We don't even really know what 'matter' is. Could be quantum fields or vibrating 10 dimensional strings. Or maybe everything in physics is a kind of analogy, limited by human cognition and technology. Maybe we can't get at what reality fundamentally is. — Marchesk

Ok you jump from the underlying ontology of matter...to reality. From a intrinsic feature of the cosmos to an abstract concept . Reality is an observer dependent term which is defined by our ability to interact and verify with things in existence. A fundamental nature of reality will never change our descriptions and narratives on how reality interacts with us and vice versa.
This is the problem when general terms are used instead of specific.

think there are historical reasons that lead us to conclude that consciousness is a property of matter. But it also depends on what you think matter (or more broadly "the physical) encompasses. — Manuel

Instead of using the term Brain (material structure) Manuel used the word "matter"....and the conversation rolled down the hill reaching "quantum levels" rendering the conversation irrelevant to the biological property of consciousness.

t turns out it is helpful for organisms who don't acquire nutrients, protection and mates through root in the ground, thorns/toxic substances and airborne pollen......to be able to be aware of their needs and environment and to be conscious of which action and behavior in order to will allow them to acquire food, shelter, avoid preditors and find mates. — Nickolasgaspar

And subjective experience is necessary for that? How do organisms without nervous systems survive? Are all living nervous systems conscious?

Why should we accept that definition for machine consciousness? It's not the same thing as qualia. You just created an arbitrary definition and assigned it to 'consciousness'. It doesn't answer the question of whether a machine can have qualia. — Marchesk

This is why I opened my post by saying "it depends on the definition".
I distinguished the two types of "consciousness"based on the underlying driving mechanisms.
What you label "experience" is similar to what the machine is working on that exact moment (sensory input and processing). The difference is that your experience is "polluted" and evaluated by your feelings, custom nature of your biological apparatus and what it means to you. The machines don't have feelings and they are not guided by meaning. They have an algorithm to execute in relation to their defined goals.

A fundamental nature of reality will never change our descriptions and narratives on how reality interacts with us and vice versa. — Nickolasgaspar

Well if nature is fundamentally physical, then subjective experience doesn't conceptually fit. The biological level is still function and structure.

If you want to criticize something, you first have to demonstrate that you understand it. — Wayfarer

I find this kind if thinking really insulting. Neuroscientists are clever enough people, their intellectual capabilities should not be in question.

As such they are as capable as any other human of thinking about their methodology and how it fits with psychology and any metaphysical questions they think are appropriate.

Philosophers are not magic, nor do they have access to a set of data unavailable to ordinary people. There is not a corpus of facts to be 'understood'. There is a range of viewpoints to be read about, or not, as each person sees fit. And each viewpoint arrived at by any given philosopher (or scientist) on the subject matter of philosophy is equally accessible, merely by thought, to any sufficiently intelligent human on the planet, including neuroscientists.

The idea that somehow all neuroscientists do is examine brains and never think of anything else is grossly offensive caricature.

Scientists think about other stuff, including (quite popularly), science itself. All philosophers do is think. Everyone can think.

If, as a result of this thinking process, a philosopher and a scientist disagree about the meaning or significance of a scientific theory, the philosopher has no claim to any authority, he just used his mind, same as the scientist.

I more that if no one can put in even an example answer, they type of thing expected, then I don't see how anyone can support the claim that no satisfactory answer has been given.

If I don't even know what I'm expecting, I can't claim to not have it.

Well if nature is fundamentally physical — Marchesk

If? what do you mean if? the physical reality is all that we can observe and work on. Why poisoning the well?

-"then subjective experience doesn't conceptually fit."
Well It depends on what you mean by that term, but why? Is it in conflict with your opinion on what all should look in a physical world? My subjective experience of Nature doesn't find any "fitting" issues.
Brains have the ability to gather stimuli and use feelings, memory, symbolic language, reason, etc to introduce content in an experience.
Small differences in the input of a stimulus (our biological setup) , in memories , on our understanding of symbolism make these experiences subjective.
There is nothing mysterious or magic there.

I find this kind if thinking really insulting. Neuroscientists are clever enough people, their intellectual capabilities should not be in question. — Isaac

I thought I was the only one who finds his statements condescending and insulting....good to know.

And subjective experience is necessary for that? How do organisms without nervous systems survive? Are all living nervous systems conscious? — Marchesk

I am starting to think that subjective experience means something different to you!.
First of all when we talk about conscious states the term "subjective" is redundant. All conscious states have a subjective quality. We have different biological setups so our sensory system will register the same stimulous with small differences. Then our past experiences differ. So i.e. one might enjoy spicy food (because of a small number of taste buds on his tongue and a happy memory from his first date with a girl) but others might suffer (super tasters).
We are left with the word "experience" and I will add the important term Conscious Experience.
So your question sound sound like"why being able to consciously aware of an experience is necessary for survival." Because it allows you to acknowledge your feelings(the condition you want to avoid and identify your goal)make judgments, take decisions based on previous knowledge, take in to account the present data and inform your actions."
-"How do organisms without nervous systems survive?"
-Mutations that turn out to be beneficial (thorns, toxicity),Mechanical and Chemical processes that allow plants to "react" to external stimuli.(sun light,shade, strong wind,) successful type of reproduction (pollination, vibrant colors,germination etc).

-"Are all living nervous systems conscious"
-No , if you mean that all nervous systems are able to produce mental conscious experiences. A central nervous system is needed(Brain).

It is an unfortunately pervasive attitude, ignoring the difference between disagreeing and misunderstanding.

That one does not agree with a conclusion, or an interpretation, does not mean one has not 'understood' it. A mistake @Wayfarer seems uncommonly prone to.

I was replying to his specific claim that we don't know if matter can be conscious. I think it can, when so modified in specific configurations leading to brains. Brains are molded matter. But I make no reference to the quantum properties of the universe to explain experience, so biology very much matters.

Yet I don't think we can rule out panpsychism, or even the possibility that consciousness could arise in other types of material, such as silicon and metal.

I don't personally believe in either of the abovementioned options, but I can't rule it out.

Ι wasn't accusing you of anything. I just pointed out how a word on the wrong hands can lead a conversation to .....quantum mechanics.
Now ,we can rule out panpsychism or consciousness in structures without similar biological gear, because such structures lack sensory systems(no input) or a central processing units capable to process drives and urges (which are non existent),emotions, capability to store info (memory), to recognize pattern, to use symbolic language, to reason, etc etc.
The term Consciousness may be one word, but the things needed for such a state to emerge are so many and advanced that only complex systems (like brains) have the hardware and function to achieve it.

It doesn't seem objectively unreasonable to me that physical processing should give rise to a rich inner life. It seems clear to me that it can and it does. Note I said "clear," not "obvious" or "established." I certainly could be wrong. I look for reasons why it should seem unreasonable to others and I can come up with two answers. 1) Cognitive scientists seem to be a long way from identifying the neurological mechanisms that manifest as experience. I'm not really sure how true that is, but I don't think it's a good reason. 2) People just can't imagine how something so spectacular, important, and intimate as what it is like to be us could just be something mechanical. — T Clark

Thanks, that's interesting. I've taken the liberty of bolding a few of the words in there. I want to make a list of verbs that have been used to characterise the relationship between consciousness and a physical system. Perhaps as the basis for another thread, I could do a poll maybe.

As to the substance of what you say:
1) This perhaps is related to arguments from ignorance. I've been told that's what I'm doing several times, and that might be right. Maybe I just haven't read enough neuroscience. Maybe I lack faith in the scientific method which, after all, is easily the best method we have had so far in our history at arriving at reliable/true/useful theories about the world. Philosophy, which again has been pointed out to me many times, it completely fucking hopeless by comparison. Having said all that, the issues seem to me to be conceptual rather than empirical. Sometimes scientists need philosophers to help them out a bit with the concepts (yeah that's patronising, I don't care. Just as philosophers are often shit at science, scientists are often shit at philosophy too). One example of an important conceptual matter is the idea that consciousness does not, conceptually, seem to admit of borderline cases. Another example is the separation of different senses of 'consciousness', which Chalmers apparently does as you've quoted. Lexicographers also have a role to play here in clarifying what it is people actually use the word for. Maybe hard-bitten neuroboffins on the one hand and fairy woo-mongers on the other are talking about different things and are failing to actually disagree.

2) That may be true of some, but I don't think it's true of many philosophers. People like Brian Cox and Dawkins make much of this point - going on and on about how the wonders of the natural world are not diminished by their physical basis. I think it basically a straw man, no serious woo-mongers actually make this point.

And of course the mind, and in particular experience, isn't just something mechanical, just the operation of the nervous system, any more than life is just chemistry. The mind emerges out of neurology. The mind operates according to different rules than our nervous system. We call the study of the mind "psychology." I don't have any problem conceiving of that, even though I don't understand the mechanisms by which it could happen. — T Clark

(Collecting my list of verbs again) OK, so you're a non-reductionist about the mind. That's obviously fine but it creates a problem. If mind isn't just the operation of a nervous system, what is it? A simple unsophisticalted identification (the simplest way to be a physicalist) between neural activity and consciousness is no longer an option. One option is to take a hierarchical systems approach, saying that whole systems and sub-systems have properties unique to each 'level' and these have upward and downward causation powers, and that various components of mind, including consciousness, is somehow captured with these concepts. I think @apokrisis thinks something along these lines (no doubt I have got it wrong somewhat wrong).

If there are other reasons for rejecting a neurological basis for phenomenal consciousness, you haven't provided it. You've only really found fault with reasons why scientists say there is one. Your argument is primarily a matter of language, not science.

Sure, but it depends what you're looking for. I don't have a falsification. For example, I can't take @Nickolasgaspar's theory, use it to make a prediction, and then make an observation that falsifies that prediction. So if that's what you want from a critique, I can't offer that. One thing philosophers can offer is a mapping of the theoretical landscape, so the broad options are all clearly visible, and the pros and cons of each laid out. Then we can provisionally pick one as a result of an abductive inference. The joke I don't get tired of repeating is taken from Churchill: "Panpsychism is the worst theory of consciousness apart from all the others." The idea here is roughly that one of three options must be true: eliminativism, panpsychism or emergence. We pick the least problematic.

As for the function issue, we're not really talking about brain function, we're talking about mind function. I'm positing that not neurological function but neurological mechanism and process are the basis of mind function.

Don't quite follow that bit.

I think most would agree that phenomenal consciousness is a valuable mental resource and capability.

Sure, absolutely. As a panpsychist I go much further, and assert that any behaviour at all, including the behaviour of atoms, is valuable for the mind of the atom. Everything happens because of consciousness. I've been toying with the idea that all causation is actually psychological. We move about and do things because of how we feel. So do atoms and molecules and everything else. That's not to say mechanism doesn't exist. Just to say that mechanism is derivative of will, and a macro-effect supervening on lots of things all doing what they want. @Banno mentioned the difficulties with the concept of physical causation and linked to the SEP article, for which I was grateful. I need to read that more and reflect. The whole idea is a bit of a switcheroo.

Have to stop there, back to work for me. Thanks for interesting post.

An accurate simulation of the organ and its function should also simulate its by product. — Nickolasgaspar

A couple thoughts here:

I will grant you that there is a prima facia case that a simulated or mechanical brain should be conscious. My question is: how would we scientifically go from there? How would science "nail down" the question of whether X is conscious or not? What tests could we perform, that would give us conclusive proof of consciousness (or lack thereof)

Also, as Wayfarer pointed out, a simulated kidney on my computer cannot pee on my desk. A simulated kidney can only pee simulated urine. In the case of consciousness, a simulation of a brain would produce simulated consciousness. Is simulated consciousness the same as consciousness?

I think consciousness is awareness/intelligence from the point of view of ones individual identity.

In that case both humans, other animals and AI might be intelligent/aware, but not equally conscious as consciousness is characterised by the individuals subjective experience of their intelligence/awareness.

An intelligent being with arms and hands will not have a conscious experience of such the same as an equal intelligence without arms and hands. Both may be aware, but the quality of their awareness will differ (consciousness - human, animal or otherwise).

Now ,we can rule out panpsychism or consciousness in structures without similar biological gear, because such structures lack sensory systems(no input) or a central processing units capable to process drives and urges (which are non existent),emotions, capability to store info (memory), to recognize pattern, to use symbolic language, to reason, etc etc. — Nickolasgaspar

But I don't see a principle by which sensory inputs and processing units couldn't be created by people, in a non-biological creation. Again, I don't think it's plausible, but I don't think it's impossible either.

As for panpsychism, the reason I don't think some formulation can't be ruled out, is that there is obviously something about matter that when so-combined, leads to experience. Granted, it's in brains that such combinations arise, so far as we can tell.

But even so, if matter did not contain the possibility of consciousness as a potential, then experience couldn't happen even in brains.

This doesn't suggest that, as some panpsychists have argued, that particles have experience. That's a bit much.

I think consciousness is awareness/intelligence from the point of view of ones individual identity — Benj96

You are confusing different properties of mind with Consciousness. Consciousness, according to Neuroscience is the third basic mental property.
Consciousness is the brain's ability to connect stimuli with the rest of our mind properties allowing the emergence of content in our experiences.

You are confusing different properties of mind with Consciousness. — Nickolasgaspar

You are confusing your opinions with facts.

But I don't see a principle by which sensory inputs and processing units couldn't be created by people, in a non-biological creation. Again, I don't think it's plausible, but I don't think it's impossible either. — Manuel

Sure this is why I only excluded structures without "similar" characteristics. Replicating a brain only proves that brains are necessary and sufficient.

As for panpsychism, the reason I don't think some formulation can't be ruled out, is that there is obviously something about matter that when so-combined, leads to experience. Granted, it's in brains that such combinations arise. But even so, if matter did not contain the possibility of consciousness as a potential, then experience couldn't happen even in brains. — Manuel

-That is not panpsychism though. Matter is capable for many things under specific conditions but we don't go around talking about i.e. Pancombustism, or Panflatulencism or Panphotosynthesism.
Actually this is a great point you made, because this is the WHOLE argument of our current Scientific Paradigm.
Science's paradigm states that we don't observe Advance Properties "floating" free in Nature. We constantly verify the need of Physical Structures with functions for such properties to emerge.
This is how we demarcate Supernatural from scientific claims, When Kastrup or Sheldrake or Hoffmann etc project high level features in nature independent of physical low level mechanisms we quickly understand that we deal with a pseudo scientific story.

Try taking some Academic Moocs on Neuroscience and Cognitive Science and revisit your critique about "my opinions".
Start with Future Learn and "What is a Mind" (by Mark Solms).

That is not panpsychism though. Matter is capable for many things under specific conditions but we don't go around talking about i.e. Pancombustism, or Panflatulencism or Panphotosynthesism.
Actually this is a great point you made, because this is the WHOLE argument of our current Scientific Paradigm. — Nickolasgaspar

That's exactly right. But then I don't see why we can't speak of pancombustism, or panphotosynthesism or pan-everything. That's a problem for the panpsychists who focus on consciousness at the expense of everything else.

Even if the claim is as broad and vague as possible, it's nonetheless true, in so far as we get all these processes from combinations or interactions between matter or "physical stuff".

That others may share your opinions does not mean that they are more than opinions. Neuroscience is in its infancy. Our understanding of what matter is and what it is capable of continues to develop.

The question of what matter is capable of is related to but not the same as the question of what minds are capable of.

I have not provided a critique of your opinions. I simply pointed out the fact that those opinions are not facts.

Science's paradigm states that we don't observe Advance Properties "floating" free in Nature. We constantly verify the need of Physical Structures with functions for such properties to emerge.
This is how we demarcate Supernatural from scientific claims, When Kastrup or Sheldrake or Hoffmann etc project high level features in nature independent of physical low level mechanisms we quickly understand that we deal with a pseudo scientific story. — Nickolasgaspar

This is a really good point. I hadn't thought of it in this way before.

You are confusing different properties of mind with Consciousness. Consciousness, according to Neuroscience is the third basic mental property.
Consciousness is the brain's ability to connect stimuli with the rest of our mind properties allowing the emergence of content in our experiences. — Nickolasgaspar

I disagree on what I am confusing.

For me there is no confusion; the brain is basically the product of evolutionarily compounded/refined intelligence..

Consciousness involves this ability to be intelligent but in the context that it refers to how it is applied to the beholder/self.

In simple terms then consciousness is intelligences awareness of self - it's specific appearance, definition and this it's limitations. Ie humanness. Human consciousness is the awareness of what it feels like to be Human (limited in ability but unlimited in imagination/creativity).

Philosophical questions regarding consciousness concern, among a great number of other things, the semantics of neuroscience in relation to the first-person perspective, as opposed to the scientifically established facts of neuroscience whose perspectival meaning and significance is undefined.

Philosophical questions also call into question the semantics and significance of science as a whole, and so it isn't possible to draw philosophical conclusions about consciousness from a narrow consideration of neuroscientific discoveries, because all that will be argued are circular tautologies that resolve none of the semantics of concern.

Thanks for interesting post. — bert1

I would say the same to you. Interesting and thorough. I appreciate it.

This perhaps is related to arguments from ignorance. I've been told that's what I'm doing several times, and that might be right. Maybe I just haven't read enough neuroscience. Maybe I lack faith in the scientific method which, after all, is easily the best method we have had so far in our history at arriving at reliable/true/useful theories about the world. — bert1

I wasn't accusing you of this, I was just identifying my understanding of why people might reject neuroscientific explanations of phenomenal consciousness.

Having said all that, the issues seem to me to be conceptual rather than empirical. Sometimes scientists need philosophers to help them out a bit with the concepts (yeah that's patronising, I don't care. — bert1

This comes back to a question I asked @Isaac:

I classify phenomenal consciousness as a mental process. That's the kind of a thing I say it is. The category I say it belongs in. One of the characteristics of a mental processes is that they are behaviors or at least that they manifest themselves to us as behaviors.

If it's not a mental process, what kind of a thing is it? What category does it fit in? — T Clark

What's your answer to that question?

That may be true of some, but I don't think it's true of many philosophers. People like Brian Cox and Dawkins make much of this point - going on and on about how the wonders of the natural world are not diminished by their physical basis. I think it basically a straw man, no serious woo-mongers actually make this point. — bert1

As you indicate, that is true of some, including some posting on this thread. I noted two reasons for rejecting a neuroscience explanation for phenomenal consciousness. Those were the only ones I could think of. You've added a new one - inconsistency in the neurological explanation:

One example of an important conceptual matter is the idea that consciousness does not, conceptually, seem to admit of borderline cases. — bert1

OK, so you're a non-reductionist about the mind. That's obviously fine but it creates a problem. If mind isn't just the operation of a nervous system, what is it? A simple unsophisticalted identification (the simplest way to be a physicalist) between neural activity and consciousness is no longer an option. One option is to take a hierarchical systems approach, saying that whole systems and sub-systems have properties unique to each 'level' and these have upward and downward causation powers, and that various components of mind, including consciousness, is somehow captured with these concepts. I think apokrisis thinks something along these lines (no doubt I have got it wrong somewhat wrong). — bert1

I think you've got it right. Yes, discussions with @apokrisis and others about the hierarchical nature of science has had a strong influence on my opinions on this subject.

As a panpsychist I go much further, and assert that any behaviour at all, including the behaviour of atoms, is valuable for the mind of the atom. Everything happens because of consciousness. I've been toying with the idea that all causation is actually psychological. — bert1

I would class this understanding along with such other non-physicalist explanations of reality as Tegmark's mathematical universe hypothesis. They are metaphysical approaches and, so, there is no empirical way of testing them. They are not facts, they are ways of thinking about something. As I see it, they are not useful ways of thinking, but that is certainly opinion, not fact.

The joke I don't get tired of repeating is taken from Churchill: "Panpsychism is the worst theory of consciousness apart from all the others." — bert1

Here's the joke about Churchill I don't get tired of:

At an elegant dinner party, Lady Astor once leaned across the table to remark, “If you were my husband, Winston, I’d poison your coffee.”
“And if you were my wife, I’d beat the shit out of you,” came Churchill’s unhesitating retort. — Michael O'Donaghue - The Churchill Wit

Again, thanks for the work out.

This comes back to a question I asked Isaac:

I classify phenomenal consciousness as a mental process. That's the kind of a thing I say it is. The category I say it belongs in. One of the characteristics of a mental processes is that they are behaviors or at least that they manifest themselves to us as behaviors.

If it's not a mental process, what kind of a thing is it? What category does it fit in? — T Clark — T Clark

I'm sorry for missing this one, I did read it through and thought the question was rhetorical.

I agree that phenomenal consciousness is a mental process, I think that, despite the passing similarity in name, it has little to do with consciousness (the state) which is more to to with merely being awake. This we can measure in various cortices being 'online'. Consciousness (the process), seems more like a post hoc storytelling of self-identity, it's a way of bringing together otherwise disparate and often contradictory mental processes into a coherent whole by re-telling what just happened seconds ago with this single character as the protagonist.

I'm something of a (slightly reformed) behaviourist, so I'm also in agreement with you in that it is our behaviours which reveal to us mental processes. Later on in my career, however, I was lucky enough to work with some excellent neuroscientists on issues around visual perception and they changed a lot of the way I think about cognitive processes. Now I consider it to be a bit more OK to talk about a mere cognitive state (sans behaviour) as being a real state of affairs, but I'm still not as comfortable with it as I am with behaviour.

That others may share your opinions does not mean that they are more than opinions. Neuroscience is in its infancy. Our understanding of what matter is and what it is capable of continues to develop. — Fooloso4

This is your argument to dismiss Systematic Knowledge of specialized authorities????( 35 years of advances in rapid pace).
The ultimate nature of matter is irrelevant to the field of Neuroscience.
Different properties of Mind have distinct causal mechanisms in our brain. THis is WHY when one has damage in the area of Memory or of Face recognition or Reasoning etc etc we can verify his ability to be consciously aware of his experiences but unable to remember , recognize , reason etc etc.

Its always good to listen to TRUE authority figures, they are the reason why you can use your devise to post your ignorant critique against their Systematic Knowledge (yes your pc/phone and internet connection works even if we don't know the ultimate nature of matter).

Since you don't accept any type of Epistemology we will end our conversation here.
I never do philosophy on the vague foundations of "all opinions are equal".

This is a really good point. I hadn't thought of it in this way before. — T Clark

I think its a good way to demarcate ontological claims that enjoy scientific support . Of course conflicting paradigms aren't necessary wrong.

This is your argument to dismiss Systematic Knowledge of specialized authorities????( 35 years of advances in rapid pace). — Nickolasgaspar

I have not presented an argument and I am not dismissing systematic knowledge or the work of specialized authorities. Those who are worth their salt are in agreement with me as to the state of the art.

The ultimate nature of matter is irrelevant to the field of Neuroscience. — Nickolasgaspar

What is the "ultimate" nature of matter? How do you know it is irrelevant? The best approach to neuroscience is multidisciplinary. Solms agrees. To disregard the question of what matter is and what it does is to cut your legs off.

Different properties of Mind have distinct causal mechanisms in our brain. — Nickolasgaspar

And this is something that is still poorly understood and subject to substantial revision.

...to post your ignorant critique against their Systematic Knowledge — Nickolasgaspar

Take a deep breath Nicky. Go to your happy place and calm down. I have not given a critique. Ask someone you recognize as an authority how far along we are in our understanding of neuroscience, consciousness, the brain, the mind.

Since you don't accept any type of Epistemology — Nickolasgaspar

.

This seems desperate and is wildly off the mark. I have said nothing at all to indicate that I don't accept any type of epistemology.

I never do philosophy on the vague foundations of "all opinions are equal". — Nickolasgaspar

A good policy but again, off the mark.