Got it. Well, I think his idea of "immediate intuitions" are "unmediated" awareness of sensory input, it's not necessarily an accurate picture of the external world. — schopenhauer1

I think it pays to remember that there is no "accurate picture" of an external world, except relative to the context of our collective representation: the empirical world.

I think it pays to remember that there is no "accurate picture" of an external world, except relative to the context of our collective representation: the empirical world. — Janus

Correct, though if I was a good realist, I’d add in evolutionary fit regarding why this empirical world and not a bats, or a slug, let alone interaction without animal perception.

Kant was a direct realist. — Jamal

I'll take your word for it.

It’s when people are explicitly and politely told that what they are attacking is a position that nobody holds, and they ignore the information completely. — Jamal

If I were attacking a position nobody holds no one would disagree with me.

It’s not just me who thinks so by the way. The view is set out nicely in Possible Experience: Understanding Kant's Critique of Pure Reason by Arthur Collins.

I think it’s more that he is reacting to the equally incoherent claim that we don’t perceive things “as they (really) are”. — Jamal

I think it can be coherently argued that the principle problem of philosophy is precisely learning to perceive truly. This does not only apply to the hypothetical tree, apple, or coffee cup which is the perennial stand-in for ‘the world’. If you go back to the beginning of philosophy (with Parmenides and the Eleatics) the understanding of how things can come to be as they are is the fundamental question. I *think* this is what Heidegger was attempting to revive with his question of ‘the meaning of being’.

Anglo philosophy is now as Banno pointed out overwhelmingly realist (and I would add naturalistic) in orientation. It starts with the assumption of ‘the reality of the tree/apple/coffee cup’ and then tries to work backward from that assumption without ever really calling it into question. Whereas what is generally categorised as idealist philosophy and also phenomenology, does call the ‘normal attitude’ into question. But that kind of questioning is generally considered out-of-scope by realism for what should be pretty obvious reasons.

(The term ‘critical realism’ comes to mind, although I can’t quite put my finger on where I read it - perhaps Roy Bhaskar.)

When you see a tree, you are directly seeing not the tree but it's reflected light. — hypericin

The idea that we perceive things "as they are' seems incoherent to me. — Janus

There's the misrepresentation of realism again.

Yep.

The pretence is that our only choice is between a direct realism that does not recognise a causal chain involved in prception - a view that no one here actually holds - and the explicitly stated, and quite wrong, view that

When you see a tree, you are directly seeing not the tree but it's reflected light. — hypericin

It's poor form.

Fair enough. For my part I could apply the first few sentences of the Searle article to myself.

...without ever really calling it into question. — Wayfarer

That's mighty unfair on the likes of Midgley, Anscombe, Rorty...

I think it can be coherently argued that the principle problem of philosophy is precisely learning to perceive truly. This does not only apply to the hypothetical tree, apple, or coffee cup which is the perennial stand-in for ‘the world’. If you go back to the beginning of philosophy (with Parmenides and the Eleatics) the understanding of how things can come to be as they are is the fundamental question. I *think* this is what Heidegger was attempting to revive with his question of ‘the meaning of being’.

Anglo philosophy is now as Banno pointed out overwhelmingly realist (and I would add naturalistic) in orientation. It starts with the assumption of ‘the reality of the tree/apple/coffee cup’ and then tries to work backward from that assumption without ever really calling it into question. Whereas what is generally categorised as idealist philosophy and also phenomenology, does call the ‘normal attitude’ into question. — Wayfarer

I have two modes that I haven’t quite been able to reconcile. One is my Anglo mode, in which I’m a plain-speaking direct realist, and the other is my sort of phenomenological, sort of Marxian, quite traditional, wannabe Hegelian mode, in which philosophy has ambitions as grand as you’ve set out here. From the latter point of view, Wittgenstein’s statement that philosophy “leaves everything as it is” is an abomination.

That “the principle problem of philosophy is precisely learning to perceive truly”, in a wider sense than is meant in this here discussion, sounds good to me. I think you’d really appreciate Horkheimer’s Eclipse of Reason, which I’m reading now. He has a notion of “objective reason”, which aims at universal truths and might line up with your own conception of philosophy.

Great philosophical systems, such as those of Plato and Aristotle, scholasticism, and German idealism were founded on an objective theory of reason. It aimed at evolving a comprehensive system, or hierarchy, of all beings, including man and his aims. The degree of reasonableness of a man’s life could be determined according to its harmony with this totality. Its objective structure, and not just man and his purposes, was to be the measuring rod for individual thoughts and actions. This concept of reason never precluded subjective reason, but regarded the latter as only a partial, limited expression of a universal rationality from which criteria for all things and beings were derived. — Horkheimer, Eclipse of Reason

I’ve just read the Searle article, I agree with it in some ways but I think his characterisation of ‘the bad arguments’ of philosophy and philosophy of science is a bit facile. Midgley is one of those who calls the assumed naturalism of much English philosophy into question. Raymond Tallis is another. They’re not really whom I’m talking about.

Indeed - I’be happened on that book of Horkheimer’s and agree with his diagnosis. It’s clearly related to his work elsewhere on the ‘instrumentalisation of reason’. That’s why I’m starting to appreciate the insights of existentialism - not all of them, I don’t much care for Sartre and Camus, but the more spiritually-inclined of them.

It’s clearly related to his work elsewhere on the ‘instrumentalisation of reason’ — Wayfarer

Exactly. He wrote it around the same time he was writing DofE with Adorno. But it’s much clearer.

No matter which intermediary you choose, all of it is a part of the environment, which is directly accessible and perceived directly. — NOS4A2

It is not directly perceived though, that's the point. I do not sense space, it's conceptual. But if you're quite sure that you are sensing space I see no point to the discussion.

The pretence is that our only choice is between a direct realism that does not recognise a causal chain involved in prception - a view that no one here actually holds — Banno

Not just a casual chain, a series of fundamental transformations, between which there is nothing "direct".

They’re not really whom I’m talking about — Wayfarer

We've discussed previously how I share a disquiet with much of the scientism assumed in analytic philosophy. But we part ways in that, if I've understood you correctly, you are a dualist while I am a monist; you accept some form of spiritualism while I remain stuck at the various conceptual problems with the supernatural, reincarnation, surviving death and so on.

I'll not accept your characterising me as not calling realism into question.

The problem with this thread, and the reason I did not at first pay it much attention, is its parsing of the issues in terms of direct realism. I think I made the point earlier that the discussion elsewhere passed on to realism and anti-realism, the truth-values of our sentences about the world around us, and then on to intentionality. I agree that there are issues with Searle's article, but I think the counterpoint he is making - a remake of Austin - quite telling.

And I hope you have the integrity to agree that @hypericin account of perception and @schopenhauer1's characterisation of direct realism are shonky.

Fair enough. For my part I could apply the first few sentences of the Searle article to myself. — Banno

Even the best of us have a fatal flaw.

Not just a casual chain, a series of fundamental transformations, between which there is nothing "direct". — hypericin

I'll try one more time to show how this is a mischaracterisation of realism.

Realism holds that the sentence "the tree has leaves" is about the tree, and not about the perception of the tree, or our beliefs about the tree, or any other relation between ourselves and the tree. That the tree has leaves is true if and only if the tree has leaves, regardless of what we perceive or believe.

In particular, for you, "the tree has leaves" is not about the light reflected from the tree.

(Now someone will claim that, that it is a "tree" and that these count as "leaves" are all down to our interpretation and not facts in the world, which is not exactly wrong but certainly not quite right; yes, we structure the interpretation we give to the world - but we can do this only since there is a world to so interpret).

The opposite of realism is not idealism, but anitrealism; the view that the truth of our sentences about the tree are not just either true or false.

You can see further discussion of this at Realism.

...a fatal flaw... — Jamal

Only one?

Realism holds that the sentence "the tree has leaves" is about the tree, and not about the perception of the tree, or our beliefs about the tree, or any other relation between ourselves and the tree. That the tree has leaves is true if and only if the tree has leaves, regardless of what we perceive or believe. — Banno

But this is trivially true regardless of one's metaphysics. The idealist or anti-realist can equally say that "the tree has leaves" is about the tree not about anyone's perception of the tree. So, you're presenting a strawman; you are doing the misunderstanding, while incorrectly imagining that others have misunderstood you.

The absurdity of what you are claiming as the thinking of idealists and anti-realists is shown in the actual sentence you want to impute to them: "my perception of the tree has leaves" as if it could just as easily have not included them. Your interlocutors are not as stupid as you, stupidly, like to think.

But this is trivially true regardless of one's metaphysics. — Janus

Oh, that's good. Should save plenty of paper, then.

I have two modes that I haven’t quite been able to reconcile. One is my Anglo mode, in which I’m a plain-speaking direct realist, and the other is my sort of phenomenological, sort of Marxian, quite traditional, wannabe Hegelian mode, in which philosophy has ambitions as grand as you’ve set out here. From the latter point of view, Wittgenstein’s statement that philosophy “leaves everything as it is” is an abomination. — Jamal

Wittgenstein cannot have really believed that "philosophy leaves everything as it is" since he saw it as a therapeutic, transformative process of liberation from reificatory thinking, of "bewitchment by means of language".

But this is trivially true regardless of one's metaphysics. — Janus


Oh, that's good. Shoudl save plenty of paper, then. — Banno

Really, what are you using paper for? In any case, I'll take that as a statement of agreement

Correct, though if I was a good realist, I’d add in evolutionary fit regarding why this empirical world and not a bats, or a slug, let alone interaction without animal perception. — schopenhauer1

I don't understand this comment; can you explain?

I don't understand this comment; can you explain? — Janus

A human experience, a bat experience, and a slug experience of the tree is obviously very different. A rock's interacting with a tree is even more far afield (some would say a category error to group it with animal experience). I think @Banno isn't seeing the "realism" in "indirect realism". That is to say, the human, bat, and slug are experiencing a "real" tree, but each one "constructs" (and there is the indirect) the tree differently.

Now, once we add in non-perceiving/mon-animal/non-living forms that are simply "interacting" with the tree, that is where I feel things get interesting and metaphysical, and INFORMS the animal/perceiving/living interactions.

I think it can be coherently argued that the principle problem of philosophy is precisely learning to perceive truly. This does not only apply to the hypothetical tree, apple, or coffee cup which is the perennial stand-in for ‘the world’. If you go back to the beginning of philosophy (with Parmenides and the Eleatics) the understanding of how things can come to be as they are is the fundamental question. I *think* this is what Heidegger was attempting to revive with his question of ‘the meaning of being’. — Wayfarer

With "learning to perceive truly" do you mean something like 'learning to see richness instead of paucity'? I don't understand Heidegger as ever being concerned with the "understanding of how things can come to be as they are".

In Being and Time (as I understand it) Heidegger is attempting a phenomenological analysis of what it is to be a human being; an analysis which ultimately fails in my view, and I think in Heidegger's own view (which explains his "Kehre" or "turning" to poetic instead of analytical language).

Wittgenstein cannot have really believed that "philosophy leaves everything as it is" since he saw it as a therapeutic, transformative process of liberation from reificatory thinking, of "bewitchment by means of language" — Janus

I don’t think it’s a contradiction but I’m unwilling to work out exactly why it isn’t. The main point is that what you call a transformative process of liberation, others would call a purely negative effort to clear up some deep confusions. Getting our house in order so we can all get on with whatever it is that we already, with no input or comment from philosophy, regard as important in our social and spiritual lives. It is in this sense that some critics have labelled him as basically conservative.

I think they’re pretty much right but I also think Wittgenstein is great.

Getting our house in order so we can all get on with whatever it is that we already, with no input from philosophy, regard as important in our social and spiritual lives. — Jamal

What if debating philosophy gives us social and spiritual fulfillment? Some philosophers like the perplexing madness of it (though dealing with shitty personalities of the pompous, egotistical, and trolling variety that might be drawn to philosophy I'd say ruins some of it). Certainly "going about your day" can be very mundane so not sure why he couldn't circle back to that idea at least pragmatically speaking, being that he was kind of a linguistic pragmatist.

I don't understand Heidegger as ever being concerned with the "understanding of how things can come to be as they are". — Janus

As I understand it, his deep project was about the meaning of being, so wouldn’t that entail an “understanding of how things can come to be as they are”?

What if debating philosophy gives us social and spiritual fulfillment? Some philosophers like the perplexing madness of it. Certainly "going about your day" can be very mundane so not sure why he couldn't circle back to that idea at least pragmatically speaking, being that he was kind of a linguistic pragmatist. — schopenhauer1

I don’t understand what you’re saying here schop.

This discussion has gone off-topic. I have a feeling it was my fault.

That is to say, the human, bat, and slug are experiencing a "real" tree, but each one "constructs" (and there is the indirect) the tree differently. — schopenhauer1

I don't know about @Banno, but I think @Isaac would agree that different organisms perceive the tree differently. Organisms' perceptions are affected both exogenously and endogenously.

Personally, I think the whole direct/ indirect parlance is inapt. It's just another example of being bewitched by dualistic thinking. From different perspectives 'direct" and 'indirect' are both OK, but the idea that one or the other is "correct", in anything but a contextual sense is misguided in my view.

Philosophy delivers only contextual truths, and there are as many possible assumptions to begin from as there are philosophies. The idea that some are "correct" and others not, tout court, erroneously fails to acknowledge the different presuppositions in play, and the reality of talking past one another on account of that.

I don’t think it’s a contradiction but I’m unwilling to work out exactly why it isn’t. The main point is that what you call a transformative process of liberation, others would call a purely negative effort to clear up some deep confusions. Getting our house in order so we can all get on with whatever it is that we already, with no input from philosophy, regard as important in our social and spiritual lives. It is in this sense that some critics have labelled him as basically conservative.

I think they’re pretty much right but I also think Wittgenstein is great. — Jamal

I agree, the "purely negative effort to clear up some deep confusions" is precisely what I understand to be philosophy's "transformative process of liberation". I can speculate that Wittgenstein may have meant that philosophy leaves the world just as it is, in the sense of not adopting any metaphysical view about the nature of reality, and I would agree with that.

I see philosophy as a propaedeutic to spiritual transformation, to learning to see non-dually. Still, I would say that although philosophy cannot effect a far-reaching spiritual transformation, it can help to liberate us from being concerned with "views", just as Nagarjuna's dialectic is intended to do, and that that counts as a "transformative process of liberation"; albeit merely an intellectual one.

As I understand it, his deep project was about the meaning of being, so wouldn’t that entail an “understanding of how things can come to be as they are”? — Jamal

I guess it's a matter of interpretation: to me an "understanding of how things can come to be as they are" suggests some kind of causal account of the genesis of the world, and I don't think Heidegger was concerned with that. Of course I might be mistaken, and I could be persuaded to change my mind by being presented with anything he wrote which would suggest otherwise.

I don’t understand what you’re saying here schop.

This discussion has gone off-topic. I have a feeling it was my fault. — Jamal

You seemed to indicate that Witty is saying philosophy is a hindrance to spiritual fulfillment, but what if it is part of it for some people? And thus bypassing would not be good, as you seem to be interpreting him.

Personally, I think the whole direct/ indirect parlance is inapt. It's just another example of being bewitched by dualistic thinking. From different perspectives 'direct" and 'indirect' are both OK, but the idea that one or the other is "correct", in anything but a contextual sense is misguided in my view.

Philosophy delivers only contextual truths, and there are as many possible assumptions to begin from as there are philosophies. The idea that some are "correct" and others not, tout court, erroneously fails to acknowledge the different presuppositions in play, and the reality of talking past one another on account of that. — Janus

Yeah I'm with you. I don't like using direct or indirect realism either. I think oddly enough, we are all in agreement about the outdated/outmoded dichotomy that this presents. It simply doesn't capture the sophistication of the subject and makes it more confusing than helpful distinctions. It comes from a time when strict distinctions of idealism and realism were in play perhaps. More 18th century than 21st century.

I see. Yeah, I don’t entirely agree with him. At the same time, I don’t think I’d want to promote philosophy as some sort of personal comfort. I think it is fundamentally important to humanity and society as a whole.