me with the Universal Mind, but yet you seem to be using the same good criteria to make your best guesses about transcendent and transcendental ideas?

Absolutely**, but then, I don’t hold with being barred from metaphysical expositions. I just find ontology unnecessary as a discipline in transcendental philosophy, because the existence of things is never in question as is the manifestation of them in experience.

That’s fair. As far as I am understanding you, you are saying that the only metaphysics we can acquire knowledge of is what is a priori, correct? And thusly ontology is out of the question there.

are you saying that the “appearance” is just the impression of the thing-in-itself on you and the representation is the formulation of it according to your mind’s abilities? — Bob Ross

Nope. Impression of the thing.

If appearances are “the input to the sensory device”, then they impressions of things-in-themselves and the thing-for-ourselves is whatever our sensory devices can take in. Would it not?

You are noting that there is an impression, an intuition, and then an understanding of the thing-in-itself…. — Bob Ross

Nope. Impression, intuition, understanding of the thing.

By “thing”, do you just mean the thing-in-itself has captured by the sensory device?

Hey, give him a break. He’s a seriously-genius Enlightenment Prussian. He’s just reminding the readers, maybe half a dozen of whom are his intellectual peers, that the things of intuition are not things-in-themselves. And things-in-themselves, if they contain or are constituted by relations, such must be relations-in-themselves. Continuing with the passage…..

To be honest, although he was very smart, he says these kinds of contradictory things so much in the CPR that I think he didn’t have the view fully fleshed out.

The subjective constitution of our senses in general, which is to say regardless of whatever appears to us, is imagination and the two pure intuitions. Take away imagination the synthesis of matter to form and therefore the phenomenon is impossible; take away the pure intuitions and objects that should have appeared won’t, insofar as there is nothing for object to extend into, therefore they have no shape, and if they have no shape the can contain no matter, and if they contain no matter, they are not objects at all, and if they are not objects at all, there wouldn’t be anything to appear, a blatantly inexcusable contradiction.

To me this just seems like it is conflating the reasonable inference that we represent reality to ourselves and the reality which we are representing. To me, you just pointing out that if our representative faculty lost its two pure forms of intuition that we would not longer perceive the objects--but that doesn’t mean there aren’t any. The space and time as our intuitions isn’t necessarily the same as the space and time in reality (at least for physicalists).

Notice, too, that the nature of objects considered as thing-in-themselves, presupposes their existence. I mean….how could the nature of a thing be considered, even if the thing is considered as having the nature of a thing-in-itself, if it didn’t exist? But I think you’ve acceded that point, if I remember right.

It does not presuppose there existence as things-in-themselves.

the phenomenon of the horse is separate from but nonetheless related to the phenomenon of the fence

Yes, by why do you think there is a horse-in-itself and a fence-in-itself?

If you think about it, you can see the validity in it. You may have experience with horses, and with fences, and with things that move, but you’ve never seen a horse jump a fence. But you an still connect a horse to jumping a fence even though you’ve never seen it happen, thus have no experience of it. In short, you can easily conceptually image the motion, a certain indication it must be possible without contradicting the natural order, which is a purely logical deduction, which only understanding can provide, exemplifying the prime dualism in human cognition:

I have no problem with this.

Bob

Isn't climate change ultimately coming to liberate us from the cycle of death and rebrith? Why act to prevent it? — Tom Storm

:smirk:

:up:

Such is the bane of all speculative metaphysics: there’s no empirical proofs, but only internal logical consistency and strict adherence to the LNC, the only form of certainty we have to guide our contemplations. — Mww

:fire:

Literally all of good metaphysics tries to extrapolate based off of the real world their best explanations of it and only bad metaphysics ventures so far beyond reality with merely LNC. — Bob Ross

:fire:

@Philosophim @wonderer1 @Bob Ross

So there is what Ned Block has characterized as the "Harder Problem of Consciousness." This speaks to Philosophim's point about experiencing other consciousnesses.. the problem as I understand it is: how can I know what it's like to be you, without actually being you. The physicalist rejoinder may be: well the brain stuff is the same, so the mental states must be the same.. but the brain stuff is only approximately the same, not exactly the same, and the difference in brain states means different mental states, and these mental states are simply not accessible to another, at least, not in an "experiential" way.

David Chalmers states the hard problem thusly: "there is no question that experience is closely associated with physical processes such as brains. It seems that physical processes give rise to experience, at least in the sense that producing a physical system with the right physical properties yields corresponding states of experience. But how and why do physical processes give rise to experience? Why do not these processes take place "in the dark"..." (Chalmers, Consciousness and its place in Nature).

In other words, what is it about this arrangement of physical matter and energy that allows consciousness, and how is it different from some other assortment of physical matter and energy that does not allow consciousness? That is, if we think consciousness arises from a physical substrata, what about that physical substrata gives rise to consciousness?

Its a hard problem because we cannot currently objectively describe experiences. — Philosophim

But why should we find that even surprising on physicalism, let alone a hard problem? — wonderer1

If one takes Kant very seriously, by my lights, then there is no knowledge of things-in-themselves, and, consequently, they have to develop a post-modern pragmatist approach (such as using difference to gather knowledge)--like the American Pragmatist Pierce.

I am just curious how you get around this issue? Or is it even an issue to you? — Bob Ross

Isn’t relation the manifestation of a difference? The very conception of a synthetic a priori cognition, the backbone of transcendental philosophy, specifies a difference in the relation between the conceptions contained in the subject and the conceptions contained in the predicate of a syllogistic proposition. VOILA!!! Using difference to make the gathering of knowledge possible.

I think Piece was a closet Kantian anyway, wasn’t he? Early on he called himself a “pure Kantist ”, The Monist, 1905. Also in The Monist, he states pretty much the Kantian doctrine regarding the ding as sich, and the importance of the categories. He abdicated the Kantian pedestal only later, becoming a Hegelian absolute idealist…..for some reason or another. But I get your point.

Kant isn’t doing anything differently here other than trying to keep his metaphysical research as close to ‘home’ as possible. — Bob Ross

Agreed, iff “home” is the human thinking subject.

To me, you just pointing out that if our representative faculty lost its two pure forms of intuition that we would not longer perceive the objects--but that doesn’t mean there aren’t any. — Bob Ross

It does not follow from the loss of intuitions that we would lose perception. We would lose the ability to arrange the matter of the object into a form for a phenomenon, but that doesn’t mean there weren’t any appearing objects. Appearance means presence; because we don’t lose perception, we don’t lose appearance so the object isn’t lost to us. Completely and utterly useless appearance, insofar as we couldn’t decipher the sensation the appearance provides, but provide it does.

If you’d said we could no longer cognize the object, but that doesn’t mean there isn’t one, I’d have just said….yep.

It does not presuppose there existence as things-in-themselves. — Bob Ross

Things are things in themselves until they are met with human sensibility, re: Pierce….since you brought him up:

“….I show just how far Kant was right, even when right twisted up on formalism. It is perfectly true that we can never attain knowledge of things as they are. We can only know their human aspect. But that is all the universe is for us….”

Yes, by why do you think there is a horse-in-itself and a fence-in-itself? — Bob Ross

I don’t need to think it; I can represent to myself differences in arrangements of matter. Horse are not comprised of wood and fences don’t have hooves. Different phenomena, different things, different things-in-themselves from which the things appear.

I have no problem with this. — Bob Ross

Makes me wonder why you would ask why I maintain a thing-in-itself for each thing that appears.

To be honest, although he was very smart, he says these kinds of contradictory things so much in the CPR that I think he didn’t have the view fully fleshed out. — Bob Ross

I’ve heard that argument repeatedly, and maybe he didn’t. Takes one more scholarly that I to show it, though.

If one takes Kant very seriously, by my lights, then there is no knowledge of things-in-themselves, — Bob Ross

By way of footnote in this discussion, the book I was introduced to Kant through was a book on Buddhist philosophy, namely, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, by T R V Murti. Published in 1955, it is still in print, although it has been somewhat deprecated by recent Buddhologists on account of the perceived eurocentricity of the author, an Oxford-educated Sanskritist. But I found it tremendously helpful when I read it in my youth, as it tied together many profound themes in both Kantian and Eastern philosophy.

Anyway, getting to the point of 'things in themselves' - it is well known that Buddhist philosophy proclaims that all things ('particulars' or 'creatures' in traditional Western parlance) are 'empty'. Empty of what? Why, empty of own-being. In Buddhist philosophy, the saying "empty of own-being" or "empty of self-nature" (svabhāva) is associated with the doctrine of emptiness (śūnyatā), typically found in the Mahāyāna schools of Buddhism.

The term "svabhāva" (literally 'self-originating') can be understood as describing the inherent or independent existence of phenomena. It asserts that particulars possess an intrinsic essence or self-nature, which is what makes them inherently real and substantial. However, the Buddhist concept of emptiness challenges this notion by asserting that all phenomena lack inherent existence or self-nature.

According to Buddhist philosophy, every aspect of the phenomenal world is characterized by dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda), which means that all phenomena arise in dependence on causes and conditions. Nothing exists independently or in isolation. Everything is interconnected and interdependent.

When Buddhist teachings refer to something as "empty of own-being," it means that phenomena lack fixed, independent, or inherent existence. They are devoid of an autonomous essence or self-nature that would make them truly existing entities. Instead, their existence and identity are contingent upon causes, conditions, and relationships.

The concept of emptiness is not a denial of the conventional reality of things but rather a negation of their ultimate or inherent existence. It challenges our ordinary way of perceiving and conceptualizing the world as inherently real and permanent. Emptiness emphasizes the fluidity, interdependence, and conditioned nature of all phenomena.

So it is plain to see that by this reasoning we cannot know things in themselves because they have no inherent or independent reality. They exist as an aspect of a matrix of causal conditions. We can't have knowledge of them, because they're not real in themselves. That is the sense in which it chimes with Kant's notion of 'knowledge of appearances only'.

Murti's book provides a detailed comparative analysis of the similarities and differences between this tenet of Buddhist Madhyamika (Middle Way) philosophy and Kant's transcendental idealism, saying that they arose from a similar kind of impasse which had developed as a consequence of dialectic. A preview of the relevant section in his book can be accessed here.

This is where the obscurity sets in with Kant (for me): what do you mean “logically speaking”? If you can’t point to your experience of things being representations of other things, then why do you think they are representations at all? You can’t point to scientific inquiry into the brain: those are studies of phenomena which Kant thinks tells us nothing about what is being represented—but then why think there is something being represented in the first place? — Bob Ross

Taking the visual as paradigmatic for the sake of simplicity, the environment is presented, or given, to us, meaning that our eyes, optic nerves and brains are affected by and respond to reflected light and our brains produce representations of environments consisting of objects that stand out as such from, but are of course never separate from, the environments. It is acknowledged that ideas condition to some degree what stands out for us, what is noticed. Would anything be seen if there was nothing to be seen?

I see. This doesn’t work though. For example, if reason without sense data produces no knowledge, then you do not know that “every change has a cause”. You don’t know that “a = a”. You don’t know that “1+1=2” without counting your fingers (so to speak). You don’t even know that “reason without sense data produces no knowledge” without appealing to pure reason. Some things are a priori true, and that means they do not require sense data. — Bob Ross

If you had never encountered any sense data at all, there would be nothing to reason with and hence no a priori knowledge. Even Kant acknowledged this as far as I remember. Once we have sensory experience then reason can generalize from that experience, and will then know, a priori, that any future experience must conform to those generalizations. As an example, we see all objects extended in space and enduring through time, so we generalize to the a priori idea that no object could be experienced except spatiotemporally.

So, 'every change has a cause' is an inductive inference from experience which has eviolved into our consistent and coherent web of understanding of the empirical via science. For a simple example, if I throw a brick at an ordinary 2.4 mm pane of glass the glass will almost certainly break. If I push something which is top heavy, and precariously balanced, it will fall. If I punch you hard in the face you will likely cry out in pain, and your face will probably bruise. If I hit a nail into soft wood with a hammer it will go in more easily that into hard wood (it may even bend when I try to hammer it into hard enough wood and I may have to pre-drill a hole). These are a few examples of countless other kinds of experiences that lead to the conclusion that all effects have causes, and yet apparently in the quantum realm, not all effects do have causes.

One plus one always equals two. I can prove this by placing two objects together, and I can see two objects there or I can focus on each object and see them individually as two examples of one object. The very fact that you say that you don't know "1+1=2" without counting your fingers supports the idea that the formulation is a generalized abstraction from sense experience. It is not reason, but imagination, that tells you that reason without sense data produces no knowledge, because you cannot imagine any knowledge, or anything at all, which is completely separate from the senses.

So there is what Ned Block has characterized as the "Harder Problem of Consciousness." This speaks to Philosophim's point about experiencing other consciousnesses.. the problem as I understand it is: how can I know what it's like to be you, without actually being you. The physicalist rejoinder may be: well the brain stuff is the same, so the mental states must be the same.. but the brain stuff is only approximately the same, not exactly the same, and the difference in brain states means different mental states, and these mental states are simply not accessible to another, at least, not in an "experiential" way. — NotAristotle

My physicalist rejoinder is... Of course we all have unique brains and that is of some relevance. However the more important matter is that consciousness is a process that occurs in a specific brain, and therefore it's illogical to think that one could experience, experiences that only occur in the brain of someone other than you. So no problem.

In other words, what is it about this arrangement of physical matter and energy that allows consciousness, and how is it different from some other assortment of physical matter and energy that does not allow consciousness? That is, if we think consciousness arises from a physical substrata, what about that physical substrata gives rise to consciousness? — NotAristotle

Information processing. This physical arrangement of matter allows consciousness, because it is structured in a way conducive to being able to do a massive amount of information processing.

So then the question may become: "what about the structure of the brain allows information processing?" In other words, structurally speaking, what is doing the actual processing?

The answer is networks of neurons. This wikipedia page on artificial neural networks might help with further questions you might have.

One might ask the question as to what about the structure of a computer allows for information processing.