That's why I laughed at the piece I quoted earlier, his use of Wittgenstein:

Our penchant to misread our perceptions, as philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein pointed out to his fellow philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe, stems in part from an uncritical attitude toward our perceptions, toward what we mean by "it looks as if. Anscombe says of Wittgenstein that, "He once greeted me with the question: 'Why do people say that it was natural to think that the sun went round the earth rather than that the earth turned on its axis?' I replied. 'I suppose, because it looked as if the sun went round the earth! "Well, he asked, what would it have looked like if it had looked as if the earth turned on its axis?' The question brought it out that I had hitherto given no relevant meaning to 'it looks as if in 'it looks as if the sun goes around the earth. "Wittgenstein's point is germane any time we wish to claim that reality matches or mismatches our perceptions. There is, as we shall see, a way to give precise meaning to this claim using the tools of evolutionary game theory: we can prove that if our perceptions were shaped by natural selection then they almost surely evolved to hide reality. They just report fitness.
— The Case Against Realiy, p19 — Banno

Why not say "Well, what would a rock have looked like if the rock had been a community of conscious agents?"

It would look like a bloody rock. Nothing has changed. So the "case against reality" leaves everything just as it was.

Seems to me Hoffman hasn't understood the point Wittgenstein was making; and that Wittgenstein undermines the pretension that Hoffman will "change your understanding of reality".

:lol:

Tallis' argument is clear. Hoffman claims on the one hand that "There are no such things as objects as they are usually understood as discrete items localized in space and time". But such objects are the very basis of the theory of evolution, and of science more generally. Hoffman thereby undermines the basis of his own theory.

Hoffman uses objective reality to deny objective reality. — Banno

Untrue. Hoffman says objects and spacetime are part of the headset, which implies that evolution is, too. There's no contradiction.

Science, so far, describes the headset. Hoffman is trying to discern deeper structures which project into spacetime and gives us objects, evolution, and, most importantly, the taste of chocolate. :)

The book looks so self-cancelling from just that sample that I'm surprised an editor didn't bring it up. If we just see fitness then our seeing ourselves as just seeing fitness is just seeing fitness. And maybe it was good for Hoffman's profile.

If evolution is only a part of the "headset", how is it that it can explain that we are evolved conscious agents?

My cynical self says that the editor rubbed their hands in glee. A perusal of the clientele even of this forum shows a huge market for scientism, and for scientists and engineers dabbling in philosophical issues, poorly.

If evolution is only a part of the "headset", how is it that it can explain that we are evolved conscious agents? — Banno

Because evolution is in the headset, it explains what happens in the headset.
But "conscious agents" is Hoffman term's for what lies beneath the headset.
Can you rephrase your question?

Myself, I'm done with Donald Hoffman, no further interest in the topic.

Do you have a few sentences to offer to summarise what clinched it for you?

A side note, on your suggesting that we accept paradoxes. Accepting a paradox is tantamount to accepting anything. — Banno

Normally, in cases of clarity, that might seem be true. But when uncertainty is inherent, a compromise between competing opinions becomes necessary*1.That's why we call them "paradoxes"*2 (contrary opinion). If your opinion is different from mine, I could assume that you are wrong. But some differences of opinion eventually turn-out to be truish : a blend of yours & mine. And, since Psychology & Neuroscience are not yet "hard" sciences, Hoffman's "illusion" may be one of those cases. Besides, the Interface Theory is just an analogy, subject to various interpretations.

The most famous paradox in modern science is the wave/particle duality. In classical physics, a discrete particle is the opposite of a continuous wave. So the early quantum scientists debated the apparent combination of wave & particle properties. They eventually realized that the quantum scale of reality has different rules from the macro scale. Schrodinger's Cat paradox was not intended to be taken literally, but merely to illustrate the counter-intuitive nature of quantum physics. The Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum physics was intended to settle harsh differences of opinion about quantum reality. But the controversies continue to this day.

So, my interpretation of Hoffman's Interface Theory is that it is another cat-box paradox. Just as you would expect the cat to be either dead or alive, you'd expect that your senses, honed by eons of evolution, would convey accurate impressions of reality. But Hoffman's reality-in-a-box model is both/and : your mental reality and your objective reality must necessarily co-exist. Your opinion of reality may be different from mine, but that doesn't mean that you are wrong. It does suggest that mental Ideality & physical Reality coexist in the same world.

Therefore, I can accept Hoffman's special case paradox, about human perception & conception, without being forced to "accept anything", such as ghost sightings. However, like the Copenhagen consensus, the philosophical paradox may remain, even as the pragmatic science becomes more settled. At this moment, Hoffman's theory is considered to be "more evolutionary psychology than neuroscience"*3. Nevertheless, I find it useful for my non-pragmatic philosophical purposes. :smile:


*1. Quantum Uncertainty :
The quantum nature of the Universe tells us that certain quantities have an inherent uncertainty built into them, and that pairs of quantities have their uncertainties related to one another. There is no evidence for a more fundamental reality with hidden variables that underlies our observable, quantum Universe.
https://bigthink.com/starts-with-a-bang/quantum-uncertainty/

*2. Paradox (against belief) :
# a situation, person, or thing that combines contradictory features or qualities.
# a seemingly absurd or self-contradictory statement or proposition that when investigated or explained may prove to be well founded or true.

*3. Interface Theory Accepted? :
Q: “Is Donald Hoffmans Interface theory of perception largely accepted? Or do most scientists think evolution has meant we perceive the world relatively accurately?”
A:It is not largely accepted, but it is also not largely rejected. It provides an interesting way to work with the world, so it sits there as most theories do, considered whenever perception is considered, but not driving how we consider it.
https://www.quora.com/Is-Donald-Hoffman-s-interface-theory-of-perception-accepted-in-neuroscience

Because evolution is in the headset, it explains what happens in the headset.

But if it is in the headset, it's not happening in the world.

So homo erectus never really fucked another homo erectus - that's all just stuff in the headset; and so there was never an opportunity for evolution to occur - it was all just headset stuff.
— Art48

But "conscious agents" is Hoffman term's for what lies beneath the headset. — Art48

In which case conscious agents are just the trees and rocks an Homo Erectus of which we already talk, and his theory amounts to little more than a mathematical definition of something he - dubiously - claims is the same as consciousness.

The clincher for me is that , if 'fitness beats truth', then how is it different from regular scepticism? And life's too short - there are many other things to pursue and read up on. Oh, and his inability to say what 'conscious agents' are or what that term means. It seems absent an overall philosophical framework far as I can see.

The most famous paradox in modern science is the wave/particle duality. — Gnomon

That's not a paradox. The equations of QM are very clear, and certainly not contradictor. You cannot use them as an example of accomodating a paradox. Shut up and calculate.

Cool. Thank you.

:up:

That sounds right.

Here's a piece of an interview w/ Hoffman found here : https://www.quantamagazine.org/the-evolutionary-argument-against-reality-20160421/

Q : So everything we see is one big illusion?
A : We’ve been shaped to have perceptions that keep us alive, so we have to take them seriously. If I see something that I think of as a snake, I don’t pick it up. If I see a train, I don’t step in front of it. I’ve evolved these symbols to keep me alive, so I have to take them seriously. But it’s a logical flaw to think that if we have to take it seriously, we also have to take it literally.

Q: If snakes aren’t snakes and trains aren’t trains, what are they?
A : Snakes and trains, like the particles of physics, have no objective, observer-independent features. The snake I see is a description created by my sensory system to inform me of the fitness consequences of my actions. Evolution shapes acceptable solutions, not optimal ones. A snake is an acceptable solution to the problem of telling me how to act in a situation. My snakes and trains are my mental representations; your snakes and trains are your mental representations.

**************************
Why aren't our sensory systems also lacking objective, independent features ? Why is my nose more real than the fart it smells ? Why isn't my skull a 'mental representation' ? But that crashes the whole system ! Brains are the dream of brains are the dream of brains... The notion of the mental depends on seeing the outside of an organism with sense organs in an environment with us. I model its awareness for solid, practical reasons (it might eat me or I it.) This same case can be made against all reductions of everything to mentality or perception or sensation. Such claims seem to need a skull in an actual ('non-mental') world somewhere or another.

We can also question just how significant the difference is between taking something 'seriously' as opposed to 'literally' (akin to instrumentalism versus realism, which turns out to be a sort of boring issue).

OK, so he doesn't believe in brains ?

Neurons, brains, space … these are just symbols we use, they’re not real. It’s not that there’s a classical brain that does some quantum magic. It’s that there’s no brain! Quantum mechanics says that classical objects — including brains — don’t exist. So this is a far more radical claim about the nature of reality and does not involve the brain pulling off some tricky quantum computation. So even Penrose hasn’t taken it far enough. But most of us, you know, we’re born realists. We’re born physicalists. This is a really, really hard one to let go of.
...
The formal theory of conscious agents I’ve been developing is computationally universal — in that sense, it’s a machine theory. And it’s because the theory is computationally universal that I can get all of cognitive science and neural networks back out of it. Nevertheless, for now I don’t think we are machines — in part because I distinguish between the mathematical representation and the thing being represented. As a conscious realist, I am postulating conscious experiences as ontological primitives, the most basic ingredients of the world. I’m claiming that experiences are the real coin of the realm. The experiences of everyday life — my real feeling of a headache, my real taste of chocolate — that really is the ultimate nature of reality.

So he makes most real precisely what is typically understood as most scientifically elusive ? The ghost in the machine ! Nothing else ever. How almost true it sometimes almost rings. His headache, his enjoyment of chocolate. This is a baby's understanding of reality, the coin of the nursery.

All you’ve said here most recently, makes no mention of that which I take particular exception, that being where in the system this “judgement”, where that which “decides for me”, resides. You’ve maintained its residence to be in intuition, subsequently broadened its residence to sensibility in general. Hence, my objection that whatever you think this “judgement” is, sufficient for it to “decide for me”, being necessarily a conscious activity insofar as unconscious or subconscious decision making is inconceivable in accordance with the human intellectual system, the business of both this ambiguous form of “judgement”, and proper judgement itself, do not belong to sensibility, said objection expressed as “tantamount to proposing that sensibility thinks”. — Mww

Ok, I'll be clear. I do not know exactly where, within me, this system lies. I know it must exist because the premises I've presented produce the logical conclusion that it must be. Secondly, I did not say that it "decides for me", simply that it makes some form of decisions or judgements.

And, your unjustified assumption that it is impossible for any type of unconscious or subconscious decision making, has been shown by me to be wrong.

Imagination is the thing I found in the analysis of your term in your context. I analyzed “judgement” and rejected it as philosophically ambiguous. Of course I would be unfamiliar with “judgement”, given the established abstract conceptual system to which judgement necessarily belongs. To use it, or any of its derivatives, no matter how disguised, other than as that system demands, is to destroy it altogether. — Mww

Ok, your analysis leads you to "imagination". Now, further analysis of "imagination" itself, will demonstrate that there is judgement inherent within imagination, as my example of dreaming demonstrates.

Your assumption that "judgement" necessarily belongs to abstract conceptual structure has been proven wrong, with the evidence of real cases of irrational, illogical, emotional, and even seemingly random judgements.

Nahhhh, you don’t. You’re presupposing I have no idea what you’re talking about. I say that because at the end of our first set of comments here, pg 6, there’s a question for you left unaddressed, which would have given a different perspective entirely for what was initially a general agreement between us.

With that unanswered question, combined with my mentioning something about a form of judgement related to intuition and you changing that into a form of “judgement” contained in intuition…..we’ve digressed into irreconcilable differences.

All else is superfluous. — Mww

I don't recall the unanswered question. If it is the question of where does this faculty of judgement reside, I do not see how this is relevant. When there is evidence that judgement has been made, the evidence is posterior to the judgement. The particular instrument which makes the judgement is very rarely evident in the effects of the judgement. This is why we cannot look at what was done, and know for sure who did it. Furthermore, we do not see the intention in the intentional act, nor do we see free will in the freely willed act. All of these conclusion can only be brought from a logical procedure.

So the question of where this faculty is, which makes the judgements, is not even relevant at this point. All that is necessary now is that we recognize the reality of those judgements. This is first and foremost the requirement we need before proceeding toward determining any further feature of that source of judgement. That is how we work with acts of judgement, like intentional acts, we first determine that there was intention involved, then we can proceed toward specifying the agent.

We can also question just how significant the difference is between taking something 'seriously' as opposed to 'literally' — green flag

Boring, maybe, but also pretty decisive.

So the snake is... and here I'm trying to work out what it is Hoffman would say... some sort of community of interweaving conscious agents.

And yet, if the snake bites, you die. So "The snakebite is poisonous" is true even if the snake is not real? How's that?

Seems to me that instead we have two different descriptions of the very same thing, one as a snake, the other as a "community of interweaving conscious agents" or whatever – happy for any of Hoffman's defenders to set out an alternative – two descriptions doing very different things, but about the very same thing. And if that's so then the snake is as real as the "community of interweaving conscious agents".

That is, if his conclusion is that there are no snakes, then it does not follow from his argument. He can only reach a much less impressive conclusion, one that will not appeal to the boys quite so much.

He's just pushing a rhetorical point that is unsupported by his actual account, that we should treat his "conscious agents" as more real than snakes and trees and the other stuff around us.

He's playing on the word "real".

Boring, maybe, but also pretty decisive. — Banno

Maybe someone could call electrons useful fictions if they left ordinary stuff like microwaves alone. Personally I go with Popper's critical realism or something like that. But I understand why Mach was reluctant to embrace atomism. But what's the difference between instrumentalism and just entities as part of theories that might be falsified / modified ?

So the snake is... and here I'm trying to work out what it is Hoffman would say... some sort of community of interweaving conscious agents. — Banno

There's a frequent simile in Indian philosophy of mistaking a piece of rope for a snake. Typically it is used to represent misjudgement or being fooled by appearances. But in Hoffman's theory, if the snake is not really a snake, but only an icon, what does the icon represent? If it's not really a snake, then what is it? Answer seems to be 'we don't know'.

For that matter - is the Interface Theory of Perception falsifiable, in Popper's sense. It's hard to see how any empirical facts could be used to falsify a theory about the nature of empirical cognition.

'Quantum mechanics says that classical objects — including brains — don’t exist'.(Hoffman) — green flag

I wonder where? What a waste of time.

I reckon one could give a decent defence of scientific realism as an outcome of instrumentalism; where realism is just holding that sentences about electrons are either true or false. Might think on that a bit.

Hoffman :

The idea that what we’re doing is measuring publicly accessible objects, the idea that objectivity results from the fact that you and I can measure the same object in the exact same situation and get the same results — it’s very clear from quantum mechanics that that idea has to go. Physics tells us that there are no public physical objects. So what’s going on? Here’s how I think about it. I can talk to you about my headache and believe that I am communicating effectively with you, because you’ve had your own headaches. The same thing is true as apples and the moon and the sun and the universe. Just like you have your own headache, you have your own moon. But I assume it’s relevantly similar to mine. That’s an assumption that could be false, but that’s the source of my communication, and that’s the best we can do in terms of public physical objects and objective science.

The first bolded claim seems bold indeed. Above there is talk of measurement, presumably using publicly accessible objects : measuring devices.

The second bolded claim is common enough in philosophy but a favorite target of criticism since the 20th century. Like the theory the earth is flat. Commonsense until you look closely.

And yet, if the snake bites, you die. So "The snakebite is poisonous" is true even if the snake is not real? How's that? — Banno

He made some interesting and plausible points about perceiving quantities of water that might be worth something. But it's all dressed up in bad metaphysics. As you imply, what hurts us is real for that reason. I know you hate pragmatism, but it is inoculation against stuff like this.

For that matter - is the Interface Theory of Perception falsifiable, in Popper's sense. — Wayfarer

Good question. We'd need a good formulation of it to check.

It strikes me as muddled from the start, in that it says the document icon on my desktop is not the real document. It's just not clear what the word "real" does here. Where is this mooted "real" document? On RAM? On the hard drive? The printed version? There simply isn't something that counts as the real document, beyond our saying it is so.

SO to my eye the whole argument is founded on a false presumption of an unambiguous "reality".

For that matter - is the Interface Theory of Perception falsifiable, in Popper's sense. It's hard to see how any empirical facts could be used to falsify a theory about the nature of empirical cognition. — Wayfarer

It seems like a metaphysics and therefore subject to other tests, like consistency and meaningfulness. Both criteria are entangled and difficult, though, since new concepts/metaphors basically change the rules as they are introduced.

I recon one could give a decent defence of scientific realism as an outcome of instrumentalism; where realism is just holding that sentences about electrons are either true or false. Might think on that a bit. — Banno

:up:

I happened on a strong paper once that minimized the difference. I'd be glad to hear what you come up with.

He can only reach a much less impressive conclusion, one that will not appeal to the boys quite so much. — Banno

:up:

I don't like the metaphysical wrapping paper, but it's probably cool to study some of this on the level of detail. I've programmed worlds with little creatures myself.

Suppose in reality there’s a resource, like water, and you can quantify how much of it there is in an objective order — very little water, medium amount of water, a lot of water. Now suppose your fitness function is linear, so a little water gives you a little fitness, medium water gives you medium fitness, and lots of water gives you lots of fitness — in that case, the organism that sees the truth about the water in the world can win, but only because the fitness function happens to align with the true structure in reality. Generically, in the real world, that will never be the case. Something much more natural is a bell curve — say, too little water you die of thirst, but too much water you drown, and only somewhere in between is good for survival. Now the fitness function doesn’t match the structure in the real world. And that’s enough to send truth to extinction. For example, an organism tuned to fitness might see small and large quantities of some resource as, say, red, to indicate low fitness, whereas they might see intermediate quantities as green, to indicate high fitness. Its perceptions will be tuned to fitness, but not to truth. It won’t see any distinction between small and large — it only sees red — even though such a distinction exists in reality.

Perceptions aren't (typically understood as ) judgments. Concepts aren't being applied.What would it mean for them to be tuned to truth ? A one-one function from colors to types of objects ? That'd be a silly expectation. This looks like all kinds of tacit belief interpretation projection on eyes without mouths or even discursive minds.

He's playing on the word "real". — Banno

:up:

He seems to be making quite a few of the classic mistakes.