We should not overlook the following from the first paragraph of the second meditation:

Archimedes said that if he had one firm and immovable point he could lift the world ·with a long enough lever·; so I too can hope for great things if I manage to find just one little thing that is solid and certain.

The task of finding something that is certain is not simply a matter of Descartes finding something he can be certain of, that is, of alleviating his doubts. The one thing that is solid and certain will function as an Archimedean fulcrum with which he will reestablish the world on a new basis. The authority of the thinking I will displace that of Aristotle, "the Philosopher", and the Church.

Wow Fooloso4, that's some gold you've provided in that link, not limited to Descartes.

I was familiar with the letter, but had not seen it, I do have his Philosophical Writings collection, and volume III is a compendium of everything he wrote to everybody, but, there's no way to divide them up by topic, making finding that specific one, very hard.

Many thanks, I look very much forward to continuing this here, I will surely learn a lot.

…you cannot be incorrect that you seem to sense something… is really what Descartes means when he says that we can doubt, but that we cannot doubt that we are doubting (or think or feel, but not doubt that we are thinking or feeling). — Janus

I don’t think I’ve got to the part where he says that yet.

Pain and other sensations such as pleasure are unique in this context. If I feel pain or pleasure, it makes no sense to say that I doubt that I am feeling pain or pleasure; what could it even mean to say I doubt that I am feeling some sensation that I am feeling? — Janus

Touché; you have me there (I take this as similar to Wittgenstein’s remarks). But there is also not a context where it is meaningful to say that I am “certain” that I am in pain (unless someone else thought I was making more of something), and it is for this certainty that Descartes is searching (math-like knowledge, not just, resolved or really sure).

I am not really saying that our sensations are certain; since they are not propositional, they are neither certain nor uncertain, they are merely sensations, although what we infer on the basis of them can be certain or uncertain. — Janus

Well this distinction seems to matter. So we can be unaware of our sensations, but, if aware, not doubt them, yet be wrong about sensing something (or in denial), but not certain (other than that we do sense something), then it is our judgment which could be correct or certain. But I see or feel something but I don’t know what it is; sometimes we call this being tricked by our senses, other times because of inexperience.

Comments on the Second Meditation:


For Descartes, a certain truth is one that can't be doubted. It's as if there's a spectrum with absolute certainty on one side and pure doubt on the other. Per the SEP:

In the Second Replies, he adds:

"First of all, as soon as we think that we correctly perceive something, we are spontaneously convinced that it is true. Now if this conviction is so firm that it is impossible for us ever to have any reason for doubting what we are convinced of, then there are no further questions for us to ask: we have everything that we could reasonably want. … For the supposition which we are making here is of a conviction so firm that it is quite incapable of being destroyed; and such a conviction is clearly the same as the most perfect certainty. (AT 7:144f, CSM 2:103)

These passages (and others) suggest an account wherein doubt is the contrast of certainty.As my certainty increases, my doubt decreases; conversely, as my doubt increases, my certainty decreases. The requirement that knowledge is to be based in complete, or perfect certainty, thus amounts to requiring a complete inability to doubt one’s convictions – an utter indubitability. This conception of the relationship between certainty and doubt helps underwrite Descartes’ methodical emphasis on doubt, the so-called ‘method of doubt’ (discussed in Section 2). — SEP on Descartes' Epistemology

Having put aside uncertain propositions, he focuses now on what he couldn't doubt: that he exists.

But what about the "I" is indubitable? He lists things that come to mind about what he is: he's a man with a body. But he finds that this falls to the evil demon.

So what's left? His conclusion is astonishing, in a way. He starts with pondering what wax really is:

Perhaps what I now think about the wax indicates what its nature was all along. If that is right, then the wax was not the sweetness of the honey, the scent of the flowers, the whiteness, the shape, or the sound, but was rather a body that recently presented itself to me in those ways but now appears differently. But what exactly is this thing that I am now imagining? Well, if we take away whatever doesn’t belong to the wax (that is, everything that the wax could be without), what is left is merely something extended, flexible and changeable. What do ‘flexible’ and ‘changeable’ mean here? I can imaginatively picture this piece of wax changing from round to square, from square to triangular, and so on. But that isn’t what changeability is. In knowing that the wax is changeable I understand that it can go through endlessly many changes of that kind, far more than I can depict in my imagination; so it isn’t my imagination that gives me my grasp of the wax as flexible and changeable. Also, what does ‘extended’ mean? Is the wax’s extension also unknown? It increases if the wax melts, and increases again if it boils; the wax can be extended in many more ways (that is, with many more shapes) than I will ever bring before my imagination. I am forced to conclude that the nature of this piece of wax isn’t revealed by my imagination, but is perceived by the mind alone. (I am speaking of this particular piece of wax; the point is even clearer with regard to wax in general.) This wax that is perceived by the mind alone is, of course, the same wax that I see, touch, and picture in my imagination – in short the same wax I thought it to be from the start. But although my perception of it seemed to be a case of vision and touch and imagination, it isn’t so and it never was. Rather, it is purely a perception by the mind alone – formerly an imperfect and confused one, but now clear and distinct because I am now concentrating carefully on what the wax consists in. — Descartes, Second Meditation

He concludes that wax is none of the everchanging properties a piece of wax may have. The wax itself, is an idea. I realize that interpretation of what he's saying is up for debate. Debate!

See! With no effort I have reached the place where I wanted to be! I now know that even bodies are perceived not by the senses or by imagination but by the intellect alone, not through their being touched or seen but through their being understood; and this helps me to understand that I can perceive my own mind more easily and clearly than I can anything else. Since the grip of old opinions is hard to shake off, however, I want to pause and meditate for a while on this new knowledge of mine, fixing it more deeply in my memory. — Descartes, Second Meditation

The ego is an idea. Right?

The ego is an idea. Right? — frank

That nicely cues the work of the Third Meditation, where ideas are defined in the context of the "thinker." Giorgo Agamben makes some interesting observations about the grammar of pronouns and their indeterminate nature that may throw light on how Descartes distinguishes the 'thinking subject' from the 'I' as an object:

We should pay attention to the specific condition of the utterance:it is the very act of producing an utter, not the text of the uttered....
This act is the work of the speaker who set langue into motion. The relation between the speaker and the langue determines the linguistic character of the utterance. (Benveniste 2, pl 80)

The sphere of the utterance thus includes that which in every speech act, refers exclusively to its taking place, to its instance, independently and prior to what is said meant in it. Pronouns and the other indicators of the utterance, before they designate real objects, indicate precisely that language takes place. In this way, still prior to the world of meaning, they permit the reference to the very event of language, the only context in which something can only be signified. — Giorgio Agamben, Language and Death, The Place of Negativity, pg 17

I think that captures some of the 'living instance to instance' quality in the passage Fooloso4 quoted above:

For a life-span can be divided into countless parts, each completely independent of the others, so that from my existing at one time it doesn’t follow that I exist at later times, unless some cause keeps me in existence – one might say that it creates me afresh at each moment.

Note how often he uses the term 'imagine' in the second meditation:

Starting with the soul he says:

If I gave any thought to what this soul was like, I imagined it to be something thin and filmy– like a wind or fire or ether – permeating my more solid parts.

He goes on to say a few paragraphs later:

I am not that structure of limbs and organs that is called a human body; nor am I a thin vapour that permeates the limbs – a wind, fire, air, breath, or whatever I imagine ...

This can be read either as:
1) the soul is not as I imagined it to be
2) I only imagine I have a soul

He continues the sentence:

... for I have supposed all these things to be nothing because I have supposed all bodies to be nothing.

That he is not or does not have a body is something that he supposes for the sake of his meditation. Put differently, that he does not have a body is subject to doubt.

Compare the following statements:

That makes imagination suspect, for while I know for sure that I exist, I know that everything relating to the nature of body – including imagination – could be mere dreams; so it would be silly for me to say ‘I will use my imagination to get a clearer understanding of what I am’ ...

Well, then, what am I? A thing that thinks. What is that? A thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wants, refuses, and also imagines and senses.

He is a thing that imagines:

But the ‘I’ who imagines is also this same ‘I’. For even if (as I am pretending) none of the things that I imagine really exist, I really do imagine them, and this is part of my thinking.

That he imagines cannot be doubted, but what he imagines can be. He says that imagination is related to the nature of body, but also that to imagine is to think.

The same holds for sensing:

I certainly seem to see, to hear, and to be warmed. This cannot be false; what is called ‘sensing’ is strictly just this seeming, and when ‘sensing’ is understood in this restricted sense of the word it too is simply thinking.

On the positive side he is certain that he exists, certain that he thinks, and imagines, and senses. On the negative side, just as what he imagines and senses can be called into doubt, so too can what he thinks, for they are all part of his thinking. If what he thinks can be doubted, if even what he doubts can be doubted, is he then hopelessly lost is doubt? Will his certainty that he exists be sufficient to serve as his Archimedean point?

The sphere of the utterance thus includes that which in every speech act, refers exclusively to its taking place, to its instance, independently and prior to what is said meant in it. — Giorgio Agamben, Language and Death, The Place of Negativity, pg 17

Yes. The copy of the Meditations you're reading is an utterance. An utterance is sounds or marks.

Pronouns and the other indicators of the utterance, before they designate real objects, indicate precisely that language takes place. In this way, still prior to the world of meaning, they permit the reference to the very event of language, the only context in which something can only be signified. — Giorgio Agamben, Language and Death, The Place of Negativity, pg 17

I agree. It's by the utterance of a sentence that a proposition is expressed.

On the positive side he is certain that he exists, certain that he thinks, and imagines, and senses. On the negative side, just as what he imagines and senses can be called into doubt, so too can what he thinks, for they are all part of his thinking. If what he thinks can be doubted, if even what he doubts can be doubted, is he then hopelessly lost is doubt? Will his certainty that he exists be sufficient to serve as his Archimedean point? — Fooloso4

I mean isn't the point that what he is thinking about may be false, or misleading or an error, but that he is thinking can't be coherently doubted... can it?

For an evil demon can cause me to think more than I do - become more active or perceptive in my thoughts. Alternatively, I can be put in a state of dreamless sleep, in which case, there is no thinking. But if I am awake, that there is thinking going on - a conscious buzzing if you like - can't be denied, at least so far as I experience things myself.

Others have access only to my behavior, they have to infer that I think.

As for existing - well, one could argue logically - that thinking need not be restricted to body, thinking could be a spatial phenomena. There is no evidence for it, but also no evidence against it. But even in this case thinking would exist.

Can existence be a hallucination caused by a demon? Perhaps. But even in dreams, we exist in some manner...

We seem to be in agreement, which is not the best for furthering discussion... :smile:

Imagining that his internal dialogue is caused by something (certain), and being assured of the certainty of his self by his ability to convince himself that nothing is certain, he continues:

“let [the Deceiver] deceive me all he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing while I think I am something. So… I conclude that this proposition, I am, I exist, must be true whenever I assert it or think it.”

I think it is important to ask what the role is of “the deceiver”. Such a specific choice of words; when I am “deceived” it is because I was going along thinking I was fine (right in my knowledge of the truth), sure and certain of myself, when the rug is pulled out from under me and it turns out I was mistaken, but more than that, that I was wrong all along, had been asleep, thus I am angry enough to point a finger outward, not that I had simply failed to examine what I “assent” to with sufficient deliberateness, but that I was told I was right, as if the wool was pulled over my eyes, trained into our culture and its common criteria and opinions. And I feel betrayed, that what I believed in was nothing, that I was gaslit and feel a little insane as if someone stole something important from me, because my opinions are my identity, so maybe I am nothing.

But Descartes claims “I am something”; he “asserts” his existence. Without any standard, or basis, or justification; in the face of the betrayal of society, in defiance to it. Later, alluding to this, Emerson in Self Reliance will say “Man is timid and apologetic; he is no longer upright; he dares not say 'I think,' 'I am'” (After saying, “Whence, then, this worship of the past? The centuries are conspirators against the sanity and authority of the soul.”) He will call “conformity” what Descartes says is “the habit of confidently assenting”. Descartes continues “My old familiar opinions keep coming back, and against my will they capture my belief. It is as though they had a right to a place in my belief-system as a result of long occupation and the law of custom.” His “assertion” is not a statement that can be (true or) false; it is “true” whenever he asserts it (“while I think I am”). It is not true because it conforms to a state of affairs or is right; it is the act of the legitimate authority, the one with the right that was “as though they had”, but which is his. Thus the self is not a given continuous thing, but an act.

That he imagines cannot be doubted, but what he imagines can be. He says that imagination is related to the nature of body, but also that to imagine is to think. — Fooloso4

I think the 'imagination being related to the nature of the body' comes from Aristotle/Aquinas saying images come from senses interacting with material things and that thinking is analogous to that process because thinking requires images.

Descartes is opposing that analogy by saying our intellect is a process that we experience more intimately than its objects: After including all the various activities as kinds of thinking, he says:

I cannot keep myself from believing that corporeal things, images of which are formed by thought and which the senses themselves examine are much more distinctly known than that indescribable part of myself which cannot be pictured by the imagination. Yet it would truly be very strange to say that I know and comprehend more distinctly things whose existence seems doubtful to me, that are unknown to me, and which belong to me, than those of whose truth I am persuade, which are known to me, and which belong to my real nature--to say, in a word, that I know better than myself. But I see well what is the trouble: my mind is a vagabond who likes to wander and is not yet able to stay within the strict bounds of truth. — Second Meditation, pg 29, emphasis mine

Not being able to describe this 'real nature' must be one of the reasons why the mind is easily attracted by things that can be.

It is interesting to note that in The Second Meditation, Descartes says: "If the "I" is understood strictly as we have been taking it, then it is quite certain that knowledge of it does not depend on things of whose existence I am as yet unaware; so it cannot depend on any of the things which I invent in my imagination."

He immediately proceeds to say that using the imagination to try a grasp this topic, of what thing I am, is like trying to use dreaming as guide to seeing things more accurately.

Based on previous comments too, Descartes takes it that the imagination is misleading and leads to all kinds of mistakes.

He does conclude later on, in the same page (in my book) that it turns out the imagination is part of his thinking, but I ask, is it part of reason?

Could the I be something created by the imagination and not reason? Or maybe reason and imagination are combined in a such a manner that they cannot be separated.

It's not so clear to me that the imagination must by nature be misleading.

Contrary to Aristotle, Descartes claims that we do not see things is the world, but rather representations in the mind.

This leads to the problem of judgment, of whether the things we perceive accurately represent the things they are perceptions of.

It's not so clear to me that the imagination must be nature be misleading. — Manuel

It is not that it must be misleading by nature, but that like the senses it can be misleading. It is not, by itself, a reliable source of knowledge.

Which is fair enough. So, we rely on reason to gain knowledge, but then what is reason?

Contrary to Aristotle, Descartes claims that we do not see things is (in?) the world, but rather representations in the mind. — Fooloso4

Aristotle had a version of that separation. Descartes kicked off the consequent discussion of what was "mind independent." Maybe the thinking here is not a determination as it is often portrayed to be.

I'm into the Third Meditation. I'm reading and rereading it to get the whole thing to hang together.

Should we go through it a step at a time? Or just present ideas about what the whole thing means? What do you think it means?

“[ T ]hought! This is the one thing that can’t be separated from me. I am, I exist – that is certain. But for how long? For as long as I am thinking. But perhaps no longer than that; for it might be that if I stopped thinking I would stop existing; …Still, I am a real, existing thing. What kind of a thing? I have answered that: a thinking thing.”

It is noteworthy that one of his criteria is trying to “separate” things from himself, and so not just about doubt and certainty, but wanting a kind of inseparableness, as if it wouldn’t be taken away, or lost. And so he has shunned the world (and his own body), as it were, first, before it fails him.

But he is afraid he will only exist for now, while he is thinking; as if he is not always thinking, that it is a particular act, separate from his internal dialogue or awareness. And, if he stops, he will slide back into the pull of habit and conformity and fail to exist apart from everyone else.

But he is afraid he will only exist for now, while he is thinking; as if he is not always thinking, that it is a particular act, separate from his internal dialogue or awareness — Antony Nickles

That continuity of thinking is clearly central to the meditation and a source of concern. I don't understand what you mean by saying it is "separate from his internal dialogue or awareness."

I think Descartes is linking those activities together.

That continuity of thinking [that “thinking” is our internal dialogue and/or awareness] is clearly central to the meditation and a source of concern. I don't understand what you mean by saying it is "separate from his internal dialogue or awareness." I think Descartes is linking those activities together. — Paine

Yes, that is the assumption of the bulk of the interpretation of the Meditations, but Descartes has not clearly parsed out exactly what he is referring to (lumping it all together in a sense). Also, in looking at it as categorically open, the characteristics he is attributing to it allow for what I am suggesting, and there is clearly evidence in the text. As well as what I’ve mentioned so far, he is concerned that “what he is calling thinking” might stop and then he would cease to “exist”, not the other way around (that he would, what, die? (or whatever the opposite of metaphysically “existing” is) and thus stop talking to himself; not very profound of him).

I think I am attempting to claim that it is unnecessary to restrict Descartes to simply painting a metaphysical world of “existence”, “mind”, and “thinking” (despite his lack of care not to appear so). I believe he is more relevant than to be saddled with that legacy. We could take him to be describing the criteria for what we would judge as “thinking” as individuation from society or investigating rigorously or the like, as Wittgenstein or the later Heidegger will see it as (which may or may not interest @Banno). This possibility, of course, remains to be seen, but I have at least found it fruitful and justified so far.

So Descartes has identified himself as “a thinking thing”. But @Paine’s concern is legitimate; if I am to say thinking is not our inner dialogue nor awareness, then what is it? Descartes will ask the same thing:

“A thing that thinks. What is that? A thing that…
doubts almost everything,
understands some things,
affirms this one thing – namely, that I exist and think,
denies everything else,
wants to know more,
refuses to be deceived,
imagines many things involuntarily, and
is aware of others that seem to come from the senses?
…These activities are all aspects of my thinking, and are all inseparable from myself.
…what is called ‘sensing’ is strictly just this seeming, and when ‘sensing’ is understood in this restricted sense of the word it too is simply thinking.” 2nd Meditation (bold added)

I have broken the text to line up the “activities” to show the similarity to Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations:

“… the speaking of language is part of an activity…
Review the multiplicity… in the following examples, and in others:
Giving orders, and obeying them—
Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements-
Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)—
Reporting an event—
Speculating about an event—…
Forming and testing a hypothesis—
Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams—
Making up a story; and reading it—
Play-acting—
Singing catches—
Guessing riddles—
Making a joke; telling it—
Solving a problem in practical arithmetic—
Translating from one language into another—
Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying.” Philosophical Investigations, #23 (bold added)

Wittgenstein will show that whether these activities are being done or not is not equated with an intention or other “mental process” but that we simply judge if the movement or action has met the criteria or standards for each thing and then we would say it is that activity.

So, for Descartes, thinking consists of the activities “doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wants, refuses, and also imagines and senses.” These are not metaphysical processes in our head that we picture like our inner dialogue or our attention to this or the other, or some brain function. Affirming or doubting are acts with very specific criteria done in particular situations, just like asking, or thanking.

:up:

So, we rely on reason to gain knowledge, but then what is reason? — Manuel

For Descartes mathematics is the model of reason. Just as in mathematics, if one does not mistake a mistake then everyone, whatever their beliefs and opinions may be, will arrive at the same conclusion.

Maybe the thinking here is not a determination as it is often portrayed to be. — Paine

Can you explain what you mean?

I was agreeing with your stating that Descartes was a departure from Aristotle's model of perception and knowledge of the world but was thinking that Descartes was not sharply separating the domain of Reason as Kant did from the nature of things as they are in themselves. I take Descartes' enthusiasm as a scientist as evidence for this. There is also the search, as you have underscored, for the Archimedean point of leverage.

As you suggested, upthread, the Sixth Meditation has Descartes returning to the world able to trust in many of the elements he questioned previously.

Seeing the act of thinking as a list of activities does not reflect the problem of description that I commented upon upthread. By speaking of an 'indescribable part of myself which cannot be pictured by the imagination', it seems to me that Descartes is pointing at something that is always there but is not understood.

In the Third Meditation, Descartes says he needs the existence of God to find grounds for its relation to all of his activities. That seems the opposite approach of Wittgenstein, who describes our use of language to show what it is for us.

Descartes was not sharply separating the domain of Reason as Kant did from the nature of things as they are in themselves. — Paine

Good point. In the second meditation Descartes says:

Rather, it is purely a perception by the mind alone – formerly an imperfect and confused one, but now clear and distinct because I am now concentrating carefully on what the wax consists in.

The "clear and distinct" perception of the wax is the result of reason. What is perceived is the wax's nature, as it is, not simply as it appears to us.

Two issues that Descartes will return to are introduced here. The first is the faculty of judgment:

Something that I thought I saw with my eyes, therefore, was really grasped solely by my mind’s faculty of judgment.

The second is the dependability of what is "clear and distinct".

For Descartes the faculty of judgment is concerned with the question of whether things are as they are perceived to be, or more radically, whether they are at all outside the mind. But since we cannot make this comparison the problem of modern skepticism arises. It is here that "clear and distinct" ideas play a central role. Kant accepts the existence of things outside the mind, but rejects the question of their nature, that is, what they are in themselves.

Seeing the act of thinking as a list of activities does not reflect the problem of description that I commented upon upthread. By speaking of an 'indescribable part of myself which cannot be pictured by the imagination', it seems to me that Descartes is pointing at something that is always there but is not understood. — Paine

Here is John Cottingham's translation of this passage:

But I still can’t help thinking that bodies – of which I form mental images and which the senses investigate – are much more clearly known to me than is this puzzling ‘I’ that can’t be pictured in the imagination. It would be surprising if this were right, though; for it would be surprising if I had a clearer grasp of things that I realize are doubtful, unknown and foreign to me – ·namely, bodies – than I have of what is true and known – namely my own self. But I see what the trouble is: I keep drifting towards that error because my mind likes to wander freely, refusing to respect the boundaries that truth lays down.

According to this translation it is not some mysterious part of himself, but the 'I' itself. Why does he say it can't be pictured in the imagination. I think it because the imagination will not give us a clear and distinct idea of the 'I'. But reason does.

Both translations are in agreement with regard to the formation of mental images of bodies.

I think it because the imagination will not give us a clear and distinct idea of the 'I'. But reason does. — Fooloso4

Does reason give us a clear and distinct idea of the "I"? It seems to me that it does not, but that it yields various possible understandings of the "I"; none of which are clear and distinct.

I think the language is more forceful than that on this point. We are intimately familiar with the "I" but don't "know" it for some reason. The French version says it this way:

Mais néanmoins il me semble encore et je ne puis m’empêcher de croire que les choses
corporelles, dont les images se forment par la pensée, qui tombent sous les sens, et que les
sens mêmes examinent, ne soient beaucoup plus distinctement connues que cette je ne sais
quelle partie de moi-même qui ne tombe point sous l’imagination: quoi-qu’en effet cela
soit bien étrange de dire que je connoisse et comprenne plus distinctement des choses dont
l’existence me paroît douteuse, qui me sont inconnues et qui ne m’appartiennent point,
que celles de la vérité desquelles je suis persuadé, qui me sont connues, et qui
appartiennent à ma propre nature, en un mot que moi-même — Descartes, Second Meditation,

The tight connection between 'not knowing' and being 'unimaginable' is sort of a concession to Aristotle saying, "thinking requires the use of images." Descartes certainly uses a lot of images in his writings. But I read him to say that the activity that convinces him that he exists is prior to what Aristotle describes.

So, maybe not a mystery as much as a gap that is easily overlooked.