Obviously this statement is not compatible with a concern for Ukrainian welfare. The goal is to just harm Russia, not actually stop Russia from achieving it's objectives in Ukraine — “boethius

That's just dumb, obviously if Russia isn't stopped, Ukraine loses the war at great sacrifice, this isn't "good" for Ukrainian welfare — “boethius

.

By comparing these 2 quotations, anybody can immediately notice your conceptual confusion, typical of a militant mind addicted to reasoning through slogans. In the first one you do not talk just about “stop Russia” but about “stop Russia from achieving it's objectives in Ukraine”. Yet in the second quotation, the “from” clause has vanished (it’s common for slogans to use ellipsis: e.g. “Yes we can!”, “Just do it!”, “Stop Russia!”). So you are implicitly conflating “stop Russia” and “stop Russia from achieving it’s objectives in Ukraine” and then mistakenly projecting it on to me, hence your disingenuous misunderstanding. Why the conflation? The point is that for pro-Russian propaganda like yours “stop Russia” ultimately equates to “stop Russia from killing more Ukrainians by surrendering to all Russian demands” (because otherwise Russia won’t stop the killing! Possibly it will escalate to a nuclear war that will destroy humanity! etc.), and possibly let the West/NATO/US take the part/main/whole responsibility for what happened (because the Westerners have provoked Holy Russia), including all atrocities Russian committed to their alleged “brothers”. And the conclusion that this narrative is surreptitiously pushing is that if the West doesn’t want to stop Russia the way it is suggested by the pro-Russia propaganda that means that Western decision makers do not care for Ukrainian welfare, they are using Ukrainians as "cannon fodder” (in Putin’s words) to piss off Russia, so their policies against Russia will get discredited to the eyes of Western people and the Ukrainians’ people that really care for the Ukrainian welfare or their morality, and in turn likely lose their support.
So while your intellectually miserable rhetoric trick is insanely clear (which is classic pro-Russian propaganda), and explains your convenient misunderstanding and chopping my quotations, the substantial point is still the same as I fully stated it. The endgame of the West is not “to stop Russia” whatever that means, but something more specific which is not even to “stop Russia from achieving it's objectives in Ukraine”, but what I specified in the part that you conveniently chopped out from that quotation of mine: “But to inflict as much enduring damage as possible to Russian power (in terms of its economic system, its system of alliance, its capacity of military projection outside its borders, its its technology supply, its military and geopolitical status) to the point it is not longer perceived as a non-negligible geopolitical threat to the West”
That’s the security concern that the West is rationally expected to prioritise as any geopolitical entity (including Ukraine and Russia). Yet as long as the West wants to extend its sphere of influence in Ukraine and Ukraine wants to join the Western sphere of influence, there is convergence of interests and since both see Russia as a security threat they are cooperating to fight such threat. To the extent there is cooperation, convergence of interest and perception of threats, Western strategy against Russia is compatible with Ukrainian welfare perspectives as they understand them.

So just say you are willing to sacrifice Ukraine and Ukrainian welfare to harm the Russians, and argue that point. Sometimes great achievements require great sacrifices (of other people). — “boethius

What did you just write?! Since when do I even have the power “to sacrifice Ukraine”?! Is that a psychological quiz to guess my astrological sign?! BTW how many Ukrainian lives did your online outrage save so far exactly? How many lives you and those you care about were you willing to sacrifice to save the world from whatever deserves your online outrage exactly?

It's just crass and cowardly to show your cards, what you truly believe, which is harming Russia is your priority and not Ukrainian welfare — “boethius

What I truly believe is that Western strategic priority is neither harming Russia nor Ukrainian welfare (yet another misattribution), it’s Western security currently threatened by Russia and other authoritarian regimes.
BTW also Ukrainian strategic priority is neither harming Russia nor Western welfare but Ukrainian security currently threatened by Russia and supported by the West.
BTW also Russia strategic priority is neither harming the Ukrainian nor the Western welfare but it’s Russia security currently threatened by Ukraine and the West.
So pertinent debate about geopolitical strategy would be about reliability of threat perception and responses of these 3 geopolitical subjects, and trying to make it personal with such fallacious emotional blackmailing objections to discredit me (instead of questioning ad rem my arguments) is just an intellectually miserable move of the worst propaganda.

BTW, since you seem to care and know about the Ukrainian welfare more than I do, I still have to ask: how many Ukrainian lives did your online outrage save so far exactly? — neomac


I'll respond to this as well, as it's such a dumb strawman. — boethius

Again that’s not a strawman but an attack “ad hominem” (as an intellectually fair retortion against your attack ad hominem against me), more specifically a “tu quoque” argument (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tu_quoque). Unfortunately it’s not logically fallacious, because I’m not questioning your honesty to prove your arguments or claim over the war to be false, I’m simply questioning your honesty. At worst you can prove my accusation of dishonesty to be false. Unfortunately you proved to be overly intellectually dishonest. So good luck with that.

Obviously, my recommendation (my position in this argument) of a negotiated resolution to the conflict, which would require recognising legitimate grievances of the Russians (and also against the Russians) would be the first step in trying to find an acceptable compromise to the warring parties, would, if followed, result in an end to the war and saving Ukrainian lives who would otherwise perish in the trenches, explosions, from the cold in their apartments, disease, and all manner of evils which accompany a war if it was to continue (which it has).
What I can say, is that if my recommendation was followed at the start of the war (when Ukraine had likely the most leverage it would ever have) literally hundreds of thousands of people now dead would still be alive (not only in Ukraine but due to increases in food and energy prices worldwide that translates directly into more suffering and deaths).

Of course, it could be argued that whatever compromise would be required is not worth saving those lives, or that the Russian demands of an independent Donbas (at the time) and recognition of Crimea would be a worse state of affairs than the lives lost since.

It could be argued that what's important is:

The end game for NATO/US involvement in this war doesn’t need to be to stop Russia or overturn its regime. But to inflict as much enduring damage as possible to Russian power (in terms of its economic system, its system of alliance, its capacity of military projection outside its borders, its its technology supply, its military and geopolitical status) to the point it is not longer perceived as a non-negligible geopolitical threat to the West. — neomac

And so concern of Ukrainian lives is misplaced given what can be achieved if we encourage them to fight on, even perhaps without actually "stopping the Russians" and even if we know that to be the likely outcome.

But saying a peace settlement would not result in less Ukrainian dead, is just dumb. Obviously it would.

The benefits to a peace and compromise are less death, and the benefits to more war are achieving the fruits of war (mostly territory and national pride) at the cost of a lot of death. — boethius

First, this argument doesn’t prove concern for Ukrainians’ welfare at all. You are simply suggesting a moral dilemma involving Ukrainian lives as a burden for Western/Ukrainian decision makers and their supporters, which is perfectly in line with the kind of argument pushed by pro-Russian propaganda too, including Russian decision makers, namely those who ordered committing atrocities against Ukrainians. And committing atrocities against Ukrainians doesn’t sound much like being concerned about “brother” Ukrainians, right? So your accusations exposing my alleged lack of concern for Ukrainian welfare (based on arguments I find fallacious) can be as easily and fairly retorted to you and your emotional blackmailing strategy.
Second, what do you mean by “require recognising legitimate grievances of the Russians”? Peace negotiations can be dealt with as quid-pro-quo without recognising any legitimate grievances, like a prisoner exchange, so why would this be required as a first step for a peace negotiation? What form should we adopt such recognition exactly? Is it something that needs to be officially recorded anywhere? With what potential/likely legal and propaganda cost/benefit and strategic implications? What kind of “legitimate grievances” are you talking about and in what sense you consider them “legitimate”? Finally what kind of legitimate grievances against the Russians (notice how the negotiation requirements are framed around pro- and cons- for Russia, because they are the ones really need convincing not the West or the Ukrainians) is Russia required to recognize as a first step?
Third, the rest of your quotation is just a text-book example of dishonest framing your opponents’ views over one single trivial point (peace settlement would result in less Ukrainian dead). Indeed you are just conjecturing arguments (“It could be argued”) and claims (“saying a peace settlement would not result in less Ukrainian dead”) and opponents’ reasons (“mostly territory and national pride” “at the cost of a lot of death”) which nobody in this thread actually expressed (certainly I didn’t), constantly framed in terms of discounting “Ukrainian lives” (“concern of Ukrainian lives is misplaced”, “not worth saving those lives”, “worse state of affairs than the lives lost since”), to hint how the moral dilemma must obviously be solved to you. In other words, an insanely clear prove of your brainwashing strategy.

Now, this is of course a debate between non-decision makers, so at no point do I have the power to directly translate my recommendations into "saving Ukrainian lives" by negotiating what I think is a reasonable resolution to the war; so proposing that as a burden of proof of some kind is just stupid.
No where do I claim I've saved Ukrainian lives, and that's basically the text-book definition of a strawman to present my position as claiming that or somehow requiring to demonstrate that.
Had there been a peaceful resolution at any point in the conflict, perhaps then I could say my analysis contributed to that in some small way, but there is no peace and no lives have been spared. — boethius

First, talking in terms of “my recommendations” is already symptomatic of your militant mindset. Unfortunately you do not look anything other than an avg anonymous dude of a philosophy forum giving “recommendations” to other avg anonymous dudes for a negotiation between Ukraine and Russia even though nobody in the thread is a decision maker (by your own assumption) nor is evidently directly involved in that war, and yet so passionately looking forward to intellectually wanking himself over the idea of a peaceful resolution where perhaps maybe who knows inshallah then he could say "his" analysis (practically copy and paste of pro-Russian propaganda) contributed to that resolution in some small microscopic infinitesimal practically unnoticeable by anybody yet so so so decisive way ?! How pathetic is that?! And I am the delusional one here?! Tell me more about "your" analysis’ contributions to end the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, dude! How is it going with the war in Yemen, dude?!
Second, that question wasn’t a strawman, and it didn’t mean to suggest claims of yours you didn’t make (as you repeatedly did and keep doing with me). It was an accusation of hypocrisy: your outrage and accusation of lack of concern of Ukraine welfare, your disingenuous psychological quiz, your anonymous, cheap, simplistic and unoriginal recommendations about peaceful negotiation for your self-conceited moralism prove neither my lack of concern nor your concern for Ukrainians’ welfare at all. And since exposing your interlocutors’ alleged hypocrisy seems to matter to you, no matter how pointlessly, here I’m fairly exposing your hypocrisy.
Third, elsewhere you too seemed to understand that the problem is not just peace deal to save lives which Westerners and Ukrainians want but also other critical needs including a “third party to keep Russia to its promise” and to “actually act” which also Westerners and Ukrainians want [1]. It’s wanting to satisfy all such critical needs and yet perceiving that the circumstances are such that one can not have all of them satisfied at the same time that triggers the moral dilemma. Indeed if other needs weren’t perceived at least as critical as the lives already sacrificed and at risk of being sacrificed, starting with those who must directly suffer such sacrifices of the war (i.e. the Ukrainians), there would be no moral dilemma. But since you also believe the disagreement between your views and your opponent’s views may not be related to moral corruption (as you keep so desperately trying to depict pro-Ukrainian/West supporters) but to different values [2], then until you don’t offer any rationally compelling criteria to assess how your views can be justified to your opponent with different values you’ll remain entrenched in your irrational informational bubble and arbitrary accusations of moral corruption (e.g. no concern for Ukrainian welfare, Russophobia, hypocrisy, cowardice, etc.). Such is the abyss of your intellectual misery.

It’s Xmas time and yet I have no pity for you. Go figure.

[1]

My point is simply that obviously Russia is willing to pay the cost of war with Ukraine under certain circumstances (such as circumstances that literally exist right now ... if they weren't willing, then they'd be withdrawing right now and the war would be over). Therefore, you could never reasonably assume such circumstances would not reemerge in the future regardless of any peace deal today. If there's no third party to keep Russia to its promise to not reinvade in the context of a peace deal (even ignoring the problem of why we'd believe such a third party would actually act), then there is simply nothing that can be remotely described as a guarantee of not being reinvaded available to Ukraine. — boethius

[2]

Certainly we would want law to conform to our normative disposition, but until A. all people have the same values and B. little or no corruption exists, then that won't be the case — boethius

Merkel’s revelation proves EU-inked deals not worth the paper they’re written on — DPR
https://tass.com/world/1549509

By comparing these 2 quotations, anybody can immediately notice your conceptual confusion, typical of a militant mind addicted to reasoning through slogans. In the first one you do not talk just about “stop Russia” but about “stop Russia from achieving it's objectives in Ukraine”. Yet in the second quotation, the “from” clause has vanished (it’s common for slogans to use ellipsis: e.g. “Yes we can!”, “Just do it!”, “Stop Russia!”). — neomac

Your words are absolutely clear:

Sure, here I restate it again and bolden it: The end game for NATO/US involvement in this war doesn’t need to be to stop Russia or overturn its regime. But to inflict as much enduring damage as possible to Russian power (in terms of its economic system, its system of alliance, its capacity of military projection outside its borders, its its technology supply, its military and geopolitical status) to the point it is not longer perceived as a non-negligible geopolitical threat to the West. Outrageous right?! — neomac

No where in this is Ukrainian welfare or Ukraine "winning" requirement in your endgame, whatever definition of that they are using today, under consideration. Ukraine can both lose, and in the process suffer extreme harms, and your end game can still be accomplished if enough damage is inflicted on Russia.

The instrument to "inflict as much as enduring damage as possible to Russian power" is Ukrainian lives. In the world of "practical rationality" there is no military achievement in this context possible without sacrificing Ukrainian lives. So, if you want to maximise your military objective, which is harming the Russians in your "endgame", then that requires maximising the sacrifice of Ukraine. Even when in a clearly losing position and even when suffering far higher kill-ratios than the Russians and civilian and economic damage etc. fighting on another day will still inflict another day of damage to the Russians.

Predictably, you now try to move the goal posts to NATO and Ukraine, but again the harms to Ukraine in such a process can still be essentially total. Ukraine could be totally destroyed, totally sacrificed, in such a project and if the goal to inflict enough damage on Russia is achieved then perhaps Russia is indeed no longer a threat to Ukraine. However, if in the process "Ukraine", however you want to define it, is totally sacrificed and destroyed, clearly Ukrainian welfare has not been protected.

You just throw up bullshit and then move the goal posts around in typical pseudo-intellectual fashion.

However, you've made your position and priorities clear, which is an entirely coherent geopolitical position to take: you want the US to "win" in this conflict, Russia to be damaged enough to no longer be "a threat" and Ukraine can serve this objective. If your top priority is inflicting damage on Russia, then Ukrainian welfare is subordinate to that.

You can not serve 2 masters: you will love the one and hate the other. Clearly, you serve US interests in this conversation.

Which leads to plenty of interesting debate.

For example, I have serious doubts about your geopolitical theory considering China is the much larger hegemonic competitor to the US.

Is the US attritting Russian forces and weapons stockpiles and political capital using the Ukrainians ... or is China attritting the US weapons stockpiles and political capital using the Russians?

Are energy flows from Russia that once fuelled the NATO war machine in Europe diverging to fuel the Chinese war machine a good thing for the US?

Does the US need its allies in Europe in good economic order more than China needs its ally Russia in good economic order, is Russia even hurting economically more than Europe? Now and over the medium and long term.

Can your objective of inflicting "enough damage" on the Russians even be achieved, considering the war is 99.9% taking place in Ukraine and Russia has already increased it's population due to the annexes and refugee flows out of Ukraine:

Number of Ukrainian refugees recorded in each country:
1. Russia (2,852,395) — wikipedia citing the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees

And military stockpiles after a war (that you win) usually rapidly match and exceed the stockpiles that existed prior to the war (although perhaps not in this case, given the size of the Soviet stockpiles, but certainly Russia has the resources and production capacity to keep arms manufacturing going at a good pace both during and after the war).

As far as I can tell, regardless of how and when this war ends, post-sanctions-and-war Russia will be far more dangerous to its neighbour's and the West than the previous Russia-we-trade-with, and at the same time Europe will be significantly worse off economically.

The war is certainly good for US gas producers and arms producers, but equating these interests with US interest as such or "the West's" interest as such is a big mistake.

The Economist interviewed General Valery Zaluzhny, the head of Ukraine’s armed forces.

Now, normally I don't pay much mind to government or military officials' statements. You have to read between the lines to get a morsel of useful info. But Zaluzhny is no politico, and he is known for speaking candidly on those infrequent occasions when he speaks in public. And indeed, this interview is not what you might expect: "Rah-rah-rah! Crimea in six months!" Not at all. — SophistiCat

Scott Ritter's take on this interview is essentially as follows:

First, this is not some spontaneous off-the-cuff remarks by some low level commander.

He may very well be someone who speaks candidly, but this interview was certainly planned by the US administration (because it's to a US news outlet; if it was to Ukrainian journalists, then maybe in that case he's gone off script or just shit-happens kind of thing). In addition, Zelensky was there.

So, already the fact this interview happens and is Zaluzhny is the primary representative of Ukraine delivering critical information is pretty significant.

Why not Zelensky? Because he's talked himself into a corner of refusing all compromise, insisting Ukraine is winning, and going to win every single inch of territory back, including Crimea and anything less is unacceptable.

Unfortunately, in war you may simply not be able to achieve what you want, and this is Zaluzhny's central message, that 300 tanks, 600-700 infantry fighting vehicles and 500 howitzers would be required to take Melitopol, a key objective to pressure Crimea.

Not only does he state this, but he states Russian mobilisation has been a success and without this fairly massive infusion of equipment (if I'm not mistaken, larger than every single NATO country's vehicle fleet, with the exception the US; actually Turkey has 3000 main battle tanks, followed by Greece with 1200, and Poland with some 800, and then a Romania, Bulgaria, France and Spain have over 300, along with the US 8000, so numbers isn't a problem but these are mostly tanks that NATO does not want to provide), that Russia will win the war.

To emphasise his point, he reference Field Marshal Mannerheim's concession speech explaining Finland admitting defeat and signing the armistice with the Soviet Union.

Finland has been used as a model for fighting the Russians (in reality Soviets), but if that's the model, Finland loses the war. Of course, losing the war while retaining independence was potentially the best outcome for Finland, so it was definitely a "win" in that sense, but since it was simply impossible for Finland to "defeat" the Soviet Union, the only options are eventual defeat or then a diplomatic compromise (acceptable to the Soviet Union; what other people think doesn't matter if you're dealing with Soviet Union).

Now, the white house did not respond with "yeah, yeah, yeah, all that's on its way".

So, if defeat is inevitable, and it's impossible for Zelensky to negotiate, then Zelensky will need to be replaced. This is pretty standard politicking, as insofar as you believe more fighting in desirable, someone like Zelensky is good for moral by essentially maximising the cheerleading, then when further fighting is no longer desirable someone more "candid" can be selected to replace him and negotiate a resolution.

That Zelensky was still involved in the interview indicates to me that he'll likely be resigning, instead of being thrown under the bus. This will be the definite signal to Ukrainians, as well as the whole world, that Ukraine will negotiate a peaceful settlement.

Is essentially Scott Ritter's analysis.

Of course, nothing is totally certain in war, but I would guess the US administration is setting up the option for an end to the war along these lines with this interview and switching media focus to Zaluzhny. People in the West now know who Zaluzhny is and that he's a trustworthy straight talker.

The other piece of evidence I would add that would support this analysis, is that the US response to all the Russians shutting down the Ukrainian grid every 2 weeks and degrading it, is to send Patriot Missile systems.

These cannot possibly defend Ukrainian air space against this kind of an attack. Essentially nothing can defend against offensive missiles except your own offensive missiles.

Air defence only works against vastly inferior opponent that is unable to attrit your AA systems. The basic math is: offensive missiles are cheaper than defensives missiles, and the attacker can employ decoys which has no counter part in defence. Not only can you make smaller and cheaper decoys but you can also just produce cheaper missiles with minimal guidance and no payload (or replace with fuel) and then fly around and there's zero way to differentiate.

Not that anti-air is useless. It does make sense in defending point targets like military bases and air craft carrier with multiple levels of defence, but, even there, the point is you're also attacking and your AA is buying time while you carry out your own air attacks on the opponents assets. So definitely, if you attacked a US carrier group, your missiles maybe destroyed and yourself shortly after.

However, there is simply no way to employ Patriot or any other AA systems in a war of attrition against an electricity grid spread out over a vast area without being able to actually destroy the origins of these attacks (i.e. invade and conquer Russia). Indeed, even in it's intended use case of defending fixed points, if you weren't fighting back, and even if Patriot is 100% effective you would quickly run out of missiles and everything else and your entire carrier group would be sunk (what makes the carrier group dangerous is that it will probably fight back).

Some parallel developments, FYI

Council adopts decision not to accept Russian documents issued in Ukraine and Georgia
^{— European Council · Dec 8, 2022}

The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Karim A.A. Khan KC, announces conclusion of the investigation phase in the Situation in Georgia
<sup>— Karim Ahmad Khan · International Criminal Court · Dec 16, 2022

• Russo-Georgian War (Wikipedia)
• Responsibility for the Russo-Georgian War (Wikipedia)</sup>

A couple of scattered, peripherally related news items ...

Russia sends St. Petersburg riot police to Mariupol to stop new protests
^{— Daniel Stewart · News 360 · Dec 16, 2022}

Someone, quick, the coast is clear, incite some bigtime protests in St Petersburg. :up: :grin:

Israeli-tied Moldovan TV channels halt Russia-Ukraine war reporting
^{— Reuters via The Jerusalem Post · Dec 17, 2022}

Ilan Shor, "the young one", is done with corruption/subversion in Moldova I guess.

As far as I can tell, regardless of how and when this war ends, post-sanctions-and-war Russia will be far more dangerous to its neighbour's and the West than the previous Russia-we-trade-with, and at the same time Europe will be significantly worse off economically. — boethius

Russia won't be more dangerous after the war, it will be defanged and humbled. Don't you look forward to that?

Russia won't be more dangerous after the war, it will be defanged and humbled. Don't you look forward to that? — Olivier5

It could be, but that's far from certain.

Conventional war theory is that an army that is merely not-defeated (doesn't even need to win), is stronger after a war than before even if damage suffered during the war is severe. As I've mentioned, even militaries that lose and essentially forced to disarm, such as Germany after WWI, still have all the experience benefits enabling starting entirely new world war a few decades later in this case, but typical examples are the US army after the US civil war and Soviet army after WWII (some 12 million personnel despite some 9 million dead and 22 million wounded during the war; essentially 2 orders of magnitude greater than current Russian losses in Ukraine).

The reasons for this is that fighting an actual war is not only "real-world experience" necessary to get good at anything, but places significant meritocracy pressure on the chain of command, as well as orienting a large part of the economy to war materials and fighting.

It is very simplistic thinking to believe that short term harms inflicted on the Russian army translate to any medium or long term harms.

As for economic sanctions, I have trouble seeing any problems for Russia insofar as China is willing to supply them. People should keep in mind that nearly all our "Western technology" is fabricated and/or assembled in East-Asia, significant portion in China itself, and there's zero way to significantly obstruct Russian supply chains without China's active assistance.

Considering we've been calling China our rival, geo-political threat, needing a pivot or two, etc. for decades, I have difficulty imagining why China would suddenly assist us in what is, arguably, a Chinese proxy war to attrit NATO.

And this is not controversial opinion in geo-political analysis circles, the top "cold warriors" nearly all came out of retirement to warn the US and NATO that their actions in Ukraine are potentially counter-productive in terms of the balance-of-power, such as Kissinger.

Does cutting Russia off from the Western economic system (while still needing to buy their resources directly or through intermediaries) harm Russia? Or does it reduce our leverage in dealing with Russia? Leading to all sorts of trouble down the line.

Is Russia transitioning to (a large degree) a war economy where we've purposefully removed all potential pathways to "Westernise", even going so far as to ban Russian orchestras and sports teams etc., increase or decrease Russia as a threat to our interests?

Indeed, Kissinger just reiterated his position that peace is a preferable geopolitical choice.

I disagree with a lot Kissinger's decisions, but there is no denying his expertise on geopolitical issues as well as his priority being "US interests".

It's time for a negotiated peace in Ukraine, Kissinger says — Reuters

Notably, Kissinger also suggests international organised referendums as a means to solve the annexation issue (which I was the first to suggest, on this very forum, as far as I know).

Likewise, achieving the goal of breaking up Russia, potentially resulting in chaotic internal nuclear wars between factions, is not a reasonable goal to have, as I've also pointed out.

Russia won't be more dangerous after the war, it will be defanged and humbled. — Olivier5

How do you envision this "defanging" and "humbling" taking place?

No where in this is Ukrainian welfare or Ukraine "winning" requirement in your endgame, whatever definition of that they are using today, under consideration. — “boethius

First, it’s not “my” endgame. Making it personal would be misleading even if there was no intellectual dishonesty involved, because it may confuse my understanding of certain geopolitical dynamics with my taking position toward them. These are 2 distinct things. My understanding how the chess game is played by a couple of players is one thing, my siding with any of them is another.
Second, of course we can not rationally expect that the ultimate endgame for a geopolitical subject X concerns the security of a separate geopolitical subject Y. The ultimate endgame for X concerns the security of X. No matter who is X and Y. So if it’s the welfare of Ukraine that needs to be ultimately secured, that’s the task of Ukraine as geopolitical agent, not of other geopolitical agents like West/NATO/US. And the other way around. Yet the conditions may be such that not only there is enough motivation for cooperation between separate geopolitical agents in the pursuit of their respective security interests, but it’s even possible that their respective security interests may eventually merge: e.g. as of now not only fighting Russia is in the interest of both Ukraine and the West (e.g. EU/NATO), but maybe in the future Ukraine will be part of the West (e.g. EU/NATO). All this is perfectly compatible with the West “feeling concerned” about Ukrainians’ welfare or taking Ukraine “winning" as instrumental to its ultimate endgame, more likely so, if the long term goal is to have Ukraine integrated within Western sphere of influence (e.g. NATO/EU). The point is the West can not be reasonably expected to be as concerned about Ukrainians’ welfare as Ukraine.
Third, I’m arguing that Western support to Ukraine is strategically and morally defensible in theory, how strategic and moral reasons are playing on the ground is however hard to assess for short term goals and much harder for longer term goals (like for the next decades).

Ukraine can both lose, and in the process suffer extreme harms, and your end game can still be accomplished if enough damage is inflicted on Russia.
The instrument to "inflict as much as enduring damage as possible to Russian power" is Ukrainian lives.
In the world of "practical rationality" there is no military achievement in this context possible without sacrificing Ukrainian lives. — boethius

Again you are conveniently framing the issue as it suits your narrative. Ukrainian lives (namely casualties) are not “The instrument to ‘inflict as much as enduring damage as possible to Russian power’” but the collateral damage of Ukrainian decisions to fight back Russian aggression, direct damage inflicted by Russian decisions on Ukrainians, and indirect collateral damage of Western decisions to support Ukrainians in fighting back Russian aggression. As collateral damage is Ukrainian lives, this poses a moral dilemma of course.

So, if you want to maximise your military objective, which is harming the Russians in your "endgame", then that requires maximising the sacrifice of Ukraine. Even when in a clearly losing position and even when suffering far higher kill-ratios than the Russians and civilian and economic damage etc. fighting on another day will still inflict another day of damage to the Russians. — boethius

I didn’t focus on military goals. I talked about Russian power of threatening Western security. So the sacrifice of Ukrainians can be contained (in the present and in the future) by disrupting whatever relevant factor (not only the military one) that fuels the Russian war machine. If you reason through hypotheticals I can counter with hypotheticals. After all the geopolitical game admits best and worst scenarios and all in between, so the debate should focus more over their likelihood. The fact that you obsess over conjecturing worst scenarios and build fallacious and conspirational arguments around them more than providing evidence in their support or internal inconsistencies in your opponents views about them is proof of your rationally self-defeating militant mindset.

Predictably, you now try to move the goal posts to NATO and Ukraine, but again the harms to Ukraine in such a process can still be essentially total. Ukraine could be totally destroyed, totally sacrificed, in such a project and if the goal to inflict enough damage on Russia is achieved then perhaps Russia is indeed no longer a threat to Ukraine. However, if in the process "Ukraine", however you want to define it, is totally sacrificed and destroyed, clearly Ukrainian welfare has not been protected. — boethius

“Moving goal posts” is your brainwashing mantra likely reinforced by your arbitrary assumption that it’s on you to set what counts as “goal post”. If one wants to understand the reasons of Western involvement in Ukraine one has to understand things from Western perspective. If one wants to understand the reasons of Ukrainians fighting Russians one has to understand things from Ukrainian perspective. By this way one can see why they can cooperate as they actually do and how this cooperation is not occasional but with shared long term goals of integration, which your conjectures totally fails to consider. As much as they fail to consider that Ukrainians have agency, concern for their lives and welfare (expectedly way more than you and Putin possibly do), can understand strategic and moral stakes for them and the Westerners, and that the cooperation implies costs/risks/limits. One can’t reasonably expect Ukraine to willingly (or coercively?) sacrifice its people just to advance Western goals as pro-Russian propaganda you are lining with suggests, or just for “territory and national pride” (as you framed Ukrainians’ position) which is more likely true for powers like Russia trying to restore their sphere of influence outside their borders through wars and atrocities than for their victims which are trying to survive such wars and atrocities.
In any case your conjectures are not proof of what is actually nor likely happening nor what is rationally expected to happen. Letting your conjecture always drift toward the worst scenario (like in a slippery slow) is how you desperately try to mess with your opponents’ psychology as you do with escalation to MAD (which will destroy the world, maybe except the evil US right?) and induce some irrational fear, or phobia, and again fear mongering is also classic textbook strategy of the worst propaganda.

You can not serve 2 masters: you will love the one and hate the other. Clearly, you serve US interests in this conversation. — boethius

Let’s examin the density of your intellectual squalor as illustrated by this arbitrary accusation.
First, I expressed my preferences and the reasons of my siding with the Western support to Ukraine in previous posts, so there was no need for you to invent such pathetic slogans about my preferences (BTW why love one and hate the other? I could be averse to both powers yet hate Russian hegemony way more than the American one).
Second, I’m arguing that Western support of Ukraine is both strategically and morally defensible (actually more than the opposite view for avg Westerners) so your attack ad hominem is irrelevant wrt such arguments. Besides it’s likely fallacious given that you didn’t offer rationally compelling arguments ad rem, so you are shifting goal posts to discrediting me personally with biased accusations.
Third, such biased attack ad hominem can be as easily and fairly retorted against you. You can not serve 2 masters: you will love the one and hate the other. Clearly, you serve Russian interests in this conversation. The difference is that Ukrainians fighting Russia would hold views more likely in line with my views than yours. That’s why when you and Putin blame the West for Ukrainian lives doesn’t mean that you and Putin care for them more than the Westerners, actually it can likely be the opposite. In your twisted logic and hypocrisy, you might despise the Ukrainians for sacrificing their lives for the US, and secretly enjoy the atrocities they are suffering as a just punishment for not siding with the master you love and siding with master you hate.

Which leads to plenty of interesting debate. For example, I have serious doubts about your geopolitical theory considering China is the much larger hegemonic competitor to the US. — boethius

Your claims lead to plenty of more interesting debate to me. For example:

• Can you show better how your accusation follows from your notion of “justification”?
• Does “you cannot justify to others” mean that my claims are not justified until I can prove that everybody on earth agrees with me?!
• since you believe the following “Certainly we would want law to conform to our normative disposition, but until A. all people have the same values and B. little or no corruption exists, then that won't be the case” how can we possibly justify (in your terms) our position to others if they do not share our values or we can’t assure that little or no corruption exists?
• what do you mean by “require recognising legitimate grievances of the Russians”?
• Peace negotiations can be dealt with as quid-pro-quo without recognising any legitimate grievances, like a prisoner exchange, so why would this be required as a first step for a peace negotiation?
• What form should we adopt such recognition exactly?
• Is it something that needs to be officially recorded anywhere? With what potential/likely legal and propaganda cost/benefit and strategic implications?
• What kind of “legitimate grievances” are you talking about and in what sense you consider them “legitimate”?
• Finally what kind of legitimate grievances against the Russians (notice how the negotiation requirements are framed around pro- and cons- for Russia, because they are the ones really need convincing not the West or the Ukrainians) is Russia required to recognize as a first step?

To recapitulate your intellectual failures so far: emotional blackmailing, slippery slopes, strawmans, ad hominem, misattribution, misinterpretation and conflations, bagging the question, framing, arbitrary accusations (like “strawman”, “tautology”, “shifting goal posts”, “love the master US”, “Russophobia”), and so ardently looping over your fallacious reasoning post after post like any brainwashed useful idiot of pro-Russian propaganda. So intellectually intimidating right? You are a textbook example of logic illiteracy, namely how one should NOT argue to be rationally compelling. What a loser.

, the UK stopped being a global (colonial) power, the US retreated from Vietnam, the USSR pulled out of Afghanistan, ... I'm sure there have been bruised egos. Should Ukraine be intact sometime in the foreseeable future, Russia will continue on without, perhaps even a bit improved, maybe along the lines of what suggested. Hardly impossible or unheard of.

How do you envision this "defanging" and "humbling" taking place? — Tzeentch

You don't have much imagination, do you?

And indeed, this interview is not what you might expect: "Rah-rah-rah! Crimea in six months!" Not at all. — SophistiCat

Indeed. Taking Melitopol would do the trick. That's why he is referring to the 84 km to Melitopol. So it's a long war.

He may very well be someone who speaks candidly, but this interview was certainly planned by the US administration (because it's to a US news outlet; if it was to Ukrainian journalists, then maybe in that case he's gone off script or just shit-happens kind of thing). In addition, Zelensky was there. — boethius

Really? How are you sure of that. Oh, I forgot, Ukrainians are only the pawns of Americans...

Why not Zelensky? — boethius

Or because Zelensky is the elected political leader of the country and this is an interview with the head of the Ukrainian army, general Zaluzhny.

Of course, losing the war while retaining independence was potentially the best outcome for Finland, so it was definitely a "win" in that sense, but since it was simply impossible for Finland to "defeat" the Soviet Union, the only options are eventual defeat or then a diplomatic compromise (acceptable to the Soviet Union; what other people think doesn't matter if you're dealing with Soviet Union). — boethius

Yeah.

And Japan didn't "win" Russia in the Russo-Japanese war, because it didn't "defeat" Russia.

Or Germany didn't "win" Russia in WW1, because it didn't "defeat" Russia.

So Ukrainians might be looking at similar "losing" this war as the two mentioned above. So he is hopeful as things aren't as bleak as they were for us Finns in the Winter War.

To recapitulate your achievements so far: emotional blackmailing, slippery slopes, strawmans, ad hominem, ......... — neomac

He's trolling, which means that he doesn't measure his success by the number of correct, logical points he makes, but by the amount of time you waste here talking to him.

First, it’s not “my” endgame. Making it personal would be misleading even if there was no intellectual dishonesty involved, because it may confuse my understanding of certain geopolitical dynamics with my taking position toward them. These are 2 distinct things. My understanding how the chess game is played by a couple of players is one thing, my siding with any of them is another. — neomac

You're really now trying to say you're just engaging in objective analysis without a horse in the race?

Moving the goal posts all the way from:

Putin and China are questioning the West-backed world order. The West must respond to that threat with determination. That’s why Putin unilateral aggression must fail in a way however that is instrumental to the West-backed world order. If this war is not just between Russia and Ukraine, then it’s not even just between the US and Russia, it’s between whoever wants to weigh in in establishing the new world order, either by backing the US or by backing Russia. — neomac

All the way to "My understanding how the chess game is played by a couple of players is one thing, my siding with any of them is another."

We debated your support for "the West" in this war in Ukraine for many pages.

You present your actual arguments in clear terms "Putin unilateral aggression must fail".

It's "your endgame" because you're the one proposing it:

Sure, here I restate it again and bolden it: The end game for NATO/US involvement in this war doesn’t need to be to stop Russia or overturn its regime. But to inflict as much enduring damage as possible to Russian power (in terms of its economic system, its system of alliance, its capacity of military projection outside its borders, its its technology supply, its military and geopolitical status) to the point it is not longer perceived as a non-negligible geopolitical threat to the West. Outrageous right?! — neomac

"Putin must fail" and you propose an US/NATO endgame that "doesn’t need to be to stop Russia".

You then literally just say the exact thing I just says, just you're issue is my "framing".

Again you are conveniently framing the issue as it suits your narrative. Ukrainian lives (namely casualties) are not “The instrument to ‘inflict as much as enduring damage as possible to Russian power’” but the collateral damage of Ukrainian decisions to fight back Russian aggression, direct damage inflicted by Russian decisions on Ukrainians, and indirect collateral damage of Western decisions to support Ukrainians in fighting back Russian aggression. As collateral damage is Ukrainian lives, this poses a moral dilemma of course. — neomac

Collateral damage to Ukrainian lives would make sense if NATO was fighting with Russia in Ukrainian territory, then Ukrainian lives lost would be unfortunate collateral damage.

That's not the case, NATO isn't fighting.

Ukrainian lives (especially the soldiers) are the instrument of US / NATO policy in this fight, and the collateral damage would be civilians and structures that the Ukrainian military kills, wounds or damages as an unintended consequence of warfare.

Soldiers dying is not collateral damage.

However, even if you want to call it that, you recognise the main issue which is all this death and destruction in Ukraine "As collateral damage is Ukrainian lives, this poses a moral dilemma of course."

Why is there a moral dilemma? Because achieving the policy objective you set (and US / NATO doesn't have much problem admitting to) of inflicting enduring damage on the Russian military is not the same objective as Ukrainian welfare, which I have zero problem saying can involve some fighting (the first weeks of fighting is certainly preferable to total capitulation and humiliation, but it's after demonstrating your honour on the international stage, is the optimum time to sue for peace and accept a compromise as a smaller nation) but (regardless of when peace is sought) fighting for the welfare of Ukrainians is a much more constrained criteria than fighting to harm the Russians. Saying "they both want to fight the Russians so they both want the same thing" is simply totally wrong: "fighting the Russian insofar as it's in the interest of Ukrainians" is a very different objective than "fighting the Russians insofar as it damages the Russians".

This is why "the US / NATO fighting to the last Ukrainian" has been a focal point of debate since the beginning of the war, because, obviously, if the goal is simply to maximise damage to Russia then what follows from that would be "fighting to the last Ukrainian". It's a way of saying the objectives of Ukraine and US / NATO are not the same, which US / NATO don't really have a problem saying.

For example, saying Putin and Russia must "pay a cost" for breaking the international "rules based order" is exact same idea, maybe with slight "narrative framing" differences. It is not saying "we must ensure Ukrainian welfare is the top priority, which may require compromise with Russia", but it clearly means the priority is damaging Russia so the war is costly, which means pouring arms into Ukraine as they are doing the fighting, which means Ukrainians are the instrument of this policy, not the beneficiaries. The beneficiaries are all who benefit from the "international rules based order" and if the entirety of Ukraine is sacrificed for this policy then "mission accomplished".

Let’s examin the density of your intellectual squalor as illustrated by this arbitrary accusation.
First, I expressed my preferences and the reasons of my siding with the Western support to Ukraine in previous posts, so there was no need for you to invent such pathetic slogans about my preferences (BTW why love one and hate the other? I could be adverse to both powers yet hate Russian hegemony way more than the American one). — neomac

Even more ridiculous that after stating "My understanding how the chess game is played by a couple of players is one thing, my siding with any of them is another" you state a few paragraphs later "I expressed my preferences and the reasons of my siding with the Western support to Ukraine".

Can you not read and understand your own statements? You are "siding with the West" and you propose an "endgame" that is sufficient for the West (The end game for NATO/US involvement in this war doesn’t need to be to stop Russia or overturn its regime. But to inflict as much enduring damage as possible to Russian power) ... so i.e. an endgame you support.

Second, I’m arguing that Western support of Ukraine is both strategically and morally defensible (actually more than the opposite view for avg Westerners) so your attack ad hominem is irrelevant wrt such arguments. — neomac

Sure, but as you yourself admit there's a "moral dilemma" in the Western support of Ukraine for the purposes of harming the Russians, as it is not the same thing as supporting Ukrainian welfare.

So, if Ukrainian welfare is sacrificed for a goal that is not Ukrainian welfare, the moral responsibility for our policies cannot just be then shifted to the Ukrainian leadership and "Ukrainian people" (insofar as we equate them with Ukrainian leadership), we are still responsible for our own policies and what we are trying to achieve. Just because you want to kill someone doesn't mean I am justified in giving you the weapon to do it. Even if you were justified in your desire to kill (say self defence) and I was justified in helping you do that, even then it does not justify any form of lethal support. As @Isaac pointed out, self defence vis-a-vis your neighbour doesn't justify nuking the whole city. As the provider of lethal support, I'd still be responsible for the outcome and how my actions contributed to the outcome.

Whenever the cost to Ukraine of the Western policy is pointed out, essentially all the supporters of the policy here and elsewhere just throw their hands up and say "Ukrainians want to fight!" and seem to believe that completely unburdens them of the consequences of the policy.

But as you say yourself, there's a "moral dilemma". If you want to support this policy and argue in good faith, then solve the moral dilemma, rather than move the goal posts around for your own arguments so much that the "game" your playing is now entirely made of goal posts. We're literally walking on goal posts.

Can you show better how your accusation follows from your notion of “justification”? — neomac

I've accused you of moving the goalposts of you arguments around rather than just arguing what you actually believe (that the endgame is to "inflict enduring damage on Russia", which causes "collateral damage" in pursuit of that goal, that causes a moral dilemma).

I have argued the justifications you present are insufficient, such as a UN general assembly vote being some sort of "normative / legal justification", or, even if it was (which it isn't), then totally incompatible with supporting the US despite the US ignoring UN generally assembly votes all the time. More importantly for the actual debate we're having, the "normative / legal" argument isn't your actual justification but rather supporting the West, and US hegemony in particular, generally speaking.

There are four central issues to what you actually believe.

1. First being the justification of US hegemony in the geopolitical struggle with Russia, but more importantly China. Now, like yourself, I prefer to live in the West than in China or Russia, however, this is equatable with seeking hegemonic control / influence / containment of China and its neighbours. My approach would be a "lead by example" policy and not picking fights that get hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians killed and injured and destroying half or more of the Ukrainian economy, in seeking to harm Russia, which benefits China so seems to me entirely counter productive on the geopolitical hegemonic "chess game" in any case.

2. Bringing to the second point which is this policy really does advance US hegemony and Western leadership of the whole world.

3. And lastly, that the sacrifice of Ukraine to advance this policy is morally justified. At least the US was fighting in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan and there's at least honour to that and suffering the consequences of the policy. It is impossible to ignore the fact that when parties are armed to do the fighting for us, that this creates an intense moral hazard, moreover when any criticism of the leadership and war is banned in the country, we wholeheartedly condone and promote propaganda for "morale" purposes and winning the "information war" with Russia (i.e. we cannot even say there's some sort of informed consent) and (make matter morally worse) we produce a lot of the propaganda ourselves (encouraging belief that the side we need to fight can "win" when our military and civilian leadership may be fully aware that is very unlikely) leading to decisions on false pretences, and, also important, if pouring money and arms into the country is de facto bribing the leadership of that country who benefit immensely in both legal and illegal ways from all this money and arms pouring in.

4. That anytime the goal posts change to "Ukrainian sovereignty!" then why aren't Western armies in Ukraine defending this alleged priority?

These are not "accusations" but just what your position actually entails. If harming Russia is the objective, and Ukrainians are doing the fighting, and the West is arming and bankrolling and "advising", then it simply goes with that position that it's entirely possible, perhaps even likely, that this setup will result in Ukrainians fighting beyond their own self interest (which I have zero problem recognising involves some fighting).

In other words, we may have already (I would definitely argue this), and if not, may very well in the future, sacrifice Ukrainian welfare to pursue the West's priority in this situation, which is, to boil it down, "not letting Putin get away with it!".

Does “you cannot justify to others” mean that my claims are not justified until I can prove that everybody on earth agrees with me?! — neomac

"Justification" has a social function definition of justifying to others. If a judge asks for your "justification" for some actions, the request is to justify to the judge not yourself. When a justification is only to oneself, we say "self justification" to clarify that no one else is intended to be convinced by the argument.

For example, if you were caught taking something and this led to a trial, "I wanted it" is not a good justification in this context; this self-justification goes without saying and not the issue at trial (no harm in mentioning it, obviously you took the thing because you wanted it) so if you started your explanation with "well I wanted it" unlikely anyone would disagree, but a adequate justification in this context would be some right to the thing (there was a deal for example, that the counter party is now denying) or then some particular circumstance (some emergency, for example, or then you actually thought it was lost and took it to "return it" to the owner etc.).

That's just what the word justification means.

Of course, one can propose nothing is justified, there is no justice, all moral language is for the purposes of rationalising and manipulation. But, even in this position, the word "justification" still refers to the attempt to convince others your actions are just (only everyone, perhaps even yourself, is always deceived about it, there is no "actual" justification for anything, life has no purpose other than pursuing your inclinations and desires, which are accidental to your genes and upbringing and themselves not justified either, just nothing else to do).

Anyways, essentially no one, certainly not myself, argues that a position is justified only after a everyone agrees, which creates immediately the problem of why anyone would believe it's true if it's not true until everyone believes it's true. The "truth" (or then meaninglessness of the issue) of a justification is independent of anyone's belief about it. Your actions maybe justified and a judge and everyone else disagrees. Indeed, your actions maybe justified and you yourself are convinced it was actually wrong later.

The point of getting into the meaning of justification, is that what people propose as their justification maybe a lie. So, it is entirely reasonable to speculate as the real motivations behind what people do. Now, the actual (secret in this case) justification maybe true and following from that the lies about it are also justified, or then maybe both are not-justified. Or, the more confusing situation but entirely possible, is one uses a true justification to advance a hidden objective that is similar to but not actually the same or even compatible with the true justification.

For example, I maybe entirely justified in helping a traveller in distress, but if my true intentions are to simply gain this travellers trust for the purposes of stealing from them, then my actions up to that point only appear entirely justified but it is in actuality part of a deception. So, a true justification can also be a lie, that it only even possibly revealed in the future.

since you believe the following “Certainly we would want law to conform to our normative disposition, but until A. all people have the same values and B. little or no corruption exists, then that won't be the case” how can we possibly justify (in your terms) our position to others if they do not share our values or we can’t assure that little or no corruption exists? — neomac

We may not be able to, but we try nevertheless. For example, the Byzantine Empire would argue theology with the various caliphates they were in contact with. Neither side expected to convince / convert the other, but they would still make the attempt. Lot's of reasons for this: vis-a-vis the other party in the debate it can be simply a sign of respect to argue one's position, as it recognises the other party's arguments at least have the merit of being responded to, and it can also be for the purposes of just maintaining a polite dialogue with people you may need to deal with to avoid wars or do business etc. or then it could be for internal reasons of just impressing your own court with "proofs" that the heathens are wrong (or for all these purposes) or then just an obvious task of one's own theologians to prove the faith etc.

However, what's a norm, what's normative, and what's legal are not the same thing. Certainly the goal of society is to harmonise all three, and for some things that happens to be the case, but you cannot deduce one from another. Simply because something is a norm does not mean it it normative nor legal. From my position in corporate management, people break the law literally all the time with no consequences.

what do you mean by “require recognising legitimate grievances of the Russians”? — neomac

This was discussed at length near the very beginning of this discussion, but, in short, if you want to negotiate a dispute with a party the first step is to recognise legitimate grievances of the other party (i.e. grievances that you yourself agree are reasonable and can do something about). Generally, everyone has some legitimate grievances in any situation, and the more complex the situation the more legitimate grievances everyone has, if you want to negotiate a settlement then the first step is to layout all the grievances of all the parties on the table and see if everyone can at least agree those are all legitimate points of view. The other essential starting element is the leverage each party has. Based on these two things, perhaps it is possible to come up with an arrangement acceptable to all the parties that is preferable to further conflict.

If you ignore someone's grievances then they are unlikely to accept anything you propose. Now, "legitimate" is prepended to "grievances" as maybe someone grievances are simply unreasonable (at least to you) and you can do nothing to solve them. "Legitimate grievance" is something you yourself agrees the counter party has a point about and an agreement would need to resolve, compensate or address in some way.

The position that Russia is 100% wrong about everything and has no legitimate points or grievances, is simply the position of refusing to negotiate and the choice of more warfare, which maybe justified, but the West and Zelensky like to present demands obviously Russia would never accept and just deny any problems on their own side. Like the very real Nazi's with significant influence, whether there is enough to justify invasion or not, it's clearly a legitimate grievance that the West should also have a problem with. Also expansion of NATO is also a legitimate grievance, considering NATO is quite clearly an anti-Russia organisation. Engaging in the self-justification of NATO expansion, just insisting that of course it's anti-Russian because Russia is the threat and countries want protection from Russia and getting into NATO and expanding NATO closer to Russia is not a threat to Russia because NATO's intentions are pure, people can do ... but, if you don't intend to negotiate. Obviously, my "anti-you" alliance will be perceived as a threat from your point of view. That Westerners can say we place these missiles closer to Russia but that's not like "a threat" to Russia is dumb if the goal is to negotiate with Russia.

A negotiated peace would be by definition a compromise. An uncompromising peace is what's called a surrender. So, listing uncompromising demands that Russia then obviously rejects, is a convoluted, bad faith way of saying there is no desire for negotiation, the surrender of Russia is preferable, for the purposes of propaganda. The problem is if you can't actually force Russia to surrender then this sort of language prolongs the war.

The problem the West has created by encouraging Zelensky to be uncompromising and make delusional statements while also insisting all negotiation must be with Zelensky, without the other powers involved at the table, is that basically any compromise on anything is now a Russian in Zelensky's framework.

Peace negotiations can be dealt with as quid-pro-quo without recognising any legitimate grievances, like a prisoner exchange, so why would this be required as a first step for a peace negotiation? — neomac

In order to engage in a quid pro quo, you need to recognise those are in fact legitimate grievances (such as return of prisoners) to then arrive at an agreement about it. Your own side negotiating needs to do this process at least internally (hear what others have to say, what they want, etc.). Whether something is recognised explicitly in public is a form of compensation, and is not a requirement as you say. However, anyone doing any actual diplomacy with Russia (with an intention of resolving the conflict) would need themselves to evaluate legitimate grievances that are reasonable to address in a settlement, and likewise anyone simply analysing the situation and trying to what sort of resolution the war is possible must do the same (to have any chance of proposing some practical insights).

Is it something that needs to be officially recorded anywhere? With what potential/likely legal and propaganda cost/benefit and strategic implications?
What kind of “legitimate grievances” are you talking about and in what sense you consider them “legitimate”? — neomac

As I explain above, the important recognition is internal to the negotiating parties (if they genuinely seek a resolution; if not you just say whatever you want). How these legitimate grievances are then recognised in an agreement can be through explicit recognition and compensation (but this is pretty rare in a settlement, as one of the benefits of a settlement is not recognising any wrong doing), so usually it's simply recognised in compensation and horse-trading, and between nations there can be entirely secret arrangements.

What kind of “legitimate grievances” are you talking about and in what sense you consider them “legitimate”? — neomac

The main on is of course NATO expansion. When Russia mentions moving missiles and forward operating bases and so on closer to Russia is a threat to Russia, that's obviously true. One of the quid pro quo agreements with Russia in the expansion of NATO was that missile bases wouldn't advance. The actual military threats are hardware and personnel, not the actual NATO treaty, so bringing countries into NATO is one thing, and actually advancing NATO hardware, systems and soldiers is another.

In terms of real military analysis, the central military justification for Russia war is that NATO installed a missile base in the Baltics. That NATO says it was to protect against Iran and is only missile defence is entirely meaningless if you want to negotiate an end to a conflict with Russia.

There is actually a stable form of NATO enlargement in making NATO bigger but not only moving little to no hardware closer to Russia but the Easter-European states themselves becoming more stable vis-a-vis Russia and also each other and both lowering their defence expenditures because they are in NATO as well as depending on NATO command structures to function so unable really to do any independent military actions anyways. For, previous to NATO expansion you can have disputes between East-European countries entirely unrelated to Russia or NATO but that then draft Russia and/or NATO into the conflict and the it growing into a regional conflict and getting out of control. Prior to NATO directly threatening Russia with advancing missile bases and proposing Georgia and Ukraine join NATO (and notice the combination of abandoning the quid pro quo of not advancing advanced hardware will also wanting to expand right to Russia's border, is something any general would say warrants a war, and there'd be only political reasons not to go to war; this is a sad reality of NATO's actions over the last decades, that this war is totally provoked and any NATO member would evaluate things militarily exactly the same as Russia has).

So, obviously if NATO wants peace with Russia it will likely have to recognise it has to take a less threatening posture with Russia. Advancing missile bases is particular stupid if the goal is peace. Obviously, neutral Ukraine are removing the missile base would be one way of recognising this grievance. If you want Ukraine in NATO, then to convince the Russians you'd need to propose a lot more compensation for that, but that seems essentially an impossible deal, but maybe there's some sort of "NATO light" version or something.

There are definitely the Nazi's in Ukraine. As a Westerner I don't think that should be acceptable to the West, let alone the Russians. And if you look into the issue with reporting pre-invasion, these are definitely Nazi institutions with enormous power and influence in Ukraine. It should be, first of all, Western policy to not support and arm Nazi's. That Western media lauds these "ultra nationalists" as "the best fighters" that Ukraine simply needs, is even more outrageous.

The rights of Russian speaking minorities that, fact of the matter is, Ukraine started oppressing in total contradiction to the West's "values and policies" about minority rights, is also simply an entirely justified grievance, which is text-book prejudice due to ethnicity and language that the West claims to be against.

There have been war crimes also by the Ukrainians, but generally in a peaceful resolution to a war, all the warcrimes are ignored. As with any settlement, one of the main benefits is not admitting any wrongdoing.

We had trials against the Third Reich ... because we won. There was no trials of Western war crimes even if they were of comparable or worse nature than some convicted Nazi's.

Benefits of winning is also likewise not needing to admit any wrong doing.

Finally what kind of legitimate grievances against the Russians (notice how the negotiation requirements are framed around pro- and cons- for Russia, because they are the ones really need convincing not the West or the Ukrainians) is Russia required to recognize as a first step? — neomac

Yes, the negotiation from our Western perspective is mainly around the pros-and-cons for Russia, since it's them that we are negotiating with.

The first step in negotiating a settlement is coming up with a compromise of the key issues that you think is acceptable to the other party, the "deal breakers". There can be a long list of minor stuff, in this case economic arrangements of how to rebuild Ukraine or then dropping sanctions and so on, but there's no point in addressing secondary issues if there's no possible compromise on the deal breakers.

The deal breakers in this war for the Russians are concerning NATO and Crimea. There maybe someway to negotiate the other big issues, such as Russian speaking rights in Donbas and so, in a way that de-annexes these territories (such as the proposed referendums to be part of Ukraine, autonomous in Ukraine or independent) or then simply recognises the annexation (such as another referendum to join Russia that the international community recognises).

There is, for certain, no compromise Ukrainians and Westerners would be happy about, but the alternative is more war, more death, and potentially Ukraine losing anyways, which people will just blame Ukraine for not "fighting hard enough" but people should be far more unhappy about compared to a compromise now or at any point previous in the war.

Which is why the issue of the cost to Ukraine of more fighting is simply ignored in Western media, and even in this forum: so that if Ukraine comes out a big loser in all this, well that's what they wanted, what are you gonna do, all we did was give some of the weapons that they wanted, as any friend would do.

To recapitulate your intellectual failures so far: — neomac

emotional blackmailing, — neomac

That you perceive my pointing out the cost of your "endgame" for NATO, who you support, as emotional blackmail, is just demonstrating your cognitive dissonance about your own position.

Harming Russia by arming the Ukrainian army, comes at to Ukrainian welfare, and if harming Russia is the goal the cost to Ukraine could be far in excess of what would be in Ukrainian-self-interest (with or without us deceiving them about it, we would still be responsible for the outcome).

If you want to support harming the Russians, and not just a little bit but until they are no longer a threat to the West, then this requires a commensurate cost to the Ukrainians, a "moral dilemma" in your own words. Pointing out the cost is just reality, not "blackmail", and your perception that the reality is blackmail, is delusional.

slippery slopes, strawmans — neomac

What slippery slope, what straw man? You can't be more clear what your position actually is, and then you double down on it to be even more clear:

Sure, here I restate it again and bolden it: The end game for NATO/US involvement in this war doesn’t need to be to stop Russia or overturn its regime. But to inflict as much enduring damage as possible to Russian power (in terms of its economic system, its system of alliance, its capacity of military projection outside its borders, its its technology supply, its military and geopolitical status) to the point it is not longer perceived as a non-negligible geopolitical threat to the West. Outrageous right?! — neomac

It's not outrageous, it's exactly what US / NATO are trying to do, and they are pretty clear about it.

Lot's of geopolitical "moves" require the sacrifice of some country or people's wellbeing for the "greater good". Talk to the Vietnamese, talk the Kurds, talk to our liberal "friends" in Iraq and Afghanistan, talk to the Libyans and Syrians (again, our "friends" there, not to mention just average person there trying to get by).

And, indeed, it is typical of any war that it is waged on land and among civilians that do not benefit from the outcome, either way, especially if their dead. Sacrificing here or there, this person or that, for the polities benefit and not their own, is an entirely normal process in any war.

The reason it's controversial in this war is because we're not even fighting it, Ukraine may lose anyways and even if they have some sort of "win" it may easily be at an unreasonably high cost. If it was all just to virtue signal without any coherent workable plan to actually "beat" Russia, then this Western attitude (of which the policy of the leadership entirely depends) has caused immense suffering for nothing.

You support the policy, the cost to Ukraine is immense, face the reality and explain how it's worth it so far, how the same or multiple times more cost would be likewise worth it, or even the entire destruction of Ukraine would be worth it if Russia is harmed enough.

For months the cost to Ukraine was simply denied, casualties super low, easily winning, Russian army incompetent and will collapse any day etc. so everyone in the West could just ignore the "moral dilemma" of what this policy is costing Ukraine.

Now that the "bill is coming due" people in the West want to just ignore it and if they see it a little bit: Ukraine! Ukraine! Ukraine! Ukraine chose this path!!

The truth of the situation is simply that nuclear blackmail works. The situation would need to be nearly inconceivably more extreme than what is happening in Ukraine for it not to be reasonable to submit to nuclear blackmail.

And, because nuclear blackmail works, US / NATO policy is not to "escalate" beyond a certain point: that point being Russia actually losing the war.

Ukrainian lives (especially the soldiers) are the instrument of US / NATO policy in this fight, and the collateral damage would be civilians and structures that the Ukrainian military kills, wounds or damages as an unintended consequence of warfare. — boethius

Ukrainian lives (especially the soldiers) are lost in the defense of a sovereign Ukraine from an existential threat, which wants (or wanted when attacked) to annex parts of Ukraine and put a puppet regime in place for the rest of the country. Now it seems to want to destroy Ukraine and it's economy.

That simply isn't "an instrument of US / NATO policy".

Just remember that the first thing when Russia attacked was for the US to ask if the Ukrainian leadership needed help in evacuating from Ukraine. That's how much they believed in this "instrument of US / NATO policy" you try to depict.

That simply isn't "an instrument of US / NATO policy". — ssu

The Americans have purposefully steered towards this conflict since at least 2008.

Now they have their conflict, and they spin a yarn about Ukrainian sovereignty.

Lol, Scott Ritter, really? Well, shit seeks its own level.

That simply isn't "an instrument of US / NATO policy". — ssu

Yes, if the priority is to harm Russia, and not "defend Ukrainian sovereignty" then Ukraine is an instrument of this policy.

You can argue that the real objective is just a concern for Ukrainian well being and Sovereignty if you want.

Just remember that the first thing when Russia attacked was for the US to ask if the Ukrainian leadership needed help in evacuating from Ukraine. That's how much they believed in this "instrument of US / NATO policy" you try to depict. — ssu

It's entirely possible that the policy came into existence after seeing the Ukrainians fighting back successfully enough to halt the invasion.

Although I completely agree with

The Americans have purposefully steered towards this conflict since at least 2008.

Now they have their conflict, and they spin a yarn about Ukrainian sovereignty. — Tzeentch

There's been 4 US administrations since 2008, and I'd be willing to accept the idea the US more-or-less stumbled into this conflict without really a military plan if Russia did a full scale invasion (they may have been satisfied with Russia conquering Ukraine, having a big headache to deal with trying to manage it, and slapping tons of sanctions on Russia).

Which is how proponents of this policy usually frame it: know one could believe Ukraine would be so good and Russia so bad, and suddenly there was this opportunity to bleed the Russians! Is usually how it's presented.

The policy of arming Ukraine "whatever it take, but not really" may not have been pre-planned, which would explain why US keeps having this "let's negotiate ... but haha, no, but actually yes! peace would be good, but talk to Zelensky!" and completely inconsistent in the logic of weapons supplies, rather than some clear and coherent position on these issues.

Also, I wouldn't disagree that fighting back initially is a good idea, preferable to complete capitulation, even if the cost is not trivial (thousands dead). However, it's after doing that when a smaller party has maximum leverage: the leverage is basically "you might ultimately be able to win, but the cost will make it not-worth it and there are significant risks". For example, in the first weeks of the war, the Kremlin would not know how the sanctions would play out, if their lines would hold (or then be able to withdraw from losing positions without being totally encircled), if Ukraine / US had some insane surprise, what the domestic political reaction would be to the war and sanctions and so on, if mobilisation would work / be accepted by Russians, if the whole thing could just spiral into a nuclear conflict the Kremlin doesn't actually want either and so on. There's not only the cost even if you win, but all these other risks and if the cost of 2 weeks of war to Russia isn't that much, then it doesn't have to get much in a compromise to show it was "worth it". Likely, due to all these risks, when the Russians offered to be out of Ukraine the next day, if Donbas was independent and Crimea recognised as Russian and Neutral Ukraine, it was entirely genuine and clearly the minimum the Russians would accept.

The longer the war drags on, the more all these risks at the start either go away or then get clarified (or then just now familiar and no longer feared as much, even if the risk is actually the same).

However, if the priority is Ukrainian sovereignty then what follows from that is an honest discussion with Ukraine of what would be a reasonable compromise to end the war on the best conditions possible, given the limitations of Western support and also the cost in itself of more war (some plausible cost-benefit analysis for Ukrainians, not the West). Additionally, if the priority was Ukrainian sovereignty and welfare, the West would use its economic leverage to help negotiate the best outcome, or then just have used its economic leverage before the war to try to avoid the war (such as Nord Stream 2; of which the logic of refusing to open it was not that the project wasn't mutually beneficial to Europe, or clearly a basis of peace for Russia, but simply that US wants to "contain" Russia, which is by definition promoting conflict and not peace).

And this is clearly not how the US and NATO are making decisions, but the only consideration is what harms Russia the most while not escalating into nuclear war, meaning Russia losing would be going to far. To sweep all the moral issues of this position under the rug, US and NATO just yell "Ukraine wants to fight! Ukraine wants the weapons!" but this moral hot potato does not somehow dissociate our actions from the consequences of our actions.

Lol, Scott Ritter, really? Well, shit seeks its own level. — SophistiCat

Any issues with the actual analysis?

It definitely seems to me that Zelensky is being pushed to the side, didn't even get to address the World Cup as he wanted, which, seems to me, the US would have made happen if it wanted; Qatar being a 100% US security dependent.

The interview is also quite extraordinary in its revelations, it's not some sort of "get to know the general" puff piece.

He literally states that Ukrainian will inevitably lose the war if it doesn't receive significant increase in assistance of heavy weapons, which are not on their way and may not even be enough (just that if the West put in another 300 tanks, 700 infantry fighting vehicles, and 500 howitzers then it's invested for double or triple or quadruple those numbers). He then references a military commander's concessions speech, Mannerheim, to the Soviet Union / Russia in a similar circumstance.

Especially considering Zuluznhy doesn't speak much to the press, it is even more difficult to believe this was just off-the-cuff remarks that the US administration did not approve of.

Now, it maybe pretty much ignored by Western media, but for certain Ukrainians paid careful attention to this, as well other policy makers in Europe and Russia. The interview is basically saying the writing is on the wall for Ukraine and some sort of concession speech is coming "if" significantly more equipment doesn't arrive which aren't on their way.

Of course, could all be part of some subterfuge to make the Russians believe Ukraine is giving up, when they aren't giving up! Or then just the private musings of the General without any indication of a policy change whatsoever. But that's difficult to imagine.

However, I would agree that interview doesn't commit anything, but I have a hard time imagining the interview was planned without the idea of setting up these options. I'd also be willing to believe that setting up a concession speech, Zelensky resigning, compromise with the Russians is coming from the Ukrainian side if they see there is simply no more viable path to victory, in which case the US is managing the process with controlled statements in the Western press rather than some confusing speculation engine of random remarks to Ukrainian press.

Just a side note, Zelensky doesn't necessarily need to resign, but could just become a figurehead, and the actual negotiation done by Zuluzhny. Then a Ukrainian election and Zelensky steps down from politics then. This is also a usual way to do these things. A lot of the conflict is portrayed as basically personal issue between Zelensky and Putin.

The Economist is ignored by the Western media, really?

The Economist is a US outlet, really?

You guys live in your own world, where your own defecations smell like Channel n°5.

The Economist is ignored by the Western press, really? — Olivier5

I don't see much discussion about this interview in Western media, seems to me very much "last weeks news" that was pretty much ignored.

Something can appear in Western media and still be ignored by Western media generally speaking. Lot's of pretty "big deals" appear once in the New York Times or somewhere and then are pretty much never discussed again, or it's a topic of the current news cycle and just goes away in the next.

When a topic is focused on in Western media it will have plenty of followup, different people's reactions and takes, questions to politicians and officials, analysis by scholars and so on, which can go on for weeks, months, or years.

For example, for 2 decades there was constant focus on the topic of "terrorism"; interviewing generals, academics, journalist opinion, analysis of policy (too much, not enough), all sorts of speculations, documenting and re-documenting their crimes, talking to victims, reporting people think it's really bad in various forms, etc.

After the withdrawal of Afghanistan, the issue is basically now completely ignored. BBC reported on some starving children in Afghanistan, but there wasn't much discussion about it, not a topic that was focused on. The word "terror" or "terrorism" appears 0 times on CNN, CNBC, BBC, The Guardian, Reuters front webpage (as of writing this), whereas Ukraine or Ukrainian appears on the front page on CNN 6 times, CNBC 4 times, The Guardian 22 times, and Reuters 4 times.

Interestingly the BBC does not have Ukraine as front page news on their website today (nor any analogue like "Kiev" or "Zelensky") ... could be the first time this has happened since the start of the war; make of it what you will.

I don't see much discussion about this interview in Western media — boethius

The Economist is Western media, one of the most visible. Evidently, its competitors, such as the NYT, are not going to talk much about a scoop that escaped them. Why would they advertise for a competitor?

In my experience, American news outlets tend to ignore non-American ones -- it's part of their so-called exceptionalism.

There's been 4 US administrations since 2008, and I'd be willing to accept the idea the US more-or-less stumbled into this conflict without really a military plan if Russia did a full scale invasion (they may have been satisfied with Russia conquering Ukraine, having a big headache to deal with trying to manage it, and slapping tons of sanctions on Russia). — boethius

The remarkable thing is that during those four administrations the United States policy has been constant, unchanged. That is no coincidence.

Additionally, the United States must have expected full-scale war because that's what they sought to prepare Ukraine for for years, through all kinds of military aid, from training, equipment, to joint military exercises, etc.

A "wir haben es nicht gewußt" from the United States I won't buy.


I agree what the Americans are doing isn't illogical from a realpolitik point of view.

Russia was weak after the Cold War, scarcely a great power. The Americans, seeing new great power competition on the horizon with China likely sought to end Russia as a great power permanently to avoid having to contend with two potential peer competitors in the future.

Instead, what it achieved is the exact situation it tried to avoid - Russia and China being united in their opposition towards United States hegemony.

Wow.
I read several of those articles and found the talking points of boethius and Tzeentch in bold relief. In some cases, they have been transcribing the text verbatim.

The Economist is Western media, one of the most visible. Evidently, its competitors, such as the NYT, are not going to talk much about a scoop that escaped them. In general, American news outlets tend to ignore non-American ones -- it's part of their exceptionalism. — Olivier5

Ignoring an issue does not imply "has never been mentioned once" it just means paying little attention to it.

If you're ignoring someone or something, there's a spectrum to it, in particular if we're talking about large institutions.

But, please, post any analysis in mainstream media about this interview made today or in the last few days, certainly would be interesting to see.

If I search Zaluzhny in the past 24 hours on google, the top hits are:

1. https://vpk.name
2. Twitter (just linking to general search of Zaluznhy in twitter)
3. https://www.president.gov.ua
4. Medium
5. https://kyivindependent.com
6. https://infographics.economist.com
7. https://www.ukrinform.net

Which is not something I would predict of a topic of interest for the main stream Western media. I'm pretty confident that if a mainstream publication was talking about it, google would put it pretty near the top. And the economist.com page on it isn't even new content, just posting the an 8 second audio clip of the interview.

The remarkable thing is that during those four administrations the United States policy has been constant, unchanged. That is no coincidence.

Additionally, the United States must have expected full-scale war because that's what they sought to prepare Ukraine for for years, through all kinds of military aid, from training, equipment, to joint military exercises, etc. — Tzeentch

I agree it's not coincidence, just that it may not have been completely thought through, or then arming Ukraine post-Russia invasion was not the original plan.

Letting Russia conquer Ukraine, fomenting dissidence and sanctioning Russia would be an equally reasonable contingency in the case of a full invasion.

Certainly the US could not know ahead of time Ukraine would fight and not capitulate, so, in the least, they planned for both possibilities.

So when @ssu points out the US offering refuge to Ukrainian leadership, this may have been genuinely part of the plan "Ukraine is conquered by Russia".

However, certainly the US policy since 2008 has, at minimum, zero problem with provoking Russia into invading Ukraine, but I would guess the idea was that this would be a net-loss to Russia even if they took the territory (and need to deal with Ukrainian insurgence / nationalists for years). When US officials and policy wonks kept saying "we can give Russia's their Afghanistan" before and at the start of the war, they may very well have had that in mind, of Russia winning the conventional war and then needing to deal with an insurgency and dissidence and it's more than they can handle, and, for certain, pretext for the sanctions, selling gas to Europe.

That Ukraine fought tenaciously to halt the conquering and the massive social media response and so on, may have been unexpected and seen as a new opportunity after the war started, or that they were pushing for total war but wanted to be sure Ukrainian leadership was really committed (so offering the refuge is a way to evaluate that).

Evidence for this would be that the US / NATO didn't flood Ukraine with the ATMG's and Stingers before the war, so what exactly was the plan could have been pretty ambiguous (even to the US administration and bureaucracies).

Likewise, the US could not have been completely sure of Europe's reaction to the war. Germany and France could have opposed supporting Ukraine, or been vocal about the need for peace from the beginning or resisted sanctions etc. in one way or another, in which case plan total war via Ukraine may not be feasible. The current predicament maybe a case of being victim of one's own success, in that Europe was totally in with essentially no dissent, Ukraine was fighting well with what they had, total exuberance for war in Ukraine, Europe and the US, so everything was peachy at the time. The problem that creates being how to calibrate the harm you want to do to Russia, but not more, and then end the war when it becomes a net-liability rather than an asset.

Definitely seems to me the US has achieved all it would like to achieve in the war so far, but there's no easy way to end it.

The Zaluzhny interview could be indication they're willing to just do it. But I think we've been close to peace before when a new cycle of escalation is triggered and that goes off the rails, so could be a similar situation this time.

I'm open to the possibility, but I fail to see a coherent plan behind letting Russia conquer (parts of) Ukraine.

For one, Ukraine isn't Afghanistan, Ukrainians aren't Afghanis, etc. I don't think it goes without saying that the preconditions for a similar kind of insurgency are in place in Ukraine as they were in Afghanistan or other parts of the Middle-East.

Second, the Russians also realize what happens to nations who try to conquer too much at once. They've suffered through their failure in Afghanistan and then saw the Americans try and fail in much the same way.

There's a good chance that what we're seeing today in Ukraine is already a part of this new approach: conquer a piece of land and pacify it while keeping the conflict hot.

Thirdly, both Crimea and Donbass were annexed without any type of insurgency taking shape. It's possible that that is still to come, but again I don't think it goes without saying that it will.

Lastly, the American elite (the Bidens, for example) are deeply invested in Ukraine, and during the 2013 Maidan revolution they were already getting busy constructing a new Ukrainian government. I don't see how that fits into a picture where the United States is content to let Russia conquer Ukraine.

↪boethius I'm open to the possibility, but I fail to see a coherent plan behind letting Russia conquer (parts of) Ukraine. — Tzeentch

I think we can agree it's not all that coherent.

One driver of NATO expansion is simply you need to be in NATO to be able to buy certain weapons, but also you're obviously not going to be buying from Russia (even though that has happened, such as Turkey buying AA systems, it's at great US protest), so it's a good arms-client relationship for the US.

I would guess the main reasoning behind the policy is simply that the war on terrorism has to end sometime, so who's the next enemy?

It's easy to say "China's the near-peer-competitor" but it's a lot more difficult to demonise China as the new "other", due to their economic leverage. Whereas Russia is more doable.

The thought process could have simply been we're setting up Russia as the new enemy and focus of attention for when the war on terrorism ends, but they may not really have thought through how Russia may react to these policies.

I think what's clear is that the idea was to have a tense but balanced relationship with Russia, and especially find a way to sell Europe LNG.

So, if imagine myself as a policy analyst, or even card carrying neo-con, to the US intelligence and administration, recommending this pathway, my idea maybe not to harm Europe economically, or even Russia really, and I may not even have in mind a total war in Ukraine, but more ... just scare the Europeans a bit, get them to buy more arms and more LNG (perhaps just in the name of "diversifying"): what's good for US arms and Gas is good for the US, QED.

In parallel to these macro economic issues, US intelligence operations in Ukraine was also clearly in retaliation for Russia saving Asad.

So, how all these forces mixed within the US government and NATO more generally (and Biden's son sitting on a board of a gas company and whatever the biolabs were about and so on--just seems an absolute cesspool), and then with Russia and Ukraine, I could definitely imagine results in this outcome without anyone really having planned it, nor even viewed as remotely plausible or even preferred (at the time) when considered.

In particular, the desire to sell LNG to Europe maybe a problem that really had no short term solution until the war started, so it could have seemed like a blessing from the lord and too good to be true or giveup or mitigate the risks in anyway, and the policy then sort of takes on a life of its own.

The Americans have purposefully steered towards this conflict since at least 2008.

Now they have their conflict, and they spin a yarn about Ukrainian sovereignty. — Tzeentch

LOL.

Just a quote from the White House page from 2010:

In one of his earliest new foreign policy initiatives, President Obama sought to reset relations with Russia and reverse what he called a “dangerous drift” in this important bilateral relationship. President Obama and his administration have sought to engage the Russian government to pursue foreign policy goals of common interest – win-win outcomes -- for the American and Russian people.

And this included:

The New START Treaty:

On April 8, 2010, in Prague, Presidents Obama and Medvedev signed the New START Treaty, a strategic offensive arms reduction treaty to follow-up on the START Treaty, which expired on December 5, 2009. The New START Treaty reduces limits on U.S. and Russian deployed strategic warheads by approximately one third.

Non-Proliferation:

In addition to the New Start Treaty and actions taken against Iran and North Korea, the U.S. and Russia have made significant progress in developing our common nonproliferation agenda over the past eighteen months. Russia joined the United States in supporting the UN Security Council Resolution 1887 on September 24, 2009. Russia also played a critical role in President Obama’s Nuclear Security Summit, held on April 12-13, 2010.

Creation of the Presidential Bilateral Commission:

During their meeting in Moscow on July 6, 2009, Presidents Medevedev and Obama established the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Commission consisting of sixteen working groups ranging from nuclear cooperation, space, health, military-to-military, cultural and sports exchange, to civil society.

Military-to-Military Cooperation:

Russia and the United States agreed to renew bilateral military cooperation and have approved a work-plan for this cooperation under the Defense Cooperation Working Group of the Bilateral Presidential Commission. Russia and the United States also have cooperated successfully on anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and have committed to intensify counter-piracy cooperation. The U.S. sponsored Russia’s UN Security Council resolution for an UN-led study on the cost and effectiveness of various approaches to prosecute pirates.

Accelerating Russia’s WTO Accession:

After a long lull while Russia focused on forming its Customs Union with the Republics of Belarus and Kazakhstan, the United States and Russia have intensified their discussion regarding Russia’s WTO accession. - On June 24, based on the significant progress achieved, including agreement on the treatment of state-owned enterprises, and provided that Russia fully implements the mutually agreed upon action plan for bringing Russian legislation into compliance with WTO requirements, the Presidents agreed to aim to settle remaining bilateral issues by September 30.

Supporting President Medvedev’s Initiative on Innovation:

The Obama Administration has welcomed President Medvedev’s focus on innovation and has looked for ways to support this initiative. In February, 2010, the State Department and National Security Staff led a delegation of high-tech executives to Moscow and Novosibirsk to help promote this innovation agenda, including promoting entrepreneurship, openness and transparency, internet freedom and freedom of expression, and the use of communications technologies to augment the work of traditional civil society organizations.[/b]

Expanding Trade and Investment:

Rostechnologiya and Boeing signed a proposal acceptance to enter into a sale of 50 737 Boeing aircraft with a potential additional sale of 15 planes to the Russian national airline Aeroflot. The multi-billion dollar sale will create potentially 44,000 new jobs in America’s aerospace industry. U.S. companies have opened new manufacturing facilities in Russia in the areas of soft drinks, paper, and tractors.

Above seems quite something else than "steering towards this conflict". Oh! But as the year WAS 2010, the Russo-Georgian war had happened, and according to you the march to war had started. Of course Georgia, a war that had happened two years ago, was mentioned also:

Georgia:

The Obama Administration continues to have serious disagreements with the Russian government over Georgia. We continue to call for Russia to end its occupation of the Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and in parallel have worked with the Russian government to prevent further military escalations in the region. We have witnessed some incremental confidence building measures, such as opening the border at Verkhniy Lars and allowing direct charter flights between the two countries, and continue to press for the strengthening of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms and a return of international observers to the two occupied regions of Georgia.

Yes! Serious disagreements. Yet incremental confidence building measures seemed to have been noticed. And yet the differences are not so serious to prevent everything else mentioned above and even more... just on one meeting with the US and Russian presidents.

Hence this idea of the US starting the march to war in 2008 is quite biased and ignorant view, which picks some events and disregards everything else, but is well suited for Putin's present propaganda.

How according to some the US marches to war: