And when I say the things I've been saying it feels kinda wrong, in that I'm speaking from a position of privilege: the privilege of living in a liberal secular society that makes it too easy to take a contrarian anti-militant-atheist line. — Jamal

Speaking as a US Bible Belt preacher's kid*...

I appreciate you noticing that.

* 60 yo

I don't expect to be able to reason with fundamentalist theists any more than I do with miltitant anti-theists. — Janus

I find it easier not to try. But I still recognize the main difference between them: the first holds it as his own inalienable right to force other people, through indoctrination, legislation and intimidation, to live as he believes they ought to live; the second holds as his inalienable right to live his life as he thinks he ought to, and defends the rights of other to live as they see fit.

I'll grant that universeness is an ideologue, a fanatical anti-theist, but I don't think I'd call him or her a militant anti-theist. — Janus

OK.... um... ideologue, fanatical don't sound all that different from militant to me, but no quibble. whatever. I know he holds strong opinions, and expresses them forcefully. I disagree with some of them to various degrees, but I respect the hell out of his consistency of conviction and his right to express them any way he wants to.

I doubt you lost the argument, because I don't believe any cogent or non-simplistic arguments have been presented by the person in question. — Janus

Of course I did. Didn't sway him one iota, while I did revisit my own position on a couple of issues. The disarray was a facetious exaggeration; I am usually quite orderly in retreat.
Just watch.

I am curious as to which "pseudo-friends" you are referring to.

You wouldn't know them. They live in the orange crate I use as a footstool; only I have seen or spoken to them. The upside is, we were in the same isolation bubble, safe from the antii-vaxx militant anti-maskers all through Covid.

I do believe I have said - up to four times each - everything I can possibly contribute here, and so it's time to retire from the field.

I know he holds strong opinions, and expresses them forcefully. I disagree with some of them to various degrees, but I respect the hell out of his consistency of conviction and his right to express them any way he wants to. — Vera Mont

Cheers Vera! :flower: :flower:
I assume you are referring to a small part of our exchange on the 'culture is critical,' thread, yes?
We had plenty of common ground in that thread. You are a very honest and honourable interlocuter.

You wouldn't know them. They live in the orange crate I use as a footstool; only I have seen or spoken to them. The upside is, we were in the same isolation bubble, safe from the antii-vaxx militant anti-maskers all through Covid. — Vera Mont

:rofl:

I do believe I have said - up to four times each - everything I can possibly contribute here, and so it's time to retire from the field. — Vera Mont

I hope you just mean this thread and not TPF Vera! :fear:

:grin: But seriously... there is another variety of dogmatism, which is not quite the same. It starts from exactly the same response - "you must not understand me.", but does argue, properly at first. But when it becomes apparent that the proposition at stake will not be abandoned, (for example, as in ad hoc explanations), the debate is over - unless one can agree on a solution such "hinge proposition" or axiom, in which case a solution has been reached. Those solutions are a bit of a problem.

The key, though, is that proper engagement requires that one put one's own beliefs at stake. — Ludwig V

This is an interesting method for determining dogmatism!

It is interesting because the content of beliefs isn't referenced at all -- it's the character of the person at the moment rather than the beliefs, whether in content or even in relation to other beliefs. So any belief could serve as an example of dogmatism, depending upon the attitude of the person.

It's a luxury for me to say it, but it still looks to me like religion as such is not the problem, but the social and geopolitical situation in which religious divisions take on greater significance than otherwise. — Jamal

You may well be right. So I will retreat to saying that it depends on the details of the case and I won't argue about what "significance" means. I assume that if the people involved find religion significant in their context, it is significant.

This is an interesting method for determining dogmatism! It is interesting because the content of beliefs isn't referenced at all — Moliere

I'm glad you find it interesting. Now, I'm interested that you think that the content might be relevant. I never considered the possibility, because you find dogmatists everywhere. Atheists, priests, philosophers, football fans, etc. One could look at the status or role of the belief. But I'm reluctant to call axioms or "hinge" (or similar) propositions dogmas even though they are beyond argument, because they can be evaluated indirectly, through the system that results.

Now, I'm interested that you think that the content might be relevant. — Ludwig V

Originally, I was closer to considering content because I was thinking about dogma as a relationship between beliefs, which would be partially content-dependent -- if flipping the truth-value of a belief flips the truth-value of other beliefs that could only be judged if we knew what the beliefs are and their (informal) inferential relationships to one another.

Also I have been thinking about Kant throughout the discussion and his notion of dogmatism relies upon what can or cannot be justified -- so insisting that space is infinite, for instance, is dogmatic due to the place that "space" fits within the scheme of reason.

Could'nt resist this one Jamal Do you think this statement by Janus makes him a fanatic? — universeness

Why would thinking that children should not be forced to do what they don't want to make me a fanatic? And why appeal to @jamal for support?

Some of the conversation here has got me thinking. In my extremely secular milieu, militant atheism seems ... silly. But in, say, the US Bible belt or the Middle East, religion is still a very big deal and causes a lot of problems. — Jamal

I agree, and I can understand being fanatically opposed to fanaticism, which has actually been my main point. It's the same as being tolerant of everything but intolerance.

He did not equate them, he compared them. — universeness

He equated theism with fascism and sexism in the sense that what he said assumed that theism is an evil just as fascism and sexism are evils. Read it again.

How would you respond to a fascist that called you a fanatic and a militant due to your anti-fascist views.
I am sure this was quite a common occurrence between neighbours, in 1939 Germany. — universeness

So, you think fascism is, only relatively speaking, an evil? I certainly wouldn't have picked you for being a relativist.

K.I.S.S (Keep it simple stupid!) — universeness

Sure, keep it simple if it's a simple topic or you are addressing simpletons, and don't unnecessarily complicate any explanation. In any case 'simple' does not have the same meaning as 'simplistic'.

the second holds as his inalienable right to live his life as he thinks he ought to, and defends the rights of other to live as they see fit. — Vera Mont

That's not how I would define a miltant anti-theist. A militant anti-theist is against all religion and will fight to eradicate it. A fanatical anti-theist may not fight to eradicate religion but will speak disparagingly against all theism. It's not a case of "live and let live" with fanatics, they will be in your face if you represent what they oppose, even if they don't attack you, or what you represent, physically. Bear in mind I am not opposing fanaticism being opposed by fanaticism.

I disagree with some of them to various degrees, but I respect the hell out of his consistency of conviction and his right to express them any way he wants to. — Vera Mont

Sure, I respect his right to present his views too. Do you respect the right of others for calling out his views for being fanatical?

Didn't sway him one iota, while I did revisit my own position on a couple of issues. — Vera Mont

Fair enough, but I wouldn't characterize that as losing the argument.

do believe I have said - up to four times each - everything I can possibly contribute here, and so it's time to retire from the field. — Vera Mont

:up: I feel pretty much the same at this juncture.

That's true. I'm happy to accept that a madcap interpretation is an interpretation, but only in the sense that a broken watch is a watch. — Ludwig V

I wouldn't even accept this analogy. A broken watch does not do what it is supposed to do, keep time, a madcap interpretation does what it is supposed to do, provide an understanding of meaning. The madcap interpretation is just different, in the sense of being outside the norm, so to make the analogy good, the watch would not be broken, but giving you the wrong time. In theory there would be a way to "translate" the interpretation, like relativity translates different ways of keeping time, because as a translation it must be ordered in some way and not completely rendom.

You are quite right, of course. But fiction is a particular context. Even so, Aristotle says that a story must be plausible. I think that's too restrictive, yet there's something in it. — Ludwig V

That depends on what you mean by "plausible". If it makes sense, it's plausible isn't it? But writing goes far beyond that, as lyricists in music and poetry for example string together disassociated ideas, to make a strange story. When interpreting a piece of writing we tend to look for consistency, and adhere to consistency as a principle, while overlooking the fact that the author could very easily stray from consistency even intentionally. So in philosophy for example, if we read something, and we cannot find a way to make it plausible, there is just too much inconsistency or nonsense, then we simply reject the material as unacceptable.

But even in these cases of rejecting the whole because it is incoherent as a whole, certain parts of the writing may be very insightful and illuminating. So the writing is rejected as a whole, but certain parts are very intelligible. And this can be reflected in the "madcap" interpretation. The interpretation itself is an expression, a piece of writing, and it is incoherent as a whole, but certain parts may be very intelligible. This is because the madcap interpreter releases the need for coherency, and this is actually very important because coherency is context dependent. We learn in school to think in certain ways. So when a modern person interprets an ancient writing, the person's ideas of coherency must be dismissed prior to proceeding, because the ancient people lived in a different environment of coherency. So the ancient person could very well be writing in a way which would appear incoherent to us today. Then the interpreter who tried to put things in coherent terms would br doing a faulty interpretation.

Another example (legal in this case) based on ancient memories of "The West Wing". Suppose a country has a constitution written more than 200 years ago. There is a provision that each geographical division of the country should send to the legislative body an number of representatives proportionate to its population. It is taken for granted that women do not count. It is further provided that slaves shall count as a fraction of a person (say 2/5th). Fast forward to the present. It is clear, isn't it, that something must be done. No-one is a slave any more, so perhaps that provision can be simply ignored. The provision about women was so obvious that it is not even mentioned, so perhaps one could simply include women. But it would be safer to delete the slave clause and add a definition of "person". You might not count that as re-interpretation, but it surely demonstrates that it is sometimes necessary to take account of the contemporary context as well as the historical context. — Ludwig V

I don't think this is a good example. This is not a matter of re-interpretation, it is a matter of rewriting the rule to better reflect modern values. What you seem to be saying, is that the rule as written is not applicable today, because of societal changes, so it needs to be rewritten.

A better example probably is the ongoing discussion around the second amendment in the US constitution, the right to bear arms. A common subject for debate is the intent of that amendment, and how that intent ought to apply in the modern day. It might seem sort of irrelevant to focus on th ancient intent, because we could simply change the wording if needed, as you suggest. But this is exactly where the problem lies, we look to these ancient laws as "authority", and so we make sure that it's not easy to change them. Therefore instead of looking to change them it just becomes a question of the intent behind them, and how to apply that same intent today. Once the intent is established it can be applied to the modern society. But to allow the condition of the modern society to influence how one interprets the intent of the authors would be a mistaken (subjective, because one's personal position would influence the) interpretation. The objective interpretation would be to look solely for the authors' intent, and not allow one's own intent to influence the interpretation.

Be careful when dealing with many, who claim to be atheists, they often make strange bedfellows with theists. — universeness

Is there some sort of tribal purity requirement to being an atheist? Am I at risk of losing my atheist card for being friends with theists - for considering fellow social primates to be brothers?

It is a dogma that dogma is bad.

Dogma is the bedrock of one's understanding; the bars on the cage of the mind that stop one falling out into the bliss of total ignorance. To imagine oneself without dogma is to imagine oneself as God.


The only avowedly atheist governments I know of are the old Soviet regime and Modern China. One might also include Japan, but not 'avowedly'.

It's a very small sample, but not a great record. the assumption seems to be that dogma makes for intolerance, but perhaps it is more related to power, and dogma is simply 'certainty'.

A broken watch does not do what it is supposed to do, keep time, a madcap interpretation does what it is supposed to do, provide an understanding of meaning. The madcap interpretation is just different, in the sense of being outside the norm, so to make the analogy good, the watch would not be broken, but giving you the wrong time. In theory there would be a way to "translate" the interpretation, like relativity translates different ways of keeping time, because as a translation it must be ordered in some way and not completely random. — Metaphysician Undercover

"Giving the wrong time" makes some sense. I'm not sure in advance that all madcap interpretations provide an understanding of meaning. On the other hand, I can see that you don't want to rule out radically unorthodox interpretations in advance. Perhaps we should lump all madcap interpretations into the same trash-heap.

I don't quite understand your last sentence. If it means that all interpretations must be mutually reconcilable, that undermines the point of different interpretations - unless the reconciliation is simply the original text, which all interpretations have in common.

If it makes sense, it's plausible isn't it? — Metaphysician Undercover

That doesn't seem obviously true to me. Philosophy has produced several theories which, in my view, make sense, but aren't plausible. My dream that I can jump/fly over tall buildings makes sense, but isn't plausible.

So the ancient person could very well be writing in a way which would appear incoherent to us today. Then the interpreter who tried to put things in coherent terms would be doing a faulty interpretation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, as usual, you have a coherent position. Revealing the incoherence of a text on its own terms is a perfectly coherent project. But would you say that Locke anticipated modern physics, or that Berkeley anticipated modern relativity theory?

But to allow the condition of the modern society to influence how one interprets the intent of the authors would be a mistaken (subjective, because one's personal position would influence the) interpretation. The objective interpretation would be to look solely for the authors' intent, and not allow one's own intent to influence the interpretation. — Metaphysician Undercover

But can we always divine the intent of the author? We can't always discern the intent of even modern authors from the text alone. But I accept that the intent of the author, so far as we can divine it, is always important in interpreting a text. The same applies to the context in which they are written. But if that's the only correct way to read them, I'm left puzzled by the fact that some texts remain relevant long after times have changed, and we continue to read and discuss them. Your approach seems to consign all historical texts to a museum.

I thought the starting-point of this discussion was the issues around the fact that there's no single authoritative (privileged) interpretation.

A better example probably is the ongoing discussion around the second amendment in the US constitution, the right to bear arms. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are right, that is a better example.

Therefore instead of looking to change them it just becomes a question of the intent behind them, and how to apply that same intent today. — Metaphysician Undercover

Fair enough. But the catch is "how to apply that same intent today". That means interpretation in a context the author(s) didn't know about. There's a narrow line there between divining the intent of the author and speculating.

The objective interpretation would be to look solely for the authors' intent, and not allow one's own intent to influence the interpretation. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not well-informed about jurisprudence, but I believe that the Supreme Court in the UK has a rule that the intent of Parliament does not determine the meaning of the Act; it will only consider the words on the page. There's a notion of objective meaning at work there which philosophy would find troublesome, but nonetheless, lawyers seem to be able to work with it, and if meaning is use, that validates the principle, at least in the context of the law.

dogma as a relationship between beliefs, which would be partially content-dependent — Moliere

I certainly agree that dogma is a relationship between beliefs, in that dogma is in some way protected against refutation, with the implication that other beliefs can go to the wall. But that status is attributed by the believer, so I don't see that I can delineate any content in advance.

so insisting that space is infinite, for instance, is dogmatic due to the place that "space" fits within the scheme of reason. — Moliere

Yes. Kant is using "dogma" in its traditional, non-rhetorical use. Which is not wrong, just very unusual. One of my problems here is precisely to distinguish "respectable" dogma from the disreputable kind.

Be careful when dealing with many, who claim to be atheists, they often make strange bedfellows with theists.
— universeness

Is there some sort of tribal purity requirement to being an atheist? Am I at risk of losing my atheist card for being friends with theists - for considering fellow social primates to be brothers? — wonderer1

No, Mr Atwill was talking about the various clashes he has had with atheists such as Dr Richard Carrier, regarding the veracity of the content of his book.
See https://www.richardcarrier.info/archives/4664 from Carrier, and see Atwill's response at:
https://web.archive.org/web/20140327024645/http://caesarsmessiah.com/blog/2013/12/richard-carrier-the-phd-that-drowned-at-gadara/

Carrier supported a lot of the criticisms of Atwill's book made by theists but I think the reason Carrier did that was that he was becoming a bit jealous regarding Mr Atwill's rise to prominence. Some atheists enjoy the public limelight they have built, so much, that they will become bedfellows with anyone to attack another atheist they see as a threat to their standing/status. It's just another unpalatable part of the human psyche that can arise in some folks.

Why would thinking that children should not be forced to do what they don't want to make me a fanatic? And why appeal to jamal for support? — Janus

Theists who experience your law preventing them from compelling their children to experience their gods glory by attending their church, would definitely label you a fanatic, you fanatic!
:rofl: You think my post to Mr Jamal was a request for his support!

He equated theism with fascism and sexism in the sense that what he said assumed that theism is an evil just as fascism and sexism are evils. Read it again. — Janus

I think @180 Proof is the person who best knows what he posted, it certainly is not you. I suggest you read his posts again and again and again, until the penny drops.

So, you think fascism is, only relatively speaking, an evil? I certainly wouldn't have picked you for being a relativist. — Janus

Do you actually answer questions or can you only respond by asking other questions which are just really bad attempts to twist my questions?

:up:

If it makes my initial point any clearer for you, @Janus, I reiterate that your equating "anti-theism to theism" is as much a false equivalence as equating (e.g.) anti-dogmatism to dogmatism (or anti-supernaturalism to supernaturalism).

Perhaps we should lump all madcap interpretations into the same trash-heap. — Ludwig V

The point though is that I do not want to throw all madcap interpretations in the same trash-heap. As I said, the madman still expresses glimpses of insightful intelligence. And different madmen express different forms of insight. So their interpretations cannot all be classed together.

I don't quite understand your last sentence. If it means that all interpretations must be mutually reconcilable, that undermines the point of different interpretations - unless the reconciliation is simply the original text, which all interpretations have in common. — Ludwig V

That's right, they are all reconcilable through the original text, as "the object". But this implies that I affirm that there is nothing absolutely random which is added by the subject. If the subject added something which was absolutely random, it would be unintelligible through reference to the text, as completely unrelatable to it. So as much as we have free will and freedom to interpret however one pleases, I deny the possibility of an absolutely random act of interpretation. You can see how this makes sense, because such an act could not be related to "the object" and therefore could not be an interpretation.

My dream that I can jump/fly over tall buildings makes sense, but isn't plausible. — Ludwig V

Sorry, but without some more information, such as the apparatus you would use to propel yourself, this idea of you flying over tall buildings makes no sense to me at all. How does it make sense to you?

Well, as usual, you have a coherent position. Revealing the incoherence of a text on its own terms is a perfectly coherent project. But would you say that Locke anticipated modern physics, or that Berkeley anticipated modern relativity theory? — Ludwig V

No, I would not say that at all, I do not use "anticipate" like that. But some people seem to use the word in a way which implies that this would make sense to them. I do not understand such a use of "anticipate". One can "anticipate" a defined future event, in the sense of prediction, but this requires that the event be defined. Also, one can have "anticipation" in a most general sense, without any definition of the future event which is causing the anticipation. This is better known as a general anxiety, and it can be very debilitating in some situations, because it is an anxiety which cannot be dealt with, as having a source beyond the usual "deadline" as a source of the stress.

But to mix these two senses of "anticipate" into some equivocated mess is just a category mistake. That is to name some particular event which was in the future at the time, "modern physics", or "modern relativity theory", and say that the person anticipated the particular, in the general sense of "anticipate". That, to me is an equivocated mess of category mistake. It is incoherent and makes no sense, even though some people like to say things like this.

But can we always divine the intent of the author? — Ludwig V

No, we can never "divine the intent of the author". That's why all interpretations are fundamentally subjective rather than fundamentally objective. We strive toward the objective interpretation, if truth is our goal, but we cannot deny the reality of the context of the interpreter, which is primary to the interpretation. The context of the author is primary to the object (written material), but the context of the subject is primary to the interpreter. Primary context is reducible, and simplified by representing it as intent. So the context which is primary to the author is the author's intent, and the context which is primary to the interpreter is the interpreter's intent. Since the interpreter's intent is primary in the act of interpretation, it is impossible for the interpreter to actually put oneself in the author's shoes, and "divine the intent of the author". This can never be done.

But I accept that the intent of the author, so far as we can divine it, is always important in interpreting a text. The same applies to the context in which they are written. But if that's the only correct way to read them, I'm left puzzled by the fact that some texts remain relevant long after times have changed, and we continue to read and discuss them. Your approach seems to consign all historical texts to a museum. — Ludwig V

I'll say that the author's intent is the "ideal". It is what we seek in "meaning", as meaning is defined as what is "meant" by the author, and this is defined as the author's intention. The problem is that there is no such thing as "the author's intent". "Intent" is just a descriptive word which refers to some unknown, vague, generality, rather than a particular "object". We can formulate simple examples of an "object", as a goal, like Wittgenstein does with "slab" and "block", etc.. If my intent, object, or goal is for you to bring me a slab, I will say "slab", and this expression represents a very specific, even particular goal (object), if it is a particular slab that I want. But these are very simplistic examples, which lend themselves well to simple fiction writing where the goal of the author is to create an imaginary scenario in the reader's mind. That's a very simple goal or object, which is easily determined as the objective of the fiction writer.

But when we get to philosophy, the intent of the author is not exposed in this way. This is because the intent of the author of philosophy, the author's goal, or objective, is often actually unknown to the author. We can express it in general terms like the desire for truth, or knowledge, or an approach to the unknown. But notice that since it is just a general "unknown" which the author is describing, or directing us toward, there can be no particular object which is being described by that author, so the intent remains veiled. This is the subjectivity of the author.

Notice the two forms of subjectivity, author and interpreter, and how they establish a relationship between "the object" in one sense as the goal or intent, and "the object" in the other sense as the physical piece of writing. Subjectivity of the interpreter is the veiled, unknown intentions of the interpreter, which influence the interpretation regardless of efforts to remove them; the interpreter cannot proceed without personal intention, and this will always influence the interpretation as subjectivity. Subjectivity of the author, is the veiled unknown intentions of the author, which influence the author's writings regardless of efforts made by the author to know, understand, and be true to one's own intentions; their are unknown aspects of one's own intentions (motivating forces) which cannot be apprehended despite all efforts of introspection.

Fair enough. But the catch is "how to apply that same intent today". That means interpretation in a context the author(s) didn't know about. There's a narrow line there between divining the intent of the author and speculating. — Ludwig V

The issue, I believe is that it is all speculation. There is no science of "diving the intent of the author". So the art of interpreting can go in two very distinct directions. Remember what I said about the madcap interpretation, that parts are intelligible and insightful. We can consider the work of the author in the same general way, as parts. We can focus on distinct parts which seem to have very clear and distinct intention (meaning), and bring those forward in the interpretation, and have as the goal of interpretation a very "objective" interpretation. But this would ignore all the author's subjectivity. Or, we can focus on the aspects where the intent of the author is not clear at all, because the author was not truly aware of one's own intent. This allows the intent of the interpreter to represent the intent of the author in various different ways, and the goal here is a subjective interpretation. Then we have many options in between these two extremes.

There's a notion of objective meaning at work there which philosophy would find troublesome, but nonetheless, lawyers seem to be able to work with it, and if meaning is use, that validates the principle, at least in the context of the law. — Ludwig V

I don't see how "meaning is use" validates that principle. The word "use" implies a user, and the user of the words is the author. If meaning is use, then we must look for the intent of the author to see how the author was intending the words to be used. Words are tools, and tools have no general "use", as use is a feature of the particular instance where the tool is put toward a specific purpose.

No, Mr Atwill was talking about the various clashes he has had with atheists such as Dr Richard Carrier, regarding the veracity of the content of his book. — universeness

Whew, I was afraid I was going to stop getting invitations to the baby roasts.

Thanks for letting me know where that came from, but a spat between Jesus mythicists seems too like a tempest in a teacup for me to be very interested.

If it makes my initial point any clearer for you, Janus, I reiterate that your equating "anti-theism to theism" is as much a false equivalence as equating (e.g.) anti-dogmatism to dogmatism (or anti-supernaturalism to supernaturalism). — 180 Proof

Out of those three, only dogmatism (defined as the belief that one knows what others should think) is arguably an evil, per se. So anti-dogmatism thereby is arguably a good. Theism and supernaturalism are not necessarily dogmatisms; people may believe in those without thinking that others should believe in them. If anti-theism and anti-supernaturalism are dogmatic, then they are arguably evils and worse than non-dogmatic theism and supernaturalism. If anti-theism and anti-supernaturalism are merely positions that one holds personally and does not claim that others should hold those positions, then they are morally equivalent to non-dogmatic theism and supernaturalism, I hope that makes clear for you what my position is. And note I don't require you to agree with me, but in my view if you don't then your thinking is narrow-minded if not dogmatic, because you are assuming that theism and supernaturalism are evils tout court.

Theists who experience your law preventing them from compelling their children to experience their gods glory by attending their church, would definitely label you a fanatic, you fanatic! — universeness

Right, but I don't think it is dogmatic, but rather I think that not forcing children to do what they don't want to except in practical life matters where it may be necessary, is fair-mindedness towards children and even if I am being dogmatic, I have already acknowledged that I think it is OK to oppose dogma with anti-dogma, intolerance with anti-intolerance and fanaticism with anti-fanaticism. Now you might characterize those "antis" as dogma, fanaticism and intolerance respectively, but if they are they are of the good kind in my view, because they uphold the principle of "live and let live" and I think of that as applying to all but those who will not live and let live.

Whatever, man.

Atheist dogmatist confirmed.

:lol:

Some chickens have been fully cooked. We both know it's futile to try to reverse the cooking but as I have typed many times, demonstrating how deep the cooking can penetrate into some chickens, can help others get out of the ovens in time. I think this thread is dead!

This thread's been a zombie for the last 11/12 pages.

The point though is that I do not want to throw all madcap interpretations in the same trash-heap. As I said, the madman still expresses glimpses of insightful intelligence. And different madmen express different forms of insight. So their interpretations cannot all be classed together. — Metaphysician Undercover

I was thinking that if there is some truth in the madcap interpretation, it isn't madcap. But still, there is the point that interpretations may be mixed. Perhaps all interpretations will be found to be mixed. In any case, perhaps a trash-heap, as such is not such a good idea. Still, I'll want to know what to spend my time on. Difficult.

Words are tools, and tools have no general "use", as use is a feature of the particular instance where the tool is put toward a specific purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover

No. Tools do have a general or standard use. It is true that bricolage can develop other uses, which may even become standard, but that doesn't undermine the point. I don't see why a particular view of interpretation should not be adopted in a particular context provided that practitioners are able to work with it.

Then we have many options in between these two extremes. — Metaphysician Undercover

There's certainly a spectrum of the kind you indicate and important difference between "simple" cases and "complex" ones.

But when we get to philosophy, the intent of the author is not exposed in this way. This is because the intent of the author of philosophy, the author's goal, or objective, is often actually unknown to the author. We can express it in general terms like the desire for truth, or knowledge, or an approach to the unknown. — Metaphysician Undercover

That exactly my bother about the "intent" criterion and why I can't accept the definition of a speech act in terms of intention. Plus there's the objection that "meanings just ain't in the head" - who was it who coined that?.

I was thinking that if there is some truth in the madcap interpretation, it isn't madcap — Ludwig V

I don't think we should use "truth" here. I tried to distinguish subjective and objective features, but since the subjective was described (by me) as primary, I don't think there is a good place for that word.

No. Tools do have a general or standard use. — Ludwig V

This is a very problematic position to take. Any claim of such a "general or standard use" will miss out on a whole bunch of non-standard usage which is just as real as that contained by the general description. Making such a claim, is just a generalization intended to facilitate some argument. "The standard use of a hammer is to pound nails". That statement, although one might agree that it is "the standard" use, does not validate any rigorous sense of "the use of a hammer", in a general sense.

In other words, we have invalid inductive logic at play here. Generalizations are produced through inductive logic, and exceptions are evidence that the induction is invalid. So every example of an exception to the rule of "general or standard use" is proof that the generalization is composed of invalid logic. In the case of word usage, the proof is overwhelming. Therefore the problematic position you propose is not at all philosophically useful because the invalidity of the inductive reasoning is very strong.

That exactly my bother about the "intent" criterion and why I can't accept the definition of a speech act in terms of intention. Plus there's the objection that "meanings just ain't in the head" - who was it who coined that?. — Ludwig V

That the intent is sometimes simply not there, is no reason why we ought to look somewhere else to find "the true meaning". The lack of intent only reinforces the claim that the meaning is subjective. That we ought to look somewhere else for the true meaning is completely unwarranted. Such a procedure, to seek objective meaning when the meaning is subjective, can only produce can only produce false or fictitious meaning.

You ought not think of meaning as in the head. It's far easier to understand meaning as being in the writing itself, but put there by the author. So for example, when the writing is judged as unclear, vague, ambiguous, incoherent, or inconsistent, this is a judgement against the artistic capabilities of the author. However, some of these features may be placed intentionally into the work, by the author, and if the interpreter does not apprehend this it is actually the capabilities of the interpreter which are at fault. The writing itself is the object, and meaning is in the object, as a representation of the author's objectives. That the meaning is subjective implies that it is "of the subject" as in from the subject, not in the subject.

I don't think we should use "truth" here. — Metaphysician Undercover

Quite right. I was careless. I should have said, "I was thinking that if there is some validity in the madcap interpretation, it isn't madcap". However, doesn't "objective" means capable of unqualified truth or falsity? "Subjective" is more complicated. I think that some people would say ¬"subjective" means not capable of either truth or falsity, while others would say it means "true or false for someone".

Any claim of such a "general or standard use" will miss out on a whole bunch of non-standard usage which is just as real as that contained by the general description. — Metaphysician Undercover

I didn't say or imply that non-standard uses of a tool are not uses. On the contrary, they clearly are.

Making such a claim, is just a generalization intended to facilitate some argument. "The standard use of a hammer is to pound nails". — Metaphysician Undercover

Sorry, I was't careful enough, again. A normal claw hammer is designed and manufactured for people to pound nails (and to pull them out). (There are other kinds of hammer designed to pound other things.) Most people use their hammers most of the time for the designed purpose - they perform better than most alternatives. I agree that's an empirical generalization.

You ought not think of meaning as in the head. It's far easier to understand meaning as being in the writing itself, but put there by the author. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, I understood "in the head" to be metaphorical for "in the mind", which is itself a metaphor. To my mind, so is "in the text". But it is true that the text expresses the author's intention or even is what the author intended to write - curiously even if certain parts/features were not intended, but developed as the text was written. It all gets hideously complicated. I think the rest of that paragraph is OK.

But I think you may be too restrictive if you are saying that the meaning of a text is limited to what the author intended. I don't see how anything can prevent other people from finding meanings (or quasi-meanings?) in the text which are not misinterpretations but which the author had not noticed. Plato was right - a text does not know who to speak to, but speaks to everyone equally.

Yes. Kant is using "dogma" in its traditional, non-rhetorical use. Which is not wrong, just very unusual. One of my problems here is precisely to distinguish "respectable" dogma from the disreputable kind. — Ludwig V

Right... if we have reputable dogma then my dogma is good and their dogma is bad.

I certainly agree that dogma is a relationship between beliefs, in that dogma is in some way protected against refutation, with the implication that other beliefs can go to the wall. But that status is attributed by the believer, so I don't see that I can delineate any content in advance. — Ludwig V

True.

Though I wouldn't propose content could be understood in advance -- only after reading or understanding or listening or something like that. The informal inferential relationships come to be known through reading scripts or through conversation, and can partially define dogma.

Though that's very cumbersome in comparison to:

Dogma is the bedrock of one's understanding; the bars on the cage of the mind that stop one falling out into the bliss of total ignorance. To imagine oneself without dogma is to imagine oneself as God. — unenlightened

Which is succinct and manages to lay out what's meant. I'm understanding better what is meant by dogma at this point.

This clicked:

It is a dogma that dogma is bad. — unenlightened

I've been expressing my own disdain for certain patterns of thought, a certainty which I've acquired through experience.

The only avowedly atheist governments I know of are the old Soviet regime and Modern China. One might also include Japan, but not 'avowedly'.

It's a very small sample, but not a great record. the assumption seems to be that dogma makes for intolerance, but perhaps it is more related to power, and dogma is simply 'certainty'.

I was thinking of dogma differently before, but I think I can get along with this way of talking.

Right... if we have reputable dogma then my dogma is good and their dogma is bad. — Moliere

Well, yes - if you don't have a definition of "reputable" that's not subjective.

Which is succinct and manages to lay out what's meant. I'm understanding better what is meant by dogma at this point. — Moliere

I like unenlightened's first sentence. I don't understand the second.

dogma makes for intolerance, but perhaps it is more related to power, and dogma is simply 'certainty'. — Moliere

Dogma includes "certainty", in the psychological sense. But psychological certainty is a trap, precisely because it leads to dogma and there's nothing like power for fostering certainty beyond what's reasonable.

I like unenlightened's first sentence. I don't understand the second.

dogma makes for intolerance, but perhaps it is more related to power, and dogma is simply 'certainty'.
— Moliere

Dogma includes "certainty", in the psychological sense. But psychological certainty is a trap, precisely because it leads to dogma and there's nothing like power for fostering certainty beyond what's reasonable. — Ludwig V

Oh, Lord, please don't let me be misunderstood.
This...

the assumption seems to be that dogma makes for intolerance, but perhaps it is more related to power, and dogma is simply 'certainty'./quote]

...I now see is badly phrased and confusing. Let me remove the ambiguous "it" and replace it thus:

The assumption seems to be that dogma makes for intolerance, but perhaps intolerance is more related to power, and dogma is simply 'certainty'.

This hopefully aligns fairly well with your"...there's nothing like power for fostering certainty beyond what's reasonable." — unenlightened