But that kind of thinking invites infinite regress (where does the thing conceptions emerge from, emerge from)
— Mww
- that is the case if you consider noting being fundamental — Eugen

There’s the reason for stipulating consciousness as fundamental, to eliminate infinite regress. If it’s fundamental, its emergence is moot, no need to ask where it comes from. Only what it does because of the conception it is, what it stands as the representative of.
————-

It can exist in a fundamental way, like being the foundation of reality, or it can exist like chairs, processes, concepts, i.e. emergent from a material foundation. — Eugen

If reality is a fundamental conception itself, it won’t have a foundation because it already is one.

Chairs have properties, they don’t have processes or concepts. They can and do emerge from a material foundation, just as any real object must.

Chairs exist, processes do not exist in the same way as chairs, re: processes do not have extension in space, hardness, or weight.

If concepts have a material foundation, it can only be the human brain. Where in the human brain can the conception representing a ‘57 De Soto be found, such that upon perception of some object, it is determinable whether or not that object is one? Positing that conceptions emerge from the brain, while almost certainly the case, gets you nowhere.

Consciousness is a purely metaphysical derivative, so the only certainty allowed to it, is logical validity, never any empirical existence.

Do processes such as metabolism, homeostasis and reproduction 'emerge from' simple lifeforms such as single-cell organisms? Or are those metabolic processes inherent to what makes them organisms in the first place? As soon as they die, they cease from being organisms and exist only as decomposing collections of elements. In that sense, life itself is irreducible, because as soon as it is reduced to its material components, it's no longer alive.

Snippet on the view of enactive or embodied cognition: Enactive cognition is a theory that suggests that the mind is not something that is contained within the brain, but is instead a process that emerges from the interactions between the organism and its environment. In other words, the mind is not just in the head, but is distributed throughout the body and the environment.

Evan Thompson argues that this enactive perspective on cognition is closely tied to the concept of life, because living systems are characterized by their ability to actively engage with and shape their environment. According to Thompson, the mind is not just a passive observer of the world, but is an active participant in the process of life.

Chairs have properties, they don’t have processes or concepts — Mww

Chairs is concept, it is language. It can also be a process. Everything is dynamic.

processes do not have extension in space, hardness, or weight. — Mww

A porocess IS totally reducible (i.e. weakly emergent) to interaction among particles, that interraction can be reduced further and so on. There is nothing about a process that cannot be fully deducile, reducible, and explained by what is more fundamental.

Concepts might or might not be reducible to matter. If they are, materialism is true. If they aren't, materialism is false. You can't have it both ways.

Concepts might or might not be reducible to matter — Eugen

Trying doing that without employing concepts :wink:

Trying doing that without employing concepts — Wayfarer

I don't personally think they are, but either way... I don't think concepts can avoid fundamentalism or emergence.

Chairs is concept, it is language. It can also be a process — Eugen

Ohfercrissakes. Must I preface every comment using a word, with the admonition I’m representing an object with it? The use of a word is supposed to indicate the speaker and the listener congruently understand the object common to them.

A porocess IS totally reducible (i.e. weakly emergent) to interaction among particles — Eugen

Ever reduced a process to its particles? Known anyone that has? Ever heard anyone talking about a method by which reducing the process of human cognition to its particles, is accomplished? Not to say it can’t be done, but if it hasn’t in the totality of human existence, perhaps there’s a reason for it. And what do we do in the meantime?

Concepts might or might not be reducible to matter. If they are, materialism is true. If they aren't, materialism is false. You can't have it both ways. — Eugen

If conceptions can’t be reduced to matter, then objects known as basketballs, aren’t?
If the objects known as basketballs is the case, which implies concepts are reducible to matter, we’re right back to where we started: the impossibility of finding where and what are they.

Before I can respond any further, I must ask to clarify the meaning of the terms written here. First of all, what does "fundamental" mean? Does it mean something which is in a term, the basis or source of things which are not fundamental? Second, when you distinguish between weak and strong emergence, do you mean that strong emergence is when a property not found in the fundamental reality appears out of seemingly nowhere? Finally, I really want to understand the model of the possibilities. If I and II combine to form 100% of all possibilities, how can I and II by themselves already be 100%?

Finally, a possible reality which is excluded from this model as I understand is a reality of a single object. Absolutely only one object. No distinctions at all. This means there can be no relationships of fundamentality or emergence.

what does "fundamental" mean? — IP060903

It is about establishing a reduction base. The reduction base is the set of concepts, entities, or principles that are considered fundamental or basic to a philosophical position. It serves as the starting point for explaining and analyzing other phenomena or concepts that are deemed less fundamental or derivative.

In philosophy of mind, physicalists will argue that mental states can be reduced to physical states of the brain. In this case, the reduction base would consist of the physical entities and processes that underlie mental states, such as neurons, synapses, and neurotransmitters. Other phenomena, such as conscious experience or thoughts, would then be explained in terms of these more basic physical components.

Those opposing will argue that mental acts, such as speaking and reasoning, and perhaps even the very quality of subjective experience itself, cannot be explained in terms of physical processes.

Those opposing will argue that mental acts, such as speaking and reasoning, and perhaps even the very quality of subjective experience itself, cannot be explained in terms of physical processes. — Wayfarer

Whether consciousness can be explained in terms of physical processes is a different question than whether it or the physical (or neither) is ontologically fundamental. Then there is the further question as to whether the notion of ontological fundamentality really makes any sense.

To me it seems obvious that the qualitative aspect of experience cannot be explained in physicalist terms, just as the meaning of a poem cannot be given in mathematical terms. There are many possibilities for category error and reification.

There are many possibilities for category error and reification. — Janus

:up:

Whether consciousness can be explained in terms of physical processes is a different question than whether it or the physical (or neither) is ontologically fundamental. — Janus

How is it a different question? For the physicalist, the physical substrate is fundamental, consciousness is epiphenomenal. So explaining consciousness in terms of physical processes is at the same time making the claim that the physical is ontologically fundamental. After all, it's what physicalism means.

:eyes: :cry: :sweat: wtf ...

It seems to me our difference is in language.
Is there a real fundamental difference between the interaction between atoms in a chair versus the interaction between atoms in our lungs? I don't think so. It's a silly idea that playing with words (I am not referring to you here) will somehow change the reality.

For the physicalist, the physical substrate is fundamental, consciousness is epiphenomenal. — Wayfarer

I don't think that's right. Epiphenominalism is arguably a kind of dualism (property or substance, both fit). A non-causal invisible 'froth' somehow produced by some organisms. It's motivated by taking our subjective experience as real and not reducible to physical processes, at the same time as not violating the causal closure of the physical. Both of these are very plausible intuitions separately, but when smashed together look very odd. If I were a physicalist I would reject epiphenominalism as violating physicalism. I would want to say that consciousness just is a physical process.

:up:

1. Is the logic of the model correct? — Eugen

Yes, pretty much, I think.

Applying this to consciousness, you've left out eliminativism as an option, which you probably should have included. In terms of the broadest possible scheme of options, I tend to think of it like this:

Either:
1) Panpsychism (everything is conscious)
or
2) Emergentism (of some kind) (some things are conscious)
or
3) Eliminativism (nothing is conscious)

2. There is an alternative to this model, i.e. a model in which ''absolutely anything you could think of" is not fundamental, but it is neither 100% reducible nor strongly emergent? — Eugen

Intuitively that doesn't seem possible, but I'd need to do some work on various ways something could be emergent.

3. Does this model apply to any type of reality? I mean, if instead of matter we assume that the most fundamental thing is an immaterial computer or information, does this change have any impact on the model? — Eugen

Intuitively, yes, it would apply to any kind I would have thought. Seems conceptually necessary, but I might not have thought of something.

you've left out eliminativism as an option, — bert1

I did, because I think weak emergence is eliminativism. I might be wrong though...

I did, because I think weak emergence is eliminativism. I might be wrong though... — Eugen

Oh, I see what you mean.

Fair enough.

Is there a real fundamental difference between the interaction between atoms in a chair versus the interaction between atoms in our lungs? I don't think so. — Eugen

Nothing wrong with that; I wouldn’t think so either. But what are you trying to say with it? What’s the point?

It's a silly idea that playing with words (….) will somehow change the reality. — Eugen

Agreed. Nothing has changed regarding the circumstances of sitting in a chair, since the discovery of elementary particles. Even though I now know socks are comprised of molecules of this or that, I put them on exactly the same way my great granpappy did back a coupla centuries ago. More to the point, perhaps, even though I now know of neurons and activation potentials and whatnot, anyone looking in my brain is never going to find my consciousness, nor will he find the words I use to express my distaste of Lima beans.

anyone looking in my brain is never going to find my consciousness, nor will he find the words I use to express my distaste of Lima beans. — Mww

Moreover, if you imagine a green bird, nobody will find that image in your brain. But that's a refutation of materialism, not a refutation of fundamental-emergent.

Nothing wrong with that; I wouldn’t think so either. But what are you trying to say with it? What’s the point? — Mww

I'm trying to say that what we call a ''process" is not fundamentally different than what we call ''objects". If objects can be emergent, then processes can be emergent. Is that advantageous for a philosophical debate to talk about processes in terms of fundamental or emergent? I admit I have no idea.

Either:
1) Panpsychism (everything is conscious)
or
2) Emergentism (of some kind) (some things are conscious)
or
3) Eliminativism (nothing is conscious) — bert1

4) Property Dualism (there are complementary ways of describing an entity as 'conscious' or 'extended' or both) ...

if you imagine a green bird, nobody will find that image in your brain. But that's a refutation of materialism, not a refutation of fundamental-emergent. — Eugen

Not sure what to do with that. Things I imagine are not real things, but my imaginings don’t cause real things to not exist. In humans at least, imaginings are incorporated in brains, brains are material, therefore materialism is affirmed by imaginings, not denied or refuted.

I hope you’re not extending the notion that because all imaginings are immaterial in themselves, that there are no material things. If so, I must refer you to the immortal missive of dear Dr. Samuel Johnson via James Boswell, circa 1791. As second-hand as it may be, not to mention dangerously painful.

On the refutation of the fundamental/emergent dichotomy: can’t be done. In the human cognitive system legislated by the Principle of Complementarity, which says that for every conception the negation is given immediately (up/down; left/right; wrong/right, yes/no, true/false, ad infinitum), and for every application translates to, if it isn’t this, then it is necessarily that. It follows that any human cognitive activity in general, as well as every component thereof, is either one or the other of the fundamental/emergent complementary pair.

Nature of the beast, donchaknow……

@180 Proof
Do you think there is any progress offered by labelling 'consciousness' a system?
From Wiki:
A system is a group of interacting or interrelated elements that act according to a set of rules to form a unified whole. A system, surrounded and influenced by its environment, is described by its boundaries, structure and purpose and is expressed in its functioning. Systems are the subjects of study of systems theory and other systems sciences.
Systems have several common properties and characteristics, including structure, function(s), behavior and interconnectivity.

A system is dynamic, and can be purely energy based (such as the system of photons,) or consist of all, some or no physical components.
Was the big bang singularity, fundamentally, a system? So there was never a 'time' when only one fundamental ever existed, as a singularity is/was a dynamic system with properties such as density, temperature, extent etc.

A system has functionality and the fact that it is dynamic, means it can 'process' and produce output.
So the question now becomes, Is/was there ever a system that was irreducible, in the sense that it cannot have ANY functionality of any significance to conscious beings, if it did not have the properties required to inflate/expand into becoming this universe. Would the properties of hot, dense, concentrate of dynamic energy with extent, be the ONLY notional system that makes any logical sense from the 'naturalist' viewpoint, as an irreducible fundamental.

I think the biggest problem about trying to understand the source of human consciousness is that we are trying to understand the source of consciousness, using consciousness. But there seems to be no other tool available.

180 Proof
Do you think there is any progress offered by labelling 'consciousness' a system? — universeness

No.

Why not?

IMO, "system" gets us nowhere and only loops back (no pun intended) to the "brain-hardware / mind-software / IPO" metaphor that obfuscates much more than it elucidates.

Fair enough.