Other nations have more than a rhetorical interest in the outcome. The security crisis in Europe is real. The economic crisis is real. The refugee crisis is real. — Paine

You'd think then that the Europeans would have been a bit more reprehensive about letting the Americans stir up shit in their backyard, because they helped create all of those crises.

Or perhaps that now they would be interested in ending the conflict instead of "teaching the Russians a lesson", which is a recipe for protracted, possibly nuclear war.

It seems to me the European stake in this conflict is mostly the ego of its deluded leaders.

But to depict Russia as merely defending itself is to turn a blind eye to what they have been doing and what they are capable of. — Paine

I don't view Russia merely as defending itself, but pointing out the obvious role the Americans and the Europeans had in causing this conflict seems enough to give off that impression to some.

For all her faults, Angela Merkel actually understood this. She recently went on record saying that what the Americans and Europeans intended to do with Ukraine would be interpreted by the Russians as a declaration of war, and she was spot on.

That's why she sought to stop Ukraine from entering NATO.

Asked about whether she regretted opposing the US-led membership action plan for Ukraine and Georgia in 2008, Merkel said: “Ukraine was not the country that we know now. It was a Ukraine that was very split … even the reformist forces [Yulia] Tymoshenko and [Viktor] Yushchenko were very at odds. That means it was not a country whose democracy was inwardly strengthened.” She said Ukraine at the time was “ruled by oligarchs”.

From the Russian president’s perspective, “it was a declaration of war”. While she didn’t share Putin’s perspective, Merkel said she “knew how he thought” and “didn’t want to provoke it further”.

She claimed to have blocked Ukraine’s route to membership of the military alliance with the country’s best interests at heart. “You cannot become a member of Nato from one day to the next,” Merkel said. “It’s a process, and during this process I knew Putin would have done something to Ukraine that would not have been good for it.”

You seemed to be on the verge of recognizing those aforementioned crises are real ones and then you say: "European stake in this conflict is mostly the ego of its deluded leaders." It sounds like you are saying that the leaders could solve those problems if Russia wins or not. You will have to explain what the former scenario would look like. The latter has already been established as the basis for policy decisions.


Please link the document you are quoting Merkel from. Whatever were the concerns about Russia's intentions before 2014, 300 days of preemptive war has given us a chance to learn more about them.

It's unlikely the Chinese will alter their stance towards Russia much, regardless of what happens in Ukraine. — Tzeentch

China has said that they are against the use of nuclear weapons being used in Ukraine.

The international community, said Xi, should “jointly oppose the use of, or threats to use, nuclear weapons,” according to a statement carried by Xinhua, China’s state news agency. The world should also “advocate that nuclear weapons cannot be used, a nuclear war cannot be waged, in order to prevent a nuclear crisis” in Europe or Asia, Xi added.

I highly doubt that Western leaders are willing to enter a protracted land war in Eastern Europe and/or nuclear conflict just to save face for the Americans after they overplayed their hand in Ukraine. — Tzeentch

But then you aren't highly in doubt that the Russian leader and military will want to escalate the war and face a possible conventional NATO attack when they have experienced severe losses in Ukraine?

We also seem to agree that NATO would not retaliate with nuclear weapons, why would it?

As for conventional retaliation, this is really a problematic thing. You don't just casually destroy Russian forces. The options are fairly limited. — boethius

During the Cold War, which seems to be continuing now, US and Soviet forces did clash. When they did, both sides didn't opt to escalate to the next level and go to a declared war. First and foremost, this is rhetoric on both sides now. Russia hasn't used nuclear weapons and hence NATO's response is also hypothetical. But when the issue has already come up, I think that the situation is different than where the West was in 2014. The West has given an unified response and I don't think

Sending in boots on the ground into Ukraine ... does any Western nation actually want this? — boethius

Why would they be sending ground troops? If the response to a hypothetical use of nukes would be a conventional attack, that likely would be done by cruise missiles and aircraft. Then Russia would have to think if it wants to escalate further and strike NATO countries. And really, if it now has problems to fight a war with Ukraine, is the solution to start a war with countries it even before it's attack in February didn't match? De-escalation through escalation is simply a shock-and-awe strategy which can work when the other side is totally unprepared for it.

Certainly, there are plenty of reasons not to use nuclear weapons we would agree on (domestic politics, China and India's reaction); however, that Russia is reasonably deterred by conventional military means, or reasonably deterred by nuclear means, or believes nuclear weapons are not useful, are fairly weak arguments. — boethius

Russia has gotten already the benefit from it's nuclear weapons: NATO hasn't openly interfered in the war. There aren't any "no-fly-zones" being patrolled over Ukraine.

Hence to start actually using them is in my view really pushing the limit. Russian armed forces aren't on the verge of imminent collapse in Ukraine. Hence it would be really strange just why to continue to be so reckless.

Sending funding (basically bankrolling the entire Ukrainian military payroll), sending weapons, providing intelligence, covert meddling, are all in themselves interventions. — boethius

Which happened all the time everywhere during the Cold war with the Soviet Union and the West.

And that's why the era was called a Cold War.

So absolutely nothing new here.

No, the West can definitely fuckup now by actively obstructing peaceful resolutions, encouraging hundreds of thousands of deaths and injuries and millions of traumatised and disrupted lives and the complete destruction of Ukraine which Zelensky does not hesitate to tell us is being done for "your values" (i.e. the West, not necessarily good for Ukraine) and to protect Eastern Europe (not necessarily good for Ukraine). — boethius

Lol.

Let's first notice just what Russia had in mind if their planned 10-day operation would have been successful and they would have gotten Kyiv:

After D+10, the role of Russia’s conventional forces was to transition to a supporting function
to Russia’s special services, responsible for establishing occupation administrations on the
territories. Since these activities were critical to the Russian theory of victory in the operation,
it is important to outline these plans to appropriately contextualise the role of the conventional force. The assumption appears to have been that Ukrainian government officials would either flee or be captured as a result of the speed of the invasion. It was also anticipated that shock would prevent the immediate mobilisation of the population, and that protests and other civil resistance could be managed through the targeted disintegration of Ukrainian civil society. To manage these protests Russian forces would be supported by Rosgvardia (Russian National Guard) and riot control units. Meanwhile the FSB was tasked with capturing local officials.
The Russian counterintelligence regime on the occupied territories had compiled lists that divided Ukrainians into four categories:

• Those to be physically liquidated.
• Those in need of suppression and intimidation.
Those considered neutral who could be induced to collaborate.
• Those prepared to collaborate.

For those in the top category, the FSB had conducted wargames with detachments of the Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) to conduct kill-or-capture missions. In many cases, the purpose of capture was to put individuals involved in the 2014 Revolution of Dignity (often referred to as the Maidan Revolution) on trial to be executed. Although initial lists of persons in the second category existed, the approach was to be more methodical, with the registration of the population through door-to-door sweeps and the use of filtration camps to establish counterintelligence files on large portions of the population in the occupied territories. Filtration would be used to intimidate people, to determine whether they needed to be displaced into Russia, and to lay the groundwork for records to monitor and disrupt resistance networks. Over time, Russia would bring teachers and other officials from Russia itself to engage in the re-education of Ukrainians.

See Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022

That above is the reality what "De-nazification" would have meant. We already have seen this in the occupied territories with Russification taking place. The evident Stalinist approach makes this a truly existential struggle for Ukraine and Ukrainians, hence it is ludicrous to talk about that Ukrainians are being killed for "our values". The fight is about their existence their sovereignty and own culture and hence it's whimsical to argue that Zelensky and the Ukrainian defence is the problem here. It's all totally evident when you just think what it means when Russians declared earlier Ukraine to be an "artificial" state.

China has said that they are against the use of nuclear weapons being used in Ukraine. — ssu

Isn't everybody, including the Russians, against the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine?

That doesn't mean that it won't happen.

But then you aren't highly in doubt that the Russian leader and military will want to escalate the war and face a possible conventional NATO attack when they have experienced severe losses in Ukraine? — ssu

My expectation is that they will escalate if they start to lose, and they won't shy away from using tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine, possibly even on NATO troops should they choose to intervene.

You seemed to be on the verge of recognizing those aforementioned crises are real ones and then you say: "European stake in this conflict is mostly the ego of its deluded leaders." It sounds like you are saying that the leaders could solve those problems if Russia wins or not. You will have to explain what the former scenario would look like. The latter has already been established as the basis for policy decisions. — Paine

Anyone with a shred of sense can see that the Americans purposefully pissed off the Russians in Ukraine, in Europe's backyard, as it always does - stirring up shit far away from their island so other people can bear the cost of war and conflict.

I've always argued that the European leaders should not have played America's lapdogs, and not let Europe become a pawn in America's game, as it is now.

Things were looking great between Europe and Russia. Even after 2008 and 2014 (both crises caused directly by the Americans), things were mendable. Perhaps things were looking a little too great for the Americans' taste - heartland theory and all that, divide et impera.

Had the European leaders cared about their countries, they would have given a clear 'no, and never' to Ukrainian membership to NATO and EU. Merkel did this in 2008 for Ukrainian NATO membership.

The part I quoted was taken from an interview she gave in June of this year.

I didn't agree on much with Merkel, but at least she was level-headed. It seems nowadays European leaders are desperate to prove something. That Europe is strong perhaps, to keep the dream of a United States of Europe alive. But being completely dependent on America and lacking any military strength (or intellectual, for that matter) they were always destined to become Washington stooges in the process.

To "teach Russia a lesson" - what a joke, but I don't know whether to laugh or cry.

Such rhetoric belongs in the children's playground - not in the real world where "teaching lessons" means thousands of people will die and countries get destroyed.

To "teach Russia a lesson" - what a joke, but I don't know whether to laugh or cry.

Such rhetoric belongs in the children's playground — Tzeentch

It's better than some posters' rhetoric about nuclear weapons, which belongs to death.

Russia needs to be humbled alright, and the Ukrainians are busy doing so.

First and foremost, this is rhetoric on both sides now. Russia hasn't used nuclear weapons and hence NATO's response is also hypothetical. But when the issue has already come up, I think that the situation is different than where the West was in 2014. — ssu

Clearly the situation is different than in 2014, there is a full scale war.

However, it is not first and foremost rhetoric. The nukes are very real and have a real impact on decision making. Putin recently harmonising Russian nuclear policy with United States policy to allow first strike against a non-nuclear opponent, is not rhetoric.

The original issue we were discussing was if nuclear weapons would be effective or not, which I think we agree they would be effective against a number of military targets, but Ukraine could continue fighting anyways.

Why would they be sending ground troops? If the response to a hypothetical use of nukes would be a conventional attack, that likely would be done by cruise missiles and aircraft. Then Russia would have to think if it wants to escalate further and strike NATO countries. And really, if it now has problems to fight a war with Ukraine, is the solution to start a war with countries it even before it's attack in February didn't match? De-escalation through escalation is simply a shock-and-awe strategy which can work when the other side is totally unprepared for it. — ssu

Ground troops are the other conventional response, but if you agree that's unlikely then no need to debate it further.

The problem with a conventional air attack on Russian forces in Ukraine is that it may simply not be as effective as the nukes. If we're talking long range cruise missiles, those maybe in limited supply to do damage remotely similar to the damage Russia just did with nukes in this scenario. So there's a real risk of "cost of doing business", as I've mentioned.

Significantly upping the damage would require planes, but it's entirely possible that Russia can shoot down a significant amount of NATO aircraft. It would also not even be possible to establish air superiority without attacking SAM's and air bases in undisputed Russian territory.

I would definitely agree that NATO could do significant damage with its air power, no questions about that. The problem is the tolerance for losses. Western audience will be expecting literally zero losses, stealth is magical, Russians are incompetent and so on.

Stealth has been around now for decades and the Russians have put significant effort into defeating it. I think the odds of zero losses is pretty low, so the question becomes how many NATO losses would be tolerable in such an operation. On top of this analysis of the operation itself there's the risk of nuclear escalation, such as tactical nuclear missiles launched at NATO air bases.

The other problem is that even if such operations are successful with acceptable losses, no escalation, everything seems "fine" ... it doesn't end the war, Russia would still be there, and essentially in a permanent hot-war with NATO firing at any aircraft that comes near and so on, maybe withdrawing from and re-invading Ukraine regularly, using tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine at will, potentially for decades.

The logic that Russia uses a tactical nuclear weapon, NATO spanks Russia, profit, I just don't see how that actually works. Even if successful, one needs a plan for what happens next.

Russia has gotten already the benefit from it's nuclear weapons: NATO hasn't openly interfered in the war. There aren't any "no-fly-zones" being patrolled over Ukraine.

Hence to start actually using them is in my view really pushing the limit. Russian armed forces aren't on the verge of imminent collapse in Ukraine. Hence it would be really strange just why to continue to be so reckless. — ssu

We agree here. There's lot's of reasons not to use nuclear weapons; I'm just disputing the idea NATO has an obvious and easy retaliation that would make it clearly "bad" for Russia in military terms, and also the idea nuclear weapons would not be effective. We agree, however, on all the political reasons not to use nuclear weapons.

And, although I'm not sure NATO can so easily implement a no-fly zone over South Ukraine, for sure one retaliation would be more and more sophisticated weapons to Ukraine.

As I've outlined before, the scenario in which Russia would consider nuclear weapons seriously is if they were actually losing. However, if NATO is essentially letting Russia win by the weapons drip feed, only introducing the next weapons system when the previous one proves insufficient, and everything is very predictable and controlled, then Russia has no need of nuclear weapons and their use only introduces plenty of unknowns and risks that have no need to be tested.

One would need a situation where there is serious risks of not-using-nuclear weapons, such as actually being routed at large scale on the battle field.

All this analysis, in my view, NATO has done, which explains their policy to let Russia slowly win but inflicting (tolerable) damage and limiting the scope of victory. When NATO considers trying to escalate to actually defeat Russia in the field with the weapons (NATO tanks, NATO planes, cluster munitions, thermobaric weapons, "whatever Ukraine needs") and the training that would require ... then that does start to look like a situation Russia would consider nuclear weapons, which NATO doesn't have any obvious and easy response to, hence the decision is not to supply these systems.

Lol.

Let's first notice just what Russia had in mind if their planned 10-day operation would have been successful and they would have gotten Kyiv: — ssu

You are citing from:

The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) is the world’s oldest and the UK’s leading defence and security think tank. Our mission is to inform, influence and enhance public debate to help build a safer and more stable world. — Rusi.org

Which is difficult to take you seriously when you don't mention their top funders 2020-2021:

Over £1,000,000
European Commission

£500,000 to £999,999
United States Department of State

£200,000 to £499,999
BAE Systems plc
British Army, Futures Directorate
Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office
Global Affairs Canada
John D. And Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Tetra Tech International Development Ltd
Verification Research, Training & Information Centre (VERTIC)
ZemiTek, LLC

£100,000 to £199,999
Alion (US DoD/EUCOM)
Alliance for Intellectual Property
Carnegie Corporation of New York
Goldman Sachs Gives
Google, Inc.
Lockheed Martin UK
Palantir Technologies Ltd
Philip Morris International Management SA (PMI Impact Fund)
Redacted, Inc — Rusi funders

And just "maybe" their analysis is biased towards being essentially pure propaganda for their funders.

But, if nevertheless you are certain this analysis is just pure-truth, then I'll respond to it.

However, make very clearly you believe the analysis you posted is really true, the authors have access to the the (Russian?) data required to make their conclusions.

As for opportunities to end the war, the biggest opportunity of ending the war was before the war, implementing the Minsk agreements in good faith and actually end the civil war, and also licensing Nord Stream 2 (or then not allowing it to be built in the first place; which you may say isn't sufficient justification to start a war, but that's just the reality of geopolitics and Russia starting about it, show their "serious", is an expectation ... and Germany allowed the pipeline to be built because buying the gas is to their own benefit).

The next biggest opportunity was when Ukraine had successfully arrested the Russian offensive, this is the common sense and obvious time in which to negotiate a peace deal with a larger invading force, the time of maximum leverage. Again, if the West encouraged, even de facto ordered, Ukraine not to negotiate a peace deal at that time, that is a major fuckup (if the goal is Ukrainian welfare) that has resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths and injury, and millions of traumatised and disrupted lives since.

It is pretty conventional and classic war theory that the thing you want to avoid doing in a fight with a superior force is a protracted war of attrition (why would a smaller force have an advantage in doing that?) and the more such a war goes on, the more the invading force would need to get in a peace deal for it to be "worth it" for the home audience. So the choices (after initial resistance and demonstrating will and capacity to fight and the cost of further fighting) becomes a much worse deal and suffering significant damage or then fighting to some sort of victory (which may not even be possible).

Of course, Western neo-cons would be upset that Ukraine makes any compromise and Russia gets anything, like recognition of Crimea and independent Donbas, and so on, and they'd be doing their little tantrums about it. However, is the destruction of the war so far really worth not-compromising over the Donbas?

Now, the counter argument would be "Russia will just take more later!" but the whole point of the fighting is to demonstrate the cost of such an operation.

The scenario where concessions just encourage more land grabbing, is if land is given up without a fight ... if it's at no cost, why not take more? However, if a heavy cost is inflicted, like hundreds of tanks destroyed, one's army and people demonstrates the will to fight a war, the whole point of doing that to show land grabbing is at a significant cost that is not worth it. But it's simply the reality that a superior force is going to need something to end the war, to sell it to the home audience. You may say "that's not fair" but that's just reality. Alternative is entering a long drawn out war of attrition.

So, are you really arguing that concessions (such as Nord Stream 2, which isn't even a concession but a mutually beneficial "comparative advantage" trade project) before the war or then in the first stages of the war (no NATO, which you keep saying was never a possibility anyways, independent Donbas still part of Ukraine, and recognising Crimea), would not have been worth it for Ukraine to avoid the current situation?

Again, "normative legal force" is just pseudo-intellectual bullshit. Are you adding "normative" to "legal force" because you are aware there is no actual legal force involved in the situation? Or do you just have no idea what you're talking about? — boethius

In “normative legal force” the expression “normative” refers to the fact that laws are norms and “legal” is a specification of “normative” since there are also non-legal norms. Now “normative force” and “law” or “legal system”, or “legal force” are part of very common jargon in the juridical domain. Google it if you have no idea what I am talking about.
Besides you are the one to believe that international law is “ornamental” or with “zero meaning”. I already made my point against this. And I stick to it (even recently Macron was talking about “security guarantees” for Russia).

In terms of the situation, legal justification for military action under the UN system requires a security council vote, which Russia obviously vetos.
As for the votes you're talking about in the general assembly of the UN, they have no legal force in military matters — boethius

That could be a conclusive objection if one took “LEGALLY JUSTIFIES the western policies of the West against Russia” as meaning that each Western foreign policy (like economic sanctions and military support of Western countries) against Russia should be approved by a UN resolution to be legally justified. But that’s not necessary at all, nor I claimed otherwise anywhere. Indeed, international law resolutions that for whatever reason are not enough to coordinate an effective action against infractions still leave the UN members the initiative to take such resolution as a legal justification for national law foreign policies. So the UN resolution wasn’t just a demoscopic survey with no legal consequences, indeed it legally justified Western national policies against Russia.
Besides your legal quibble is irrelevant wrt he original point of contention: I referred to the UN resolution against the Russian invasion of Ukraine to clarify my original claim about Russian defiant attitude toward the West.

Indeed, justification can be anything you mention, but the essential element is we are justifying it to others with some relation to the concept of "justice" that's universal in some way. Of course, what sorts of theories and arguments can be used to justify an action is wide open, the common element is that justification is towards others; arguments we want other to agree with

"Regardless of justification" in the context I use it, refers to the US/NATO, or you own, justifications to others about the policies. You've made it quite clear you are on the "side of the West" and simply want the West to win. That is not a justification to me, or to other third parties that need not pick a side (India, Africa etc.), and certainly not less Russia. — boethius

About time you made an effort to clarify your own terminology. My impression is that your notion of “justification” is pretty general as mine, if not even more vague than mine, with possibly some non-negligible differences like the relation to the notion of “justice” and the “universal” clause. In any case, I can’t clearly see how the notion of “justification” you just laid out is enough to support your accusation (i.e. “regardless of justification”) against my claims and what has this to do with my being “on the side of the West”. Can you show better how your accusation follows from your notion of “justification”?

Now, you may accept that what you want you cannot justify to others (although it maybe still useful to your purposes to fool them into believing the actions are justified) and have a separate internal justification for your actions. In this case, within your own head, there becomes two uses of the word justification; one use is essentially how you try to trick others, say a public position on the matter, and another use is why you are actually doing what you're doing, say a private position. So, in this duelism it can make sense to talk of your justifications for trying to convince others of your justifications which are not your real justifications, but it serves your real justification if others believe your justifications for other reasons. — boethius

As long as I don’t understand how you apply your notion of “justification” I can’t really assess if it’s consistent (BTW does “you cannot justify to others” mean that my claims are not justified until I can prove that everybody on earth agrees with me?!).
My notion of “justification” is easy to understand: the UN resolution against Russian invasion, Russian threatening and defying attitudes toward the West, historical and current Russian genocidal oppression of Ukrainians justifies Western policies against Russia among others justify Western attitude toward Russia based respectively on legal, security and moral criteria shared among Western countries. Where is the trick exactly in claiming this?
Maybe you could argue according to your notion of “justification” (which I’m not committed to) that those reasons are not enough to justify my or Western position because India, Africa and Russia, you disagree with that. But why should I or Westerners care about this? I or Westerners may not see universal agreement necessarily as an attainable or desirable goal under the current circumstances. And if I or Westerners disagree with Russia/India/Africa’s or your position, they & you aren’t justified either, because they & you can not justify your position to me or Westerners, right?
Besides in the case of power competition, unreconcilable disagreements are likely the root cause of the outbreak of conflicts between involved parties so I don’t see how “justification” for involved parties’ policies could reasonably require previous agreement of all involved parties.

if US hegemonic status is a justification, which you clearly state it is, then if Russia wins the war then it's just asserting its hegemonic power over Ukraine, and likewise justified. If the US can't stop Russia then clearly it isn't a global hegemone, as it was unable to determine the outcome of this even that happened on the globe. US may, nevertheles, have a larger sphere of hegemoning than Russia, but it is not global. — boethius

We can agree on this as long as you don’t confuse your notion of “justification” with mine. In a competitive game between countries for global hegemony each country can act at the expense of their adversaries the way they see fit. But that’s not enough for practical rationality applied to geopolitical agents. Indeed countries’ policies toward potential or actual enemies must also take into account available means and related usage to effectively succeed. In other words, taking into account not only relevant security goals but also available means to ensure those goals are preconditions for the kind of rational attitude the countries can exhibit. A chess player’s moves are justified by the chess game rules not only if they are aiming at checkmating the rival, but also if they are adequately assessed as effective to that end. The reciprocal situation holds for the adversary of course.

In particular, your point 3 is extremely clear "the end game for NATO/US involvement in this war doesn’t need to be to stop Russia or overturn its regime. But to inflict as much enduring damage as possible to Russian."
Your "end game" involves zero consideration of Ukrainian welfare nor any notion that it would be justified — boethius

The fact that I didn’t mention "Ukrainian welfare” in that statement is not enough to conclude that there is zero consideration of the Ukrainian welfare on the NATO/US’s part. Indeed there is no logical incompatibility between that “end game” and consideration for Ukrainian welfare. In other words, it may be in the interest of the Western power struggle against Russia to take into account the Ukrainian welfare, for the simple reason that power is grounded not only on brute military force and systematic deceit, but also on consensus, reliable partnership/alliance, and related reputational profile. That’s why discrediting the West also through dishonest arguments is so important for the pro-Russian propaganda like yours.

Which, whether the war is even doing that, would be an interesting question which I'm happy to debate. It could be the war is harming Russia, but it could also be Russia will come out of this war with a far more efficient and powerful army, more autonomous economy and new international banking system and so little reason to ever stop "defying the West" (had Putin implemented the sanctions himself this would have certainly caused serious domestic problems, but since the West did it for him, it's easy to say the West doesn't want to do business with Russia ... sort of what sanctions mean), rapidly replace any equipment, and all its neighbour's far less (rather than more) willing to "defy" Russia, seeing as they clearly can and will do what it takes to destroy your entire economy and the West clearly doesn't have a solution to the needing gas problem. — boethius

I would be more interested in the empirical evidence supporting your conjectures.

So, if you want to stop advancing propaganda, we could discuss what you actually believe, which is that the US / West can and should use this war to harm Russia in pure power competition terms. Ukrainian welfare doesn't matter, nor any other justification, just harming Russia. — boethius

I believe all I claimed so far. So we are already discussing what I actually believe. You simply repeatedly failed to understand it. Or you are simply playing dumb.
I don’t know what you mean by “in pure power competition terms”, I’m more inclined to say that there is no “pure” power competition. Power competition is messy, without predefined and universally accepted way to account for strategies, and practically everything can serve it (including unintended consequences or unpredictable circumstances).
I didn’t claim anywhere that “Ukrainian welfare doesn't matter, nor any other justification”. Quote where I did made such claims, instead of putting words in my mouth like the most intellectually dishonest propaganda.

The problem with your position is that historically wars, even extremely harmful wars in the short term (such as the American civil war, or WWI or WWII), generally result in any non-losing-party having far more powerful military at the end of the war.

Indeed, even losing parties can radically increase their real military power, such as Germany after WWI still had all sorts of "war experience" benefits even if physical war fighting capacity was essentially dismantled, despite this and the high casualties it is applying the experience and lessons of WWI that Germany could then rapidly rebuild their military power and fight WWII. — boethius

I would be more interested in Russian history’s lessons: https://www.rferl.org/a/adam-michnik-russia-ukraine-change-putin-brezhnev-afghan-war/31808312.html

However, in the case of the war at hand, there is little probability that Russia will lose. At best, it "won't win". — boethius

Since you didn’t specify what counts as “win” or “lose” to you, all I can say is that if we are talking great power competition then it’s relative power which must be assessed, and most importantly its trend in the long term, which is the most difficult part to account for when we are still in the middle of these events. In any case, I don’t care about your conclusions, I care about your arguments.

Furthermore, in your hegemon's got to hegemon, you don't consider at all China.
Viewed as a proxy war between Russia and the US, perhaps US is winning something at some expense (at the expense of the destruction of Ukraine), but viewed as a proxy war between China and the West, China is winning a great deal at no expense; indeed, if the first view is correct, the West is weakening due to this war as well as Russia, an otherwise regional competitor.
So, if this war with Russia is satisfying some "rational requirement" of a global hegemon, there should be some argument as to why this helps against China, a more economically powerful adversary.
For, if China is a larger threat to US hegenomic power, which was the basis of all this talk of "pivoting" to East-Asia for over 2 decades, then optimum hegemomic strategy would be to "divide and conquer" the would be Russia-China alliance, and certainly not expend immense material and political capital in trying to harm the weaker of the two in such a team. — boethius

It’s not true that I didn’t consider at all China. Certainly I didn’t say much about my understanding of the American strategy toward China nor I have the intention to start a discussion on another contentious subject now, so I limit myself to say that I don’t believe that “China is winning a great deal at no expense” nor that “the optimum hegemonic strategy would be to ‘divide and conquer’ the would be Russia-China alliance”. All I can concede is that there are implied non-negligible costs and risks for the West at least in the short period, arguably significantly more for the Europeans than for the US.

In “normative legal force” the expression “normative” refers to the fact that laws are norms and “legal” is a specification of “normative” since there are also non-legal norms. Now “normative force” and “law” or “legal system”, or “legal force” are part of very common jargon in the juridical domain. Google it if you have no idea what I am talking about. — neomac

I know what the words mean, obviously you don't. You could have said "normative and legal force" (and then explain your non-legal theory and your hegemonic normative theory) but a normative statement is not the same as a legal statement. The Nazi genocide was "legal" as well as US slavery and segregation, but we have normative issue with such legal states of affairs.

Certainly we would want law to conform to our normative disposition, but until A. all people have the same values and B. little or no corruption exists, then that won't be the case and just prepending "normative" to "legal force" means you don't understand the subject matter.

To make matters worse, "normative" is not at all the same as a "norm" and laws are also not necessarily norms. It's illegal to jay-walk, but can be entirely the norm, likewise it can be illegal to take bribes but, likewise, just as much a norm as jay-walking.

Furthermore, powerful states invading or interfering smaller states that "defy them", in your jargon, without any UN security resolution, is the actual "norm" on this subject matter. You spent some time justifying why the US can invade countries to maintain their hegemony for the simple fact that they are the hegemon.

Now, if you actually do google "normative legal force" you get a whole list of entries that explain the difference between normative and legal statements.

After distinguishing some other senses of the “normativity” of law, this chapter addresses its moral force. It is argued that all deontological accounts of a prima facie duty to obey the law, other than the argument from consent, fail for being unable to show that the moral value of law as an institutional order implies a duty to obey each and every legal rule. The argument from consent fails for familiar reasons. This leaves an instrumental account of the moral force of law as the only option. The upshot is that, for individuals, the moral force of law is variable, and often weak. The case is different for state officials, as subjects of either domestic or international law. Here the instrumental case for obedience is typically strong. — Chapter 3, The Normative Force of Law, Individuals and States, Liam Murphy

Is literally the first result for doing as you suggest, which is a paper explaining how there is no prima facie normative connection to law.

Not only, as you account for yourself in your next paragraph, no actual UN legal basis for the West's intervention (no security council resolution), but your reference to "normative legal force" just leads directly to an explanation that even if there was a UN security resolution that would not be sufficient to establish to a duty to implement it (it maybe legal but wrong, due to, for example, resulting in a worse outcome for the citizens concerned, such as we saw in Libya).

Besides your legal quibble is irrelevant wrt he original point of contention: I referred to the UN resolution against the Russian invasion of Ukraine to clarify my original claim about Russian defiant attitude toward the West. — neomac

If you're moving the goal posts back to this argument, then certainly you'd agree that Russia's actions in Ukraine are entirely justified by Ukraine's defiant attitude toward Russia, and that Russia is only "wrong" in your framework if they fail to teach Ukraine a lesson.

As long as I don’t understand how you apply your notion of “justification” I can’t really assess if it’s consistent (BTW does “you cannot justify to others” mean that my claims are not justified until I can prove that everybody on earth agrees with me?!). — neomac

What a ludicrous straw man.

First, justifying one's actions to others is independent of whether the actions are justified or if others agree. The actions can be justified but you fail to convince anyone. Likewise, the actions could unjust but everyone agrees with you.

Indeed, one maybe engaged in a process of justification one knows to be false (lying to investigators, or throwing out UN resolutions as having "legal force"), but hope other parties agree. Of course, in this scenario, presumably one has some internal justification for presenting a false justification.

Even more bizarre is the idea the entire world would need to agree as a condition for justification, which doesn't even make any internal sense. For, if the proposition isn't justified until everyone agrees ... why would one be justified to try to convince people of it's truth, which is by definition is false until everyone agrees.

Obviously in any remotely common sense ethical framework, the truth of a justification is independent of others agreeing it's true.

Since your arguments don't make any sense and are mutually incompatible, also take note of your trying to flip the burden of proof of what "justification" means, as it's very clear your actual position is that you're a fan of US hegemony, which, by definition, non-US partisans should not be a fan of by the same logic of lust power. Of course, if people under hegemonic control, such as Europe, can be convinced the hegemony is good for them, that's a better situation, even if one knows that's the self delusion copium of de facto captives and advancing their own interests, rather than the hegemon's, would, by definition, be in their interest to do.

You've made this position clear, showed your hand so to speak, so maybe argue this position and that the US actions in Ukraine will strengthen, rather than overstretch, their hegemonic position, vis-a-vis their largest hegemonic competitor: China.

The rest of your comments are basically just word salad, but I'll respond to the meaningful part:

The fact that I didn’t mention "Ukrainian welfare” in that statement is not enough to conclude that there is zero consideration of the Ukrainian welfare on the NATO/US’s part. — neomac

The fact you don't mention Ukrainian welfare is obviously because that is not a priority. Describing how the US / NATO endgame need not be Ukrainian "victory" but just sufficient harm to Russia could nevertheless be compatible with maximising Ukrainian welfare is just a farce.

In what plausible version of the world, would Ukraine losing the war, with the death and casualties so far and likely at least as much but likely many multiples on the way to losing, and then losing, would be compatible with Ukrainian welfare?

Sure, "logically" we can imagine a universe in which somehow every single Ukrainian gets a billion dollars (without any inflation problem from that) and every dead Ukrainian comes back to life, and all bad memories of the war are replaced by happy cat videos, nothing "logically incompatible" between that and:

3. The end game for NATO/US involvement in this war doesn’t need to be to stop Russia or overturn its regime. But to inflict as much enduring damage as possible to Russian power (in terms of its economic system, its system of alliance, its capacity of military projection outside its borders, its its technology supply, its military and geopolitical status) to the point it is not longer perceived as a non-negligible geopolitical threat to the West. — neomac

You literally state NATO/US involvement need not be to "stop Russia".

And you accuse me of quibbling? You literally need basically magic to imagine a scenario in which "not stopping Russia" is in the welfare of Ukrainians. Sure, "logically" we can imagine by some unexpected turn of events that magic is real, reincarnation a breeze, memory replacement facile, and so on, Russia isn't "stopped" and this is actually great for Ukraine.

Indeed, "logically" there is nothing that prevents Russia winning but this somehow results in Zelensky becoming emperor of the entire planet, immortal, and a just and wise ruler who solves all our problems.

Do you even consider a few seconds what you are writing?

You do not mention Ukrainian welfare in your "endgame" because you do not care about Ukrainian welfare. You care only about harming Russia due to some irrational fear (especially when combined with the belief that the Russian military is incompetent ... of which the corollary is they are nothing to fear); i.e. your entire position rests upon Russuphobia and, as you say, not mentioning Ukrainian welfare.

I mean, I thought "practical rationality" was your pseudo-intellectual slogan, and you dare move the goal posts to "logical compatibility"?

My expectation is that they will escalate if they start to lose — Tzeentch

And what have they been doing? Winning and having huge victories?

Anyone with a shred of sense can see that the Americans purposefully pissed off the Russians in Ukraine, in Europe's backyard, as it always does - stirring up shit far away from their island so other people can bear the cost of war and conflict.

I've always argued that the European leaders should not have played America's lapdogs, and not let Europe become a pawn in America's game, as it is now. — Tzeentch

Anyone with a shred of sense can see the hollowness of the "everything is America's fault" argument. Never mind that Russia isn't just intervening in it's neighbors, but annexing parts of them. That too, Russia wanting create Novorossiya again, must be the fault of the Americans.

So when attacking your neighbors, just say how everything is the fault of the US and there's an eager audience in the West wanting to listen to you.

. Putin recently harmonising Russian nuclear policy with United States policy to allow first strike against a non-nuclear opponent, is not rhetoric. — boethius

Russia hasn't made this change recently. They have said this far earlier than now, actually.

Ground troops are the other conventional response, but if you agree that's unlikely then no need to debate it further. — boethius

Conventional response means non-nuclear in this case. NATO and the US use the arm of the forces that is most powerful, which is the air forces and cruise missiles. I don't know why you are insisting the case for ground forces, which make an obvious target. Air attack is the way to keep the response limited. You can stop the attacks instantly. It's Russia's choice then to escalate.

The deterrence of nukes isn't hypothetical, but the use of them on the battlefield is.

All this analysis, in my view, NATO has done, which explains their policy to let Russia slowly win but inflicting (tolerable) damage and limiting the scope of victory. — boethius

NATO letting Russia to win? Bit of hubris there from you.

Which is difficult to take you seriously when you don't mention their top funders 2020-2021: — boethius

LOL!

Oh you are so funny again. Yes... the evil Commission of the European Union!!!

The next argument will be that I'm referring to experts with military intelligence background or military leaders themselves. Or perhaps all the interviews of Ukrainian people that have been tortured? All of them are just propaganda!

And what have they been doing? Winning and having huge victories? — ssu

As I've said before, considering the amount of troops they deployed at the start of the war it is likely that taking the Donbas and establishing a landbridge to Crimea were the Russians' primary military objectives. I don't view them as losing - definitely not to a degree that would make them consider nuclear weapons, especially since they can escalate conventionally.

Anyone with a shred of sense can see the hollowness of the "everything is America's fault" argument. — ssu

I'm not making that argument.

This is just the knee-jerk deflection for anyone who doesn't like to think about the obvious role the US and the EU have played in provoking this conflict.

If after 400 pages of thread you still haven't moved beyond a World War I-esque propaganda depiction of the Russians as the imperialist bad guys then I don't know what to tell you. Geopolitics might not be for you.

That too, Russia wanting create Novorossiya again, must be the fault of the Americans. — ssu

As Mearsheimer points out, there is zero evidence for that.

However there are bags of evidence, 15 years worth of evidence if not more, that Russia viewed Ukraine in NATO as a security threat.

Russia hasn't made this change recently. They have said this far earlier than now, actually. — ssu

They've mentioned their previous policy before of using nuclear weapons if attacked with nuclear weapons or to defend against a threat to the existence of the Russian state, but news seems

Russia is thought to be considering adding a preemptive aspect to its nuclear doctrine, Vladimir Putin has said.

If added this policy would allow it to strike with nukes first, not just in a retaliatory manner.

The Russian doctrine of using nuclear weapons is currently different to that of the USA, which does have a first strike clause. — Daily Star

Normally I wouldn't cite the Daily Star, but it seems just citing Putin's speech. If you want to quibble that they haven't technically changed the policy just yet, feel free. Clearly the policy of what policies are under consideration have changed in that case.

Conventional response means non-nuclear in this case. NATO and the US use the arm of the forces that is most powerful, which is the air forces and cruise missiles. I don't know why you are insisting the case for ground forces, which make an obvious target. Air attack is the way to keep the response limited. You can stop the attacks instantly. It's Russia's choice then to escalate.

The deterrence of nukes isn't hypothetical, but the use of them on the battlefield is. — ssu

I'm not insisting on ground forces, other people talk about ground forces in Uktaine, including main stream media. I am just listing and considering the possible responses and noting they are all problematic. We both agree ground forces would be highly problematic.

Yes, air attacks are the likely option, but as I point out using only cruise missiles is of limited damage, and there are large risks in sending NATO planes into Ukraine. Maybe they would be highly effective, teach the Russians a lesson, and then maybe Russia won't escalate further. But both elements there are problematic. NATO cannot know its air combat effectiveness against Russias integrated air defence system, and any essentially any losses are going to be embarrassing.

It's also simply doesn't seem possible to implement air superiority without striking AA systems in undisputed Russian territory, which NATO is unlikely to do in this scenario. So even if you pushed Russian air craft out of Ukraine they would still fly around on the Russian side firing missiles at your planes.

The deterrence of nukes isn't hypothetical, but the use of them on the battlefield is. — ssu

We agree we're talking hypotheticals, just obviously not rhetoric. Rhetoric is what you use to try to convince your interlocutors or simply justify your actions. Threats (that are not empty) are not rhetoric.

NATO letting Russia to win? Bit of hubris there from you. — ssu

NATO could have been training Ukrainian pilots on F-35 and modern NATO main battle tanks and supplying every sort of missile, from day one of the invasion, or even years prior. If your goal was to see Ukraine win, this is what you would do, yet they don't even supply F-16's or older NATO tanks. Sure, would take time, but the war may still be on during that time frame in which case you want this option.

Why doesn't NATO do this?

Because they don't want to "escalate" beyond a certain point. What's that point? A point unacceptable to the Russians. What would be unacceptable? Actually losing.

If you didn't care about Russias own metrics of evaluation and what's acceptable to them, you'd simply provide all the equipment and training that maximises the Ukrainian force to allow them to win.

The two concepts of holding back weapons systems and Ukraine winning being your main priority, are incompatible. It's like if I say I "really, really, really want you to win this cross country ski race", but I give you second hand skis that are a major handicap, while holding on to plenty of shiny modern skis in my garage. Obviously, my first priority isn't seeing you win the race, but there's some other priorities that lead me to hold back the support I could provide, but choose not to. Sure, maybe I would wish for a world where I give you shitty skis and you manage to win the race somehow anyways, but that's not how priorities and decision making work.

LOL!

Oh you are so funny again. Yes... the evil Commission of the European Union!!!

The next argument will be that I'm referring to experts with military intelligence background or military leaders themselves. Or perhaps all the interviews of Ukrainian people that have been tortured? All of them are just propaganda! — ssu

Can't help but notice you ignore the "s" to "funders" and don't bother to even put United States Department of State and BAE Systems plc as the next entries on the list.

The whole reason think tanks exist is because you can simply buy the analysis you want whereas academia is more difficult to control.

The whole reason academia is more difficult to control is because biased analysis and censorship (of intellectual debate) proves harmful to society and so a few (however limited) mechanism were developed to limit such harms, such as tenured professorship as well as a general context of needing to at least encounter different points of view.

You really think the funders on that list are going to finance producing analysis that criticises their polices?

Nevertheless, noted, that you can only come up with a strawman that my issue was "only with the European commission" and I believe they are evil caricatures of some sort.

What you cite has literally no sources.

Since these activities were critical to the Russian theory of victory in the operation,
it is important to outline these plans to appropriately contextualise the role of the conventional
force. — Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022, RUSI.org

How do we know what the Russian theory of victory was or is? Did the Kremlin publish it somewhere? Why then do they directly contradict the theory of victory they themselves published, it in public statements saying they were prepared for this outcome and the Northern offensive was a fixing operation to capture the South etc. Do the authors just telepathically read the Kremlin and Russian army top commanders minds and "know what they really think"?

The assumption appears to have been that Ukrainian government officials would either
flee or be captured as a result of the speed of the invasion. — Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022, RUSI.org

What the hell is "assumption appears to have been" doing in purported serious analysis. Is everything that follows just deductions from what "appears" to the authors?

Complete trash.

It was also anticipated that shock would prevent the immediate mobilisation of the population, and that protests and other civil resistance could be managed through the targeted disintegration of Ukrainian civil society. To manage these protests Russian forces would be supported by Rosgvardia (Russian National Guard) and riot control units. Meanwhile the FSB was tasked with capturing local officials. The Russian counterintelligence regime on the occupied territories had compiled lists that divided — Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022, RUSI.org

What does "targeted disintegration of Ukrainian civil society" even mean?

Do the authors have the FSB list?

How do they know the categories:

Ukrainians into four categories:
• Those to be physically liquidated.
• Those in need of suppression and intimidation.
• Those considered neutral who could be induced to collaborate.
• Those prepared to collaborate. — Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022, RUSI.org

The entire paper is just an unsourced narrative based on (in the authors own words) "appearances" that Ukrainian partisans would certainly wish to be true.

And who are the authors?

Oleksandr V Danylyuk served as the Special Adviser to the head of Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service, and as an adviser to Ukraine’s Minister of Defence. He currently heads the Centre for Defence Reforms and is a coordinator of the NATO–Ukraine intergovernmental platform for
early detection and countering hybrid threats. Oleksandr is an Associate Fellow at RUSI. — Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022, RUSI.org

Literally includes Ukrainian intelligence.

And ...

Mykhaylo Zabrodskyi was born in 1973 in Dnipro, Ukraine.

[blah blah blah got promoted a bunch]

Today he serves as First Deputy Chairman of the Committee of the Supreme Council of
Ukraine on National Security, Defense and Intelligence. He has been awarded with state awards, including the Golden Star (with the Hero of Ukraine status), Danylo Halytskiy Award ІІІ class, and Bohdan Khmelnytskiy Award III class, as well as Military Distinguished Service Medal І and ІІ classes, and the Military Virtue Medal. In 2012, he was also awarded with personal arms by the minister of defence of Ukraine. — Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022, RUSI.org

You're really stating here, in this forum, today, placing your posting reputation on, sear by the scared runes, that this RUSI paper represents unbiased and well sourced analysis and simply trustworthy expertise?

... and not a total farce of the most transparently stupid propaganda?

This is just the knee-jerk deflection for anyone who doesn't like to think about the obvious role the US and the EU have played in provoking this conflict. — Tzeentch

As clearly stated even in this thread, Russia has desired Ukrainian territories right when Ukraine got it's independence. If this was about NATO, Putin wouldn't be annexing territories, talking about how artificial the whole construct of Ukraine is and how Ukraine belongs to Russia. The frozen conflict in Moldova shows that this isn't about NATO, as Moldova has never tried to join NATO.

Not only is it a figleaf of a reason, just like to say Iraq's Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait because the country wasn't towing the OPEC production quotas or presumably drilling oil from the Iraqi side.

Nope, this view is based on an alternative reality where causes and effects have changed places: that NATO is the hostile aggressor, not that countries next to Russia have frantically tried to protect themselves from a hostile militant nation that by force tries to conquer it's lost Empire. And now this aggression can be seen by all in just what Russia does and says.

This illogical view tries to disguise itself as "realpolitik", that somehow an economically failed dictatorship should have the right to dominate and annex countries that have long since broken from the former Soviet Empire it enjoyed. And that these countries, that many thankfully have joined NATO for protection now, are only "pawns" of the US, not having either the capability or the intellect to chose their own foreign and security policies. The Balts, the Poles and even now the Swedes and Finns admit just what an untrustworthy and dangerous neighbour Putin's Russia is. But they, just like Ukraine and Ukrainians, don't matter in the story where only the Americans are the actors. Such is the arrogant hubris.

No, the idea that this war is America's and NATO's fault is the knee jerk view of people who just blindly want to be "critical" of the West's actions and for whom a more nuanced version of reality is uncomfortable.

Can't help but notice you ignore the "s" to "funders" and don't bother to even put United States Department of State and BAE Systems plc as the next entries on the list. — boethius

Well, it's a war.

You can of course be critical what military intelligence of the West says, but then just look at what actually has happened in the occupied territories: forced movement of people, jailings and torture, the Russification policies... All that gives the credibility to what they are saying. If Russian actions and manner in which the war is fought would be different, then I would be also critical about such plans. But it seems that they have indeed implemented such actions. That "denazification" can be quite well seen.

Yes, air attacks are the likely option, but as I point out using only cruise missiles is of limited damage, and there are large risks in sending NATO planes into Ukraine. — boethius

Likely it would be of limited damage, at least in the long run.

Look. I think it should be evident that in the case of Russians using nukes the vowed retaliation by US/NATO would likely to be to save face. If they have given the message that in case of using nukes, they will make a conventional response, then it would really look very bad if they would not do anything. Yet NATO or the US have no desire or ambition to take the war inside into Russia and have a victory parade in the Red Square.

Yet coming back from hypotheticals, the likely future of this war is that Russia will try to stabilize the fronts for the winter and build up strength for a spring offensive. The Russians have formed the 3rd Army Corps to handle the inflow of the mobilized troops. These are now either sent in company strength formations to plug gaps in the line or sent near Rostov to create new formations. Will we see an Ukrainian offensive perhaps against Melitopol earlier in the winter? Next months will tell.

In short, this doesn't look like the situation is so desperate that Putin would gamble with nukes. Hence it's quite unlikely. Putin already gambled with attempting to seize the government with a 10-day campaign in which Ukraine ought to have fallen just like US-backed Afghanistan. Likely he isn't in the mood for desperate gambles, yet. But who knows.

Nope, this view is based on an alternative reality where causes and effects have changed places: that NATO is the hostile aggressor, not that countries next to Russia have frantically tried to protect themselves from a hostile militant nation that by force tries to conquer it's lost Empire. — ssu

You won't find a credible source portraying Russia as a "hostile militant aggressor" before 2014.

That's where your entire argument falls apart - before 2014 Russia was seen as a mostly normal state, and Putin was widely regarded as a reasonable leader with whom the West could do business. Cold War rivalries were put aside, things were looking good and you can find plenty of sources lauding the Russians during this period. That's why there was even talk of Russia joining NATO and the EU.

Your attempt at creating a larger context of Russian aggression has no leg to stand on, since this narrative only started after the conflict in Ukraine went hot.

normative statement is not the same as a legal statement. — boethius

Now, if you actually do google "normative legal force" you get a whole list of entries that explain the difference between normative and legal statements — boethius

.

I made my google search before asking you to do the same. Now I see that the problem is not the exposure to an unfamiliar jargon but, worse, your conceptual confusion. Of course there is a difference between normative statement and legal statement. That’s why I wrote: “legal” is a specification of “normative” since there are also non-legal norms. The point is that talking about normative force or legal force doesn’t presuppose any specific theory about what motivates or should motivate agents to follow norms or laws. My usage of the expression “normative legal force” in that context was descriptive and not theory-laden: there are different kinds of norms, among those norms there are legal norms or laws, and laws that agents are motived to follow can be said to have some “force”. And the reference to the UN resolution is a consistent illustration of that conceptual framework. As simple as that.

After distinguishing some other senses of the “normativity” of law, this chapter addresses its moral force. It is argued that all deontological accounts of a prima facie duty to obey the law, other than the argument from consent, fail for being unable to show that the moral value of law as an institutional order implies a duty to obey each and every legal rule. The argument from consent fails for familiar reasons. This leaves an instrumental account of the moral force of law as the only option. The upshot is that, for individuals, the moral force of law is variable, and often weak. The case is different for state officials, as subjects of either domestic or international law. Here the instrumental case for obedience is typically strong. — Chapter 3, The Normative Force of Law, Individuals and States, Liam Murphy

Is literally the first result for doing as you suggest, which is a paper explaining how there is no prima facie normative connection to law. — boethius

First, your quotation (and the entire chapter for that matter) doesn’t conflict with my conceptual framework which I clarified above. Indeed it arguably presupposes it. The quotation simply refers to the fact that there are different theoretical accounts (instrumental vs deontological) of the “moral force” of the “normativity” (which itself has different senses!) of the law. And talking about “moral force” is already a theoretical position: “while it is true that many people are motivated to act in accordance with legal norms, it is not obvious that they ought to be; there remains the question of whether there are, in fact, prudential or moral reasons to accept the law. My focus is on the moral force of law – the ancient philosophical issue of whether there is a prima facie obligation to obey the law. ” (Chapter 3, The Normative Force of Law, Individuals and States, Liam Murphy) which is a step if not several steps further the basic conceptual framework I laid out.
Second, the quotation you reported is talking about the “normativity of law” so what on earth is “there is no prima facie normative connection to law” supposed to mean? The question if “there is a prima facie obligation to obey the law” is a theoretical issue that divides deontologist from instrumentalist accounts ultimately concerning the “normativity of law”!
In other words, you just offered a good couple of intellectual failures.

“Certainly we would want law to conform to our normative disposition, but until A. all people have the same values and B. little or no corruption exists, then that won't be the case and just prepending ‘normative’ to ‘legal force’ means you don't understand the subject matter.” — boethius

First, you didn’t prove anywhere that I should understand “normative” and “legal force” the way you understand it. So judging my position according to your understanding which I find conceptually confused, begs the question.
Second, the argument that precedes your claim in bold, is intelligible also within my conceptual framework, not to mention that my conceptual framework can obviously account also for the idea of normative issues due to the clash between laws and other norms (e.g. moral norms like in the case of the Nazi anti-semitic laws or the slavery laws). So that argument doesn’t illustrate anything that would support your claim in bold.
Yet another couple of your intellectual failures.

Not only, as you account for yourself in your next paragraph, no actual UN legal basis for the West's intervention (no security council resolution) — boethius

To me, “no security council resolution” doesn’t equate to “no actual UN legal basis” for West’s intervention. Actually I argued against this equation “in the next paragraph”. So again you are attributing to me something I don’t believe nor claimed anywhere. Yet another fallacious move.

If you're moving the goal posts back to this argument, then certainly you’d agree that Russia's actions in Ukraine are entirely justified by Ukraine's defiant attitude toward Russia, and that Russia is only "wrong" in your framework if they fail to teach Ukraine a lesson — “boethius

.

First, I didn’t move any goal post. I argued against your objection, then I reminded you that in previous posts you were questioning my claim that Russia was “defiant” toward the West. So it’s you who is shifting the polemic target, after failing the previous one.
Second, “entirely justified” is not an expression I used for a reason: I already questioned the idea that Russia was strategically justified to start a war against Ukraine. So not only you are suggesting beliefs or claims I never expressed but I also explicitly questioned them. Yet another fallacious move.

As long as I don’t understand how you apply your notion of “justification” I can’t really assess if it’s consistent (BTW does “you cannot justify to others” mean that my claims are not justified until I can prove that everybody on earth agrees with me?!). — neomac

What a ludicrous straw man — “boethius

.

What on earth did you just write?! Are you crazy?! A “strawman argument” is an argument: A straw man (sometimes written as strawman) is a form of argument and an informal fallacy of having the impression of refuting an argument, whereas the real subject of the argument was not addressed or refuted, but instead replaced with a false one. One who engages in this fallacy is said to be "attacking a straw man”. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Straw_man)
I didn’t formulate any argument, there is no conclusion from premises in there: I just confessed that I don’t understand your notion of “justification” and I can not assess it, and added a question concerning your obscure expression “you cannot justify to others”. Yet another catastrophic intellectual failure of yours.

First, justifying one's actions to others is independent of whether the actions are justified or if others agree. The actions can be justified but you fail to convince anyone. Likewise, the actions could unjust but everyone agrees with you.

Indeed, one maybe engaged in a process of justification one knows to be false (lying to investigators, or throwing out UN resolutions as having "legal force"), but hope other parties agree. Of course, in this scenario, presumably one has some internal justification for presenting a false justification.

Even more bizarre is the idea the entire world would need to agree as a condition for justification, which doesn't even make any internal sense. For, if the proposition isn't justified until everyone agrees ... why would one be justified to try to convince people of it's truth, which is by definition is false until everyone agrees.

Obviously in any remotely common sense ethical framework, the truth of a justification is independent of others agreeing it's true.

Since your arguments don't make any sense and are mutually incompatible, also take note of your trying to flip the burden of proof of what "justification" means, as it's very clear your actual position is that you're a fan of US hegemony, which, by definition, non-US partisans should not be a fan of by the same logic of lust power. Of course, if people under hegemonic control, such as Europe, can be convinced the hegemony is good for them, that's a better situation, even if one knows that's the self delusion copium of de facto captives and advancing their own interests, rather than the hegemon's, would, by definition, be in their interest to do. — “boethius

Dude, I explained what I mean by “justification”, so I already unburdened myself of this task. And it’s a while that I keep asking you what you mean by “justification”. You just recently tried to clarify it, but I still do not understand it. I told you that and asked questions:

• Can you show better how your accusation follows from your notion of “justification”?
• Does “you cannot justify to others” mean that my claims are not justified until I can prove that everybody on earth agrees with me?!

Unfortunately I still don’t see any positive answers to my questions in your delirious rant. So can you answer them or not? Give it a try at least.
Here an additional question: since you believe the following “Certainly we would want law to conform to our normative disposition, but until A. all people have the same values and B. little or no corruption exists, then that won't be the case” how can we possibly justify (in your terms) our position to others if they do not share our values or we can’t assure that little or no corruption exists?

Describing how the US / NATO endgame need not be Ukrainian “victory” but just sufficient harm to Russia could nevertheless be compatible with maximising Ukrainian welfare is just a farce.

In what plausible version of the world, would Ukraine losing the war, with the death and casualties so far and likely at least as much but likely many multiples on the way to losing, and then losing, would be compatible with Ukrainian welfare? — “boethius

You are making objections to my position based on a poor understanding of my claims and on unclarified notions of “victory” and “losing” for Ukraine. But to me it’s non-trivial matter to understand what counts as “victory” or “losing” in terms of welfare for Ukrainians. All I said about this is: both Ukraine and the West/US converge enough in fighting Russia until Russia ceases to be a threat to both, whence their allegiance. The West/US have strategic, legal and moral reasons to support such convergence. Notice also that Ukraine expressed its interest in entering Western/US sphere of influence by joining NATO and/or EU so the convergence may not be occasional but systemic. However the competitive game these players are engaging in is full of uncertainties and occasions for non-negligible divergence which players must deal with. Nobody can offer a recipe for victory or a full account of what’s best in the long term.
So I don’t have some idealised notion of “victory” for Ukraine/West nor I have some idealised notion of “compatibility” between Western and Ukrainians’ interests. I just see enough convergence in interests and effective means to pursue common goals.
Besides, the Japan case in WW2 proves that even in the most daring post-war conditions things can turn out to improve in terms of rights and welfare in the long term under the right surrounding conditions. So I’m relatively confident that the Western sphere of influence can offer such surrounding conditions to Ukraine at the end of this war, more likely than remaining outside of it or falling under the Russian sphere of influence. Apparently Ukrainians believe the same. And if that’s a farce to you, I don’t care.

You literally state NATO/US involvement need not be to "stop Russia".

And you accuse me of quibbling? You literally need basically magic to imagine a scenario in which "not stopping Russia" is in the welfare of Ukrainians. Sure, "logically" we can imagine by some unexpected turn of events that magic is real, reincarnation a breeze, memory replacement facile, and so on, Russia isn't "stopped" and this is actually great for Ukraine.

Indeed, "logically" there is nothing that prevents Russia winning but this somehow results in Zelensky becoming emperor of the entire planet, immortal, and a just and wise ruler who solves all our problems.

Do you even consider a few seconds what you are writing? — “boethius

Sure, here I restate it again and bolden it: The end game for NATO/US involvement in this war doesn’t need to be to stop Russia or overturn its regime. But to inflict as much enduring damage as possible to Russian power (in terms of its economic system, its system of alliance, its capacity of military projection outside its borders, its its technology supply, its military and geopolitical status) to the point it is not longer perceived as a non-negligible geopolitical threat to the West. Outrageous right?! Yet if the endgame was stopping Russia, the quickest effective way would be for the West to force Ukraine to surrender to all Russian demands, or not even start a “proxy war” against Russia in the first place, right?! But that’s neither the Western endgame nor the Ukrainians’. So YES concern for the Ukrainian welfare is LITERALLY and REASONABLY compatible with not stopping Russia if that means Ukrainian surrender.
As always, I’m responsible for what I write, not for what you understand.
Said that, let’s deal with your myopic conspiracist mindset which is likely driving such preposterous understanding and accusations of my position: even if immoral dispositions like cynicism, power lust, greed (of the lobbyists e.g. the weapon industry, the oil shale industry, financial institutions, etc.) are the dominant motivational factors of Western policies and narratives against Russia (which I do not believe, but I won’t a priori exclude for the sake of the argument) would this be necessarily incompatible with advancing Ukrainian welfare? I doubt that for 2 reasons: 1. Also Western policies and narratives appeasing Russia (as well as anti-Western policies and narratives from Russia and the Rest for that matter!) may be driven by exactly the same immoral motives, so if such policies and narratives would still be compatible with advancing Ukrainian welfare (even in just relative terms), the immoral motivational factors behind them are not the issue 2. Alternatively, even if such motives will likely be pursued by each opposing faction at the expense of Ukrainian welfare, it still remains the possibility that the clash of opposing factions may wear out the most wicked effects of those motivations on the Ukrainian welfare at some point e.g. by leading to a negotiation between opposing factions that may benefit the Ukrainian welfare, regardless of the persisting immoral motivational factors behind such a negotiation.

You do not mention Ukrainian welfare in your "endgame" because you do not care about Ukrainian welfare. You care only about harming Russia due to some irrational fear (especially when combined with the belief that the Russian military is incompetent ... of which the corollary is they are nothing to fear); i.e. your entire position rests upon Russuphobia and, as you say, not mentioning Ukrainian welfare. — “boethius

Your attacks ad hominem would be more credible if your fallacious arguments ad rem weren’t so overwhelming. BTW, since you seem to care and know about the Ukrainian welfare more than I do, I still have to ask: how many Ukrainian lives did your online outrage save so far exactly?

I thought "practical rationality" was your pseudo-intellectual slogan, and you dare move the goal posts to "logical compatibility"? — “boethius

Both are rational requirements that you extrapolated from their argumentative context just to randomly reiterate one of your “big lies”. There is no moving goal posts on my part. There never was.

Kudos for your epic failure practically on all your points!

You won't find a credible source portraying Russia as a "hostile militant aggressor" before 2014. — Tzeentch

Medvedev agrees with your view of Georgia incursion.

Sure, here I restate it again and bolden it: The end game for NATO/US involvement in this war doesn’t need to be to stop Russia — neomac

You're just so delusional.

Obviously this statement is not compatible with a concern for Ukrainian welfare. The goal is to just harm Russia, not actually stop Russia from achieving it's objectives in Ukraine (which, unless you invoke basically magic, is not compatible with Ukrainian welfare).

So just say you are willing to sacrifice Ukraine and Ukrainian welfare to harm the Russians, and argue that point. Sometimes great achievements require great sacrifices (of other people).

It's just crass and cowardly to show your cards, what you truly believe, which is harming Russia is your priority and not Ukrainian welfare, which is not "mentioned" as you say, then say "no, no, no, there's nothing logically impossible about "not stopping Russia" and Ukrainian welfare!!

That's just dumb, obviously if Russia isn't stopped, Ukraine loses the war at great sacrifice, this isn't "good" for Ukrainian welfare.

If it's an acceptable end game for you, then it's acceptable for you to sacrifice Ukraine for your objectives.

So maybe stop your torrent of psuedo intellectual bullshit that doesn't even have anything to do with your actual position in this matter: which is:

Sure, here I restate it again and bolden it: The end game for NATO/US involvement in this war doesn’t need to be to stop Russia — neomac

BTW, since you seem to care and know about the Ukrainian welfare more than I do, I still have to ask: how many Ukrainian lives did your online outrage save so far exactly? — neomac

I'll respond to this as well, as it's such a dumb strawman.

Obviously, my recommendation (my position in this argument) of a negotiated resolution to the conflict, which would require recognising legitimate grievances of the Russians (and also against the Russians) would be the first step in trying to find an acceptable compromise to the warring parties, would, if followed, result in an end to the war and saving Ukrainian lives who would otherwise perish in the trenches, explosions, from the cold in their apartments, disease, and all manner of evils which accompany a war if it was to continue (which it has).

What I can say, is that if my recommendation was followed at the start of the war (when Ukraine had likely the most leverage it would ever have) literally hundreds of thousands of people now dead would still be alive (not only in Ukraine but due to increases in food and energy prices worldwide that translates directly into more suffering and deaths).

Of course, it could be argued that whatever compromise would be required is not worth saving those lives, or that the Russian demands of an independent Donbas (at the time) and recognition of Crimea would be a worse state of affairs than the lives lost since.

It could be argued that what's important is:

The end game for NATO/US involvement in this war doesn’t need to be to stop Russia or overturn its regime. But to inflict as much enduring damage as possible to Russian power (in terms of its economic system, its system of alliance, its capacity of military projection outside its borders, its its technology supply, its military and geopolitical status) to the point it is not longer perceived as a non-negligible geopolitical threat to the West. — neomac

And so concern of Ukrainian lives is misplaced given what can be achieved if we encourage them to fight on, even perhaps without actually "stopping the Russians" and even if we know that to be the likely outcome.

But saying a peace settlement would not result in less Ukrainian dead, is just dumb. Obviously it would.

The benefits to a peace and compromise are less death, and the benefits to more war are achieving the fruits of war (mostly territory and national pride) at the cost of a lot of death.

Now, this is of course a debate between non-decision makers, so at no point do I have the power to directly translate my recommendations into "saving Ukrainian lives" by negotiating what I think is a reasonable resolution to the war; so proposing that as a burden of proof of some kind is just stupid. No where do I claim I've saved Ukrainian lives, and that's basically the text-book definition of a strawman to present my position as claiming that or somehow requiring to demonstrate that.

Had there been a peaceful resolution at any point in the conflict, perhaps then I could say my analysis contributed to that in some small way, but there is no peace and no lives have been spared.

You may want to double-check who was the aggressor in that war.

The Economist interviewed General Valery Zaluzhny, the head of Ukraine’s armed forces.

Now, normally I don't pay much mind to government or military officials' statements. You have to read between the lines to get a morsel of useful info. But Zaluzhny is no politico, and he is known for speaking candidly on those infrequent occasions when he speaks in public. And indeed, this interview is not what you might expect: "Rah-rah-rah! Crimea in six months!" Not at all.

Putin says Russia may be fighting in Ukraine for a long time
^{— Mark Trevelyan · Reuters · Dec 7, 2022}

They consider Russia a second-class country that has no right to exist. This is the whole problem, the whole trouble. — Putin

, I guess I could repeat, though the thread is rife with repeats already. It so happens that some of the bolder Kremlin'ers say that Washington set up a coup and installed a Nazi junta in Kyiv, other of those folk say Russia need to liberate Ukraine from a Nazi regime. Sure, it's propaganda (good point :up: :wink:), because it's false, yet there you have their justification, what government officials and TV broadcast. (Already posted whatever sources, quotes, speeches, commentaries, propaganda, situation reports on the ground, comparisons, whatever.) The implication is that their supposed justification was a ruse, an excuse, plus there are additional reasons for this implication, outside of their propaganda — as (also) mentioned, you may inspect their actions. Hence the point, a ruse, an excuse. On the other hand, if you wish to justify what the Kremlin'ers claim, then you'll have to show the supposed Ukrainian Nazi regime (from memory, you ignored/declined that prior), that it's not propaganda after all. While rounding up what characterizes Nazi rule, I noticed some indicators that...nevermind, you'll just designate it all propaganda (again). :D

Zelenskiy shuts court, says Ukraine can fight graft, Russia at same time
^{— Dan Peleschuk · Reuters · Dec 13, 2022}

This story has drawn to a close. But the story of reforms continues – it continues, even in the time of such a war. — Zelenskyy

Ukraine's parliament enacts reform laws recommended by EU - Speaker
^{— The Jerusalem Post · Dec 14, 2022}

Such likes ↑ at least, look positive.

While reading ...

Exclusive: The global supply trail that leads to Russia’s killer drones (via MSN)
^{— Stephen Grey, Maurice Tamman, Maria Zholobova · Reuters · Dec 15, 2022}

I was vaguely reminded of ...

Stop funding Russia’s nuclear weapons
^{— Henry Sokolski; The Hill; Nov 13, 2022} — Nov 14, 2022

Florida, Hong Kong, in addition to US/EU funds going to Rosatom, ..., the plot thickens.

:D

Ukrainian man reunited with his rabbit after Russia destroyed his house
^{— Josh Milton · Metro News · Dec 14, 2022}

Gave me a chuckle

Russia rejects Zelenskiy call for troop pullout, saying Ukraine must accept 'realities'
^{— Mark Trevelyan, Guy Faulconbridge · Reuters · Dec 13, 2022}

The Ukrainian side needs to take into account the realities that have developed during this time. And these realities indicate that new subjects have appeared in the Russian Federation. They appeared as a result of referendums that took place in these territories. Without taking these new realities into account, no kind of progress is possible. — Peskov

The sham annexations may have to break, one way or other.
If that causes collisions in Moscow, then so be it; if they don't break, then so be it as well.
I guess it's illegal to criticize in Russia; they can break, however. ^{(2014, 2022)}

You won't find a credible source portraying Russia as a "hostile militant aggressor" before 2014. — Tzeentch

Sorry, but that is the most ludicrous statement, which shows your ignorance. The threat of Russia acting as it has now was obvious... at least to a minority. Of course the mainstream hope was that Russia would transform. Remember all the reboots in US Russian relations!

Ok, to give just SOME examples of many, let's have now one favorite of the pro-Putinists, John Mearsheimer from 1993.

(Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3 Summer, 1993) Most Western observers want Ukraine to rid itself of nuclear weapons as quickly as possible. In this view, articulated recently by President Bill Clinton, Europe would be more stable if Russia were to become "the only nuclear-armed successor state to the Soviet Union."

-

President Clinton is wrong. The conventional wisdom about Ukraine's nuclear weapons is wrong. In fact, as soon as it declared independence, Ukraine should have been quietly encouraged to fashion its own nuclear deterrent. Even now, pressing Ukraine to become a nonnuclear state is a mistake.

A nuclear Ukraine makes sense for two reasons. First, it is imperative to maintain peace between Russia and Ukraine. That means ensuring that the Russians, who have a history of bad relations with Ukraine, do not move to reconquer it. Ukraine cannot defend itself against a nuclear-armed Russia with conventional weapons, and no state, including the United States, is going to extend to it a meaningful security guarantee. Ukrainian nuclear weapons are the only reliable deterrent to Russian aggression. If the U.S. aim is to enhance stability in Europe, the case against a nuclear-armed Ukraine is unpersuasive.

Do note what Mearsheimer is talking about: Russia attempting to reconquer Ukraine.

And there are a multitude of other writers, for example Stephen Kaufman from 2004:

As much after the Soviet collapse as before it, the "Russian Problem" remains Europe's single biggest security issue. The collapse of the Soviet Union did, of course, end the threat of continental war in Europe, making the world a much safer place. The retreat of Soviet power also unmasked a broad range of other security threats ­ ethnic and nationalist conflicts; unstable governments and concomitant crime and terrorism; unrest due to economic collapse; and a power vacuum in East-Central Europe. Yet it is Russia itself that has dominated the attention of Western policy makers, and for good reason: it is Russia's attitude toward these issues, and toward the West in general, which will have the most decisive impact in shaping the political atmosphere in Europe in the coming years.

What the real problem is Russia and the choices it's leaders have made. NATO expansion is a consequence of Russia's ambitions: that countries like Finland and Sweden shed their neutrality and join NATO, when they surely would preferred good relations with Russia, shows this clearly. It is simply absurd after all the annexations to insist that Russia is acting defensively and NATO would be here the culprit and aggressor in this war.

Stephen Kotkin explains this very clearly in the following short commentary:

None of those are calling Russia a "hostile militant aggressor."

They are simply aware of the geopolitical issues that exist, and assume conflict will break out at one point or another. That's the realist view.

If discussions about geopolitical issues that a country is involved in brands them as a "hostile militant aggressor" then I suppose the United States more than fits that bill, but that seems to be a hard pill for you to swallow.

And since you're keen on quoting Mearsheimer, I assume you take his analysis of the current state of affairs very seriously then? Or do you only quote him when you believe it suits your argument?

NATO expansion is a consequence of Russia's ambitions — ssu

Nonsense. After the Cold War ended the subsequent NATO tranches have been a result of American ambitions, seeking to take advantage of Russia's weakness. Mearsheimer makes that point aswell, but I forgot his opinion only matters when it suits your views.

It is simply absurd after all the annexations to insist that Russia is acting defensively and NATO would be here the culprit and aggressor in this war. — ssu

That after 400+ pages of discussion you're still clinging to this strawman is the real absurdity.

They are simply aware of the geopolitical issues that exist, and assume conflict will break out at one point or another. That's the realist view. — Tzeentch

The basic fact is that Russia thanks to it's own policies constituted that threat. Naturally countries tried to do have good relations and hope for the best, but the unpredictability of Russia was totally obvious to many.

And that's why Eastern European countries wanted to join NATO.

Now NATO in the 1990's early 2000's was looking for other roles, but those applying for membership had Russia in mind. And the threats that for example the Baltic states tried to get other Europeans to think about just came only true after 2008, 2014 and 2022.

If discussions about geopolitical issues that a country is involved in brands them as a "hostile militant aggressor" then I suppose the United States more than fits that bill, but that seems to be a hard pill for you to swallow. — Tzeentch

The US can be defined in such away in the Middle East and Central America or the Caribbean. Unlike some, I don't have that as "a hard pill to swallow". I've been critical of the US policy in the Middle East for a very long time. It's usually the leftists that have this problem that when they are critical about the US, they cannot be critical about the countries that oppose the US. That's their own illogical behaviour.

And since you're keen on quoting Mearsheimer, I assume you take his analysis of the current state of affairs very seriously then? Or do you only quote him when you believe it suits your argument? — Tzeentch

Just because people are so keen to quote him as an expert. Well, he has his views and they sell very well to one segment of the audience. What should be obvious (which seems not to be for some) is that you can agree with some issues and disagree with other issues what an individual expert says. The counterarguments to Mearsheimer's present views are simply compelling. Besides, the view that one has to accept all views of some academic person and you have to put them on a pedestal and support them is very naive.

Nonsense. After the Cold War ended the subsequent NATO tranches have been a result of American ambitions, seeking to take advantage of Russia's weakness. — Tzeentch

How did the US force Russia to annex Ukraine, to see Crimea as a historical and essential part of Russia? How did the US make Putin to see Ukraine as an artificial state?

How did US ambitions make Sweden to through away it's neutral stance after few hundred years? How did US ambitious makes us apply for NATO with more support than when we joined the EU?

You cannot answer that, because the idea is just absurd. It's nonsense.

Naturally countries tried to do have good relations and hope for the best, ... — ssu

By ignoring the Russians for fifteen years when they proclaimed Ukraine in NATO was a dire security concern and a red line?

Now, you're right that most countries tried to have good relations, and in that they succeeded for the most part up until 2013.

That's when 'the most important country' - the United States of America, doubled down on intentionally provoking conflict with the Russians, likely because they thought the Russians were weak and would allow it, just like they had allowed all the other NATO expansion prior.

The US can be defined in such away in the Middle East and Central America or the Caribbean. — ssu

I think the term "hostile militant aggressor" objectively fits US foreign policy a lot better than it does the Russian.

You seem to be at a point where you're able to accept that the world isn't black and white, and that at the level of great power politics there are no good guys or bad guys.

Perhaps then it's also time for you to take a more balanced stance towards this conflict.

What should be obvious (which seems not to be for some) is that you can agree with some issues and disagree with other issues what an individual expert says. — ssu

The issue is not that you disagree. The issue is that you dismiss Mearsheimer's views entirely when they don't fit your ideas, and treat people who agree with his ideas as Kremlin propagandists.

So yes, I find it very weird how you can quote Mearsheimer in one context as an expert and dismiss his ideas as nonsense in the next. And how odd too that these instances seem to coincide with whehter they support your personal fancies or not.

How did the US force Russia to annex Ukraine, to see Crimea as a historical and essential part of Russia? How did the US make Putin to see Ukraine as an artificial state?

How did US ambitions make Sweden to through away it's neutral stance after few hundred years? How did US ambitious makes us apply for NATO with more support than when we joined the EU? — ssu

There have been several NATO tranches before 2014, if you'll remember. All of which directly violated agreements made at the end of the Cold War that NATO would not expand eastward.

But I guess we'll just pretend those are the result of Russia's "hostile militant aggression", and when after decades of NATO expansionism and warnings from the Russians the Russians finally lash out, you go "SEE! I told you they were a hostile militant aggressor!"

You fell hook, line and sinker for the western narrative.