Hume is saying that causation is founded on reason. — Metaphysician Undercover

Amazing as I find it, I got the impression that Hume is saying that causation is NOT founded on reason. He says:

The mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause, by the most accurate scrutiny and examination. (EHU 4.9) — David Hume An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

In my understanding, "can never" is a negation and is equivalent to "can not". How you can interpret "can never" as an affirmation is a mystery to me

The mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause, by the most accurate scrutiny and examination. (EHU 4.9) — Jaques, quoting David Hume An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

But you’re the one who keeps insisting on the absolute indubitability of the causal relationship between the brain and the mind. Why is this instance of an inductive causal relationship immune to Hume’s criticism which you’re so happy to apply to anything else? (Quite aside from the fact that David Hume is hardly the last word in the topic of neuroscience and consciousness.)

But you’re the one who keeps insisting on the absolute indubitability of the causal relationship between the brain and the mind. Why is this instance of an inductive causal relationship immune to Hume’s criticism which you’re so happy to apply to anything else? — Wayfarer

If I understand it correctly, Hume is not criticizing the postulation of causal relations per se, (such as friction and heat), rather he is commenting on the procedure by which these causal relations are derived: not by logical reasoning, but only by observation of multiple identical sequences of two successive events, which are then called cause and effect. What Hume claims is that from the observation of the cause alone, one cannot infer its effect; one can infer the effect only by observation and not by logical reasoning.

Right. But it also applies to your contention of a causal connection between brain and mind, no less than any other causal relationship.

Inductive reasoning is really just custom and habitual expectation at work according to Hume. — Janus

Yes, and this is why Jacques' claim is a strawman representation of "Hume's argument" when he describes Hume's view of causality as "based neither on logical necessity nor on inductive and deductive reasoning, but on custom or habit". Hume's view is that causation is based in inductive reasoning.

Hume actually supports what I described, that all forms of causality are reducible to forms of necessity by reason. Hume then goes even further in the analysis (or reduction), to represent reason as habits of thinking which are formed through custom.

But instead of going further in this analysis, to describe "habit" in the Aristotelian terms of potential and actual, as was customary in prior philosophies, Hume suggests, as indicated by Jacques' quoted passage ("By employing that word, we pretend not to have given the ultimate reason of such a propensity."), that there is no further to go in such an analysis. See, Hume is claiming that the idea that we can proceed further in the reduction, toward an understanding of things like "habit" and "custom" through application of the Aristotelian ontological structure, is just a pretense. This I would call a sort of intellectual laziness.

I believe this is representative of a very important bifurcation in the understanding of biology, which was developing at that time. Lamarckian evolutionary theory placed great importance on "habit" as formative, i.e. having a causal role in the process of evolution. And Lamarck's evolutionary theory became widely accepted in the east of Europe, being well-suited to Marxist materialism. The idealism, and scientism of the west however, had no place for this idea, that the activities of the living organism could actually be causal in shaping the form of the material body.

So we, in the west, became immersed in the custom of thinking that the cause of change in evolution was random chance mutations. This custom, the idea of "chance" as a cause, remains paramount in the concept of abiogenesis, though mainstream biology is now moving more and more toward removing chance as the reason (cause) for the genetic mutations deemed necessary for evolutionary change. In general, when "chance" is stated as a cause, it is just a stop-gap (God of the gaps), which serves as a placeholder until a better understanding is developed. Those who adhere to this idea of 'chance as a cause', refusing to acknowledge that it is just the stop-gap that it is, resist and deny the need to look further for the true cause, and this incapacitates the philosophical will to know. This is very evident in the concept of "spontaneous generation" which was widely accepted by the unphilosophical right up until the nineteenth century and the work of Louis Pasteur.

In my understanding, "can never" is a negation and is equivalent to "can not". How you can interpret "can never" as an affirmation is a mystery to me — Jacques

If you place a quote like this, in the context of what Hume says overall, the bigger picture, which is represented by Janus' quote above, "Inductive reasoning is really just custom and habitual expectation at work", you will see why I assert that Hume's position is self-defeating, as self-contradicting and inconsistent.

He clearly argues that causation reduces to reason as Janus indicates, it is a matter of inductive reasoning. But then, as you show, the problem of inductive reasoning, which Hume exposes, forces the conclusion that there is no "real" necessity here. The "necessity" is an inductive necessity which does not provide any absolute certainty, therefore not the requirements of a true objective necessity. This opens the door to "chance" as the filler of that gap, when we deny the "Will of God" as the filler of the gap.

The reason why this move by Hume is self-defeating, and contradictory due to inconsistency, is that it starts by attributing causation to reason. The reasoning involved is inductive, as Janus presents. Then, the deficiencies of inductive reasoning are exposed, and from this Hume concludes what you present, "the mind can never possibly...". But this itself is an inductive conclusion, and the form of the conclusion "can never possibly..." is exactly what is denied by Hume's exposé concerning the problems of inductive reasoning.

So Hume's conclusion exactly contradicts his premise. And it is this inconsistent move which opens the door to "chance" as having a real place in causation. Instead of accepting what he has exposed, a deficiency in human reasoning, which might be improved upon in the future, to close this gap in certainty caused by the problem of induction, he wrongly concludes that this deficiency cannot ever be rectified.

Then, from this false necessity which he has produced ("the mind can never possibly..."), we can go on to assume that the gap in certainty is a feature created (caused) by the independent material world, rather than a feature created (caused) by deficiencies in the habits of the human mind. But this is to proceed on the foundation of that very false premise of necessity. And when we apprehend this gap in certainty as a feature of the independent world, rather than as a deficiency in the habits of the human mind, we are wrongfully convinced in our belief that this gap cannot ever be closed. From this misdirected position, we tend to attribute to "chance" these features of the world which we incorrectly believe cannot ever be understood. And of course, we assume that we cannot ever understand them because they are chance, in this extremely vicious circle which circumvents the philosophical desire to know.

Another thing to recognize here is the difference between "custom" and "habit". What I explained in the other post is that we can take actions which are directly contrary to custom. Such an action was represented as "pretense". It is the fact that such acts are contrary to custom which makes the various forms of deception and misleading possible. In the case of intentional misleading or deceiving there is a conscious effort to be contrary to what is customary. This is what is required for that type of action to be successful.

These acts which are contrary to custom may even become habitualized, so that we have instances of habitual liars for example. That some habits may be according to custom, and some might be contrary to custom indicates that "habit" is the wider category, and that "custom" in its relation to "habit" only refers to a specific type of habits.

This means that we cannot understand habits by referring to custom, but we can get some understanding of customs by referring to habit. Therefore we must proceed to principles completely independent from custom if we want to understand habits, and this would be necessary if we want to understand customs in their relation to habit.

But it also applies to your contention of a causal connection between brain and mind, no less than any other causal relationship. — Wayfarer

Of course, the same applies for the causal link between brain activity and mental experiences as for any other causal relationship: no cause, no effect. Similarly, it is also true for this causal relation that it cannot be deduced by any logical conclusion of the world, but only by observation. A single observation of a thought without preceding brain activity is sufficient to say that mental experiences are not always caused by brain activity. However, as said, such a case has never been observed since brain scans have been available.

@Metaphysician Undercover

I am sorry to say that I cannot see any connection between Hume's thesis on causality and your post. :sad:

A single observation of a thought without preceding brain activity is sufficient to say that mental experiences are not always caused by brain activity. However, as said, such a case has never been observed since brain scans have been available. — Jacques

However, as is well known, correlation is not causation. It is obviously the case that a functioning brain is a requirement for consciousness, but the sense in which the brain ‘produces’ or ‘creates’ consciousness is what is at issue and remains an open question. This is the subject of the David Chalmer’s paper, Facing Up to the Hard Problem of Consciousness and has been the subject under discussion in this thread for the last month.

I am sorry to say that I cannot see any connection between Hume's thesis on causality and your post. — Jacques

Yes, it has become very evident that your understanding of Hume is quite sorrowful.

I mean you provided the clinching quote from Hume himself, and you still don't understand the predicament which Hume put himself into.

The mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause, by the most accurate scrutiny and examination — David Hume An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

If that is not an inductive conclusion which asserts the exact form of certainty, (with "never possibly find..."), which Hume insists that inductive conclusions cannot provide, then how do you explain it?

Hume's view is that causation is based in inductive reasoning. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree, but I don't think inductive reasoning involves any deductive certainty, or necessity.

I agree, but I don't think inductive reasoning involves any deductive certainty, or necessity. — Janus

That's right, but inductive reasoning is still a form of reasoning, so we cannot deny, as Jacques does, that causation is based in reason. We just have to respect the fact that this type of reasoning, which currently provides us with our understanding of causation, cannot provide that high degree of certainty which deductive reasoning does.

However, the problem which arises, which Jacques exposes with the skillfully selected quote above, is that Hume makes an inductive conclusion about causation which expresses the exact form of certainty which he insists that inductive reasoning cannot provide, i.e. "the mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause".

It is this faulty conclusion of Hume's which leads us toward the the equally faulty assumption that there is no such necessary relation between cause and effect, rather than the more appropriate conclusion that the human mind's application of induction, does not provide the capacity required, to properly understand the necessary relation between cause and effect. In other words, it is the deficiencies of inductive reasoning which make it so that we cannot find necessity here, as is the case with inductive reasoning in general. But this does not mean that necessity is not there hidden within the concept of causation, such that we can conclude with certainty, as Hume does, that the mind can never possibly find that necessity.

That's right, but inductive reasoning is still a form of reasoning, so we cannot deny, as Jacques does, that causation is based in reason. We just have to respect the fact that this type of reasoning, which currently provides us with our understanding of causation, cannot provide that high degree of certainty which deductive reasoning does. — Metaphysician Undercover

The issue here is that animals also seem to have inductive expectations. So maybe what we think of as inductive reasoning consists in rationalising our instinctive expectations.

Another line of thought is that the idea of causation derives from our direct experience of ourselves as both causal agents and as being subjected to the effects of other things like the sun, wind and rain and so on. I can push, pull, cut and smash things and in doing so feel the force I am exerting.

So, on that view the idea of causation does not merely derive from observing constant conjunctions, but rather derives from the actual bodily sensations of the forces involved in moving, cutting and smashing things etc., as well as forces like the heat of the sun, the wind and the rain and so forth on the body

This morning I posted this, which I think is also relevant, in another thread:

The kind of expectation that things in the future will be as things have been in the past does seem to be instinctive in animals as well as humans. The implicit logic there would be "regularities remain invariant", but I am not imagining that animals actually have such explicit thoughts.

So, I don't think there is really any "law of induction", or at least it would be some kind of conditional deductive formulation such as, "if there are laws that govern observed invariances, and if those laws are changeless, then we could expect observed regularities to remain regular".

The issue here is that animals also seem to have inductive expectations. So maybe what we think of as inductive reasoning consists in rationalising our instinctive expectations. — Janus

I remember once, you described to me what you thought qualified as inductive reasoning carried out by other animals, and it did not appear to be anything like the way that I understand "inductive reasoning". And I think it's clear that this would not qualify as a concept of causation, like Hume was talking about. I do not think that things like Pavlov's conditioning qualify as analogous with the predictive capacity of the human concept of causation. I mean, there may be some underlying base capacity which is common to both, but the latter qualifies as prediction based on inductive reasoning, while salivating at the sound of a bell does not, it is just a basic form of association.

Another line of thought is that the idea of causation derives from our direct experience of ourselves as both causal agents and as being subjected to the effects of other things like the sun, wind and rain and so on. I can push, pull, cut and smash things and in doing so feel the force I am exerting. — Janus

I agree with this to an extent, and it is why, as I explained already, the concept of "necessity" which we associate with causation is based in "necessary" in the sense of what is needed, as the means to an end. This is why it is misdirected to attempt to ground the "necessity" of the relation between cause and effect, in some sort of logical necessity which is supposed to be grounded in certainty. Instead, logical necessity, which is supposed to produce certainty is grounded in "necessary' in the sense of the means to an end. So the "necessity" which we assume for the sake of logical proceeding is the means (as necessary for) the end which is understanding, or knowing. Therefore "logical necessity" is grounded in "necessary" in the sense of what is needed for an end, hence the archaic phrase for logical necessity "must needs be", as signifying "necessary for".

...but I am not imagining that animals actually have such explicit thoughts.

Without the explicit thoughts, we cannot classify this as "inductive reasoning". So, we must look for some other form of process similar to rational thinking, but not rational thinking, which rational thinking may be based in, as a manifestation or growth from this process, but is completely different from rational thinking, as we think of cause as being distinct from effect.

However, as is well known, correlation is not causation. It is obviously the case that a functioning brain is a requirement for consciousness, but the sense in which the brain ‘produces’ or ‘creates’ consciousness is what is at issue and remains an open question. — Wayfarer

There is consensus among brain researchers that the relationship between neuron activity and mental experiences is one that goes beyond casual correlation and has all the hallmarks of a causal relationship.

Yes, it has become very evident that your understanding of Hume is quite sorrowful. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is a pity that we cannot invite Hume for a talk, but fortunately he has given us his thoughts in writing. I quote from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy and leave it to everyone to draw his own conclusions:

Hume concludes that this inference [from cause to effect] has no foundation in the understanding—that is, no foundation in what he calls “reasoning”. How does Hume arrive at this position?

All our inductive inferences—our “conclusions from experience”—are founded on the supposition that the course of nature is sufficiently uniform so that the future will be conformable to the past (EHU 4.21; SBN 37–38):

"For all inferences from experience suppose, as their foundation, that the future will resemble the past …. If there be any suspicion, that the course of nature may change, and that the past may be no rule for the future, all experience becomes useless, and can give rise to no inference or conclusion."

Therefore, what Hume is now seeking, in turn, is the foundation in our reasoning for the supposition that nature is sufficiently uniform.

Section 4, part 1 of the Enquiry distinguishes (as we have seen) between reasoning concerning relations of ideas and reasoning concerning matters of fact and existence. Demonstrative reasoning (concerning relations of ideas) cannot establish the supposition in question,

"since it implies no contradiction, that the course of nature may change, and that an object, seemingly like those which we have experienced, may be attended with different or contrary effects." (EHU 4.18; SBN 35)

Moreover, reasoning concerning matters of fact and existence cannot establish it either, since such reasoning is always founded on the relation of cause and effect, the very relation we are now attempting to found in reasoning (EHU 4.19; SBN 35–36):

"We have said, that all arguments concerning existence are founded on the relation of cause and effect; that our knowledge of that relation is derived entirely from experience; and that all our experimental conclusions proceed upon the supposition, that the future will be conformable to the past. To endeavour, therefore, the proof of this last proposition by probable arguments, or arguments regarding existence, must be evidently going in a circle, and taking that for granted, which is the very point in question. — Graciela De Pierris, Michael Friedman

I mean you provided the clinching quote from Hume himself, and you still don't understand the predicament which Hume put himself into.

The mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause, by the most accurate scrutiny and examination
— David Hume An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

If that is not an inductive conclusion which asserts the exact form of certainty, (with "never possibly find..."), which Hume insists that inductive conclusions cannot provide, then how do you explain it? — Metaphysician Undercover

I do not find that it is an inductive inference, because it is not an inference from particular cases to the general case. It is more likely to be a case of analytical reasoning.

Hume concludes that this inference [from cause to effect] has no foundation in the understanding - that is no foundation in what he calls 'reasoning'. — Graciela De Pierris, Michael Friedman

I explained quite clearly already, why such a conclusion is self-defeating. Notice that even this statement is self-contradicting. The word "inference" implies reasoning. An inference is what is derived from reasoning. So if a supposed "inference" has no foundation in reasoning, it cannot be called an "inference" because that would be contradictory. Yet it is called an "inference", because it is recognized that it actually is founded in reason, and Hume's attempt to portray it as not founded in reason is just incoherent hypocrisy.

Hume attempts to limit the meaning of "reasoning" to exclude inductive reasoning from the category of "reasoning", because of the deficiencies found to inhere within this form of reasoning. However, that leaves Hume's own conclusion, that the relation between cause and effect is not founded in reason, as itself not founded in reason. Therefore unjustified. That's why Hume's conclusion is self-defeating.

I do not find that it is an inductive inference, because it is not an inference from particular cases to the general case. It is more likely to be a case of analytical reasoning. — Jacques

An inference from the particular to the general is exactly what the quoted conclusion is. Look:

"The mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause, by the most accurate scrutiny and examination.

Hume gives many examples of particular instances of why the mind cannot find the effect to be implied by the cause. These examples of particulars are supposed to be representative of what observations of the "most accurate scrutiny and examination" could provide for us. Then he states the general (inductive) conclusion "the mind can never possibly find...".

Analytical reasoning involves judgements concerning relationships of meaning. Hume could not produce that conclusion of impossibility, "the mind can never possibly..." through analytical reasoning because there is no premise or axiom to support that inference of impossibility, only Hume's observations of what the mind can and can't do. Then the general principle "the mind can never possibly...", is produced; clearly inductive reasoning.

@Metaphysician Undercover

Finally I understand that you are not criticizing my interpretation of Hume, but Hume himself. I am so relieved because I am sure he does not need my help. :smile:

There is consensus among brain researchers that the relationship between neuron activity and mental experiences is one that goes beyond casual correlation and has all the hallmarks of a causal relationship. — Jacques

There is not. What you’re describing is a philosophical attitude, not a scientific hypothesis, known as brain-mind identify theory. There are many cogent arguments against brain-mind identity but I’m not going to bother thrashing that particular dead horse any longer.

Finally I understand that you are not criticizing my interpretation of Hume, but Hume himself. I am so relieved because I am sure he does not need my help. — Jacques

I'm criticizing both, your interpretation, and Hume himself. Your interpretation is bad because you interpret Hume's argument to be demonstrating that the conception of causation is not based in reason, when he clearly shows that it is based in reason. The reason for your bad interpretation though, is that Hume's argument is incoherent, so you can blame Hume if you will. Notice that the quote from Stanford which you provided says that Hume concludes that the relation between cause and effect has "no foundation in what he calls 'reasoning'". The authors at Stanford notice that Hume is working with an unconventional idea of "reasoning".

You do not seem to have noticed this, and that's why I am criticizing your interpretation. What you're not noticing is that Hume describes this relation between cause and effect as being based in reason, when "reason" is understood in the conventional way. But, he proposes that we restrict our use of "reason" according to a private definition which he is outlining, so that the type of reasoning by which we commonly relate cause to effect, does not qualify as "reasoning" under this private definition. The issue here is that faulty or invalid reasoning is still reasoning.

The further point I made, is that by Hume's own argument, his conclusions concerning the relation between cause and effect cannot be "reasoned" conclusions, so his conclusions are fundamentally unjustified. Therefore Hume undermines his own argument, so his argument is self-defeating. The same premises by which he argues that the concept of causation is not derived from reason, ensure that his own conclusion is not derived from reason. That you do not apprehend this is a further indication that your interpretation is poor.

What you’re describing is a philosophical attitude, not a scientific hypothesis, known as brain-mind identify theory. There are many cogent arguments against brain-mind identity but I’m not going to bother thrashing that particular dead horse any longer. — Wayfarer

Indeed, I did not intend to describe brain-mind identity theory. I do not hold that brain and mind are identical, rather that mind is a function of the brain, just as digestion is not identical with stomach, but is its function.

What Hume

What Hume meant to say is this: when you observe an unknown process for the first time in your life, say the encounter between two unknown creatures from the deep sea, you cannot predict by any reasoning what will happen. The only way to find out is to observe what happens.

Without the explicit thoughts, we cannot classify this as "inductive reasoning". — Metaphysician Undercover

I have no doubt that some kinds of animals have a capacity to reason, and I don't believe that reasoning is necessarily carried out, even by humans, in the form of "explicit thoughts". But I also don't care to expend the effort on trying to convince you of that.

What Hume meant to say is this: when you observe an unknown process for the first time in your life, say the encounter between two unknown creatures from the deep sea, you cannot predict by any reasoning what will happen. The only way to find out is to observe what happens. — Jacques

And that's relevant?

Consider this. The fact that reasoning cannot provide us with an absolutely perfect and omniscient capacity of prediction, does not imply that our capacity of prediction is not based in reason. That conclusion would require the premise that reasoning provides us with absolutely perfect and omniscient knowledge.

This is why the Stanford article you quoted says about Hume's argument, "what he calls 'reasoning'''. Hume consistently mischaracterized, poorly described, or incorrectly defined (if we can call descriptions definitions), the capacities of human beings.

I have no doubt that some kinds of animals have a capacity to reason, and I don't believe that reasoning is necessarily carried out, even by humans, in the form of "explicit thoughts". — Janus

I tend toward believing that many animals perform some sort of processes which are very similar to "reasoning", if not actually reasoning. The issue here is in how one would define "reasoning". If we limit "reasoning" only to those formal processes like deduction and mathematics, which produce a high degree of certainty, in the way that Hume wanted, then I think we decisively exclude the mental processes employed by other animals from the category of "reasoning". I don't know Hume well enough to say this for certain, but this may have been his intention, to produce a clear separation between the mental capacities of human beings, and the mental capacities of other creatures.

I like to think of "reasoning" as being defined by the use of symbols in the thinking process. And, there are formal ways of using symbols in thinking, being defined by convention, and also informal ways of using symbols in thinking, and these could be called private ways. We need to allow for the reality of private ways of thinking, in order to account for creativity; the reality of growth and expansion, evolution in the thinking process. Private ways may be taught, and adapted by others, becoming new conventional ways.

If, as I propose above, we use the use of symbols as the defining feature of reasoning, we might in some sense exclude other animals from the category of "reasoning", but this depends on how one would define "symbol", and exactly what type of mental images other types of creatures employ. In many ways, an aural or visual imagine can qualify as a "symbol", so the exclusion of other animals is not so simple.

This problem of definition is very common when analyzing the capacities of living creatures, and it is the principal reason why deductive reasoning does not provide us with the high degree of certainty which many people believe it does. The results of deduction are only as sound as the premises employed, and definitions constitute a large part of the premises. Each definition creates a sort of internal boundary as to what is essential, necessarily inhering within, the defined term. And this is known as logical priority. So, in the example above, I define "using symbols" as necessarily inhering within "reasoning", such that using symbols is an essential aspect of reasoning, and therefore logically prior to reasoning. Then "using symbols" is the broader category and may include other activities which are not properly "reasoning".

The problem is that the thing which inheres within, that which is "logically prior", as essential to the defined thing, is always the broader and less well-known category, therefore receiving a less clear and concise definition. So the effort to produce certainty in our deductive reasoning requires that we go further and further inward in our quest to understand and define the prerequisite terms employed, and as we proceed in this way, the terms are less and less well defined, decreasing the desired certainty accordingly. And since this is how defining works, uncertainty inheres within conception.

That is the principal reason why "systems theory" is not at all suited for the understanding of "living systems". Systems theory relies on the use of boundaries, and the boundaries define the external limits of the proposed system. But a living system is defined as "open" and this implies that the boundary is not a true boundary. The reason why the boundary is not a true boundary is because it does not provide a good definitional base for distinguishing the status of some things as to 'part of the system' or 'not part of the system'. And the issue, or deficiency, is that the model puts the boundary around the outside of the system, while the true opening, or weakness (which is really a weakness of definition) is to the inside of the system. Therefore the opening in the boundary of an "open system", a living system, ought to be represented as on the inside.

Let me make an analogy. Let's suppose a model of thinking which is a neurological representation, is presented as a system. As wayfarer states above, this "brain-mind identity theory" is defective. The neurological system model puts a boundary on the system which is an external limit to the system. Things which have a causal effect on the system as a whole, which cause change to the system, must come from outside the system and pass through the external boundary in order to be apprehended as having an effect. However, as I demonstrated above, the mental process of thinking and reasoning employs symbols with defining boundaries to the inside. In this process, the weakness of the whole, the location where things are not clearly defined and therefore may be either part of, or not part of, the whole, thereby having causal influence on the whole, is to the inside of the whole, not the outside. Systems theory, since it is based in empirical observations from the outside of the system provides no means for apprehending the cause of changes which pass through the principal weakness of the whole, the internal opening.

@Metaphysician Undercover

Why do you have to keep clinging to single words like "reasoning"? Hume also uses other expressions for what he means, such as "scrutiny" and "examination". What is important is the meaning of these words, all three stand for thinking, reasoning, combining or whatever contributes to finding a solution to a question. Ultimately, he means an effort of the mind. And his thesis is that one cannot derive an effect from a cause by thinking alone. This is only possible by observation.

Please consider the following example of two billiard-balls used by Hume

to illustrate his thesis that cause and effect are entirely distinct events, where the idea of the latter is in no way contained in the idea of the former (EHU 4.9; SBN 29):

The mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause, by the most accurate scrutiny and examination. For the effect is totally different from the cause, and consequently can never be discovered in it. Motion in the second billiard-ball is a quite distinct event from motion in the first; nor is there anything in the one to suggest the smallest hint of the other.

A few lines later Hume describes this example as follows (EHU 4.10; SBN 29):

When I see, for instance, a billiard-ball moving in a straight line towards another; even suppose motion in the second ball should by accident be suggested to me, as the result of their contact or impulse; may I not conceive, that a hundred different events might as well follow from the cause? … All these suppositions are consistent and conceivable. — Graciela De Pierris, Michael Friedman

I agree with you that whether or not we ascribe reasoning to animals will depend on how we define 'reasoning'.

And his thesis is that one cannot derive an effect from a cause by thinking alone. This is only possible by observation. — Jacques

Well sure one cannot derive causation from thinking alone. That would be rather nonsensical because something has to stand in, within the thinking, as the cause and as the effect. That is known as the content of thought, and most of the content is derived from observation.

But that is not the issue here. The issue is whether the concept is derived from thinking, (better stated as "reasoning") or some other living process like a simple propensity to associate one thing (the cause) with another thing (the effect). Hume's claim is that our capacity to predict, through the use of the concept of causation, i.e. to say that a certain outcome (effect) would be necessitated by a certain action (cause), is not based in reason, but in some sort of propensity toward seeing things in this way.

The mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause, by the most accurate scrutiny and examination. For the effect is totally different from the cause, and consequently can never be discovered in it. Motion in the second billiard-ball is a quite distinct event from motion in the first; nor is there anything in the one to suggest the smallest hint of the other. — Graciela De Pierris, Michael Friedman

This is the heart of Hume's mistake. He misunderstands how we sense and observe things. We actually observe things as continuous in time, not as distinct events. there are no natural divisions observed between events or motions, as motion is observed as continuous. It is the mind which separates, or individuates distinct events, or distinct motions, within the flow of time. So we observe a multitude of billiard balls rolling and bouncing off each other as one event. This is very evident with the opening shot which breaks the pack, and the balls are rapidly moving around bouncing off each other. It is the mind which separates the action of one ball from the action of another ball, and the mind numbers these individuated events as motion #1, and motion #2, in a temporal order, assigning cause to the motion of one, and effect to the motions of the other.

This is evident in all such activities which are divided in this way to assign cause to the earlier part of the event, and effect to the later part. For example, a rock flying through the air hits the window and the glass breaks. That is sensed as one continuous event. But the mind of the observer separates the flying rock, as cause, and the breaking glass as effect.

So Hume's thesis is incorrect, by starting from a false premise. He assumes that we must somehow associate cause with effect, and so inquires as to the means by which we establish a relation between these two. in reality though, the temporal process which constitutes cause and effect is perceived by us as continuous, without natural divisions, and we separate cause from effect. So the proper inquiry should have been to inquiry how the mind separates cause from effect, rather than how we relate cause to effect..

@Metaphysician Undercover

Ok, let's suppose Hume is wrong. Then try to solve the following problem: A billiard ball rolls toward a second billiard ball. Try to figure out (before they meet) what will happen when the two balls meet and state what method you used to do it.

By what reasoning do you find out whether the balls will attract each other, whether they will bounce off each other and in what direction, whether they will penetrate each other, or disintegrate, or explode, or ... or ...?

Hume thinks "causation" reduces to "constant conjunction." That is, "A causes B iff whenever A occurs B occurs after." So, for Hume, causation is a conditional relationship, which is something that exists in/can be known by reason.

That said, I think you're correct about how Hume thinks of causation in a way, because he is essentially saying, "what most people think causation is cannot be what it really is because such a relationship is unknowable, thus by "causation" we mean constant conjunction." However, he doesn't think that there is a secret causation unaccessible to reason lurking behind a veil in the world, he thinks causation is just conjunction.



Measure everything and plug the data into equations we have for exactly this sort of thing. If you do it right you will correctly predict how the balls will react every time to a degree of precision that makes any variance indistinguishable. If you're a good billiards player, you can do this intuitively.

This seemingly relies on induction, at least from our standpoint. However, multiple paths exist around the problem of induction.

First, we could adopt a Bayesian approach utilizing the principle of maximum entropy. This is an approach where we use methods grounded in deduction to determine the statistical likelihood that observation X predicts observation Y. This method requires jettisoning any attempt to speak about ontology or causation, and any hope of certainty, but arguably grounds itself in deduction from probability theory. Of course, no one actually lives like this, so it's a best an academic exercise to investigate how such a scheme works.

Second, we could adopt the position the the world is inherently rational. We can ground this in speculative exercises and logical arguments, e.g. Hegel's objective logic. From here, provided we haven't gotten lost in our dizzying system or made an error somewhere, we can proceed with "causality as logical entailment," or more popular in physics today "causality as computation, progressions between possible states."

Third, we can note that Hume's argument undercuts any knowledge of the world. To be sure, Hume thought 'relations of ideas,' i.e. logical truths, were secure, and even known 'matters of fact,' but those who came after him began tearing down those concepts. After all, don't we use induction in proving to ourselves that our memories are accurate or in vetting the sources for our matters of fact? And Quine has a pretty damaging critique of relations of ideas (although I am left less convinced by it than many it seems.). This being the case, we are left with radical skepticism about everything. Except no one lives like they assume this to be true, and so we have to assume that Hume made a fundamental mistake somewhere along the line in assessing how we come to know about the world. If knowledge is impossible, why trust the knowledge that knowing is not possible in the first place? It's self-undermining.