And you're committing the no true Scotsman fallacy there. — Terrapin Station

No, I'm not; it's a mere matter of definition. If you believe something that contradicts a central tenet of s religion, then you are simply not an adherent of that religion. How do you know that "the bulk of real folks' beliefs, in all religions, are (often?) quite different than academic analyses of them; do you know the "bulk of real folks" personally? ( I put the 'often' in brackets, because it seems prevaricatory; the bulk of real folks' are either different or they are not).

Most of the people I'm talking about aren't poorly educated in general. — Terrapin Station

That's alright; I meant they are poorly educated when it comes to the central tenets of the religion whose central tenets they contradict in what they believe, while still calling themselves adherents of that religion.

But, all you're saying is that the world doesn't manifest obvious person-hood in its parts. Most of the parts of our bodies do not, merely in themselves, manifest person-hood either.

No, I'm not; it — John

Yeah, you are.

How do you know that "the bulk of real folks' beliefs, in all religions, are (often?) quite different than academic analyses of them; — John

Just via an informal survey of many different people.

My God...the rigor!

What rigorous study were you using for most folks' religious beliefs adhering to academic analyses?

I made no claim about "most folks". I said that it's a matter of definition. If any of a person's beliefs contradict a central tenet of a religion, or a sect of a religion, then they are not, even if they consider themselves to be, an adherent of that religion or sect, taken as a whole. They might be adherents to more or less of the parts, obviously.

So you'd say that you don't know how most folks' beliefs match up with academic analyses of the religion in question?

But, all you're saying is that the world doesn't manifest obvious person-hood in its parts. Most of the parts of our bodies do not, merely in themselves, manifest person-hood either. — John

No, that's not all I'm saying. I said that personhood is for persons, and that the world is evidently not a person, it's the world - it merely contains persons. I stand by that. You can only go so far with that analogy. The world is just the totality of it's parts and there's no good reason to assign to it any anthropomorphic qualities, whereas there's ample evidence that people are persons.

I can see that there would be no good reason for you to assign anthropomorphic qualities to the world because for you good evidence would be empirical (i.e. inter-subjectively justifiable) evidence. What good empirical (i.e. directly observable) evidence do you think there is to assign personality to active human bodies? The personality is not assigned to the body, even the whole of it, though; is it?

Doesn't the logic of our notion of personality consist in the idea that persons have a body and a mind rather than that a personality is, exhaustively, a body/mind? If personality consisted in the body then removal of some of its parts would result in a diminished person; but that doesn't seem right at all. So, the question is really as to whether there is any intentionality operating 'behind' phenomena. And the answer to that question is not obvious at all, and is not even conceivably attainable by empirical enquiry or 'pure' reason.

If personality consisted in the body then removal of some of its parts would result in a diminished person — John

It's a specific part of the body--the brain functioning in particular ways, and yes, removal of some parts of a brain results in a diminished person.

With regards to human beings, and other beings, determining intentionality is more obvious than you make out. You'd look at things like behaviour, for example. With regards to the world, you're looking in the wrong place. It doesn't even make sense to look. What would you even expect to find? What signs would you be looking for? The world is not the kind of thing that can have a personality. It's nothing like the kind of things which have personality. It's not even a thing, it's everything. It's not an organism, it's the universe. It doesn't have a personality, it just is. But people can and do project personal qualities onto it, perhaps because it makes them feel better. They can even rationalise this by convincing themselves that it's a special, secret kind of personality which can't be detected in the usual kind of ways, but can only be found by true believers.

How exactly does human behavior display intentionality? Remember we are looking for something that is not merely an interpretation, but something directly observed.

I don't think it makes sense to say the person is diminished, its just their capabilities that are diminished. We still accord them the same degree of human rights that we do to all other persons, don't we?

How exactly does human behaviour display intentionality? Remember we are looking for something that is not merely an interpretation, but something directly observed. — John

People with intentionality behave like people with intentionality, rather than like people who are brain dead.

I don't think it makes sense to say the person is diminished, its just their capabilities that are diminished. We still accord them the same degree of human rights that we do to all other persons, don't we? — John

It makes a lot of sense. I would be nothing like the person I am today if I were to lose an important chunk of my brain. And the law is the law, and doesn't necessarily reflect reality. Likewise if you mean what is considered by some to be a human right, even if this is not reflected in the law. If we accorded rocks human rights, would that equally count as evidence that they're persons? As you probably know, there is much controversy relating to the laws and ethics surrounding this issue, regarding such questions as whether or not people in permanent vegetative states should ever be kept alive, and if so, what conditions would first need to be met. So the issue is by no means settled, and appealing to particular laws or interpretations relating to human rights at the present time is by no means a reliable basis for defending your position. Who knows, fifty years from now, the laws and prevailing view might be completely different.

People with intentionality behave like people with intentionality, rather than like people who are brain dead. — Sapientia

Great! You've succeeded in saying precisely nothing about what constitutes observable evidence of the existence of intentionality in people generally; which is what I was asking for. You've simply begged the question.

I would be nothing like the person I am today if I were to lose an important chunk of my brain. — Sapientia

You would be nothing like as functional as you are today. I don't see any sense in defining person-hood in terms of function. From your argument it follows that a high-functioning person is more of a person than an ordinary person. Doesn't sound right to me, and unless you can justify such a judgement by cogent argument I see no reason to change my view.

Of course, there comes a point where someone might not be able to function as an autonomous decision-maker at all; but even then you don't know what goes on inside the consciousness of that person.

Great! You've succeeded in saying precisely nothing about what constitutes evidence of intentionality. — John

Are you telling me you can't figure out the obvious behavioural differences between someone like you or I and someone who's brain dead? Those behavioural differences amount to evidential differences.

You would be nothing like as functional as you are today. — John

Yes, and I would be nothing like the person I am today as a result. Let's say that I'm an outgoing, talkative person, who is passionate about philosophy, loves having a laugh, can sometimes lose his temper, and regularly gets out and about doing all kinds of things. Obviously, if I was brain dead, then that would only make sense as a description of the kind of person I was, before the accident, rather than the kind of person I would be now, which would be no person at all really in any meaningful sense. I would be living and breathing and fed through a tube, and I would display no signs of having a personality or of having intentionality at all.

I just don't see any sense in defining person-hood in terms of function. From your argument it follows that a high-functioning person is more of a person than an ordinary person. Doesn't sound right to me, and unless you can justify such a judgement by cogent argument I see no reason to change my view.

Of course, there comes a point where someone might not be able to function as an autonomous decision-maker at all; but even then you don't know what goes on inside the consciousness of that person. — John

I'm not saying that functionality is the be-all and end-all, but that it plays an undeniable role.

Are you telling me you can't figure out the obvious behavioural differences between someone like you or I and someone who's brain dead? — Sapientia

It might be true that someone who is brain dead is simply gone from this world, and certainly will no longer be counted as a person if 'person' is defined as 'someone who acts in the world'. But again that would be defining 'person' entirely in terms of function and you haven't given an argument for why that would be right. Also the crucial word "observable" is missing in what you quoted. You must have been responding as I was editing.

The point is that not everyone agrees that intentionality is real; we infer it and attribute it to others and ourselves on account of the illusion we have that we are in control, according to this argument. I'm not saying I agree with that, but there seems to be no directly observable phenomenon that can be identified as intentionality. We either rightly intuit it in ourselves and others, in which case it could be argued that we rightly intuit it in nature; or we rightly intuit it in ourselves and merely infer it of others, in which case it could be argued that we rightly infer it of nature; or we are completely deluded about it, and there is no real intentionality anywhere.

I don't think it makes sense to say the person is diminished, its just their capabilities that are diminished. We still accord them the same degree of human rights that we do to all other persons, don't we? — John

As long as they're still alive we still accord the same degree of human rights, sure, but

(1) You had been talking about personality, not human rights, and personality is one aspect re whether they're diminished as a person, and

(2) If you remove enough or the "right parts" of their brain they're no longer alive, and corpses do not have all of the same rights as living persons.

I wonder if a similar challenge doesn't arise from the psychology of peak experience, of flow, and so on. If you have an experience that you interpret religiously, does it really not matter that someone else has a similar experience when surfing? — Srap Tasmaner

Peak Experience is an effect of self-actualisation.
Flow is automatic attention.
Belief is an attitude which accepts a proposition as true without evidence.
Imagination is the faculty of forming a mental image apart from perception.

In what way is the experience of these psychological things similar?

I had a fellow philosophy major tell me once over beers that he was a believer because of a particular experience he had while tripping on acid. He explained that, at the time, he was already an experienced tripper, and so he was able to recognize that this was not the usual experience of using LSD, but something completely different. I took him at his word, but what are you really to do with something like that? — Srap Tasmaner

Ask alot of questions.

Belief is an attitude which accepts a proposition as true without evidence. — Galuchat

That one I don't agree with, Belief can involve accepting propositions without evidence, but it often only arrives with evidence. I believe that I have a rubber rat on my desk (it has to do with the Florida Panthers hockey team), but I only believe that because I have evidence of it.

"God", is this type of higher consciousness that we are able to connect with not through "looking out into the world" but looking "up into the present". God transcends the physical reality and so if you try looking out into the world for it, you won't find it. It could be the case that we have built within our psyche this "God Gene" of sorts, sort of like the Freudian "ID", that motivates us to search for a higher presence, but I actually feel the presence because I'm "in it" and it seems so real that I can't honestly say that something isn't there.

God is a "type of higher consciousness" that we "connect" with by "looking 'up into the present', and this experience is not communicable, "but it's a collective sentience that brings everything together"

The experience of the present is not communicable, but when we speak with each other, we occasionally 'stay in the moment' we share an experience, which we take each in our own way. If God is a higher consciousness, one that we connect with by thinking about what is neither past nor future, then perhaps God dwells in us, but I've not gotten that far.

"but it's a collective sentience that brings everything together" I like the collectivity notion, perhaps this and the possibility that the experience of God is not communicable is why religions have rituals, so the faithful can share their motions as a way of sharing their experience of the ineffable.

In what way is the experience of these psychological things similar? — Galuchat

I don't understand your point here. Can you elaborate?

I don't understand your point here. Can you elaborate? — Srap Tasmaner

Sure. It's not a point, it's a question; a request for an answer (not an argument).

Given that:
1) Peak Experience is an effect of self-actualisation.
2) Flow is automatic attention.
3) Belief is an attitude which accepts a proposition as true without evidence.
4) Imagination is the faculty of forming a mental image apart from perception.

In what way is the experience of these psychological things similar?

Sure. It's not a point, it's a question; a request for an answer (not an argument).

Given that:
1) Peak Experience is an effect of self-actualisation.
2) Flow is automatic attention.
3) Belief is an attitude which accepts a proposition as true without evidence.
4) Imagination is the faculty of forming a mental image apart from perception.

In what way is the experience of these psychological things similar? — Galuchat

Okay. I suppose we could think of these as departures from the ordinary, practical, everyday run of things. Imagination seems to insinuate itself all over the place, but is still a stepping aside from direct experience, I guess.

I'm really not sure what we're talking about.

(1) You had been talking about personality, not human rights, and personality is one aspect re whether they're diminished as a person.

(2) If you remove enough or the "right parts" of their brain they're no longer alive, and corpses do not have all of the same rights as living persons. — Terrapin Station

(1) I had been talking about personailty in the sense of personhood, though; not in the sense of manifesting an active personailty. If function is lost then manifestation of active personality is certainly lost, too. But I have already explained that I am not thinking of personality in terms of function. Rights are accorded not on account of the degree of active personality; otherwise some people would obviously warrant more comprehensive rights than others. Rights are accorded on account of personailty considered as personhood.

(2) Obviously corpses are not living persons, so their personality is extinguished or if it still exists, is no longer attached to the body. So, what's your point?

I had a fellow philosophy major tell me once over beers that he was a believer because of a particular experience he had while tripping on acid. He explained that, at the time, he was already an experienced tripper, and so he was able to recognize that this was not the usual experience of using LSD, but something completely different. I took him at his word, but what are you really to do with something like that? — Srap Tasmaner

You could, as suggested, "ask a lot of questions", but you could not do anything with an experience like that, or the answers to your questions, unless you had the experience yourself.

Okay. I suppose we could think of these as departures from the ordinary, practical, everyday run of things. Imagination seems to insinuate itself all over the place, but is still a stepping aside from direct experience, I guess. — Srap Tasmaner

Different psychological functions cause and/or sustain different types of experience. Because imagination is the psychological cause of, and belief the psychological resolve which sustains, spiritual experience, no rational explanation of its knowledge-imparting quality can be given.

William James wrote a book on the subject:
The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature. Being the Gifford Lectures on Natural Religion Delivered at Edinburgh in 1901–1902, Classics, Library of America, 2010, ISBN 978-1-59853-062-9.
https://ia600209.us.archive.org/31/items/varietiesreligi01jamegoog/varietiesreligi01jamegoog.pdf

One of my favourite books at one point in life (along with Alduous Huxley's The Perennial Philosophy, which explores similar territory.)

had a fellow philosophy major tell me once over beers that he was a believer because of a particular experience he had while tripping on acid. — Srap Tasmaner

There is the famous anecdote, related by Bertrand Russell, which also mentions James:

“William James describes a man who got the experience from laughing-gas; whenever he was under its influence, he knew the secret of the universe, but when he came to, he had forgotten it. At last, with immense effort, he wrote down the secret before the vision had faded. When completely recovered, he rushed to see what he had written. It was: "A smell of petroleum prevails throughout.”

Mind you, many decades ago, I certainly had a glimpse of higher truth through hallucinogens (with the caveat that I don't encourage drug use). It is something I regarded as apodictic, i.e. impossible to deny. The point which struck me with great force was the inherent perfection of natural objects, like moss-covered rocks and saplings. I had this sudden realisation of the extraordinary beauty and significance of ordinary life, and felt that this feeling was something that we all should have and mainly lack. It was a sense of the holiness or sacredness of life - as many testified about such experiences. I also realised I couldn't stay in that place by artificial means but it was a powerful eye-opener.

It is something I regarded as apodictic, i.e. impossible to deny. The point which struck me with great force was the inherent perfection of natural objects, like moss-covered rocks and saplings. I had this sudden realisation of the extraordinary beauty and significance of ordinary life, and felt that this feeling was something that we all should have and mainly lack. — Wayfarer

That sounds like a typical spiritual experience, with emotional and knowledge-imparting aspects. Apparently, entheogens do induce spiritual experiences:
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3050654/

I wonder if this effect could be psychologically described as imagination enhancement. In other words, could entheogens be considered to be a crutch for those who lack imagination?

There is no truth to be found in drug use. I used it to be dumber, easier to delude, and for the short term memory impairing effects. When you physically feel great, all you have to do is forget about your circumstances to be happy -- but then they just get worse and worse.