Obviously this statement is not compatible with a concern for Ukrainian welfare. The goal is to just harm Russia, not actually stop Russia from achieving it's objectives in Ukraine — “boethius
.That's just dumb, obviously if Russia isn't stopped, Ukraine loses the war at great sacrifice, this isn't "good" for Ukrainian welfare — “boethius
So just say you are willing to sacrifice Ukraine and Ukrainian welfare to harm the Russians, and argue that point. Sometimes great achievements require great sacrifices (of other people). — “boethius
It's just crass and cowardly to show your cards, what you truly believe, which is harming Russia is your priority and not Ukrainian welfare — “boethius
BTW, since you seem to care and know about the Ukrainian welfare more than I do, I still have to ask: how many Ukrainian lives did your online outrage save so far exactly? — neomac
I'll respond to this as well, as it's such a dumb strawman. — boethius
Obviously, my recommendation (my position in this argument) of a negotiated resolution to the conflict, which would require recognising legitimate grievances of the Russians (and also against the Russians) would be the first step in trying to find an acceptable compromise to the warring parties, would, if followed, result in an end to the war and saving Ukrainian lives who would otherwise perish in the trenches, explosions, from the cold in their apartments, disease, and all manner of evils which accompany a war if it was to continue (which it has).
What I can say, is that if my recommendation was followed at the start of the war (when Ukraine had likely the most leverage it would ever have) literally hundreds of thousands of people now dead would still be alive (not only in Ukraine but due to increases in food and energy prices worldwide that translates directly into more suffering and deaths).
Of course, it could be argued that whatever compromise would be required is not worth saving those lives, or that the Russian demands of an independent Donbas (at the time) and recognition of Crimea would be a worse state of affairs than the lives lost since.
It could be argued that what's important is:
The end game for NATO/US involvement in this war doesn’t need to be to stop Russia or overturn its regime. But to inflict as much enduring damage as possible to Russian power (in terms of its economic system, its system of alliance, its capacity of military projection outside its borders, its its technology supply, its military and geopolitical status) to the point it is not longer perceived as a non-negligible geopolitical threat to the West. — neomac
And so concern of Ukrainian lives is misplaced given what can be achieved if we encourage them to fight on, even perhaps without actually "stopping the Russians" and even if we know that to be the likely outcome.
But saying a peace settlement would not result in less Ukrainian dead, is just dumb. Obviously it would.
The benefits to a peace and compromise are less death, and the benefits to more war are achieving the fruits of war (mostly territory and national pride) at the cost of a lot of death. — boethius
Now, this is of course a debate between non-decision makers, so at no point do I have the power to directly translate my recommendations into "saving Ukrainian lives" by negotiating what I think is a reasonable resolution to the war; so proposing that as a burden of proof of some kind is just stupid.
No where do I claim I've saved Ukrainian lives, and that's basically the text-book definition of a strawman to present my position as claiming that or somehow requiring to demonstrate that.
Had there been a peaceful resolution at any point in the conflict, perhaps then I could say my analysis contributed to that in some small way, but there is no peace and no lives have been spared. — boethius
My point is simply that obviously Russia is willing to pay the cost of war with Ukraine under certain circumstances (such as circumstances that literally exist right now ... if they weren't willing, then they'd be withdrawing right now and the war would be over). Therefore, you could never reasonably assume such circumstances would not reemerge in the future regardless of any peace deal today. If there's no third party to keep Russia to its promise to not reinvade in the context of a peace deal (even ignoring the problem of why we'd believe such a third party would actually act), then there is simply nothing that can be remotely described as a guarantee of not being reinvaded available to Ukraine. — boethius
Certainly we would want law to conform to our normative disposition, but until A. all people have the same values and B. little or no corruption exists, then that won't be the case — boethius
By comparing these 2 quotations, anybody can immediately notice your conceptual confusion, typical of a militant mind addicted to reasoning through slogans. In the first one you do not talk just about “stop Russia” but about “stop Russia from achieving it's objectives in Ukraine”. Yet in the second quotation, the “from” clause has vanished (it’s common for slogans to use ellipsis: e.g. “Yes we can!”, “Just do it!”, “Stop Russia!”). — neomac
Sure, here I restate it again and bolden it: The end game for NATO/US involvement in this war doesn’t need to be to stop Russia or overturn its regime. But to inflict as much enduring damage as possible to Russian power (in terms of its economic system, its system of alliance, its capacity of military projection outside its borders, its its technology supply, its military and geopolitical status) to the point it is not longer perceived as a non-negligible geopolitical threat to the West. Outrageous right?! — neomac
Number of Ukrainian refugees recorded in each country:
1. Russia (2,852,395) — wikipedia citing the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
The Economist interviewed General Valery Zaluzhny, the head of Ukraine’s armed forces.
Now, normally I don't pay much mind to government or military officials' statements. You have to read between the lines to get a morsel of useful info. But Zaluzhny is no politico, and he is known for speaking candidly on those infrequent occasions when he speaks in public. And indeed, this interview is not what you might expect: "Rah-rah-rah! Crimea in six months!" Not at all. — SophistiCat
As far as I can tell, regardless of how and when this war ends, post-sanctions-and-war Russia will be far more dangerous to its neighbour's and the West than the previous Russia-we-trade-with, and at the same time Europe will be significantly worse off economically. — boethius
Russia won't be more dangerous after the war, it will be defanged and humbled. Don't you look forward to that? — Olivier5
It's time for a negotiated peace in Ukraine, Kissinger says — Reuters
No where in this is Ukrainian welfare or Ukraine "winning" requirement in your endgame, whatever definition of that they are using today, under consideration. — “boethius
Ukraine can both lose, and in the process suffer extreme harms, and your end game can still be accomplished if enough damage is inflicted on Russia.
The instrument to "inflict as much as enduring damage as possible to Russian power" is Ukrainian lives.
In the world of "practical rationality" there is no military achievement in this context possible without sacrificing Ukrainian lives. — boethius
So, if you want to maximise your military objective, which is harming the Russians in your "endgame", then that requires maximising the sacrifice of Ukraine. Even when in a clearly losing position and even when suffering far higher kill-ratios than the Russians and civilian and economic damage etc. fighting on another day will still inflict another day of damage to the Russians. — boethius
Predictably, you now try to move the goal posts to NATO and Ukraine, but again the harms to Ukraine in such a process can still be essentially total. Ukraine could be totally destroyed, totally sacrificed, in such a project and if the goal to inflict enough damage on Russia is achieved then perhaps Russia is indeed no longer a threat to Ukraine. However, if in the process "Ukraine", however you want to define it, is totally sacrificed and destroyed, clearly Ukrainian welfare has not been protected. — boethius
You can not serve 2 masters: you will love the one and hate the other. Clearly, you serve US interests in this conversation. — boethius
Which leads to plenty of interesting debate. For example, I have serious doubts about your geopolitical theory considering China is the much larger hegemonic competitor to the US. — boethius
Indeed. Taking Melitopol would do the trick. That's why he is referring to the 84 km to Melitopol. So it's a long war.And indeed, this interview is not what you might expect: "Rah-rah-rah! Crimea in six months!" Not at all. — SophistiCat
He may very well be someone who speaks candidly, but this interview was certainly planned by the US administration (because it's to a US news outlet; if it was to Ukrainian journalists, then maybe in that case he's gone off script or just shit-happens kind of thing). In addition, Zelensky was there. — boethius
Or because Zelensky is the elected political leader of the country and this is an interview with the head of the Ukrainian army, general Zaluzhny.Why not Zelensky? — boethius
Yeah.Of course, losing the war while retaining independence was potentially the best outcome for Finland, so it was definitely a "win" in that sense, but since it was simply impossible for Finland to "defeat" the Soviet Union, the only options are eventual defeat or then a diplomatic compromise (acceptable to the Soviet Union; what other people think doesn't matter if you're dealing with Soviet Union). — boethius
To recapitulate your achievements so far: emotional blackmailing, slippery slopes, strawmans, ad hominem, ......... — neomac
First, it’s not “my” endgame. Making it personal would be misleading even if there was no intellectual dishonesty involved, because it may confuse my understanding of certain geopolitical dynamics with my taking position toward them. These are 2 distinct things. My understanding how the chess game is played by a couple of players is one thing, my siding with any of them is another. — neomac
Putin and China are questioning the West-backed world order. The West must respond to that threat with determination. That’s why Putin unilateral aggression must fail in a way however that is instrumental to the West-backed world order. If this war is not just between Russia and Ukraine, then it’s not even just between the US and Russia, it’s between whoever wants to weigh in in establishing the new world order, either by backing the US or by backing Russia. — neomac
Sure, here I restate it again and bolden it: The end game for NATO/US involvement in this war doesn’t need to be to stop Russia or overturn its regime. But to inflict as much enduring damage as possible to Russian power (in terms of its economic system, its system of alliance, its capacity of military projection outside its borders, its its technology supply, its military and geopolitical status) to the point it is not longer perceived as a non-negligible geopolitical threat to the West. Outrageous right?! — neomac
Again you are conveniently framing the issue as it suits your narrative. Ukrainian lives (namely casualties) are not “The instrument to ‘inflict as much as enduring damage as possible to Russian power’” but the collateral damage of Ukrainian decisions to fight back Russian aggression, direct damage inflicted by Russian decisions on Ukrainians, and indirect collateral damage of Western decisions to support Ukrainians in fighting back Russian aggression. As collateral damage is Ukrainian lives, this poses a moral dilemma of course. — neomac
Let’s examin the density of your intellectual squalor as illustrated by this arbitrary accusation.
First, I expressed my preferences and the reasons of my siding with the Western support to Ukraine in previous posts, so there was no need for you to invent such pathetic slogans about my preferences (BTW why love one and hate the other? I could be adverse to both powers yet hate Russian hegemony way more than the American one). — neomac
Second, I’m arguing that Western support of Ukraine is both strategically and morally defensible (actually more than the opposite view for avg Westerners) so your attack ad hominem is irrelevant wrt such arguments. — neomac
Can you show better how your accusation follows from your notion of “justification”? — neomac
Does “you cannot justify to others” mean that my claims are not justified until I can prove that everybody on earth agrees with me?! — neomac
since you believe the following “Certainly we would want law to conform to our normative disposition, but until A. all people have the same values and B. little or no corruption exists, then that won't be the case” how can we possibly justify (in your terms) our position to others if they do not share our values or we can’t assure that little or no corruption exists? — neomac
what do you mean by “require recognising legitimate grievances of the Russians”? — neomac
Peace negotiations can be dealt with as quid-pro-quo without recognising any legitimate grievances, like a prisoner exchange, so why would this be required as a first step for a peace negotiation? — neomac
Is it something that needs to be officially recorded anywhere? With what potential/likely legal and propaganda cost/benefit and strategic implications?
What kind of “legitimate grievances” are you talking about and in what sense you consider them “legitimate”? — neomac
What kind of “legitimate grievances” are you talking about and in what sense you consider them “legitimate”? — neomac
Finally what kind of legitimate grievances against the Russians (notice how the negotiation requirements are framed around pro- and cons- for Russia, because they are the ones really need convincing not the West or the Ukrainians) is Russia required to recognize as a first step? — neomac
To recapitulate your intellectual failures so far: — neomac
emotional blackmailing, — neomac
slippery slopes, strawmans — neomac
Sure, here I restate it again and bolden it: The end game for NATO/US involvement in this war doesn’t need to be to stop Russia or overturn its regime. But to inflict as much enduring damage as possible to Russian power (in terms of its economic system, its system of alliance, its capacity of military projection outside its borders, its its technology supply, its military and geopolitical status) to the point it is not longer perceived as a non-negligible geopolitical threat to the West. Outrageous right?! — neomac
Ukrainian lives (especially the soldiers) are lost in the defense of a sovereign Ukraine from an existential threat, which wants (or wanted when attacked) to annex parts of Ukraine and put a puppet regime in place for the rest of the country. Now it seems to want to destroy Ukraine and it's economy.Ukrainian lives (especially the soldiers) are the instrument of US / NATO policy in this fight, and the collateral damage would be civilians and structures that the Ukrainian military kills, wounds or damages as an unintended consequence of warfare. — boethius
That simply isn't "an instrument of US / NATO policy". — ssu
Just remember that the first thing when Russia attacked was for the US to ask if the Ukrainian leadership needed help in evacuating from Ukraine. That's how much they believed in this "instrument of US / NATO policy" you try to depict. — ssu
The Americans have purposefully steered towards this conflict since at least 2008.
Now they have their conflict, and they spin a yarn about Ukrainian sovereignty. — Tzeentch
Lol, Scott Ritter, really? Well, shit seeks its own level. — SophistiCat
The Economist is ignored by the Western press, really? — Olivier5
I don't see much discussion about this interview in Western media — boethius
There's been 4 US administrations since 2008, and I'd be willing to accept the idea the US more-or-less stumbled into this conflict without really a military plan if Russia did a full scale invasion (they may have been satisfied with Russia conquering Ukraine, having a big headache to deal with trying to manage it, and slapping tons of sanctions on Russia). — boethius
The Economist is Western media, one of the most visible. Evidently, its competitors, such as the NYT, are not going to talk much about a scoop that escaped them. In general, American news outlets tend to ignore non-American ones -- it's part of their exceptionalism. — Olivier5
The remarkable thing is that during those four administrations the United States policy has been constant, unchanged. That is no coincidence.
Additionally, the United States must have expected full-scale war because that's what they sought to prepare Ukraine for for years, through all kinds of military aid, from training, equipment, to joint military exercises, etc. — Tzeentch
↪boethius I'm open to the possibility, but I fail to see a coherent plan behind letting Russia conquer (parts of) Ukraine. — Tzeentch
LOL.The Americans have purposefully steered towards this conflict since at least 2008.
Now they have their conflict, and they spin a yarn about Ukrainian sovereignty. — Tzeentch
In one of his earliest new foreign policy initiatives, President Obama sought to reset relations with Russia and reverse what he called a “dangerous drift” in this important bilateral relationship. President Obama and his administration have sought to engage the Russian government to pursue foreign policy goals of common interest – win-win outcomes -- for the American and Russian people.
The New START Treaty:
On April 8, 2010, in Prague, Presidents Obama and Medvedev signed the New START Treaty, a strategic offensive arms reduction treaty to follow-up on the START Treaty, which expired on December 5, 2009. The New START Treaty reduces limits on U.S. and Russian deployed strategic warheads by approximately one third.
Non-Proliferation:
In addition to the New Start Treaty and actions taken against Iran and North Korea, the U.S. and Russia have made significant progress in developing our common nonproliferation agenda over the past eighteen months. Russia joined the United States in supporting the UN Security Council Resolution 1887 on September 24, 2009. Russia also played a critical role in President Obama’s Nuclear Security Summit, held on April 12-13, 2010.
Creation of the Presidential Bilateral Commission:
During their meeting in Moscow on July 6, 2009, Presidents Medevedev and Obama established the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Commission consisting of sixteen working groups ranging from nuclear cooperation, space, health, military-to-military, cultural and sports exchange, to civil society.
Military-to-Military Cooperation:
Russia and the United States agreed to renew bilateral military cooperation and have approved a work-plan for this cooperation under the Defense Cooperation Working Group of the Bilateral Presidential Commission. Russia and the United States also have cooperated successfully on anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and have committed to intensify counter-piracy cooperation. The U.S. sponsored Russia’s UN Security Council resolution for an UN-led study on the cost and effectiveness of various approaches to prosecute pirates.
Accelerating Russia’s WTO Accession:
After a long lull while Russia focused on forming its Customs Union with the Republics of Belarus and Kazakhstan, the United States and Russia have intensified their discussion regarding Russia’s WTO accession. - On June 24, based on the significant progress achieved, including agreement on the treatment of state-owned enterprises, and provided that Russia fully implements the mutually agreed upon action plan for bringing Russian legislation into compliance with WTO requirements, the Presidents agreed to aim to settle remaining bilateral issues by September 30.
Supporting President Medvedev’s Initiative on Innovation:
The Obama Administration has welcomed President Medvedev’s focus on innovation and has looked for ways to support this initiative. In February, 2010, the State Department and National Security Staff led a delegation of high-tech executives to Moscow and Novosibirsk to help promote this innovation agenda, including promoting entrepreneurship, openness and transparency, internet freedom and freedom of expression, and the use of communications technologies to augment the work of traditional civil society organizations.[/b]
Expanding Trade and Investment:
Rostechnologiya and Boeing signed a proposal acceptance to enter into a sale of 50 737 Boeing aircraft with a potential additional sale of 15 planes to the Russian national airline Aeroflot. The multi-billion dollar sale will create potentially 44,000 new jobs in America’s aerospace industry. U.S. companies have opened new manufacturing facilities in Russia in the areas of soft drinks, paper, and tractors.
Georgia:
The Obama Administration continues to have serious disagreements with the Russian government over Georgia. We continue to call for Russia to end its occupation of the Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and in parallel have worked with the Russian government to prevent further military escalations in the region. We have witnessed some incremental confidence building measures, such as opening the border at Verkhniy Lars and allowing direct charter flights between the two countries, and continue to press for the strengthening of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms and a return of international observers to the two occupied regions of Georgia.
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