As for one's own "consciousness", or subjectivity, I think it is only assumed and not observed (any more than an eye sees itself seeing). — 180 Proof

Sometimes I may be looking at something; I may not be conscious of what I am noticing, but if you asked, I could tell you what I've seen. At other times I am very conscious, in the moment, of looking at something, and of noticing what I'm noticing. You could observe me in either of these states, but you would not be able to know for sure whether I was conscious of what I was looking at, at the time. So, my own experience tells me that I can notice whether I am conscious or have been daydreaming and it is in this sense that I say this observation is private.

I don't have any observational grounds to doubt or disbelieve that I am (at least, occasionally) "conscious". Do you? — 180 Proof

So, I agree with you that we have no observational grounds to doubt that I am ( at times) conscious, and I would go further and claim that I have observational grounds to believe it.

Indeed - I should have said, 'is purported to operate throughout... ' etc. I agree. — Tom Storm

:up:

Where do you sit on the notion that maths is Platonic? — Tom Storm

Numbers are abstract objects (or structures) which are real only in so far as they are physically instantiable. I guess this view makes me more Aristotlean (hylomorphic) than Platonic-Pythagorean (supersensible).

Would mathematical Platonism quality as immaterial?

Yes; ergo, IMO, a fiction.

You could observe me in either of these states, but you would not be able to know for sure whether I was conscious of what I was looking at, at the time. — Janus

Using proper brain scans and algorithms one could easily observe your real-time un/conscious-states.

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6119943/

That's probably true, although it's not an aspect of everyday life. So, the only in principle private element is how I feel when I am conscious, or not.

If you are a monist I think this could use a little more exploration. You are right in pointing out that abstract objects must be physically instantiatable.
But I'm thinking that once we have this ability to contain the immaterial then we have an environment were the immaterial can affect other immaterial content. Much of our mental activity works this way, not just maths. In some ways this immaterial world can operate independent of the physical world.
(Regarding Platonism)

An example would be how we control the future.

You say we can "contain" the immaterial, but what does this mean? I take it that you mean we can grasp abstractions or generalizations. So, if I understand you, you are saying that abstract content can affect other abstract content. If this is right, then how would you say the affect is effected if not by means of physical processes?

I said the immaterial IS supported by physical processes. The reasoning is because we contain immaterials such as past and future (that physically do not exist) and that is evidence our brains have this ability.

So our brains have this interactive ability to connect past, present and future...and the material and immaterial.

And as 180 Proof pointed out abstract objects really only exist in a physically instantiated form, which I agree with.

I said the immaterial IS supported by physical processes. The reasoning is because we contain immaterials such as past and future (that physically do not exist) and that is evidence our brains have this ability. — Mark Nyquist

The past and future are ideas; are ideas immaterial? Ideas are abstractions, generalizations but they are not necessarily immaterial, except in the sense that they are not objects of the senses.

And as 180 Proof pointed out abstract objects really only exist in a physically instantiated form, which I agree with. — Mark Nyquist

Actually, I pointed this out earlier in the thread and 180 agreed:

Ideas, theories and generalizations only exist insofar as they are physically instantiated. Also, the idea of "material substance" is questionable; at the very least it is ambiguous. In ordinary usage it refers to tangibility, to some sensorially apprehensible aspect of the objects we see, hear, touch, and so on. — Janus

In any case, if abstract objects exist only in physically instantiated forms, then why refer to them as 'immaterial"?

It seems to me that those who insist on using this tendentious term have something invested in the belief that there is some reality over and above the physical.

Because they are immaterial. It's a reasonable development of physical monism that advances things beyond the physical present.

Edit:I mean physically instantiated immaterials. A stand alone immaterial would not exist.

:up:

It seems to me that those who insist on using this tendentious term have something invested in the belief that there is some reality over and above the physical. — Janus

The search for proof for the incorporeal is at the heart of idealism, I guess.

Maybe the issue you are raising is if the physical form of neuron configuration is all there is or is the subject matter of prime importance and the underlying biology must rise to the task. I take the latter view and it shows we have some very advanced biology by evidence of what our capabilities are.

The issue is that I see no reason to think that the things you refer to as immaterial are not physical phenomena. They may not be observably material, or physical, phenomena, but then neither are fundamental particles or quantum fields, and yet no one seems to want to claim those are not material, or physical.

So, the situation as I see it is that there are some phenomena we can observe and other phenomena that can only be detected via observable effects.

The search for proof for the incorporeal is at the heart of idealism, I guess. — Tom Storm

Since there seem to be only two kinds of proof or evidence: the logical and the empirical, I think it's going to be a
very
long.........................................................................................................................(and fruitless)
search.
:fire:

my view is mental content is universally immaterial. If I'm physically in the presence of a physical object it would be contained in my brain as an immaterial representation of a physical object.

You're entitled to that view, but I can see no reason to hold it. That said, all of us hold groundless views, so it's no biggie...

Just interested if you have an occupation or training that gives you some insight on this issue?

No special occupation or training other than undergraduate level philosophy. I also took a hell of a lot of psychedelics and practiced meditation daily for about 18 years. What about you? Do you have a special kind of training or interest?

I mostly just follow this forum.

I think it's also worthwhile reading available works on the questions that interest you. I read as much as I can find time for.

Actually I get spread thin so just check in here mostly weekends so I miss a lot. I enjoy the back and forth.

... contained in my brain as an immaterial representation ... — Mark Nyquist

This confuses me. Please clarify how an "immaterial" Y is "contained in" a material Z.

↪180 Proof If you are a monist ... — Mark Nyquist

I am an emergentist (re: holism), not "monist" (dualist or pluralist).

:up: I enjoy these forums too; I see them as being the modern equivalent of the agora.

Sorry for your confusion. Maybe I could explain it this way. Our brains do something like our hands would do to hold an imaginary tennis ball, or rubber duck, or pencil, or dish rag or almost any thing. Not a real thing but a gauging of parameters.

Don't know were the rubber duck came from???
1970's maybe.

Since there seem to be only two kinds of proof or evidence: the logical and the empirical, I think it's going to be a
very
long.........................................................................................................................(and fruitless)
search.
:fire: — Janus

Story of my life... I hear you, Brother. :cool:

... to hold an imaginary ... — Mark Nyquist

Okay, a step away from talk of the "immaterial" to the "imaginary" is progress. But how do you "hold an imaginary" X? A map of Middle Earth, for example, is instantiated on actual paper, but that map does not correspond to an actual place.

It might be just word problems. For me the immaterial is something brains can assign parameters to but they don't exist other than as brain state.

:up:

It might be just word problems. For me the immaterial is something brains can assign parameters to but they don't exist other than as brain state. — Mark Nyquist

As 180 says you seem now to be speaking about the imaginary when you refer to the "immaterial". So, if consciousness. or mental states, to return to the original example should be counted as immaterial, does it follow that they are then to be thought of as being imaginary?

I'm saying things that do not physically exist (like the past or future) can exist in our brains. Do you or others have an alternative. Physical existence of the subject matter is not required for mental content to exist.
So physical non existence of the subject matter is my use of the word immaterial and it exists as brain state in an entirely physical form. What's the problem?

And identifying this mental ability should lead to the conclusion that mental content is universally immaterial. Identifying this ability gives a better understanding of how information physically exists. So information doesn't need to be defined as an abstract concept. Does that explain it? I'm surprised at the resistance to the idea.

Enlightenment philosophy may have demystified established doctrines of the era, but at the same time, initiated its own doctrines under religious, or at least theological, conditions, so the Enlightenment didn’t categorically reject all religious doctrines. — Mww

As a basically rational & non-religious introverted personality*1 --- who has been called "Spock-like" on another forum, and a "New Age mystic" on TPF --- I stand somewhere in the middle of the Materialism/Mysticism spectrum. So, I can understand why the early scientists preferred the pragmatic philosophy of Materialism to that of impractical Mysticism. A typical view of the spectrum might say that Materialism appeals to "rational" practical/realistic intellectuals on one end, while Mysticism is embraced mostly by "emotional" theoretical/idealistic feeling-type persons on the other extreme*1. Doctrinal Religions though, captured the loyalty of sheep-like masses who want/need to be told what to believe. { Note -- The Rational vs Emotional labels are simplistic either/or categories that ignore the median*2.} Ironically, the thinkers on both ends often view the opposite type as a member of the brain-washed majority.

However, my interest in feckless philosophy has exposed me to other (non-material) ways of thinking about the world and its people. Jesus responded to the skepticism from his critics with "he who has eyes to see, let him see". Apparently, I was born blind to the objects of "spiritual consciousness". But, I can see that at least half of the population is equipped with mystical eyes or hearts. So, I try not to "pass judgment" on those who don't see & feel as I do. Some of them can give elaborate reasons for believing as they do.

Having read the encyclopedic book Mysticism, by Evelyn Underhill, I understand that there is a long tradition of mystical ideation in the history of philosophy. Yet ecstatic mystics have typically lived on the fringes of staid formal religions. She said, "that while mysticism is an essential element in full human religion, it can never be the whole content of such religion". She could be very critical of formalized religions, and even referred to theology as "empirical mysticism". By contrast, she seemed to view the true mystics as "spiritual anarchists". Even the Catholic church, with its history of rational theology had an uneasy relationship with mystics, who ignored official dogma in favor of their own inner revelations.

It's true that the Enlightenment era scientists didn't immediately & categorically reject their religious doctrines. From Galileo to Newton, physical scientists attempted to reconcile their newly observed "facts" with their inherited belief systems. Yet eventually, the trend away from acceptance of formal religious institutions & doctrines became almost categorical*3. Ironically, in a 2009 poll, " just over half of scientists (51%) believe in some form of deity or higher power". So, even pragmatic practicing scientists seem to be able to reconcile their professional Materialism with a bit of personal Mysticism. :smile:


*1. rational vs emotional personality :
In common usage, being “rational” is assumed to be good, whereas being “irrational” or “emotional” is assumed to be bad and to lead to error. Psychological science, however, is primarily interested in understanding rather than in passing judgment on kinds of thought processes.
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4128497/

*2. Psychology and the Rationality of Emotion :
Daniel Kahneman and his colleague Amos Tversky discovered some of the judgment heuristics that people use in everyday reasoning (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Much to the dismay of economists guided by “rational choice” models, it has become clear that people reason using whatever short-cuts or heuristics are available.
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4128497/

*3. Categorical rejection of religious doctrines :
92% of the members of the National Academy of Sciences reject a belief in God or higher power.
https://evolution-outreach.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1936-6434-6-33